

Final Evaluation Report ©

Evaluation of the Ghana Electoral Support Programme
DCP Ghana 524

coffey  **international development**
SPECIALISTS IN DEVELOPING COMMUNITIES



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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ARHR	Alliance for Reproductive Health Rights
BVR	Biometric Voter Registration
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CDD	Centre for Democratic Development
CEIA	Centre for Environmental Impact Analysis
CENPRODEG	Centre for the Promotion of Democratic Governance
CODEO	Coalition of Domestic Election Observers
CRI	Child Rights International
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DEO	District Election Officer
EC	Electoral Commission
EWG	Election Working Group
GESI	Gender, Economic and Socially Included
GESP	Ghana Electoral Support Programme
GFD	Ghana Federation for the Disabled
GoG	Government of Ghana
IDEG	Institute for Democratic Governance
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IGIs	Independent Governance Institutions
IPAC	Inter-Party Advisory Committee
ISODEC	The International Social Development Centre
JTI	Judicial Training Institute
LRC	Legal Resource Centre
MFWA	Media Foundation for West Africa
MIS	Management Information System
MWF	Muslim Women's Federation
NCCE	National Commission for Civic Education
NDC	National Democratic Congress the

NPP	New Patriotic Party
POSDEV	Pan-African Organisation for Sustainable Development
PWD	People Living with Disabilities
RO	Returning Officer
SMTC	Social Media Tracking Component
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Executive Summary

The 2012 election has been highly contested, including in the courts. It was the first time Ghana adopted Biometric Voter Registration (BVR), raising new issues for the Electoral Commission (EC) in ensuring that the public, voters, the international community, political parties and other actors had confidence in both the EC to manage the electoral process and the new BVR system.

To mitigate concerns about government capacity, Her Majesty's Government provided assistance to Government of Ghana (GoG) institutions including the Judiciary, Electoral Commission, security agencies, and also to civil society organisations. The Ghana Electoral Support Programme (GESP) was designed as a complementary mechanism to support the country in its 6th consecutive peaceful election process on the 7th of December 2012. The GESP total budget was £6,265,000 over a period of approximately one year (December 2011 – January 2013).

Post-2008 election reports and lessons informed the design of the GESP - highlighting weaknesses in election management process and planning; voter registration; the need to improve law enforcement; weakness in the overall legal framework and the conduct of political parties and media. The GESP outcome is aligned with these lessons in its focus of enhancing capacity of state and non-state actors to deliver free, fair and peaceful elections.

The evaluation¹ finds that the GESP components delivered to plan and that excellent progress was made in delivering towards logframe targets, milestones and outputs.² The evaluation also finds that achieving the intended targets supported components' contribution to the higher-level objectives (i.e., respect for election results, free and fair election process, compliant Electoral Commission, public participation, voter turnout, election disputes handled effectively, inclusive election process, professional media handling, and voter education outcomes). The DFID Ghana GESP team as a whole has done very well to achieve as much as they have and the GESP can provide lessons and experience to programme officers in neighbouring countries in the region who may want to offer similar support to upcoming elections in the region.

Table 1: GESP Logframe Targets

Logframe Output	Target	Impact weighting	Progress
1. Training delivered for civil society organisations and political party agents to ensure a responsive, participatory and professional election management process. (EC)	276,000 political party agents trained where at least 30% of agents are female 300,000 guidelines printed and distributed 2,524 CSOs & CBOs trained on their roles in achieving credible elections	40%	Achieved
2. A credible, independent and impartial assessment of the Biometric Voter Registration exercise (CDD-CODEO)	Experience survey published 650 trained overseers (observers and supervisors) deployed 60% of issues raised by observers addressed by election stakeholders	10%	Achieved
3. Security forces supported to be trained in election laws and prevention of election-related violence (Police - Security)	11 national communications base stations that enables nation-wide radio communication fully established 16,000 officers trained 90 officers with tactical public order and intelligence	25%	Achieved

¹ Coffey International Development conducted the evaluation with a team of four consultants: Team Leader Renee Kantelberg; Evaluation Manager and VFM Expert Tim Reilly; M&E Expert Catriona Flavel; and Governance Expert Dr Kwasi Prempeh.

² The June 2013 DFID Annual Review scored GESP (and the 4 other projects under the Rapid Response Fund) at A+ - outputs moderately exceeded expectation.

Logframe Output	Target	Impact weighting	Progress
	capability 20,000 pocket-sized booklets printed		
4. Enhanced judicial processes, with staff better equipped to deal quickly and effectively with election petitions (Judiciary)	96 judges trained in use of new manual 100 court staff trained in use of new manual 96 judges and 100 court staff trained in ICT, and ICT centre established.	10%	Achieved
5. Increased capability of Civil Society Organisations to ensure peace promotion, public education and gender and social inclusiveness (STAR Ghana)	Elections are *GESI-compliant (*gender, economic and socially-included) 70% voting age registered to vote International and domestic observation reports cite media as professional and unbiased 4,500 election observers trained and deployed in conflict-prone constituencies	15%	Achieved

GESP achieved good value for money at each of the three levels of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Evidence indicates that standardised and robust procurement processes were generally employed and that there was a 'due diligence' process undertaken for each partner organisation responsible for delivering programme component³ – i.e., to assess capacity to handle funds, technical and financial capacity.

The evaluation has identified aspects of GESP implementation that encountered significant challenges. This applies largely to the Electoral Commission and the use of BVR. The Electoral Commission should have anticipated some of the problems that occurred on Election Day and made appropriate provision for resolving or dealing with these, including through training its polling staff to troubleshoot and fix minor technical problems with the BVR system.⁴ Additionally, while the Electoral Commission's practice of relying on temporary hires to serve as Presiding Officers may be justifiable in light of the episodic or cyclical occurrence of general elections, it is important that the Electoral Commission recruit such staff from a pool of applicants with dependable numeracy and literacy skills and invest sufficient time and resources to train them in their election-day duties and tasks. Bringing about lasting improvements will require long-term engagement with previous polling agents and an approach that has a method for rehiring agents who have participated in previous elections.⁵

Finally, it is important to assess the approach of GESP as a one-year election programme and consider extending this into a programme that would provide support during the entire election cycle. Components and stakeholders noted that support to elections need not be time bound and restricted to a certain stage of the election. There are opportunities to work well before the election year, particularly with voter education and providing MIS or IT guidance to improve the quality of the Electoral Commission systems in place. Post-election, the Election Working Group could be a key contributor to this effort and continue the dialogue with institutions and civil society to discuss key concerns and challenges, priorities and workplans for the upcoming election 2016.

Findings and Recommendations

Relevance of the GESP

Findings: GESP was based on credible evidence of the importance of fair, free and peaceful elections to ensuring Ghanaian democratic stability and accountability, identified the key electoral challenges, was

³ The GESP was delivered through 5 key implementing partners: the Electoral Commission, Judicial Services, the Police, the Centre for Democratic Development and Strengthening Accountability and Responsiveness Programme (STAR Ghana).

⁴ Meeting with CDD/CODEO, February 14, 2013. Meeting with EC, February 12, 2013.

⁵ Interview with EC Feb 12th, Interview with CODEO/CDD February 11th, Interview with Polling Agents February 12th of 2013

comprehensive in nature and addressed election challenges at stages throughout the election process continuum. However, the omission of high-level political party engagement (beyond Electoral Commission activities) failed to address the importance of political party acceptance of the credibility of the election process and the election institutions. The lack of coordination mechanisms potentially resulted in the failure to capitalise on synergies between complementary activities.

Recommendation: Engage the national party leadership directly in the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC), an informal but well-established body comprising representatives of all registered political parties and the Electoral Commission that meets to discuss, agree on, and advise the Electoral Commission on election matters.

Coherence and Coordination of the GESP

Findings: GESP's interventions complemented the work of other partners and reflected the priorities and existing work of GOG. GESP's design noted the existing and anticipated election support priorities and interventions of other donor partners and although broader in scope than other donor programmes, GESP did not duplicate that support. Likewise, GESP funded state institutions to undertake non-core activities that would not otherwise have been undertaken and were designed to contribute to more credible and peaceful election outcomes.

Recommendation: The Election Working Group (EWG) is unique and the donors interviewed were not aware of any other group like it in Africa, especially during non-election years. The EWG could coordinate and build support for the coming 2016 election if a cyclical approach was considered as opposed to a linear one-year election approach. A platform with civil society, institutions and donors could be developed now to continue dialogue on election-related issues. Each institution could share workplans and donor partners could look at mutual governance priorities and how these align to GoG priorities, drawing lessons from the 2012 election to inform support during the next electoral cycle.

Effectiveness of the GESP

Findings: While all five GESP components delivered towards their objectives and overall met their targets, the Police, CODEO and civil society interventions were the most effective and made the biggest difference in terms of addressing the problems that undermine free, peaceful and fair election processes.

Recommendation 1: A coordination function across the components was largely lacking during the implementation and delivery of GESP. The components worked in silos as opposed to collectively. We recommend that any future design put in place a coordination function to plan around mutual areas of work and common areas of impact. A specific output dedicated to coordination should be incorporated into logframes to hold the programme and components to account, and monthly coordination meetings could be held with brief reporting, action points and agreed follow-up. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) could play an initial important role in coordinating components but also sit in quarterly meetings to get a sense of how work is progressing and help resolve any issues that may arise.

Recommendation 2: Reconsider the approach of GESP as a one-year election programme and extend into a full election support programme that would consider the entire election cycle. Components and stakeholders overall pointed to the importance that support to elections needs to not be time bound and restricted to a certain stage of the election. There are opportunities to work well before the election year, particularly with voter education and providing MIS or IT guidance to improve the quality of the Electoral Commission systems in place. Post-election, the EWG could be a key contributor to this effort and continue the dialogue with institutions and civil society to discuss key concerns and challenges, priorities and workplans for the upcoming election 2016.

