Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European Union:

Subsidiarity & Proportionality

Submission by the Senior European Experts Group

Background

The Senior European Experts group is an independent body consisting of former high-ranking British diplomats and civil servants, including several former UK ambassadors to the EU, a former Secretary-General of the European Commission and other former senior officials of the institutions of the EU. A list of members of the group appears in the Annex.

SEE has no party political affiliation. As an independent group, it makes briefing papers on contemporary European and EU topics available to a number of organisations interested in European issues, drawing on the extensive knowledge and experience of its members.

All members of the group have dealt with the issues around subsidiarity and proportionality whether through serving in UKREP, in other parts of the Diplomatic Service or in the Home Civil Service or in the EU's institutions.

Overview

As the background paper sets out, the provisions on subsidiarity and proportionality are in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union and in the annexed protocol. The relevant parts of Article 5 say:

> "3. Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.
>
> The institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of subsidiarity as laid down in the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. National Parliaments ensure compliance with the principle of subsidiarity in accordance with the procedure set out in that Protocol.
>
> 4. Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.
>
> The institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of proportionality as laid down in the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality".

A simple explanation of the two concepts might be that subsidiarity is a test of *whether* the EU should act and proportionality is a test of *how* the EU should act.[1] Although first included in the Treaties in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the concept of subsidiarity within the EU had been under discussion for a number of years, not least because of Jacques Delors' advocacy of it from 1985 and its inclusion, in relation to environmental policy, in the Single European Act of 1986.[2]

Following the initial Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the European Council promoted the concept of subsidiarity in order to counter the sense, widespread after the rush of legislation necessary for the establishment of the Single Market on 1 January 1993, that the EU had begun to intrude into too many policy areas and in too much detail. The Edinburgh European Council in December 1992 published detailed guidelines on subsidiarity and proportionality, which noted that neither concept was new to the EU. The Presidency Conclusions also noted that subsidiarity was not intended to undermine the *aquis* and that it "is a dynamic concept and should be applied in the light of the objectives set out in the Treaty". The Conclusions added that:

> "It allows Community action to be expanded where circumstances so require, and conversely, to be restricted or discontinued where it is no longer justified".[3]

The statement from Heads of Government went on to explain how the three point test of subsidiarity should be applied in practice to proposed legislation. Much of the language used then is now found in the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity & Proportionality, which forms a full part of the Treaties since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.

As quoted above, Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union explains that subsidiarity means that the EU should "act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States". The principle of subsidiarity is applied in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol referred to above and also in accordance with the Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments (see below).

The Protocol on the role of National Parliaments, included in the Treaties by the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) requires the European Commission (and the other EU institutions when they are proposing legislation) to send national parliaments policy and legislative proposals at the same time as they are sent to the European Parliament and to the Council. National parliaments have eight weeks to put forward a reasoned opinion as to why the proposal does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. If a third of national parliamentary chambers object (commonly known as a "yellow card"), the Commission must review the draft legislation and if it wishes to press ahead, offer a reasoned opinion

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[1] *Constitutional Law of the European Union,* Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Longman, 2002, p.185.

[2] *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration,* Desmond Dinan, Palgrave, London, 1999, p.152 citing a speech by Delors to the European Parliament in June 1985. Article 130R (4) of the Treaty of Rome as amended by the Single European Act but the word "subsidiarity" was not used.

[3] Edinburgh European Council Presidency Conclusions, December 1992, p.19: http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/854346/1992_december_-_edinburgh__eng_.pdf

of its own as to why it believes the proposal complies with subsidiarity. If at least half of the national parliamentary chambers object (an "orange card") then the Council and the European Parliament have the power to strike out the proposal.

Provisions allowing national parliaments to challenge a piece of legislation in the European Court of Justice on the grounds of subsidiarity have so far not been used.

The principle of proportionality is also applied in accordance with the Protocol on Subsidiarity & Proportionality but national parliaments do not have any powers to act in the way they can over the question of subsidiarity.

