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Response to the Review of the Balance of Competences between the EU and the European Union in relation to Education, Vocational Training and Youth.

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I am an Associate of the London School of Economics and Political Science, and a former Visiting Fellow of the European Institute at LSE. My research on why the EU became interested in higher education has been published as *Universities and the Europe of Knowledge: Ideas , Institutions and Policy Entrepreneurship in European Union Higher Education Policy, 1955-2005* (Palgrave 2005). Later work is in journal papers and book chapters. I contribute to policy debate through articles in *Times Higher Education* (THE), *University World News* and the LSE *EUROPP* blog. My paper relates to the Call for Evidence Sections 5 and 8.

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Introduction

I respond to this call for evidence from a political science perspective. I have set out here to put the issue of the balance of competence in education, training and youth (ETY) in a policy context. It is traditional to see education, in its various manifestations of higher education, vocational education and training (VET), school education and even early childhood education, as a problem policy area, 'sensitive' or 'difficult' for European institutions to treat. So it is a puzzle as to why member states have accepted that education has strategic importance to the EU and should be subject to tough, albeit not legally enforced, rules of coordination. I suggest here some answers in the hope that they throw useful light on the debate.

My response comes in two parts. The first is that we should understand why three policy events have marked the transformation of education from an EU problem issue to an EU core issue. The second, that in reaching a fair judgement on the balance of competence in education, there is a case for including two parameters not usually invoked in discussions of the EU dimension of education. One of these parameters is the relationship of current policy to the larger EU policy canvas. The other is the process by which EU education policy is made.^{i ii}

2. From problematic issue to part of EU core strategy

A generation ago, education was problematic, albeit marginal, to the EU. Education as such was not in the Treaty. Once the pressures built up for EU action on education the issue was difficult to handle. The only way to get funding was to persuade a nationally divided Council of Ministers to bundle education up with Treaty-based policies like vocational training. An 1980s Commissioner with education in his brief admitted leaving the politics to an official 'who knew all about it' even at a time of policy stalemate on education.¹ A UK minister a decade later remembers that at routine Brussels briefings before Council meetings the order was to 'leave things' to the 'chaps' (i.e. the Brussels based UK diplomats) who were there to keep UK politicians out of trouble. The European Parliament was seldom involved, though in a sign of possible new times, the European Court of Justice was starting to produce case law which significantly built up the rights of students.²

¹ Corbett, A. (2005). *Universities and the Europe of Knowledge: Ideas, Institutions and Policy Entrepreneurship in European Union Higher Education, 1955-2005*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

² Garben, S. (2012). *Student Mobility in the EU—Recent Case Law, Reflections and Recommendations*. In A. Curaj, P. Scott, L. Vlsceanu & L. Wilson (Eds.), *European Higher Education at the Crossroads* Dordrecht: Springer.

Today the policy status of education within the EU is transformed by three factors. It has its place in the Treaty. It is at the centre of the EU's competitiveness strategy. And it is an important item in the EU's neighbourhood and internationalisation strategy.

The Treaty codified a previously ambiguous relationship between national governments and the EU (TFEU Article 165, derived from Treaty of Maastricht 1992, Article 126). In the place of the legally tortuous justifications derived used for programme legislation before 1992, the Treaty makes education a policy sector in which the EU is forbidden to engage in any activity leading to the harmonisation of law and regulations between Member States. Nevertheless EU institutions have significant scope to develop proposals for action and to provide financial incentives. With the formulation that 'action is permitted' 'if it contributes to the development of quality education by encouraging cooperation between Member States' and 'if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their action' the list of possible policy action areas is long, without having to justify action, as in the past, by reference to the law which takes primacy, that of the Treaty provisions to the freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and labour.

With the Lisbon Strategy, education and the associated vocational educational and training (VET) emerged in a new place in the EU policy spectrum. Although the original Lisbon strategy saw education largely as an adjunct to employment, the European Council conclusions which launched 'Lisbon' set off an intense period in the education arena of developing the new instruments of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). These were essentially defining concrete objectives, indicators and targets.

The relaunch of the Lisbon strategy in 2005 ('Lisbon 2') marked some rebalancing of the educational aims and objectives.³ This time the innovative potential of education was recognised as a sector 'which helped to make it possible to turn knowledge into an added value, and to create more and better jobs, a complement to research and innovation' (Council of the European Union, 2005). Most of the instruments from other policy sectors were by then in use.