Coverage of the GESP

Findings: The effectiveness of the programme's targeting of inequities related to participation in the electoral process was mixed. The civil society interventions led through STAR Ghana demonstrated a focus on addressing inequality and promoting gender equality and social inclusion.⁶ As well, CODEO published a

⁶ STAR-Ghana Grant Partner reports and results based framework have a Gender and Social Inclusion category in which all partners have to track and make a priority on how it can align and connect to their overall project outcome / objective.

statement that indicated that the registration process was inclusive.⁷ The other interventions although aware of the target to achieve greater female representation and inclusion were unable to achieve a balanced representation in training efforts. This in part is due to the make-up of the Security and Electoral Commission components that are largely male dominated institutions.

Recommendation: Future programme designs should identify opportunities to address the importance of fair and inclusive elections. Programme and component workplans should demonstrate a strong commitment to integrating issues of gender and social inclusion into programme activities. There is room for a number of improvements in regards to a more integrated gender-social inclusion approach:

- GESP could have considered engaging with the Ministry of Women or Women's Affairs Committees to scale up capacity to address gender and social inclusion related issues before, during and after elections.
- The GESP logframe lacked gender specific indicators, although the civil society STAR-Ghana component assessed the 'level of demand side activity amongst STAR-Ghana election partners on strengthening the gender-social inclusion enabling environment' during elections. The evaluation team would have preferred the logframe and the GESP monitoring framework to take on a stronger gender-social inclusion focus within each component.
- GESP components could have adopted a gender-social inclusion approach when developing component activities and assessed gender and inequality-related election issues and how components would address these. For example, the Electoral Commission was aware of the male-dominance of the political parties that remained an impeding factor in having an equal balance of female and male participation in election related activities and training.
- There is a need to build the capacity of the media on gender and social inclusion reporting. This is an essential element of building awareness and a more enabling environment for progress on gender and social inclusion issues during the elections. The STAR-Ghana component supported this to some degree but these efforts could be scaled up to address exclusion during elections.

Impact of the GESP

Findings: The design and architecture of GESP has proven to be an effective and impactful approach in supporting a peaceful election process. Aligning with GoG priorities and working alongside key state institutions along with the citizens of Ghana through a strong grant mechanism (STAR-Ghana) and supporting these key components with a capacity building strategy has proven successful. There is general agreement amongst informed stakeholders that it is through GESP support that election disputes were handled more effectively and that voter education and participation of excluded groups was greater than any other election. In this regard, the GESP achieved its outcome objectives and contributed in a substantial way towards a 6th consecutive peaceful election process.

Recommendation: Future training and capacity building for large numbers will need to be well considered and given appropriate time, as quality and content can be compromised due to the large number of persons that require training. We recommend that a capacity-building framework be developed as support to state institutions was a key approach for the GESP.

Sustainability of the GESP

Findings: The GESP activities were delivered with a focus on sustainably - building the capacity of individuals and institutions without creating an over reliance on donor funding. While this approach was appreciated by many of the programme beneficiaries, the nature of the election process means that it is beyond the capability of the programme to ensure that these benefits are carried forward to the next election process.

Recommendation: In order to improve the sustainability of election support activities, future electoral support programmes should take a strategic approach to facilitating partnerships between government institutions and other election bodies. It would also be beneficial to have an end of project workshop with all implementing partners to capture lessons, learning and innovative practices to take forward for the next election.

⁷ CODEO Final Statement on BVR (November 27, 2012). The CODEO Final Statement noted that 99% of respondents to an experiential survey successfully obtained new voter ID cards, although the statement did also note that only 65% of those requiring special assistance (i.e., those with disabilities, the elderly, pregnant women) received it.

1 Introduction

Coffey International Development carried out an independent process evaluation of the Ghana Electoral Support Programme between August 2012 and March 2013. The evaluation report incorporates the findings of the project documentation to date, results from the field study phases and further analysis and review. It also provides overall findings, lessons and conclusions. This report builds upon the Inception Report submitted to DFID in September 2012, the October Field Visit Report submitted in November 2012 and the Theory of Change and Research Plan submitted in January 2013 (attached as Annex A).

1.1 Brief Political Background

During the 2008 presidential election, none of the contesting candidates achieved more than 50% of the votes and a second round was called by the Electoral Commission. During the result aggregation process, increased tension over unsubstantiated allegations of electoral fraud emerged between the two competing parties, the incumbent the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). These tensions were exacerbated by the narrow margin of victory (the NDC achieved 0.40% additional votes) and political interests in newly flowing oil wealth. The NPP ultimately conceded defeat and the following transition of power became an important moment for the democratic life of Ghana.

Against the backdrop of the closely contested 2008 poll and early concerns about the voter register, the next presidential and parliamentary elections were scheduled for 7 December 2012. For the 2012 elections, there were eight presidential candidates and 14 political parties contested the parliamentary election, with a total of 1,332 candidates running in the 275 constituencies. Nationwide only three parties had a presence in all constituencies: the National Democratic Congress (NDC)⁸, the New Patriotic Party (NPP)⁹, the Progressive People Party (PPP). Only NDC and NPP contested the parliamentary election in all seats. The two main presidential contestants were the incumbent Mr Mahama from NDC and Mr Akufo-Addo from NPP. Two other candidates were Mr Sakara from the Convention People Party (CPP) and Mr Ayariga from People's National Convention (PNC)¹⁰. The electoral landscape was dominated by the NDC, which held the presidency and the majority of the expired parliament, and the NPP, which was the main contestant for both elections and held 47% of parliamentary seats.

1.2 Overview of the GESP

GESP was a £6,265,000 programme funded by DFID. It was a one-year programme covering December 2011 to January 2013. GESP was composed of five core interventions outlined below.¹¹

⁸ The party has its main strongholds in the three northern regions and Volta. Its manifesto priorities were: education, health, youth, economy, decentralisation and the essential role of government in directing industrial development for transforming the country's raw materials.

⁹ The NPP candidate was Mr Akofu-Addo who also competed for the 2008 presidential election. The party has its main strongholds in the Ashanti and eastern regions. Its political priorities were: free education, health, employment, economy and housing. The party emphasises support to the private sector in the development of raw material industries and housing, in a combined effort with the government.

¹⁰ The other candidates contesting the elections were: Mr Lartey from the Great Consolidated Popular Party, Mr Kwesi Nduomform from the PPP, Mr Addai Odike from the UFP and Osei Yeboah running as independent.

¹¹ There is also a £1m Rapid Response Fund and a £150,000 evaluation that fall outside the scope of this evaluation. The evaluation only covered 3 (Electoral Commission, Judiciary and Civil Society (STAR-Ghana) out of the 5 components.

Table 2: Summary of Support to Components

Recipient		Description of funding	£ Funding	% GESP ¹²
A	Electoral Commission	Ghana's Electoral Commission received support to ensure greater transparency and engagement with all election stakeholders	£2,692,578 (2012) £307,422 (2013)	48%
B	Judicial Service	The Judicial Service supported in its election adjudication function	£272,000 (2012)	4%
C	Ghana Centre for Democratic Development	The CDD was funded to ensure an impartial and independent observation of the compilation of a new voter roll using biometric technology	£243,000 (2012)	4%
D	Police Service	The Police Service received support to detect, prevent and properly manage election-related violence through the British High Commission	£600,000 (2012)	10%
E	Civil society groups	Civil society groups supported through the Strengthening Transparency, Accountability and Responsiveness in Ghana (STAR) programme	£1m (2012)	16%

1.3 Purpose of the evaluation

The primary purpose¹³ of the evaluation was to assess the implementation of the GESP (process evaluation), although the evaluation also assess the effects of the programme and its contribution to free, fair and peaceful elections in Ghana.

DFID Ghana commissioned the evaluation and are the primary evaluation stakeholders. It is anticipated that DFID will use the evaluation findings as a performance management tool for the existing programme components and to inform future policy and programme design. The findings of the evaluation will also likely be shared within DFID and with other stakeholders involved in election-related programmes to provide them with lessons learned from GESP and insight into what interventions are effective, for whom, and in what circumstances.

1.4 Scope of the evaluation

The evaluation assessed several aspects of GESP: the original analysis of the problem, how this analysis was incorporated into the design of GESP, the project implementation and the GESP's influence on the election process and capacity of state and non-state institutions.

The evaluation considered the Programme as a whole, but focused on specific programme components as agreed with DFID during the Inception Phase.¹⁴ The evaluation focused primarily on interventions related to the Electoral Commission, security services, Judicial Service and civil society groups (through

¹² These totals do not equal 100% as funding has also been set aside for an Evaluation and a Rapid Response Fund

¹³ The purpose as stated in the original TOR was for a process evaluation to: "Evaluate the implementation of the five components of DFID's electoral support programme as outlined above. This assignment will involve an assessment of how implementing partners have implemented DFID's support, including identification of any successes and weaknesses in the approach." During the inception phase, DFID highlighted their need for the evaluation to also assess the impact of the programme. This development of the original purpose of the evaluation is captured in the Inception Report (September 2012).

¹⁴ As the scope of the evaluation was expanded from a process evaluation to an impact evaluation, DFID agreed that in order to manage costs, the evaluation would prioritise certain programme components.

STAR-Ghana). Interventions relating to the security services were the subject of an independent evaluation, and as such, the research and findings of that evaluation have been incorporated where necessary. It was agreed during inception that the CDD-CODEO Observer component would not to be a part of this evaluation exercise due to budget resource constraints. CDD-CODEO is carrying out its own evaluation of the election observation work with the remaining budget from their contract with DFID. As well, four additional projects¹⁵ supported from the £1 million emergency fund set aside to support necessary rapid response election work were not part of this evaluation exercise.

