



From: [REDACTED]

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.1

Our reference: FHP/1522/73

Your reference:

19 June 1973

D/2367

[REDACTED]
Director
AWRE

Dear [REDACTED],

SEISMIC EXPERTS MEETING GENEVA 10 - 13 JULY 1973

stail/ You are already aware that the Disarmament Conference intend to hold informal meetings on 10 - 13 July, with appropriate experts, on seismic detection and verification. The agenda for the meeting has not been defined in any greater/than that, and I believe both we and the Americans will have an interest in trying to see that the meeting does in fact do no more than review developments over the last two years in seismic detection and verification. To that end, as you know, [REDACTED] and his group have prepared two papers from which the UK can speak: 1. a review of the overall programme, and 2. an account of [REDACTED] work attempting to refine the depth of focus criteria.

There are two matters connected with this meeting on which I should like your advice and assistance. The first one is that [REDACTED] propose that [REDACTED] should be accompanied at this meeting by [REDACTED]. As you know, we in Ministry of Defence think it wise that I should also attend each meeting, largely because defence has too much of an interest in continued testing to want to let anything that might happen at the experts meeting get in the way of our needs. I very much fear however that by fielding three "experts" we shall be fielding more than any one else, and shall be in danger of appearing to have a real and pressing interest in a CTBT. The FCO tell me that they do not expect other delegations to bring more than one expert, or two at the most. Certainly in the case of the US, it would seem that only two experts will be there. While I am reluctant to suggest it, since no doubt [REDACTED] would benefit from attendance at an international meeting of this type, I believe that on this occasion it might be better to restrict our attendance to [REDACTED] and myself.

The second point concerns peaceful nuclear explosions. I gather that there is some possibility that the Japanese and other Delegations may wish to raise the subject of PNEs in a CTBT context at the experts meeting. Precisely why, and what points they wish to raise I do not know. Neither we nor the FCO see the point of raising PNEs in a CTBT context at this particular time, but if the Japanese wish to make some form of statement on them we shall not be able to stop them. We on our side shall want to make the minimum contribution we can get away with, and in principle we shall probably use the material in the ACDRU


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background paper, propounding the problem identified in it without suggesting any solution. We certainly do not wish to send any PNE experts especially for this meeting.

It would however be useful to me if your PNE people could prepare for me a background brief on the steps that the IAEA have taken so far to establish international control over the exploitation of PNE. It would also be helpful if I could have a note summarising your latest views on the proliferation problem which PNE debris in the territory of a non-nuclear power might present.

Yours sincerely,



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