The launch of *Europe 2020* confirmed education as part of the European Council's core vision for the 2010-2020 decade, building on the strategic framework for education and training, *Education and Training 2020 (ET 2020)*. The core of this strategy is to make lifelong learning a reality; improve the quality and efficiency of education and VET, promote equity, social cohesion and active scholarship; and enhance creativity and innovation including

³ Maassen, P., & Olsen, J.-P. (Eds.). (2007). *University Dynamics and European Integration*. Dordrecht: Springer.

entrepreneurship at all levels of education.ⁱⁱⁱ At European Council level it is taken that education will contribute to all four elements of its growth strategy: the acquisition and production of knowledge and greater innovation, the development of a more sustainable economy, higher levels of employment and greater social inclusion. Education was given a lead policy role in three of the five Europe 2020 targets, and three of the seven flagship initiatives (Youth on the Move, Agenda for New Skills and Jobs and Innovation Union). The Europe 2020 programme also brought education – more controversially in the view of some – into general OMC processes. In other words it required participation in national reform programmes and the negotiated feedback by which the Commission and the Member State concerned agree Country Specific recommendations (CSRs). But by then Member States had already accepted the publication of the EU performance indicators relating to their system.

In parallel the Commission, with Council support, was engaged in developing a coherent policy on its programmes for education and training policy. Its long experience with Erasmus, Leonardo de Vinci and other programmes provided the foundations for the Lifelong Learning Programme 2006-2013, as foreshadowed in the 2004 joint Council Commission report announcing the programme which first integrated the Commission's work in education training and youth, *Education and Training 2004 (E&T 2010)*. It was its success in integrating all policy sectors from preschool to higher education under the umbrella of lifelong learning, that made this a watershed moment.⁴ It is to be noted that the Commission acted with a certain pragmatism. The programme associated the intergovernmental Bologna Process with the programme, as well as the Bologna-inspired, but EU managed, Copenhagen Process for VET. And, in a kind of ping pong, the Bologna Process was to follow the OMC model in its own way, with national stocktaking reports.⁵

The programme recently approved for the period 2007-2020, *Erasmus+*, goes even further. Notable is the fact that it now includes the EU's multiple international efforts formerly dealt with by external relations divisions of the commission but now placed within education. These include such well established programmes as *Tempus*, launched in the 1990s when the prospect of European reunification became real but also extend to the regional cooperation programmes with other areas of the world.

2. The larger EU canvas and the political dynamic

⁴ Gornitzka, A. (2006). The Open Method of Coordination as practice: A watershed in European education policy? (Vol. 16/2006). Oslo: ARENA.

⁵ Corbett, A. (2011). Ping Pong: competing leadership for reform in EU higher education 1998–2006. *European Journal of Education*, 46(1), 36-53.

By taking a larger canvas we see that educational initiatives were not simply the brainwave of some officials. They were always linked to the political dynamic of general EU politics around particular ideas. This was the case with the revival of Europe after World War II when the future of the university became an issue in the larger discussions of the 1950s about what sort of future community could, or would be, supported by the six European states of the pioneering European Coal and Steel Community . Perhaps surprisingly, the issue of a supranational university was raised at the founding meeting of the future EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community, as a model for national universities, many of which had been battered by the war.⁶ REF hereThe idea survived into what became the EAEC Treaty, though it was to fall when the discussions were taken up at national level.

There was a similar political dynamic at work in the Hague Summit of 1969 when EEC member state governments agreed they wanted a 'wider and deeper' community, and the an enlargement from the six founding Member States. Ministers of education took that opportunity to settle some educational questions. One was to agree they should try for a form of educational cooperation under an EEC umbrella, in the hope it would be more effective than the traditional intergovernmental activities at providing solutions to common problems. The education component took form in 1971 with the first meeting of ministers of education on Community premises. The first Erasmus programme provides another example of the characteristic link between European education initiatives and mainstream EU policy. The programme grew out of the double dynamic of the attempt to rally Europe's citizens through the People's Europe initiative of 1984 and the drive, which started in 1985, to complete the Single Market.