1.5 Structure of the Report

Coffey conducted a process and theory-based evaluation that assessed GESP against the OECD-DAC Evaluation Criteria and also tested the 'theory of change' underpinning the programme design. Further detail of the evaluation approach and methodology is provided in Section 2 below.

The findings of the report are structured according to the evaluation criteria of Relevance, Effectiveness, Impact, Efficiency, Sustainability, Coordination, Coherence, Coverage and Comparative Assessment. The evaluation findings in relation to the hypotheses that were tested are provided under the relevant criterion. A full list of the hypotheses (ordered by evaluation criteria) can be found in the Evaluation Matrix in Annex B.

The lessons learned through the evaluation process are set out in Section 4 and Section 5 summarises the conclusions drawn from the findings in the final report.

¹⁵ Penplusbytes to track social media on Ghana's 2012 Elections; The National Democratic Institute to conduct Parallel Voter Tabulation (PVT) of the elections; The Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) to strengthen the political and security conditions for peaceful and credible elections in December 2012; The University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) to conduct a study on the impact of domestic election observation on electoral violence, integrity and voting behaviour.


2 Approach and Methodology

2.1 Evaluation Approach

The evaluation of the GESP focused upon three key areas for the evaluation. These are described below and depicted alongside the policy chain in Figure 1:

- **Process:** how was the intervention delivered? (relevance, coherence, coordination and effectiveness)
- **Efficiency:** did the benefits justify the costs? (efficiency)
- **Impact:** what did the programme achieve that wouldn't have otherwise been achieved, who did it benefit, and to what extent is this sustainable? (coverage, impact and sustainability)

Figure 1: Programme Policy Chain



The table below outlines Coffey's data collection methodology and analytical approach for each evaluation focus area. Each of the analytical approaches is then detailed below.

Table 3: Evaluation Analytical Approaches

Focus of evaluation	Data collection methodology	Analytical approach
Process evaluation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Systematic review of reports and existing evidence 	Qualitative data analysis
Efficiency evaluation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary research –in-depth interviews, observation, focus groups 	Measurement and management approach to Value for Money Assessment
Impact evaluation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sample surveys, focus groups, semi-structured stakeholder interviews, secondary data analysis 	Contribution analysis; qualitative analysis

As noted in Table 3 above, primary data collection consisted primarily of semi-structured interviews with key informants identified by DFID and the implementing partners and focus group discussions with participants identified by the implementing partners. This qualitative data, along with review of secondary sources and the telephone survey of polling agents, provided evidence to support the process, efficiency and impact evaluations of GESP.

2.1.1 Process evaluation

The process evaluation assessed the delivery of GESP, i.e., whether the programme components were implemented as intended and what worked more or less well, and why. The process evaluation relied on existing monitoring data supplemented with primary research where appropriate.

Once data was collected and collated, Coffey assessed the following factors, which largely respond to the 'delivery' questions in the impact chain:

- *what* it is the programme was actually delivering compared to what it meant to deliver as set out in the original programme planning documentation;
- to what extent has the programme delivered its activities as originally intended, including whether: (1) the programme was performing in terms of its capacity to deliver the quantity and quality of activities and services that were originally planned; (2) the activities and services delivered were being used for the optimal effect; and (3) programme management and administration arrangements were facilitating the delivery process to this end; and
- whether the key drivers and barriers to delivery had positive and negative effects on the performance of the programme.

2.1.2 Efficiency Evaluation

The evaluation team evaluated the efficiency of GESP by assessing the degree to which the programme optimised costs and key management processes and resource allocation decisions made at each stage of the implementation process resulted in the efficient delivery of higher value inputs, activities, outputs and ultimately impacts. This involved assessing GESP's performance across six criteria:

- Procurement
- Unit Costs
- Productivity
- Risk Analysis and Mitigation
- Impact
- Leverage and Sustainability

The efficiency evaluation also assessed whether GESP's investments were aligned and proportionate to the effectiveness and impact of the programme's components on the programme's aims and objectives.

2.1.3 Impact Evaluation

The anticipated impact of the GESP is "the occurrence of the sixth consecutive peaceful election in Ghana" and the programme components all worked to this end by strengthening the capacity of state and non-state actors to deliver free, fair and peaceful elections. Due to the relative size of GESP, the importance of external factors to the goals sought, and the timeframe in which the evaluation was initiated, neither experimental nor quasi-experimental evaluation approaches were deemed appropriate. The evaluation team instead employed contribution analysis.¹⁶ The application of the contribution analysis methodology is detailed in section 2.4

2.2 Evaluation Questions

The evaluation questions are set out in Table 4 and structured according to the evaluation criteria and Theory of Change against which GESP has been evaluated. These overarching questions were used to structure the evaluation. In order to respond to each question, component-specific evaluation questions were developed. The questions were designed to test the hypotheses and assumptions in the theory of change underpinning GESP. The relationship between the hypotheses and assumptions and the evaluation questions is set out in the evaluation matrix at Annex B.

Table 4: Overarching Evaluation Questions

Criteria	Evaluation Questions
Relevance	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To what extent did GESP effectively identify the problems around the election? 2. To what extent did GESP and its component parts address the problems identified?
Coherence	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. To what extent did the design of the GESP complement the existing work of other partners?
Coordination	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. To what extent was the design of the GESP aligned with the existing work, priorities and systems of the Government of Ghana?

¹⁶ The approach to contribution analysis was based on Mayne, J., (2008) 'ILAC Brief 16 – Contribution analysis – an approach to exploring cause and effect', ILAC


Criteria	Evaluation Questions
Effectiveness	5. Were the activities and services delivered in accordance with what was originally intended? 6. Were activities under the programme completed to time and budget? 7. Were there any issues identified in the implementation of the components? If so, how successfully were these addressed by the project implementers? 8. How many people received direct support from DFID (corroboration of the projected results and monitoring system)? 9. Were indicators in the Logframe met? What evidence exists to support this? 10. What were the most effective interventions in improving the election process? Why?
Efficiency	11. To what extent did GESP represent good value for money? How could this have been improved? 12. Was the balance of investment in each of the components proportionate to their effectiveness and impact on the programme's aim and objectives?
Coverage	13. To what extent did the results reflect the inequities and inequalities identified in the problem analysis?
Impact	14. What were the perceived benefits to the recipients of the training provided under the programme? 15. In retrospect, what changes, if any, would beneficiaries have sought from the training provided? 16. How did GESP activities impact on beneficiaries' performance/ achievements relating to the election process? 17. Was the election process more free and fair as a result of GESP activities?
Sustainability	18. To what extent will the results and benefits of the programme continue to be realised beyond the 2012 election process?
Comparative Assessment	19. Would other countries benefit from a similar programme of election support?

2.3 Analytical framework

To ensure that the evaluation process was transparent and objective, an evaluation matrix was developed (see Annex B) that sets out overarching evaluation questions, the component-specific evaluation questions and the hypotheses in the GESP theory of change to which these relate.

For each component-specific evaluation question, a series of research questions were developed. These questions were used to inform the design of the research tools (i.e. interview and focus group guides) and were also used to inform the analysis of information. The answers to the specific research questions inform the answers to the level component-specific evaluation questions and ultimately the overarching evaluation questions. The hierarchy of questions is depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 2: Hierarchy of evaluation and research questions¹⁷



For each component-specific evaluation question, the evaluation matrix also clearly sets out the data sources that were used to help inform the evaluation’s response to the question and the evaluation team’s approach to managing the risks associated with the nominated data sources. The data sources and risk management approach are provided in the evaluation matrix to ensure transparency by providing stakeholders with clarity about how the assessment of the GESP would be undertaken and what evidence the assessment would be based on.

Refinement and use of the evaluation matrix

The first draft of the evaluation matrix was developed after the first evaluation visit in August 2012 based on the theory of change workshop and preliminary discussion held with all stakeholders. This matrix was then further refined throughout the course of the evaluation as more a clearer understanding of the ways of working and intended outcomes of the activities under each component became clearer.

The matrix served as the analytical framework for the evaluation and the basis for the development of interview and focus group discussion topic guides and for subsequent analysis of the qualitative and administrative data. At the conclusion of each day of interviews or focus group discussions, the participating evaluation team members would review and make any amendments to their notes. The Team Leader then manually coded the notes according to the Evaluation Criteria (first), Component (second), Evaluation Question (third), Judgement Criteria (fourth) and Indicator (if applicable). At the conclusion of each stage of fieldwork, the evaluation team collated the relevant information by Evaluation Question and Component and incorporated this information into the evaluation report template.

The evaluation team synthesised and triangulated the available and relevant evidence at the conclusion of the fieldwork based upon the data and sources within the evaluation report template. In this manner, both component specific issues and cross-cutting themes were identified and addressed. Synthesis and triangulation of different types and sources of data enabled the team to objectively verify and validate the

¹⁷ This diagram is for explanatory purposes only and does not represent the actual numbers of questions.

changes and effects that were observed from any one single data source. This triangulation process¹⁸ took into account the representativeness, accuracy and reliability of each piece of data that was collected to ensure the findings were as robust as possible given the data that was available.

2.4 Application of contribution analysis

Contribution analysis was deemed to be the most appropriate method for assessing the impact of the GESP and its influence on the electoral process. The application of contribution analysis was also useful for other processes in the design and implementation, including:

- **Defining the evaluation questions:** Based on the theory of change developed, specific research questions were developed to guide the primary and secondary research conducted for both the process and the impact evaluation.
- **Testing the program logic:** The evaluation was able to provide evidence about *how* and *why* the GESP activities were effective by testing the causal linkages and assumptions between activities and immediate and intermediate effects.
- **Assessing the contribution of GESP activities to higher level objectives:** The research conducted throughout the evaluation was structured to test the hypotheses and assumptions implicit in the theory of change developed in collaboration with project stakeholders. The evaluation team inferred GESP’s contribution to the intended impact where:
 - GESP was based on a reasoned theory of change supported by evidence;
 - GESP activities were implemented and targets were met;
 - the theory of change was verified by evidence and the expected results occurred; and
 - other factors influencing the programme were assessed (e.g. legal framework, alignment with state institution priorities and parallel activities) and support the finding of programme impact.¹⁹

2.5 Research methodology

The evaluation was carried out in a number of steps in three key phases. These are outlined in Table 5 below and further detail is provided in Annex C. In addition to extensive desktop review, the evaluation team conducted field visits in August and October 2012 and February 2013. Observers were also commissioned to attend polling stations for the purpose of observation on election day.