The subsidiarity principle applies to legislation in areas of shared or supporting competences but not when the area in question is one of exclusive EU competence. As there are only five areas of exclusive competence (one of which does not currently affect the UK as we are not part of the eurozone) but 18 areas of shared or supporting competence, the application of subsidiarity is a significant issue in large parts of EU activity, including the Single Market, justice and home affairs, the environment and social policy.[4]

Subsidiarity and proportionality are principles whose purpose is to make the EU more effective. There should be EU legislation when there is a policy objective which is best attained by EU legislation: and when policy objectives can best be achieved by Member States or regions, the EU should not legislate. Legislation should be proportionate: sufficient to achieve the desired objective but no more.

How these principles are put into practice will depend on the subject matter concerned. Some EU legislation is lengthy and detailed, but it can be lengthy and detailed for good reason. For example, cleaning up vehicle emissions while maintaining the Single Market in vehicles and fuel requires detailed requirements for fuel content and emissions to be agreed at EU level.

Making subsidiarity and proportionality work better has been a key British objective in the EU for over 25 years. Partly this is political, a belief that an EU which regulates less and better will be more popular in the UK, but it also reflects a national culture that tends to be wary of excessive regulation.

Scope

Are the principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality effective ways to decide when the EU acts, and how it acts? You may wish to refer to particular examples in your evidence.
The tests for subsidiarity and proportionality are part of a wider set of tests applied to new legislation in the EU and they are included in the published impact assessment released with any legislative proposal. These tests are first applied by the institution which proposes the legislation. In the case of the Commission, there is an initial test of subsidiarity and proportionality when the outline plan ("road map") for major initiatives

[4] The full list of areas of competence can be found in Articles 3, 4 and 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

is announced. A more detailed assessment forms part of the wider impact assessment, which is then referred to the Commission's Impact Assessment Board.

Subsidiarity and proportionality are both tests that are applied in other contexts (subsidiarity has its origins in the thinking of the Roman Catholic Church as well as the writings of philosophers such as John Stuart Mill and de Tocqueville). The concept of subsidiarity appears in the German constitution for example (although the actual word is not used) in order to make clear the division of responsibilities in Germany between the different layers of government.[5]

There is unlikely to be universal agreement about the application of subsidiarity in practice; Member States have different views of the role and purpose of the EU and different legal and constitutional orders. The Dutch Government's 2013 review of the application of subsidiarity (and proportionality), for example, suggested a new principle for the EU to guide its work:

"European where necessary, national where possible".[6]

This approach was welcomed by the current UK Government but the particular list of items that the Dutch Government suggested the EU did not need to proceed with included items, such as the Fourth Railway Package, that the UK would be likely to support. This sort of difference of view about the application of the principle of subsidiarity to particular legislation and subsidiarity is inevitable. This is why it is so significant when a substantial number of national parliamentary chambers agree that a proposal does not meet the subsidiarity test and why the Commission should take such a reaction more seriously (see below).

There is a trade-off between subsidiarity and other important principles, such as the prevention of the abuse of EU funds. The 2003 Common Agricultural Policy reforms are a good example of subsidiarity, as Member States and regions were given greater latitude to design their own farm payments schemes in accordance with the EU framework (the UK took advantage of this through its devolved legislatures).

The reform of the CFP now being implemented provides another interesting example of subsidiarity and proportionality in action. Some common rules under the CFP have been strengthened: in particular discards of pelagic fish are to be banned: a tougher common solution to a common problem. On the other hand decision-taking in respect of certain measures has been cascaded down to regions within the EU, allowing Member States to take measures appropriate to their fisheries.