In a repeat of this pattern, education has become of strategic interest to the EU can through the EU's turn to a competitiveness agenda. The 1993 White Paper, *Growth, Competitiveness and Employment* advanced a strategic conception of a more knowledge-based economy for Europe. The Treaty of Amsterdam enshrined the concept by adding as a goal of EU member states 'the development of the highest level of knowledge for their peoples through a wide access to education and through its continuous updating' (Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, Article 1,2). *Agenda 2000*, the paper which prepared also the ground for EU enlargement to central, eastern and southern Europe, and the reform of the common agricultural policy. put knowledge to the forefront.⁷ The education-themed Commission communication, *Towards a Europe of Knowledge*, did likewise in largely employment-related

⁶ Corbett, A. (2005). op cit

⁷ Chou, M.-H., & Gornitzka, A. (Eds.). (2014). *Building the Knowledge Economy in Europe*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

terms. But the scientists and policy advisers who took the lead in advocating the EU's knowledge based economy and were to be so influential in the formulation of the Lisbon strategy insisted that a knowledge economy driven by new ways of knowledge production, knowledge diffusion and knowledge utilisation requires high levels of education⁸.

3. Matching Ideas with Instruments and Institutions

There is a second lesson which emerges when current policy is set in a historic frame. That is, that past efforts to give a European policy dimension to educational cooperation failed, not because of the idea, but because the institutional frameworks of the time did not support educational initiatives. Initially this was a matter of education in general not being in the Treaty of Rome, EEC, and the concept of a supranational dimension to higher education in the Treaty of Rome, EAEC, being too ill-thought out to survive. In the 1970s ministers of education discovered that educational cooperation was doomed to remain unresourced unless initiatives could somehow be tied to the Treaty. The ambiguities of the situation made ministers unwilling to act. All ways to advance policy were tortuous. In the 1970s and 1980s Council meetings were divisive: there were always ministers opposed to the bundling of policy packages to slide non-Treaty education policy proposals in with Treaty -based policies, or to the recourse to the European Court of Justice (e.g., the judgements that allowed education to be treated as vocational training, and the development of legislation on student rights).

Hence the Treaty of Rome and the Lisbon Agenda can be seen as the solution to two long-standing issues that had got education mostly stuck in the 'too difficult' box. The Treaty of Maastricht, 1992, solved the historic problem of competence on education by defining the boundaries between member states and the Commission. But in giving the EU institutions a supporting role for action, as long as it did not attempt to harmonise policy, the Treaty has left the door open for developments which generations of education ministers meeting within the EU had shown that they wanted.

The Lisbon agenda of 'soft' policies, as opposed to hard policy backed by the Treaty and the European Court of Justice, has had an obvious appeal to governments, not least in the UK, especially since the 'soft' approach applied to all the policy areas in the strategy. For example, the option for uniform employment legislation was ruled out in favour of a soft coordination process with the specific aim of addressing national diversity within an

⁸ Corbett, A. (2102). Education and the Lisbon Strategy. In P. Copeland & D. Papadimitriou (Eds.), *The EU's Lisbon Strategy: Evaluating Success, Understanding Failure*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

aspirational framing of a European model which would develop solutions to common problems, such as the negative effects of economic development on the social sphere⁹

As for the programmes, proposed here as the third of the transformative policy events for EU education policy of the last 22 years, conflicts have tended to focus on the budget not the content of the programmes. These programmes were acceptable because they offered Member States the incentives to act more effectively on long standing cross-border issues. These are, historically, student mobility and, more recently, a variety of options which have proved attractive. One such as the e-twinning between schools, a form of cooperation unimaginable in the 1990s.^{iv} The programmes since 2006 have also enabled the Commission, in consultation, to develop work on emerging issues such as adult learning, school drop out, migration and ethnic diversity, and what the Commission calls the modernisation of higher education: its drive for greater autonomy to be accorded to higher education institutions, in effect targetted at states with highly centralised higher education systems.

Two other aspects of development since 2006 are of interest. One is that the Bologna Process is recognised as occupying most of the policy space for developing the instruments to underpin a higher education area that extends the boundaries of a common space beyond the EU. The VET area, inspired by Bologna, does much the same.

The other is that the programme development on issues relevant to global competition, now attract high level political interest. These relate to the 'knowledge and innovation triangle' which strengthens the EU linkages between education, research and innovation across EU institutions.¹⁰ The other is the three-point internationalisation and policy cooperation strategy which aims at improving policy dialogue with specific regions and countries; promoting European higher education in the world; and making the EU more attractive globally. There is complementarity with the Bologna Process on this. Also to be remarked is that the DG Education and Culture has, under the *Erasmus+* programme, acquired the policy leadership on external education initiatives and programmes, previously invested in the Commission's outward facing DGs.