Table 5: Evaluation Methodology

Phase	Steps
Phase 1: Inception	1. Data mapping and stakeholder analysis 2. Articulation of an overarching theory of change 3. Refinement of evaluation questions
Phase 2: Research & Analysis	4. Systematic review of documentation 5. Development theories of change and the risks to it for each component 6. Establishment of the attribution problem to be addressed 7. Data quality verification 8. Development of research methodology 9. Primary research 10. Assembly and assessment of the contribution narrative and challenges to it 11. Gathering of additional evidence
Phase 3: Analysis	12. Analysis ²⁰

¹⁸ See section 2.6 on Limitations and Research Problems Encountered for further discussion on the challenges of gathering evidence for each assumption and hypothesis

¹⁹ Mayne J (2011) Contribution analysis: addressing cause and effect. In: Schwartz R, Forss K and Marra M (eds) *Evaluating the Complex*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 53–96.

Phase	Steps
& Reporting	13. Revision and strengthening of the contribution narrative 14. Reporting

2.5.1 Sources of Evidence

The evaluation drew on a range of different sources of qualitative and quantitative evidence. During the analysis and reporting phase, the evaluation team triangulated the evidence that had been collected in order to inform the evaluation findings.

The key sources of evidence are listed below:

- **Document review:** The evaluation team reviewed over 50 documents produced by DFID, programme components and other election stakeholders. The full list of documents is provided in Annex D.
- **Semi-structured interviews and focus groups:** the Team conducted over 100 semi-structured interviews and focus groups with the following groups. The full list of interviews and focus group participants is provided in Annex E.
 - Judiciary: Superior Court Judges (12); Court staff (8); Judiciary Programme Implementation Team (6)
 - Electoral Commission: EC Programme Implementation Team (3 people); Polling Agents (20); CSOs (14)
 - CODEO: CODEO Observers (15); CODEO Programme Manager (1); Executive Director (1)
 - Donors: UNDP (1); European Union (1); USAID (1); FCO (1), DFID (3)
 - STAR Ghana: Civil Society Grant Partners (31) STAR Programme Implementation Team (4)
- **Survey:** 150 polling agents who received training from the Electoral Commission were surveyed. An overview of the methodology for the phone survey is provided in Annex F and an analysis of the results of the polling agent survey is provided in Annex G.
- **Observation:** Observation was carried out at 5 polling stations.
- **Analysis of media reporting:** Records of print media and observations from electronic media on Election Day and the days surrounding the election were collected to inform the analysis.

2.6 Limitations and research problems encountered

The evaluation team encountered limitations and research problems during the course of the evaluation due to the sensitive nature of the subject matter, the scope and the timing of the evaluation. These are summarised below:

- **Limited quantitative data:** The evaluation was largely qualitative. It relied heavily on the discussions, interviews and workshops it held with GESP components and partners, as well as their quarterly findings and evidence within these reports, to understand the implementation process and achievements gained from implementation towards component targets and the overall Outcome and Impact of the GESP. The methodology was thorough, aligned with research questions tailored to the theory of change, and based on substantial qualitative and documentary evidence. However, the lack of quantitative data limited the level of precision that could be demonstrated through the evidence.
- **Availability of interviewees:** The evaluation team struggled to find suitable times to meet with many of the evaluation stakeholders because they were heavily engaged in the election process. For example, despite numerous attempts to arrange interviews with political party representatives through various channels, the evaluation team could not meet with political party representatives to conduct the planned interviews.
- **Access to data:** The evaluation team struggled at many points to get access to data, particularly from government ministries. The need to follow up with data was an inefficient use of resources and in

²⁰ Evaluation judgments and conclusions were drawn by triangulating documents, interviews and interview notes. Often evidence was obvious as all three approaches confirmed the research question / indicator. If evidence was conflicting or of poor quality we followed up with the component and asked for additional examples or materials to provide proof of substantiated claims.

some cases the delays had a significant effect on the team's ability to conduct research. For example, the survey of polling agents was significantly delayed because of delays from the Electoral Commission in providing the list of trainees.

- **Triangulation of evidence** – The evaluation matrix provided in Annex B and research plan provided in Annex A are extremely comprehensive in listing out all of the hypotheses underpinning the theory of change and the implicit assumptions made. Testing all of these causal relationships with triangulated evidence and considering alternatively hypotheses would be an extremely resource intensive process, and beyond the scope of the evaluation. The extremely demanding nature of comprehensive and rigorous contribution analysis is a common issue faced by evaluators.²¹ In the case of this evaluation, significant evidence was gathered from a wide range of sources. Where possible, evidence was triangulated, but there are some cases where the evaluators were forced to rely on single sources of evidence and the measures taken to limit bias.
- **Uncertainty as to the outcome of the election:** At the time of the evaluation research, the result of the election had not been confirmed. This meant that field visits in February were challenging as programme partners were still busily engaged on election issues. Several programme partners informed the evaluation team that the election was not over as they were still gathering information due to the court case and security remained a concern. *"There is still more to do these 'last days' according to many observers, hence the security initiatives by the police, the Peace Council, Civil Society Groups and the political parties themselves to educate the populace to accept the outcome of the judgement (sic) is quite laudable. The security services led by the Ghana Police are leaving nothing to chance. The new police unit will obviously play a crucial role in quelling any kind of insurgency which might arise after the judgement (sic)."*²²

²¹ Delahais and Toulemonde, 'Applying contribution analysis: Lessons from five years of practice', 2012, *Evaluation*, 285.

²² Headlines August 1st, 2013 reiterating what GESP components spoke of in Feb 2012. <http://independentgh.com/politics/ghana-at-crossroads-as-supreme-court-gets-set-for-judgement>

3 Main Findings

3.1 Relevance

3.1.1 To what extent did GESP effectively identify the problems around the election?

GESP is based on a sound and comprehensive assessment of the role of credible and peaceful elections in ensuring democratic stability and accountability in Ghana and of the continuing challenges that face the conduct and delivery of credible elections in Ghana. The business case assessed previous lessons, and recommendations from the 2008 election. GESP recognised that many of the challenges around political and media conduct, voter turn-out and participation, police professionalism and law enforcement, election management, etc. were all within the main challenge of structural and institutional weaknesses in the political system and practices. Therefore, the design targeted and supported the necessary institutions through capacity building – i.e., the judiciary, police and security agencies, the Electoral Commission and civil society organisations.²³

The Role of Credible and Peaceful Elections in Ensuring Democratic Stability and Accountability

USAID's Ghana Democracy and Governance Assessment, which partly informed the GESP Business Case, highlights the structural and institutional weaknesses in Ghana's constitutional and political system and practices, how these severely limit prospects for meaningful checks-and-balances and accountability within the country's formal governmental structures, and how as a result, "electoral competition" and credible periodic elections remain the principal check on executive dominance in Ghana.²⁴ GESP's focus on the delivery of credible elections, therefore, addressed a critical governance need in Ghana's current democratic system.

Challenges for Elections in Ghana

Despite the generally orderly and peaceful conduct and outcome of recent elections in Ghana, certain characteristics of Ghana's democratic politics and practice presented continuing uncertainties and challenges for the December 2012 elections. Notably, the fiercely competitive and divisive character of Ghana's electoral politics, with two main rival political parties that are roughly equally matched in their national electoral strength, coupled with the country's winner-takes-all political tradition, the start of oil production in the country in 2010, and the introduction of biometric voter registration for the first time in 2012 amidst partisan disagreement and mistrust raised the stakes considerably for the December 2012 elections.²⁵ The interventions identified and supported by GESP appropriately anticipated and targeted both new and recurring areas of concern and controversy in Ghana's elections as well as activities and actors with the most likely prospect of ensuring the delivery of credible and peaceful election outcomes.²⁶

Role of Political Parties

One area where the design of GESP could have more directly and effectively addressed the problem underlying election issues was in relation to the engagement of the political parties. Evidence from past elections and the USAID Governance Assessment demonstrate that the two main parties (the NDC and the NPP) are key stakeholders in elections: their trust in the credibility of the election process, including in the state institutions that manage the process, crucially determines the general acceptability of election results. While GESP through its components did engage with political parties²⁷, stakeholders including DFID, the EU, and the UN acknowledged that more could have been done to bring political parties into the process and to have them form almost a specific component or platform collectively to support the election process.²⁸

While DFID funded the Electoral Commission to train political party polling agents, these are local, low-level party operatives who do not generally have much influence on their party's official opinion of or reaction to electoral outcomes. Both the Electoral Commission and the Judicial Service attempted to engage top party

²³ Ghana Elections Business Case, GES Logframe, CODEO Statement on Pre-Election Environment, EIU Ghana Report 2012, EU EOM Final Report

²⁴ USAID, Ghana Democracy and Governance Assessment, Final Report (August 2011).

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Interview with DFID, UN, EU, February 7, 8, 15th, 2013. Meeting with EC, February 12, 2013.

²⁷ The EC engaged political parties both regionally and nationally on the integrity of the election process, inviting them to familiarise themselves with the BVR, to understand the workings of the 'strong room' where election results from constituencies are faxed for the purpose of collation prior to declaration of the final results by the EC.