Proportionality is now a well-established constitutional principle in many jurisdictions around the world.[7] The UK courts have taken a different approach, based around a more stringent test of reasonableness (the Wednesbury test, after a case in 1947), although they

[5] Discussed in *Constitutional Law of the European Union*, Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Longman, 2002, p.176.
[6] http://www.government.nl/news/2013/06/21/european-where-necessary-national-where-possible.html
[7] Discussed in a paper published by the Dutch Healthcare Authority, 2013: http://www.nza.nl/104107/230942/Researchpaper_'Proportionality_in_EU_law-a_balancing_act'_01_2013.pdf

have had to apply proportionality when considering the application of EU legislation.[8] In the EU context it applies to both EU acts and acts by Member States when applying EU law, although the test is applied in different ways at the EU and Member State levels.

In Member States, the test applied is that the "least restrictive means" necessary have been adopted in order to ensure the effective implementation of EU law. In the landmark *Cassis de Dijon* case, the European Court of Justice rejected an attempt by Germany to retain national laws on the content of spirits as disproportionate and proposed labelling the product to indicate its contents as a proportionate alternative (the case also led to the introduction of mutual recognition, an important step forward in developing the Single Market).[9]

The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are important balancing provisions in the Treaties which protect the interests of Member States and their citizens. As such they are necessary and when applied effectively they improve the quality of regulation and enhance the credibility of the EU as an actor. But the key question may be not whether these *principles* are effective but whether the *application* of them is effective; this issue is considered below.

Interpretation

What are your views on how the principles have been interpreted in practice by EU and Member State actors including: the EU courts, the other EU institutions, Member State governments, Member State parliaments, sub-national or regional bodies and civil society?

As regards courts, there has been no finding yet by the Court of Justice that a piece of legislation breaches the principle of subsidiarity. The Court has evolved six tests to judge whether or not the principle of subsidiarity has been infringed.[10] But all these tests derive from the Court's judgments and are subject to amendment as case law develops.

With the Commission, the question is whether its internal culture militates against effective implementation of the subsidiarity principle – i.e. is there a presumption in favour of integration in the minds of officials that tends to trump other factors? The Commission would point out that it carries out a test for subsidiarity and proportionality early in the legislative process (as explained above) and the detailed impact assessment is then considered by the Impact Assessment Board, an internal Commission body before the legislation proceeds further.

Despite this, critics claim that the Commission is too inclined to try to regulate at the European level, especially when lobbied hard by special interests. An example of recent years was the short-lived proposal for a ban on reusable olive oil jugs in restaurants which was met with widespread ridicule when the idea was formally tabled and was then

[8] Proportionality in English law is discussed in an article in the *Student Journal of Law*, issue 3: http://www.sjol.co.uk/issue-3/proportionality

[9] Explained in the Dutch Healthcare Authority paper, op cit, p.7.

[10] Explained in a useful guide to subsidiarity published by the Committee of the Regions: http://extranet.cor.europa.eu/subsidiarity/Publications/Documents/Guide%20on%20SubsidiarityFINAL.pdf

quickly withdrawn.[11] But the legislative procedure for the EU has many checks and balances and it is up to Member States and the Parliament to challenge the Commission as to whether its proposed actions are proportionate and it is necessary to act at an EU level. The olive oil example suggests that the Commission's internal procedures are not working effectively.

Over time the Commission has shifted in its thinking about how to legislate from an emphasis on harmonisation to one where framework legislation is proposed, leaving the detail of implementation to Member States. This trend, which is welcome, may have the effect of reducing the number of legislative proposals objected to on subsidiarity grounds as Member States make use of greater flexibility in implementation instead.

The use of yellow cards by national parliaments is a recent phenomenon, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. In 2012, 70 reasoned opinions were submitted by national parliaments on the grounds of subsidiarity; 12 of these related to one piece of legislation concerning the right to strike (often called Monti II), representing 19 parliamentary chambers (bicameral legislatures have a vote for each chamber). This was sufficient to trigger a yellow card under the Lisbon Treaty procedures. The Commission argued that the proposal did not breach the subsidiarity principle but later withdrew it, ostensibly for other reasons.

The second of the yellow cards submitted by national parliaments related to the proposal for the European Public Prosecutor's Office in 2013. This yellow card of 18 votes was so quickly rejected by the Commission that the impression was given that concerns about subsidiarity had been dismissed without due consideration. The Commission has proposed that the legislation should now proceed on the basis of enhanced co-operation.

