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UNITED KINGDOM ATOMIC ENERGY AUTHORITY

ATOMIC WEAPONS RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT

ALDERMASTON.

TELEPHONE.

Ext. [REDACTED]

BERKSHIRE.

D/423/72

12th September, 1972

Dear

I have the following comments on the extract dealing with safeguards from the Chairman's speech enclosed with your letter of the 11th September:-

Para. 5

The Chairman could usefully reflect on the work done earlier in the Agency to establish a satisfactory basis for the application of safeguards under the N.P.T. which has made the progress on agreements possible.

Para. 6

Delete "lengthy". Comments on the British offer of 1967 should, I believe, follow directly after para. 6 in such terms as - "It was to facilitate the acceptance and ratification of the N.P.T. that HMG made a voluntary offer on 4th December 1967.....".

Para. 7

I do not like the first sentence and suggest that the Chairman should go straight to the points made in the remainder of the paragraph.

Para. 8

See above.

Para. 9

I am dubious whether the Chairman should get into the complex problems of our obligations to Euratom when we go in the Community and those arising from HMGs offer when N.P.T. and its safeguards have been accepted and ratified. The reference to our aspirations for a "single system" could well be reserved as a comment on this awkward subject and I suggest the paragraph be deleted.

Para. 10

This is not a good ending.

Yours

[REDACTED] Esq.,

[REDACTED] DIRECTOR/AWRE

UNITED KINGDOM ATOMIC ENERGY AUTHORITY
II, CHARLES II STREET LONDON SW1Y 4QP

TELEPHONE: [REDACTED]

11th September, 1972

Dear [REDACTED]

The current draft of the Chairman's speech to this year IAEA's General Conference contains a passage on safeguards as shown in the attachment to this letter.

I imagine that the Foreign Office will make most of the running on safeguards, but if we could find a few minutes on Thursday to discuss the position, I should be very grateful.

Yours sincerely,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED],
Director,
AWRE,
Aldermaston, Berks.

Extract from draft speech for UK Delegate to IAEA Conference,
Mexico City, 1972

5 Safeguards

It is a cause for satisfaction that steady progress has been maintained with respect to safeguards agreements with non-nuclear weapons states as called for in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Will need to be written in Mexico City in the light of events at the Board of Governor's meeting.

6 A further significant milestone along this road is that the lengthy negotiations between the Agency and Euratom were recently and successfully concluded and an agreement for the verification by the IAEA of Euratom safeguards drafted which we hope will be speedily approved and ratified. It is hoped that this will lead very shortly to ratification of the NPT by the 5 countries of the European Community involved in the negotiations.

7 In the UK we are actively engaged in organising our nuclear industry for accepting safeguards. The UK and the European Community will consult in the near future on the system of control and inspection which is to be accepted by the UK in the light of the provisions of the Euratom Treaty. We envisage that the safeguards system agreed as a result of these consultations will begin to be implemented in the UK as from 1 January 1973.

8 The question of the IAEA verification of the Euratom control of system in the light of the agreement reached between the IAEA and Euratom will be considered in the context of the voluntary offer made by the British Government on 4 December 1967 that, to assist in the negotiations on the NPT, the UK government ~~has~~ decided that, at such time as international safeguards are put into effect in the non-nuclear weapon states in implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, it will be prepared to offer an opportunity for

the application of similar safeguards in the UK subject to exclusions for national security only.

9 We intend in due course to work out with the Agency, Euratom, and our nuclear trading partners a single safeguards system in the UK.

10 The steps being taken to implement safeguards in the UK demonstrate the strong support we have for the NPT system of safeguards and our concern that non-nuclear weapon states which have not yet done so should implement NPT safeguards agreements.