²⁸ Interview with DFID, UN, EU, February 7, 8, 15th of 2013.

leadership and presidential candidates of the two main parties (among others) in GESP-supported activities designed to build trust and confidence in the respective roles of the two state institutions. However, neither initiative achieved the expected result, as the main presidential candidates failed to participate in these events.

Given legal restrictions in Ghana regarding foreign funding of political parties, it is understandable that, while the planning leading up to the GESP appropriately considered the role of political parties, the GESP did not have room within it to engage the parties and candidates directly. One possibility that could have been explored as a vehicle for GESP to engage the national party leadership directly is the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC), an informal but well-established body comprising representatives of all registered political parties and the Electoral Commission that meets to discuss, agree on, and advise the Electoral Commission on election matters. The relative exclusion of political parties as direct targets of GESP engagement ultimately frustrated the evaluation team's attempts, after the fact, to elicit from top party leadership of the two main parties their impressions and opinion regarding aspects of the election relevant to the GESP.

3.1.2 To what extent did GESP and its component parts address the problems identified?

GESP addressed the key challenges to a peaceful and fair election and covered the various stages of the election process, including:

- biometric registration of voters;
- exhibition of the voters register;
- the conduct of the election campaigns;
- the conduct and security of the balloting and voters on election day; and
- judicial adjudication of post-election disputes.

At each of these stages, GESP identified and supported appropriate state actors with the authority, and/or the civil society stakeholder with the necessary record and credibility, to undertake interventions designed to promote a more effective and successful election. Specifically, DFID supported:

- CDD-Ghana/CODEO to monitor and report on the conduct of the biometric voter registration and the exhibition of the BVR register;
- STAR-Ghana to support CSOs and CBOs to undertake local and national-level activities to increase the issue/policy content of the election campaigns, promote local peace-building efforts, stimulate voter interest and participation especially among socially marginalised groups (e.g., women, persons with disability), and ensure professional, balanced and issue-based media coverage of the election campaigns;
- the EC to train party polling agents and various CSOs to perform their respective roles as party and civic watchdogs of the voting and ballot count at local polling stations on election day;
- the Police (through the British High Commission) with equipment and training to detect, prevent and properly manage and defuse election-related violence; and
- the Judicial Service to prepare its judges and staff for its election adjudication function.

Taken together, these GESP interventions cover the full range of Ghana's election process continuum.

While GESP components were mutually coherent and reinforcing, there was no coordinating mechanism built into GESP to ensure that components whose activities reinforce each other collaborate. The evaluation team found little evidence of the type of coordination and joint working amongst components to empower joint planning and coordination meetings. Opportunities for synergy, economies, and enhancement of value for money were lost as a result. Understandably this was not requested of the components but would have been advantageous for relationship-building between institutions as well as on the ground coordination during election. For example, while STAR-Ghana supported various CBOs/CSOs in local peace building and violence-prevention initiatives, there was no linkage between these STAR-funded civil society initiatives and the activities of the Police/Security sector, despite their common goals.²⁹

Notwithstanding the absence of GESP-induced coordination between components, there were voluntary initiatives in that direction:

²⁹ STAR-Ghana Programme Management Team meeting, October 18, 2012, STAR-Ghana Focus Group Discussions February 12 & 13, 2013)

- the Judicial Service included Police (and Prisons and NCCE) personnel in its training on election/BVR-related offences;
- CDD/CODEO communicated its BVR observation reports to the Electoral Commission and some Critical Incident reports to the Police; and
- the Electoral Commission participated in CDD/CODEO's stakeholder/media post-observation briefings on the BVR exercise.

However, more systematic GESP-directed coordination between components might have produced better results. For example, although CDD/CODEO promptly communicated its observations and findings to officials of the Electoral Commission and the Police, neither the Electoral Commission nor the Police acted on these reports prior to the elections.³⁰ In the case of the Electoral Commission, the lack of timely action in response to CODEO's BVR observation reports caused avoidable problems with the operation of the BVR machines on election day, resulting in voter anxiety, undue delays and postponement and extension of voting in some polling stations.³¹

Conclusions on the Relevance of the GESP

GESP was based on credible evidence of the importance of fair, free and peaceful elections to ensuring Ghanaian democratic stability and accountability, identified the key electoral challenges, was comprehensive in nature and addressed election challenges at stages throughout the election process continuum. However, the omission of high-level political party engagement (beyond Electoral Commission activities) failed to address the importance of political party acceptance of the credibility of the election process and the election institutions. The lack of coordination mechanisms potentially resulted in the failure to capitalise on synergies between complementary activities.

Key Recommendation on Relevance of the GESP

The national party leadership should be engaged directly through the Inter-Party Advisory Committee, an informal but well-established body comprising representatives of all registered political parties and the Electoral Commission that meets to discuss, agree on and advise the Electoral Commission on election matters.

3.2 Coherence and Coordination

3.2.1 To what extent did the design of the GESP complement the existing work of other partners?

GESP's Theory of Change is consistent with political economy understanding of the election cycle and the various partners linked to the election cycle. While the GESP design did not involve a process of active consultation with other donor partners and stakeholders, the Business Case took appropriate note of existing and anticipated election support priorities and interventions of other donor partners.³²

The Evaluation found no evidence of the GESP duplicating election support interventions of other donor partners and among donor partners who supported Ghana's 2012 elections (notably USAID, UNDP, EU), only GESP was designed to cover the entire election continuum³³. An Election Working Group, comprising donor partners, STAR-Ghana, the Electoral Commission, and civil society stakeholders, met regularly (twice a month) during the course of the year and provided a forum for donor parties to keep abreast of developments and share progress in donor election support. The working group was effective as it generated a regular platform of knowledge sharing and learning for each donor. However, donors interviewed shared that while it was a good first step, more could be done next election to coordinate efforts and link governance priorities.³⁴ For example, the Electoral Commission was funded by donors within the working group separately and with separate approaches/projects.³⁵

³⁰ Interview with CDD/CODEO, February 14, 2013. Meeting with EC, February 12, 2013.

³¹ Interim Statement issued by the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO) on the On-Going Biometric Voter Registration Exercise (April, May 2012). CODEO Pre-Election Environment Observation Report for May/June 2012

³² Interview notes from meeting with DFID, October 2012, February 15th 2013.

³³ EC, EU, UNDP Interview notes October 2012

³⁴ EU and UNDP Interview notes October 2012

³⁵ Amongst the donors on the EWG, USAID supported the EC to engage in civi outreach activities with groups representing women and long-excluded marginalized groups and UNDP's programming focused upon increased participation, gender equality and conflict prevention.

3.2.2 To what extent was GESP's design aligned with the existing work, priorities and systems of GoG?

GESP provided support to three state institutions (the Electoral Commission, Judiciary and Police) to enhance their capacity, transparency, or credibility as actors in the election process. Overall, there was strong alignment of GESP with the existing priorities of GoG. Both GESP and GoG's aims aligned to improve consolidated democratic governance where fair, free and peaceful elections take place transparently and participation of citizens including previous excluded groups is enhanced. GESP was designed in such a way to not only take into account GoG priorities, but also the previous election experience and three risk factors: violence, close election result and acceptance of election result by the losing party.³⁶

GESP supported the Electoral Commission to build confidence and trust among key stakeholders in the Electoral Commission's conduct and management of the election. While GoG committed to fully fund the "core" costs of the elections, its budgetary allocation to the Electoral Commission did not cover activities such as those funded by the GESP, which GoG regarded as "non-core".³⁷ GESP support for these "non-core" activities, however, was designed to promote better understanding of the Electoral Commission's functions and operations and enhance the capacity of party agents and CSOs to play their respective watchdog roles on Election Day. Insofar as such "non-core" activities help the Electoral Commission to deliver credible and peaceful election outcomes, GESP support to the Electoral Commission supplemented the GoG's budgetary commitment to the Electoral Commission and also underwrote social peace and stability in Ghana around elections.

GESP support to the Police and to the Judicial Service also filled critical funding gaps in GoG budgetary allocations to the two state institutions and enhanced the ability of both institutions to fulfil their mandates in connection with elections.

Conclusions on the Coherence and Coordination of the GESP

GESP's interventions complemented the work of other partners and reflected the priorities and existing work of GOG. GESP's design noted the existing and anticipated election support priorities and interventions of other donor partners and although broader in scope than other donor programmes, GESP did not duplicate that support. Likewise, GESP funded state institutions to undertake non-core activities that would not otherwise have been undertaken and were designed to contribute to more credible and peaceful election outcomes.

Key Recommendations on the Coherence and Coordination of the GESP

The Election Working Group is unique and the donors interviewed were not aware of any similar group in Africa, especially during non-election years. This group could build consistently together for the coming 2016 election if a cyclical approach was considered as opposed to a linear one-year election approach. A platform with civil society, institutions and donors could develop now in order to keep the dialogue alive. Learning from the 2012 election should be taken on board to get ahead of the next electoral cycle. Each institution could share workplans and donor partners could look at mutual governance priorities and how these align to GoG priorities.

3.3 Effectiveness

3.3.1 Were the activities and services delivered in accordance with what was originally intended?

GESP's components delivered as originally intended and planned.³⁸ The evaluation finds that excellent progress was made in delivering towards logframe targets, milestones, and outputs and that achieving the intended targets supported components' contribution to the higher-level objectives (i.e., respect for election results, free and fair election process, compliant Electoral Commission, public participation, election disputes handled effectively, inclusive election process, professional media handling, and voter education outcomes).³⁹ The evaluation team confirms the assessment of the Annual Review, which scored GESP an A+, outputs moderately exceeded expectation.

³⁶ DFID Business Case, GESP Annual Review 2013, FCO and DFID Interview Notes October 2012

³⁷ Notes from Meeting with EC, February 12, 2013.