4. Explanations and Critiques

There is a division of views as to why education has become strategically important to the EU. The default answer is that expansion is due to the 'creeping competence' of EU

⁹ Velluti, S. (2102). Employment and the Lisbon Strategy. In P. Copeland & D. Papadimitriou (Eds.), op cit

¹⁰ Chou, M.-H., & Gornitzka, A. op cit

institutions. This is an answer which holds less credibility than it did when the phrase 'creeping competence' was first applied to EU budgetary and regulatory activities in the late 1990s¹¹ and before the Treaty of Maastricht corralled education into the policy areas where subsidiarity had to be respected. It is also the case that those often-referenced 'unelected bureaucrats' of the Commission have not been able to extend 'competence' on their own. In the 1980s there had been an informal partnership between the Commission and the European Court of Justice.¹² Since 2000, and with OMC, over which the European Council presides, the Commission and the Council have an institutional partnership which is reinforced by the European Semester. Nevertheless it should be noted that some recent scholarly work sees policy spillover in education still,¹³ and understands the use of a non-legislative strategy as a way of 'circumventing' the Treaty.¹⁴

I put forward an alternative explanation based on studies of the policy process undertaken.¹⁵ I see the issue of the balance of competence in education in terms of the power of a particular policy idea to overcome the hurdles or veto points in the differentiated arenas in which education policy is made: those of the stakeholders, the officials and the politicians. Each arena makes different demands. The stakeholders are concerned with the impact in their sphere. The officials are there to ensure the policy idea can feasibly be turned into policy. The politicians give the feasible policy proposal legitimacy.

The power of an idea in generating policy change tends to be ignored in legalistic framings of balance of competence questions but it has some very powerful scholarship behind it.¹⁶ The way the outcomes are reached is also context-specific. Most recently the development of an EU role in higher education has owed much to the informal partnership with the Bologna Process on ideas and instruments.¹⁷ But the argument is also institutional.

¹¹ Pollack, M. (1994). Creeping competence, the expanding agenda of the European Community. *Journal of Public Policy*, 14(2), 95-145.

¹² Shaw, J. (1999). *From the Margins to the Centre: Education and Training Law and Policy*. In P. Craig & G. de Búrca (Eds.), *The Evolution of EU Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

¹³ Warleigh-Lack, A., & Drachenberg, R.. (2011). Spillover in a soft policy era? Evidence from the Open Method of Co-ordination in education and training. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 18(7), 999-1015.

¹⁴ Souto-Otero, M., Fleckenstein, T., & Dacombe, R. (2008). Filling in the gaps: European governance, the open method of coordination and the European Commission. *Journal of Educational Policy*, 23(3), 231 — 249.

¹⁵ See select bibliography in endnotes

¹⁶ Hall, P. (1993). Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain. *Comparative Politics*, 24(3), 275-279.

¹⁷ Corbett, A. (2011). Ping Pong: op ct

The development of OMC in education, as elsewhere, is highly institutionalised and the European Semester makes it more so. The process involving the Council, the European Parliament as well as the Commission, can all be tracked.

5. Disadvantages and Advantages of the present Balance of Competences in Education

Disadvantages of the present balance

Current criticism of the way EU policy is made tends to take two forms. One of that the 'soft' methods of policy making, hailed as a new governance architecture',¹⁸ are not effective. For stakeholders this is a matter of too much bureaucracy. The evidence to this enquiry from the Universities UK jointly with the UK Higher Education International Unit¹⁹ and the Russell Group, make this point clearly when weighing up advantages and disadvantages of the present situation.²⁰ But recent scholarship exploring OMC policy areas from several policy perspectives suggests more fundamentally that the chief failing of OMC is that it has not enabled the EU to catch up with its competitors. The dominance of the financial crisis, and the 'one size fit all' austerity policy, is widening gaps between Member States that OMC strategies cannot fill.²¹

In education one should, however, note that there has been improvement in almost all the target areas, that the improvement in particular national systems is notable,²² and that political support for the practice of OMC has been so much stronger than for any other institutional solution in the past (excluding the Treaty). Within the first five years of the Lisbon strategy, education was in the surprising position of being one of the five most institutionalised policy sectors under OMC.²³

The other criticism which has political salience is that the process is less democratic than under the so-called Community method of EU legislation. Legal scholars were early to

¹⁸ Borras, S., & Radaelli, C. (2011). The Politics of Governance Architecture: Creation, Change and Effects of the EU Lisbon Strategy. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 18(4), 463-484.