Application

Do you have any observations on how the different actors play their roles? Could they do anything differently to ensure that action takes place at the right level?

The report of the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) for 2012 (the most recent) highlighted the fact that a third of the opinions that it issued had expressed concern about subsidiarity and the proposed legislation.[12] But neither the Commission nor the IAB have published any statistics for the number of proposals withdrawn or changed in scope on grounds of subsidiarity and both the IAB annual report and the Commission annual report on better regulation focus on the need to make better arguments for EU action rather than whether the action is necessary at all at EU level.[13]

While it is to the Commission's credit that impact assessments are scrutinised independently of those who draft them, the IAB's credibility is limited by the fact that it is made up of other Commission officials and that no statistics are published of the

[11] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/zester-daily/restaurant-olive-oil-regulation_b_3394231.html

[12] European Commission, Impact Assessment Board Report for 2012, p17: http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/key_docs/docs/iab_report_2012_en_final.pdf

[13] See the 2012 European Commission better regulation report, p.3: http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/better_regulation/documents/2012_subsidiarity_report_en.pdf

number of legislative proposals rejected on grounds of subsidiarity. The credibility of the process would be considerably enhanced if the IAB had more weight (e.g. if its membership included some external members) and was more transparent (e.g. there was clear evidence that some proposals were rejected or substantially amended because they had failed the subsidiarity test). This would respond to the criticism that the Commission (or other institution proposing the legislation) is both judge and jury on subsidiarity.

A more authoritative and independent IAB might also be in a stronger position (possibly with help from the Committee of the Regions) to ensure that subsidiarity applies at the right level of administration within Member States.

EU legislation is often very detailed, with long preambles setting out the basis for EU action. This level of detail can seem like over-regulation but in some cases it is necessary to get it right, given that implementation will then follow in 28 very different countries. There is a balance between ensuring consistency of application through detailed legislation and over-regulation; the balance between the two is inevitably hard to find.

The EU Treaties treat Subsidiarity differently from Proportionality. National parliaments have a role in reviewing whether EU action is appropriate (Subsidiarity). The EU is not legally permitted to act where it is not proportionate (Proportionality). Does it make sense to separate out the two principles like this, and use different means to protect them?

While the distinction between the two is understandable in a legal sense, it is not logical in terms of politics. Applying the tests together may make more sense than applying them separately. In addition, as the recent report of the House of Lords EU Committee suggested, there is a case for bringing proportionality into the yellow card procedure. As the Committee put it:

> "The two concepts are clearly closely related, and explicitly extending the procedure to include proportionality would avoid sterile disputes about whether a particular concern about a proposal fell under one heading or the other. It would make it more clear that, as well as examining the objectives of the proposed action, national parliaments should be examining the precise content and form of that action".[14]

We agree with the House of Lords Committee that the next Commission should adopt that approach (which could be done administratively without Treaty change); hiding behind an excessively legalistic separation of the subsidiarity and proportionality tests damages the Commission in the eyes of national parliaments and weakens the credibility of both the principles.

Future options and challenges

Where might alternative approaches or actions as regards the scope, interpretation and application of the principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality be beneficial?

[14] *The Role of National Parliaments in the EU,* European Union Committee, House of Lords, Ninth Report 2013/14, para. 77.

We do not believe that it is necessary to rewrite the Treaty definition of subsidiarity; a lot can be done without Treaty change to improve the policy-making process in the EU to make the application of subsidiarity and proportionality more effective.