³⁸ EC Polling Agent Pamphlet, Judiciary Manual, Police Pocket Manual, Component Quarterly Reports and End of Project Reports.

³⁹ Interview notes of October 2012 and February 2013; Component Quarterly and Final Reports; GESP Logframe; DFID Annual Review 2013

Table 6: Progress against Outputs

Logframe Output	Target	Impact weighting	Progress
1. Training delivered for civil society organisations and political party agents to ensure a responsive, participatory and professional election management process.	276,000 political party agents trained where at least 30% of agents are female 300,000 guidelines printed and distributed 2,524 CSOs & CBOs trained on their roles in achieving credible elections	40%	Achieved
2. A credible, independent and impartial assessment of the Biometric Voter Registration exercise (CDD-CODEO)	Experience survey published 650 trained overseers (observers and supervisors) deployed 60% of issues raised by observers addressed by election stakeholders	10%	Achieved
3. Security forces supported to be trained in election laws and prevention of election-related violence (Police - Security)	11 national communications base stations that enables nation-wide radio communication fully established 16,000 officers trained 90 officers with tactical public order and intelligence capability 20,000 pocket-sized booklets printed	25%	Achieved
4. Enhanced judicial processes, with staff better equipped to deal quickly and effectively with election petitions (Judiciary)	96 judges trained in use of new manual 100 court staff trained in use of new manual 96 judges and 100 court staff trained in ICT, and ICT centre established.	10%	Achieved
5. Increased capability of Civil Society Organisations to ensure peace promotion, public education and gender and social inclusiveness (STAR Ghana)	Elections are *GESI-compliant (*gender, economic and socially-included) 70% voting age registered to vote International and domestic observation reports cite media as professional and unbiased 4,500 election observers trained and deployed in conflict-prone constituencies	15%	Achieved

The table below provides a detailed summary of the key achievements and deliverables within the five components.

Table 7: Key Deliverables and Achievements

Electoral Commission ⁴⁰	Judiciary ⁴¹	Civil Society – STAR Ghana ⁴²	Security – Police ⁴³	CODEO -CDD ⁴⁴
<p>1. EC organised and delivered training for political party polling agents as planned. The training took place in 275 constituencies nationwide and all 10 regions. Twenty-two (22) training of trainers of polling agents workshops were organised at the regional level. The targets were District Electoral Officers (DEOs), the Returning Officers (ROs) and their two Deputies from the 275 constituencies nationwide. The trainings were largely conducted by Directors from the EC’s headquarters and Regional Directors of the Commission.</p> <p>2. 6,634 training sessions were conducted nationwide for party polling agents. Totally 273,490 political party polling agents trained.</p> <p>3. The EC developed, printed, and distributed 400,000 guidelines for party agents going well beyond the target (300,000)</p> <p>4. The EC organised and delivered training for a cross-section of 3,459 CSOs and CBOs on their roles in</p>	<p>1. The Judicial Service revised, printed and distributed 4000 copies of a manual on election adjudication. Exceeding the 3000 target set. The manual was published and widely discussed in both print and electronic media by analysts, political party representatives and academia.</p> <p>2. The Judicial Service organised and delivered training for 199 superior and lower court judges (21% female) in the use of the revised election adjudication manual, as planned. This exceeded the target of 96. However, the Judicial Service was compelled to modify its training timetable in order to train judges first on a new election offences law (C.I. 72) that came into force before the election adjudication manual had been completed. Due to the EC’s calendar for undertaking the BVR exercise, it was necessary to train the judges in the new law (ahead of the election manual training) so as to enable them to</p>	<p>1. STAR-Ghana has been instrumental in bringing together 45 civil society projects (44 CSOs + 7 media organisations) that encouraged effective engagement on election issues, advocacy and monitoring of the election process.</p> <p>2. 15 measures were put in place to ensure the elections were GESI compliant (gender, economic and socially included). These included get-out-the-vote initiatives and voter education specifically targeted at disadvantaged groups, capacity building for Electoral officers on physical accessibility, public education, sensitisation and advocacy on legal rights of excluded groups such as PWD to participate in elections, and monitoring initiatives to assess PWD’s participation in the electoral process. Fifty per cent of grantees targeted and ensured the involvement of excluded groups in the registration, campaigning and voting</p>	<p>1. Overall, 15,908 security personnel received direct support for training</p> <p>2. Communication equipment were installed in all the eleven regional police offices that will potentially benefit the existing 20,000 police personnel.</p> <p>3. 7,500 handsets were directly provided to the police service for distribution and utilisation by other agencies during the elections.</p> <p>4. Twenty six thousand (26,000) Aide memoires were also provided to the Ghana Police for onward distribution to election monitoring security staff.</p>	<p>1. 620 BVR observers were recruited and trained (10 for the pilot and 620 for main registration, disaggregated by 201 females) drawn from 300 Electoral Areas in 100 constituencies in all 10 regions of Ghana.</p> <p>2. 50 regional coordinators were recruited.</p> <p>3. CDD/CODEO successfully deployed 620 trained BVR overseers (including 30 supervisors) to observe the biometric voter registration exercise in 300 (randomly selected) polling stations in 100 constituencies across all 10 Regions of the country.</p> <p>4. CDD/CODEO conducted an experiential survey to gauge citizens’ experience of the BVR exercise. In all, 8,000 questionnaires were administered as part of this survey. The findings of the experiential survey were published and disseminated by the popular media (Daily</p>

⁴⁰ EC Quarterly Reports, EC Polling Agent Guidance and Manual, EC Training Report, Polling Agent Survey, EC Final Report

⁴¹ Judiciary Quarterly Reports, Judiciary Meeting Notes, Manual on Election Adjudication in Ghana, 2012, Judiciary Final Report

⁴² STAR-Ghana Quarterly Reports, STAR-Ghana Grant Partner End of Project Reports 2013. STAR-Ghana Beneficiary Responses Summary Report 2013. During focus group discussion grant partners also provided hard evidence such as photos, posters, CD-Rom, pamphlets, news articles. STAR-Ghana Final Report

⁴³ Conducting A Monitoring And Evaluation For British High Commission’s Election Security Project 2012/2013

⁴⁴ CODEO Ghana Website, CODEO BVR Observation Exercise: Registered Voters Experiential Survey 2012, CODEO Interim Reports and Press Releases, CDD Final Report

MAIN FINDINGS

Electoral Commission ⁴⁰	Judiciary ⁴¹	Civil Society – STAR Ghana ⁴²	Security – Police ⁴³	CODEO -CDD ⁴⁴
<p>ensuring credible elections. Exceeded the target of 2524.</p> <p>5. The EC organised various interactions with regional and national political party executives and candidates designed to enhance their understanding of, and build trust and confidence in, the operations, processes and preparedness of the EC. The EC was, however, unsuccessful in its outreach to the presidential candidates of the NDC and NPP to participate in its scheduled interactions with presidential candidates prior to the elections. As the EC engagements were scheduled at the height of the presidential campaign season, neither of the two main party candidates was willing to sacrifice campaign commitments to attend the EC encounters unless the rival candidate, too, was going to attend.</p>	<p>promptly and competently adjudicate any BVR-related cases prior to the exhibition of the final register.</p> <p>3. The Registrars and Courtroom staff who were trained were able to advise Counsels of Petitioners (Parliamentary Results) to file their petitions which contributed to 100% filing of the election cases as petition as against 25% in the 2008 General Elections.</p> <p>4. Judicial Service organised and delivered training for 41 courtroom staff in the procedural aspects and automated use and handling of election petitions, as planned. This was below the initial target of 100.</p> <p>5. The Judicial Service procured laptops, software and equipment for its in-house Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, which is described in the Logframe as the “ICT Centre”. The equipment is used by 19 staff and has helped the judiciary perform its duty towards completing the elections adjudication manual review. The statistics section developed new survey tools for collation of the Presidential and Parliamentary disputes with results being used to review the Revised Manual.</p>	<p>processes. In all, a total of 123, 870 women, 10,748 PWDs, 10,000 youth, over 50 youth groups, people living in 141 hard to reach communities across the country were directly reached to ensure their active participation and the exercise of their electoral franchise.</p> <p>3. STAR-Ghana election grantees put in place several measures to address conflict triggers in order to reduce the likelihood of violence. These included among others, the setup of 2 early warning monitoring systems across the country particularly in 14 known flash points, mediatory and dialogue processes that resolved tensions and built consensus among political parties and communities, targeted interventions with high risk groups such as the media and restive youth in order to check inflammatory rhetoric and limit opportunities for co-option into violence acts, and public education and sensitisation on peace and the consequences of conflict.</p> <p>4. Overall, partners carried out interventions in over 80 districts across the country, including interventions in some 141 hard-to-reach communities that would otherwise have been excluded from key electoral processes. A</p>		<p>Graphic, New Statesman, Ghanaian Times, Ghanaweb, ETV, Citi FM online, The Daily Dispatch, New Crusading Guide).</p> <p>5. CDD/CODEO issued timely interim reports to report its observations and findings as the BVR exercise progressed. Out of 7 issues raised 4 were addressed by both the EC and Police Service.</p> <p>6. There was wide dissemination of CODEO’s conclusions on the entire BVR process. CDD/CODEO held stakeholder/media briefings attended by EC officials, to communicate its observation findings and elicit responses and remedial action from appropriate state actors. Headlines were made to highlight CODEO’s approval and satisfaction with the BVR process, effectively highlighting the transparency of the registration process to citizens and the international community. As well as building the confidence of the Ghanaian registration and management of the election process.</p>

MAIN FINDINGS

Electoral Commission ⁴⁰	Judiciary ⁴¹	Civil Society – STAR Ghana ⁴²	Security – Police ⁴³	CODEO -CDD ⁴⁴
		<p>total of 283, 351 people were directly reached by partners of whom 44% (123,870) were women. Significantly, 10,748 PWDs were directly reached by GPs to increase their political participation.</p> <p>5. 986 election observers trained by IDEG and 5,809 trained by CODEO/NDI. Exceeding the target of 4500.</p> <p>6. Factors that contributed to ensuring professional and accurate media reportage included public demand for an issue based elections as well condemnation from CSOs, and the general citizenry for intemperate language. Buy-in and endorsement from members, umbrella associations such as the GJA as well as regulatory bodies such as the NMC, and NCA provided some degree of backing for the MFWA’s project. The strategic linkages brokered by STAR-Ghana between the media and CSOs ensured greater collaboration for information sharing and joint working relying on the mutual strength of both parties.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Grantees played a critical role very early in the electoral cycle by complementing the efforts of the EC and the NCCE with voter education to ensure a high turn out during the registration and 		

MAIN FINDINGS

Electoral Commission ⁴⁰	Judiciary ⁴¹	Civil Society – STAR Ghana ⁴²	Security – Police ⁴³	CODEO -CDD ⁴⁴
		<p>voting processes.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Platforms such as the presidential and vice presidential debates at the national level, as well as parliamentary debates at the constituency levels were subsequently organised by GPs providing an important interface for citizens to listen and question aspiring candidates on their manifesto promises. An estimated 700 questions were submitted by citizens and CSOs to be posed to the presidential and vice presidential candidates during the nationwide live telecast IEA debates alone. 		