¹⁹ <http://www.international.ac.uk/media/2733572/boc-response-joint-he-international-unit-uuk-education-vocational-training-youth-2-.pdf>

²⁰ <http://www.russellgroup.ac.uk/uploads/51-Russell-Group-submission-to-Governments-Balance-of-Competences-review-Education.pdf>

²¹ See Armstrong, Bulmer, Copeland, and other contributors; Copeland, P., & Papadimitriou, D. (Eds.). (2102). op cit

²² Corbett, A. (2102). Education and the Lisbon Strategy. In P. Copeland & D. Papadimitriou (Eds.), *The EU's Lisbon Strategy: Evaluating Success, Understanding Failure*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

²³ Laffan, B., & Shaw, C. (2005). Classifying and Mapping OMC in different policy areas. NEWGOC 02/D09. http://www.eu-newgov.org/database/DELIV/D02D09_Classifying_and_Mapping_OMC.pdf.

point out the paradox of OMC. While the method has been welcomed by political representatives for reasons of subsidiarity, democracy and national diversity, some legal scholars suggest that that is a major misreading. 'it is positively perverse for those who criticise the European Union, because it is executive-oriented or does not sufficiently involve national parliaments, to hark back nostalgically to [the] intergovernmental model. It leads to an even higher executive dominance and even greater parliamentary exclusion'.²⁴

Others suggest how the processes for education policymaking could in theory be made more democratic. Taking the examples of the Bologna Process which now operates in an OMC mode, as well as the Lisbon strategy, the case is made that a policy area which exemplifies a societal commitment to the values of equity and equality needs a policy making process that holds policymakers accountable for the measures they enact; and that the best way to do this is by extending Treaty competence, and giving that role to the European Court of Justice.²⁵ This approach can also be argued on the grounds of coherence, since it has become more and more difficult to isolate any policy area, on the grounds that it remains with the member states.²⁶ However for the moment that it remains in the domain of academic as opposed to political analysis.

Advantages of the present balance in education

I take it as significant that many stakeholders see EU action in terms of Europe's added value and are saying so loudly and in public.^v This, unsurprisingly, comes in terms of funding for Europe-wide initiatives and for operations a single nation could not support at all levels of the education system.

The advantages in terms of socialisation, and what can best be termed mutual enrichment are also being more widely noted. Stakeholders tend to talk in terms of policy feedback. To take higher education examples from the overlapping field of the Bologna Process, the possibilities of policy exchange have produced improvements for the UK in quality assurance processes (such as including student representatives) and have helped the

²⁴ Chalmers, D., & Lodge, M. (2003). The Open Method of Co-ordination and the European Welfare State. In C. Pierson & F. Castles (Eds.), *The welfare state reader*

²⁵ Garben, S. (2012). The Future of Higher Education in Europe: The Case for a Stronger Base in EU Law. *LEQS Europe in Question*, 50.

²⁶ Garben, S. (2015). Confronting the Competence Conundrum. Democratising the European Union through an Expansion of its Legislative Powers online in the *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*.

systems of other countries to better understand the UK systems, thus aiding student mobility.²⁷

The fact that comparative knowledge is now part of educational policy making is also a stimulus to more effective policymaking, and I would argue, more effective practice. The key findings from OECD's PISA and PIACC surveys make the news in the national media. But probably more significant in the long term is the opportunity that EU institutionalisation has given stakeholders to acquire the familiarity with other systems that leads to mutual confidence and debate around other common issues. As an example, the education system cannot solve the crisis of youth unemployment but those working VET, youth and apprenticeship matters increasingly turn to the European data and their European colleagues to deepen their own learning.

The policy arena of education has also been enriched at European level by the development of membership associations. Before 2000, the higher education organisations we now know as the European University Association, EURASHE and the European Students Union were a shadow of what they are now. The expansion of educational activity at European level has made them valuable focus points on issues which are common to nation states, and given them cross border importance.