It might help to stimulate proposals of high quality (and better aligned with principles of subsidiarity and proportionality) if national parliaments and other interested bodies chose to involve themselves at an earlier stage in the policy process. A good example of how this can be useful was seen in the recent House of Lords EU Select Committee report on the guidelines for the EU's next work programme on justice and home affairs where the Committee was able to input its views into the policy process at an early stage.[15] While most national parliaments of Member States, including the British Parliament, have a small number of representatives in Brussels to help ensure that their Parliament is informed at an early stage of policy ideas and proposals, the German Bundestag has many more staff in this role than most (around 30 compared to the average of one or two). The Bundestag Liaison Office describes its role as:

> "Advance monitoring, early warnings and networking are the most important tasks carried out by the Liaison Office, enabling the Bundestag to exercise its rights to participate in and scrutinise the German Federal Government's policymaking at the earliest possible stage"[16].

There is no reason why the UK Parliament should not adopt the approach of the Bundestag.

The Commission should also do more to challenge internally proposals for legislation so that fewer legislative proposals reach the consultative stage. In addition, the Commission should encourage greater involvement by national parliaments by giving them longer than the eight weeks in the Protocol (say 12 or 16 weeks) to consider draft proposals; and, when yellow cards are issued by the parliaments, this should lead to proposals being amended or dropped. We hope that the new Commission appointed later this year will undertake to make these changes and we believe that the Council should press them to do so. None of the proposals described above would require Treaty change.

Article 352 TFEU ('flexibility clause')

In your opinion, based on particular examples, is it useful to have a catch-all treaty base for EU action? How appropriately has Article 352 been used?

Article 352 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union has been in existence since the Treaty of Rome (it was originally Article 235 then 308, now 352). The text of the Article reads:

> "1. If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the

[15] *Strategic guidelines for the EU's next Justice and Home Affairs programme: steady as she goes,* European Union Committee, House of Lords, Thirteenth Report 2013/14.

[16] *The Liaison Office of the German Bundestag in Brussels,* p.4: https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/81023000.pdf & *The Role of National Parliaments in the EU,* op cit, para. 138.

consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures. Where the measures in question are adopted by the Council in accordance with a special legislative procedure, it shall also act unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.

2. Using the procedure for monitoring the subsidiarity principle referred to in Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union, the Commission shall draw national Parliaments' attention to proposals based on this Article.

3. Measures based on this Article shall not entail harmonisation of Member States' laws or regulations in cases where the Treaties exclude such harmonisation.

4. This Article cannot serve as a basis for attaining objectives pertaining to the common foreign and security policy and any acts adopted pursuant to this Article shall respect the limits set out in Article 40, second paragraph, of the Treaty on European Union".

Such a general purpose clause is not uncommon in the governing documents of institutions in order to allow for developments that are in the organisation's interests but are not strictly covered by some other provision. It is necessary for the EU and without it valuable policy proposals might have to be dropped. But there are important safeguards to prevent it being abused: it requires unanimity in the Council as well as the consent of the European Parliament before it can be used. The Treaty of Lisbon added in a reference to subsidiarity, with a duty on Commission to refer proposals using this Article to national parliaments. The Common Foreign & Security Policy is excluded from the scope of the Article, as is the harmonisation of Member States' laws where the Treaties prohibit it.

The value of Article 352 was demonstrated by the early European Communities legislation on the environment, where there was a clear need to tackle crossborder pollution in Europe but no specific Treaty provision on the environment until the Single European Act in 1986.

As the call for evidence points out, many of the matters dealt with under Article 352 in the past are now dealt with under new Treaty articles added at the time of the Lisbon Treaty. This could lead to a reduction in the number of Article 352 proposals. In addition, the UK has adopted a more stringent approvals process in Parliament under the European Union Act 2011, Section 8 of which provides for approval by resolution of each House of Parliament and once a proposal has been agreed by co-decision, primary legislation is brought forward if necessary to implement it in the UK.

Which alternative approaches to the scope, interpretation and application of Article 352 might be beneficial?

There are now further limitations on the use of Article 352 following the *2/94* test case, in which the Court of Justice said that the Article could not be used as the legal basis for the EU to accede to the European Convention of Human Rights. This has tightened the

grounds on which Article 352 can be used. The right to strike proposal referred to earlier, which attracted a yellow card, was based on using Article 352 and it was the proposed use of this Article as a legal base to which many national parliaments objected.