MAIN FINDINGS

3.3.2 Were activities under the programme completed to time and budget?

The majority of GESP programme activities were completed to time and budget.

Electoral Commission ⁴⁵	Judiciary ⁴⁶	Civil Society – STAR Ghana ⁴⁷	Security – Police ⁴⁸	CODEO -CDD ⁴⁹
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> The training of polling agents commenced in the month of November and, in some cases, was not delivered until the last few days before the general elections. All scheduled training was, however, completed by the time of the elections on December 7, 2012. The training was completed to budget. Developing, printing and distribution of “A Guide to Candidates and their Agents” was completed to time and budget. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> The Judicial Service’s plan of activities was completed to time and budget. The Judicial Service recorded a savings of 14.3% at the end of project. The Service achieved these savings mainly by negotiating down some of the budgeted expenses (such as the cost of printing the manual) and by changing the original terms of compensation for the expert writers of the election adjudication manual, from consulting fees to payment of a modest honorarium. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> STAR-Ghana’s election partners completed their activities within budget STAR-Ghana election partners have passed the agreed timeframe due to the result of the election court case and consolidation of project findings. STAR-Ghana to consolidate partner findings towards the end of March. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Security component was completed to time. The budget had an overrun of about 1.8%. Although the programme was expected to run from May 2012 till April 2013, it had an implementation period of six months (i.e. June to November 30th 2012) to train 16,000 staff of the security agencies in security awareness for elections, 60 persons in public order and 30 persons in intelligence training. This was a tall order as aspects of the training involved travelling to all the regions in Ghana. The electioneering campaign period for the various political parties as well as frequent travels by the presidency for the same purpose required heavy police presence making it challenging to attain the 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> CODEO’s plan of activities was completed to time and budget. CODEO recorded a surplus of £50,000 at the end of programme implementation. DFID has agreed to an amendment of its contract with CDD/CODEO to extend the contract period to the end of February 2013 and for CDD/CODEO to apply the surplus to conduct a survey of voters’ experience of the 2012 elections.

⁴⁵ EC Quarterly Reports, EC Polling Agent Guidance and Manual, EC Training Report, Polling Agent Survey

⁴⁶ Judiciary Quarterly Reports, Judiciary Meeting Notes, Manual on Election Adjudication in Ghana, 2012

⁴⁷ STAR-Ghana Quarterly Reports, STAR-Ghana Grant Partner End of Project Reports 2013. STAR-Ghana Beneficiary Responses Summary Report 2013. During focus group discussion grant partners also provided hard evidence such as photos, posters, CD-Rom, pamphlets, news articles.

⁴⁸ Conducting A Monitoring And Evaluation For British High Commission’s Election Security Project 2012/2013

⁴⁹ CODEO Ghana Website, CODEO BVR Observation Exercise: Registered Voters Experiential Survey 2012, CODEO Interim Reports and Press Releases

MAIN FINDINGS

			<p>projected participants on a daily basis for the training. This necessitated a second and third round of training to achieve the project targets with accompanying cost implications.</p>	
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3.3.3 Were there any issues identified in the implementation of the components? If so, how successfully were these addressed by the project implementers?

Each component noted specific relevant issues and challenges to the evaluation team. Many of these issues were related to the pace of the election and the project timeframe. Other issues described by the components seemed to reflect institutional obstacles that could not be solved easily as they were embedded institutionally and beyond the scope of the election exercise. The issues expressed the steps taken to address these are elaborated by component in greater detail below.

Electoral Commission

- The Electoral Commission was faced with multiple court challenges and the legislative hold-up of various “core” Electoral Commission Election 2012-related activities, including notably the creation of 45 new constituencies during GESP’s implementation period. This caused slippage in the Electoral Commission’s election activity calendar and generally affected the scheduling of GESP activities. This issue was out of the Electoral Commission’s control with the result being that it had to find more human resources and adopt plans to fit within the extra 45 constituencies.
- There was little gender diversity in the composition of the political party agents who received training. Selection of trainees was the prerogative of local party executives. Electoral Commission could only nudge, not compel, the parties to select or send women for training as polling agents. The Electoral Commission attributes the general under-representation of women among polling agents to the chronic absence of women in local political party leadership and misconceptions about the role of a polling agent leading to male-biased selection criteria (e.g. preference for “toughness”).⁵⁰ This issue was described as systemic and institutional beyond just election work.
- The Electoral Commission encountered technical difficulties on election day with the BVR system. During the BVR exercise, CODEO’s BVR observation reports noted some of these problems and took steps to bring them to the attention of Electoral Commission officials. However, the Electoral Commission did not take the necessary preventative or corrective action in response to the CODEO reports.⁵¹ Because the Electoral Commission had given public assurances prior to election day that the BVR system would present no serious problems, reports of BVR machine inoperability on election day resulting in the postponement or extension of voting in several affected polling stations (in some cases by a day) caused many to question the Electoral Commission’s preparedness and competence.⁵² The response of the Electoral Commission was to extend voting by one more day so that everyone who waited to vote and could not would be able to do so the following day.

Transparency in particular was lacking overall, as evidenced by:

- the Electoral Commission failed to inform the public properly that voting was to be extended an extra day (which is not according to the law as the Electoral Commission should have informed publicly);
- poor delivery on visibility and publishing certified counts on the Electoral Commission website (which was not working on election day); and
- the combination of late delivery of materials and the failure of biometric verification machines led the Electoral Commission to announce a second voting day for 412 polling stations, which led to a delay in the declaration of results in the affected constituencies.

Measures to strengthen the transparency of the electoral process were discussed at meetings of IPAC where the Electoral Commission discussed the main topics with political parties. In addition, the electoral regulations provided parties with the possibility to follow the distribution of electoral material, to seal ballot boxes and to sign the result forms at polling and tabulation centres. However, a stronger effort by Electoral Commission in explaining the events around the election days could have improved voters’ understanding.

⁵⁰ Meeting with EC, February 12, 2013. Party Polling Agents Focus Group, February 12, 2013.

⁵¹ Meeting with CDD/CODEO, February 14, 2013. Meeting with EC, February 12, 2013.

⁵² See e.g., EISA Election Observer Mission to the 7th December 2012 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Ghana, Interim Statement (December 8, 2012); West Africa Network for Peacebuilding Statement on the Ghana 2012 Elections (December 10, 2012); *NPP Blames EC for Woes*, Ghanaian Chronicle (December 11, 2012).

Judicial Service

- The Judicial Service had to modify its original training schedule in order to train judges on the new election offences law (C.I. 72), the passage of which had been necessitated by the introduction of the BVR. As the Electoral Commission rolled out the BVR, it became necessary to train judges in the new law so as to enable them adjudicate promptly and competently cases arising from the BVR exercise. The Judicial Service agreed with DFID modifications to the training timetable and scope and also received permission to use some funds originally meant for resourcing the ICT Centre for the training on C.I. 72.
- Following the publication of the election adjudication manual, the Judicial Service organised two stakeholder events to publicise and educate key election stakeholders about the election adjudication process. However, these events conflicted with the campaign schedules of the main political party presidential candidates and as a result, the main parties sent only token representation. The Judicial Service had no other opportunity prior to election day to discuss the contents of the election adjudication manual with the leading political party candidates and executives.⁵³

STAR-Ghana / Civil Society⁵⁴

- The timeframe for carrying out the project was challenging for STAR and its election call grant partners. Engaging with political parties prior to the elections was difficult as everyone was trying to access the political parties and in general it is an extremely busy time. CSOs were not coordinated well enough to collaborate on their issues and represent key priorities that could have supported a collective approach in the engagement exercise with political parties.
- STAR-Ghana CSOs did not all take full advantage of the media as some CSOs did not know how to work with media. STAR-Ghana management team held information workshops and gave guidance to CSOs who were unfamiliar with how to engage and use the media.
- CSOs remained largely ineffective in their coordination and collaboration on election related projects or issues. The majority of CSOs funded by STAR-Ghana worked independently. There was also a lack of consistency across the Election Grantee portfolio in how to work with media to promote and raise understanding through public broadcasting. Generally, the CSO strategy during elections was to find donor support as individual organisations. CSOs continued to not identify or look at the value chain asking what should be the key intervention(s) in which civil society influences and works towards and which actors should they work with. A clear stakeholder analysis and outcome mapping would have supported CSOs further in their collective advocacy and election work.