That said, we await more evidence on whether the greater EU lock-in on strategy as evidenced in *Europe 2020* and the country specific reviews will in fact be better at accommodating diversity than in the past, through for example the CSR process. I do not underestimate the risks of division between member states with the fear in the education area, and in politics more widely, that there are widening gaps between the European core and its periphery.²⁸

Conclusions

What I have tried to show in this overview is that the relationship between Treaty, the *Europe 2020* strategy and programmes is organic. Policy developments have arisen because of those particular relationships at a particular time. It is difficult to see how a single country's attempt to shift the balance of competence would – supposing the issues were identified – be a win-win for the country concerned.

²⁷ Corbett, A and Bols, A. Bologna Matters <http://www.international.ac.uk/newsletters/international-focus-103-europe-after-the-elections.aspx>

²⁸ Zgaga, P., Teichler, U., & Brennan, J. (Eds.). (2013). *The Globalisation Challenge for European Higher Education: Convergence and Divergence, centre and Peripheries*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang GmbH.

I conclude that the present situation is the least bad solution for the present although it could be much more fruitful. That will depend on two factors. One, if the past is to go by, this will need a general change in the European political climate. But it also requires responses at national level too. When the politicians who sanction these policy developments will put their heads above the parapet and justify their support or their opposition, rather than blaming Brussels, it would ensure that the balance of competences would not be seen as exclusively legal but a matter of political choice. We know that political attention, as opposed to stakeholder and bureaucratic attention, is short term. But we may continue to hope that, in the UK at least, those concerned with decision-making in education, and the associated policy areas of training and youth, will give a fair and evidence-based assessment. My own position, as a result of my engagement in academic work, is, I hope clear. The advantages of the present EU structures for education far outweigh the disadvantages.

ⁱ This paper owes much to the collaborative work to produce the 2012 book, *The EU's Lisbon Strategy, Evaluating Success and Understanding Failure*, edited by Paul Copeland and Dimitris Papadimitriou (Palgrave 2005) and builds in general on my work since 2005

ⁱⁱ Selected other publications

- (2006, December 18, 2006). Higher Education as a Form of European Integration: How Novel is the Bologna Process? Arena Working Papers. http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2006/papers/wp06_15.xml
- (2006, September 14, 2006). Key Moments of the European Political Debate on Education. Paper presented at the The Politics of European University Identity. Seminar of the Magna Charta Observatory., Bologna.
- (2007, January 11). How to understand EU HE policy processes: Generalisations from a case study of EU higher education policy, 1955-87. Paper presented at the Defining the European Education Agenda, Faculty of Education and Pembroke College, Cambridge University..
- (2009). Process, Persistence and Pragmatism: Reconstructing the Creation of the European University Institute and the Erasmus Programme, 1955-89. *The European Higher Education Area: Various Perspectives on the Complexities of a Multi-level Governance System*. Dordrecht: Springer.
- (2010, April 15-17, 2010). CES. The United Kingdom's Ambiguous European Choice: British Higher Education Policy Prepares for a European Higher Education Area. Paper presented at the 17 International Conference of the Council for European Studies, Montreal.
- (2012). Principles, Problems, Politics. What does the historical record of EU cooperation in higher education tell the EHEA generation? In A. Curaj & e. al (Eds.), *European Higher Education at the Cross roads: Between the Bologna process and National Reforms*. Dordrecht: Springer.
- (2014). The globalisation challenge for European higher education: convergence and diversity, centres and peripheries. *European Journal of Higher Education*, 1-4. doi: DOI: 10.1080/21568235.2014.903575
- Corbett, A., & Henkel, M. (2013) The Bologna Dynamic: strengths and weaknesses of the Europeanisation of higher education. In Bob Reinalda (Ed.), *Symposium: Where is Bologna at now? Lessons from a decade*. *European Political Studies, Journal of the European Consortium for Political Research*. Palgrave Macmillan. Online advance publication www.palgrave-journals.com/doinfinder/10.1057/eps.2013.21

ⁱⁱⁱ At higher education level the agenda has explicitly driven by two papers Commission policy papers on modernisation, Delivering on the Modernisation Agenda for Universities: Education, Research and Innovation. COM(2006)208 and COM(2011)567

^{iv} This is a technical as well as policy achievement. 1990s suggestions were thrown out on the grounds that connections between schools would have required flying schoolchildren around. The E-based initiative for schools can now be presented as a free and safe IT platform for teachers who wish to develop collaborative projects with their schools, and share ideas across Europe. At the last count over a quarter of a million teachers, 124,000 schools and 34,000 projects were involved

^v The influential Universities UK/UK higher education International Unit gives eight pages to the advantages of the present balance, one to the disadvantages.