Proposals under Article 352 are now specifically referred to national parliaments; it would be sensible to see how this new procedure works before we assess whether a different approach is needed. In any event, the EU is always likely to need a general purpose clause of some sort and the current safeguards against it being abused are considerable.

Other

Are there any general points you wish to make on how well the current procedures and actors work to ensure that the EU only acts where it is appropriate to do so, and in a way which is limited to the EU's objectives, which are not captured above?

As we have indicated, there are ways of making subsidiarity and proportionality work better and these could be done without Treaty change.

In particular, we have suggested that the Independent Assessment Board and its procedures could be improved. We believe that such reforms would enhance the legislative process and demonstrate that the subsidiarity test is genuine. Statistics on the number of proposals rejected on subsidiarity grounds should be published annually.

The disappointing response of the Commission to the second yellow card on the European Public Prosecutor's Office suggests that its culture needs to change. We think that the 2014-2019 Commission should make a policy decision to:

- increase from eight to 12 or 16 weeks the time that national parliaments have to consider draft legislation under the yellow card procedure;
- undertake to withdraw or substantially revise any proposal that attracts a yellow card;
- agree that it would be legitimate for national parliaments to address any proportionality concerns in their reasoned opinion on subsidiarity and commit to taking them fully into account.

21.05.14

Annex
Members of the Senior European Experts group

Sir Michael Arthur
Director-General Europe, FCO, 2001-3; British High Commissioner to India 2003-07; British Ambassador to Germany 2007-10.

Graham Avery
Director, European Commission, 1987–2006.

David Bostock
Deputy Permanent Representative to the EU 1995-98; Member of the European Court of Auditors 2002-2013.

Sir Colin Budd
Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee 1996/97. British Ambassador to the Netherlands, 2001-05.

Lord Butler of Brockwell
Secretary to the Cabinet and Head of the Home Civil Service, 1988-98.

Anthony Cary
Head of the European Union (Internal) Department, FCO, 1993-96; Chef de cabinet to Chris Patten, European Commission, 1999-2003; British Ambassador to Sweden 2003-2006.

John Cooke
Member of the UK Permanent Representation to the EC 1969-73 and 1976-77. Under-Secretary, International Trade Policy Division, DTI, 1992-96. Chairman, OECD Trade Committee 1996-97

Sir Brian Crowe
Director-General (External & Politico-Military Affairs) Council of the European Union, 1994-2002. Previously Deputy Under-Secretary for Economic Affairs, FCO.

Sir David Elliott
UK Deputy Permanent Representative to the EU 1982-91. Director-General (Internal Market), Council of the European Union, 1991-95.

Lord Hannay
UK Permanent Representative to the European Communities 1985-90 and to the United Nations, 1990-95.

Lord Jay of Ewelme
Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2002-06.

Lord Kerr of Kinlochard
UK Permanent Representative to EU 1990-1995; Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 1997-2002.

Anne Lambert
UK Deputy Permanent Representative to the EU, 2003-2008.

Andy Lebrecht
UK Deputy Permanent Representative to the EU, 2008 – 2012.

Sir Emyr Jones Parry
UK Permanent Representative to NATO, 2001-03 and to the UN, New York 2003-07. Political Director and previously EU Under-Secretary at FCO. Now President of Aberystwyth University.

Sir Nigel Sheinwald
UK Permanent Representative to EU 2000-03. Prime Minister's Foreign Policy & Defence Adviser, 2003-07. British Ambassador to the United States, 2007-12.

Sir Stephen Wall
UK Permanent Representative to EU 1995-2000. Head, European Secretariat, Cabinet Office, 2000-04.

Michael Welsh
Member of the European Parliament for Central Lancashire, 1979-94.

Lord Williamson of Horton
Deputy Director-General (Agriculture) European Commission 1977-83. Cabinet Office 1983-87. Secretary-General, European Commission, 1987-97.

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