CDD / CODEO⁵⁵

- As CDD/CODEO's deployment of its observers tracked Electoral Commission's BVR timetable, it often lagged behind Electoral Commission's deployment due to lack of timely notice from the Electoral Commission about the Electoral Commission's movement plan.
- CDD/CODEO encountered practical difficulties with paying agreed allowances to its widely dispersed observers due to CDD/CODEO's internal policy of paying service providers strictly by cheque or direct deposit and the absence of appropriate banking or other payment infrastructure in many localities. In the end, CODEO used its regional supervisors as intermediaries to route payment to its field observers.
- CDD-CODEO routinely shared its BVR observation reports with the Electoral Commission, which typically noted areas of concern and made recommendations for remedial action by the Electoral Commission. Yet the Electoral Commission did not act to implement CDD/CODEO's recommendations. This may have contributed to BVR-related problems the Electoral Commission encountered on Election Day that had been anticipated and flagged in CODEO's pre-election BVR observation and incident reports.
- CDD/CODEO used its Critical Incidents reports to record incidents of violence related to BVR registration and communicated the reports to the Police. CDD/CODEO subsequently tracked police action on these reported incidents but found no police follow-up on the reports prior to the election. CDD/CODEO's expectation was that timely law enforcement action on reported incidents of violence would serve to deter similar incidents on election day.

⁵³ Ibid

⁵⁴ STAR-Ghana Focus Group Discussions February 12 & 13, 2013, STAR-Ghana Programme Management Meeting February 15, 2013)

⁵⁵ CODEO Focus Group Discussion, February 11, 2013. Meeting with CDD/CODEO Programme Manager, February 14, 2013.

Recommendation on issues identified in the implementation of the components

Future election support to state institutions needs to factor in realistic timeframes as the election cycle is often busiest towards the final year of an election. Projects could start far earlier in order to prepare for any challenges along the implementation phase. A problem, risk and mitigation analysis with a clear direction from each component on how they will prepare and be ready for certain foreseeable risks should be required reporting from the beginning. This should be monitored during the project and to ensure that any setbacks are manageable and dealt with easily and efficiently so as not to delay progress. The Election Working Group can play a key role as a monitoring body when addressing issues with components during working group quarterly meetings.

3.3.4 How many people received direct support from DFID?

Figures for the following components were calculated by reviewing materials published during field interviews, verifying with DFID and following up with the final end of project reports figures. The evaluation team also checked numbers in the Annual Review to verify that they match up with end of project reports received. The final number calculated is consistent with all end of project / final report numbers and Annual Review numbers.

In total, the number of people receiving direct support from DFID through GESP is **933,994**. This is broken down per component as the following:

Electoral Commission

- 273,490 polling agents trained (15% female)⁵⁶;
- 3459 CSOs trained which reached and engaged 377,153 citizens (201,660 female, 175,493 male);

It is estimated that there were approximately 4,000,000 viewers of “A guide to Candidates and their Agents” which was aired nationwide on three of the top TV networks in Ghana (Metro TV, Multi TV and Ghana Television). Although this is not direct support per se, it is important to point out that the guide funded by DFID was launched and had a wide reach through various media channels with multiple screenings.

Judicial Service

- 5 Reviewers of the second edition of the manual on Election Adjudication (5 men);
- 9 Judges presiding over the Presidential election petition (3 women, 6 men);
- 199 Judges, Magistrates and selected police officers comprising 42 women and 157 men who were trained on the CI 72 legislation;
- 115 (97 men, 18 women) trained by the Judicial Training Institute on the reviewed Election Adjudication Manual
- 41 High Court Registrars, Court Staff and Regional ICT Personnel trained (39 men, 2 women);
- 69 people (57 men, 12 women) who registered and attended the Stakeholders Conference for the Northern Sector in Kumasi with extra /uninvited 20 participants;
- 72 registered participants with about 15 uninvited persons for the Southern sector Stakeholders Conference the Accra was Participants at the Stakeholders Conference and Annual Chief Justice’s Forum;
- 99 Media (36 women, 63 men).

STAR-Ghana / Civil Society

- 283,351 people were directly reached by Grant Partners of which 44% (123,870) were women, and 10,748 People Living With Disability (PWD) were directly reached by GPs to increase their political participation.

CODEO/CDD

- 620 BVR observers were recruited and trained;
- 50 Regional Coordinators were recruited.

⁵⁶ There were no specific targets for training women. Institutionally the EC is largely male dominated and discussions on this issue with the EC highlighted that beyond the election process the EC has much work to do in bringing more women into governance and political work. It is recognised as a challenging area to recruit and inspire more senior female roles in political-state institutions.

Police

- 15,820 officers were trained in elections laws;
- 30 officers were trained in intelligence whilst 58 officers were trained in public order and management;
- 26,000 pocket sized books on election laws were distributed to security agencies and their staff; and
- 7,500 handsets were used by the Ghana police for the whole country.

An analysis of the number of direct beneficiaries reached versus the number targeted can be found at section 3.4.1.

3.3.5 Were indicators in the Logframe met? What evidence exists to support this?

Please refer to Table 6 that provides detail of the indicators that were significantly met and exceeded expectation in some cases. The evaluation team reviewed a variety of evidence during field visits with components (quarterly reports, raw material of printed manuals and guides, photos, newspaper clippings, videos, and importantly end of project reports with evidence added into the report itself) to verify this data.⁵⁷

3.3.6 What were the most effective interventions in improving the election process? Why?

While all five GESP components delivered towards their objectives, and overall met their targets, the Police, CODEO and civil society interventions were the most effective interventions in addressing the problems that undermine free, peaceful and fair election processes.

Police

When presenting the core deliverables of the security component to donor interviewees and asking their assessment of the role in which the Police played on election day, all respondents confirmed that they were effective in delivery.⁵⁸ Police responses to public order, safety and crowd control were commendable and media highlighted the effective work that the police did overall. Police-security forces working with civil society groups and citizens well before the elections on identified dispute flash points as internal assessments of security issues were coordinated well in advance and with key stakeholders.⁵⁹ Some respondents believed it to be the “most thought out and comprehensive component of GESP.”⁶⁰

The evaluation report for the Police component stated in its key findings “an improvement in the performance of the security services was noticeable as particularly mentioned by public opinions and media reports on the professionalism of the security agencies especially the police during and after the elections.”⁶¹ The evaluation report also gives a positive assessment of the security training and its impact on security forces:

In relation to training, all respondents confirmed the acquisition of new knowledge from the public order and intelligence training sections. 93% of respondents have indicated that they acquired new knowledge from the security awareness training. Over 80% of respondents underscored the relevance of the knowledge gained through the three training sections and how it will positively enhance their performance during the pre and post elections period ... increasing the professional competence of the services to better manage security during and after the election. The British High Commission’ security awareness project has overwhelmingly contributed to the security management success of Ghana’s year 2012 elections.⁶²

STAR-Ghana supported CSOs

Civil society (STAR-Ghana) played an effective role in its civic education duties and supported delivering a more peaceful free election.⁶³ CSOs supported through STAR-Ghana are strong and qualified organisations, which have worked effectively with constituents and election work before as many organisations’ main mandates are to improve and influence governance processes through specific issues / themes.

⁵⁷ Important to point out, that GESP was closely monitored by DFID staff along with the evidence that components provided. This was clear during the Evaluation Team visits as components expressed their appreciation for DFID support throughout the project to engage them on budget, value for money and showing evidence / results during the process.

⁵⁸ Donor Meetings (EU, FCO and DFID) February 2013

⁵⁹ STAR-Ghana Grant Partner Quarterly Reports (WANEP, Violence Prevention Group)

⁶⁰ DFID, February 15th, 2013

⁶¹ Nana Ama Oppong-Duah. Conducting an M&E for British High Commission Security Project 2012 – 2013.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ STAR Ghana End of Project Report, STAR Ghana CSO Focus Group Discussion Notes February 13 -14th, 2013.

Two interventions that STAR-Ghana focused on with its partners that were particularly effective were public participation and reduction of violence/election disputes.⁶⁴ To ensure peace and raise awareness within communities on reducing violence, STAR-Ghana election grantees put in place several measures to address conflict triggers in order to reduce the likelihood of violence. These included among others:

- the setup of 2 early warning monitoring systems across the country including specifically in 14 known flash points;
- mediatory and dialogue processes that resolved tensions and built consensus among political parties and communities
- targeted interventions with high risk groups such as the media and restive youth in order to check inflammatory rhetoric and limit opportunities for co-option into violence acts; and
- public education and sensitisation on peace and the consequences of conflict.⁶⁵

To increase voter turn-out and buy in of the political process and importance of voting, STAR-Ghana grantees played a critical role very early in the electoral cycle by complementing the efforts of the Electoral Commission and the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) with voter education to ensure a high turn out during the registration and voting processes. Grantees also facilitated greater understanding of the new biometric system including the mechanics of voting to allay fears and misconceptions surrounding the registration process. Grantees undertook orientations, community sensitisations, door-to-door education, radio and television discussions, distribution of IECs translated in local languages, and used social media, film shows, drama and puppetry to share critical information.⁶⁶

Electoral Commission

The Electoral Commission did deliver to their plans and polling agents interviewed expressed that the training was useful and supported their ability to deliver on election day⁶⁷. However, it is not clear that engaging CSOs and training polling agents contributed to achieving all of the intended effects of DFID support, including a 'responsive, participatory and professional election management process' or improved transparency. For instance, an observation made by over 50% of polling agents interviewed explained that the Electoral Commission Presiding Officers were inadequately trained, which compromised the effectiveness of polling stations generally.⁶⁸ According to these accounts, Presiding Officers frequently attempted to defer to either the polling agents or CODEO observers to determine what course of action to take in a given situation, despite the fact that the polling agents and observers lacked the authority to make such decision. Similar problems relating to the Electoral Commission and election process resulted from the breakdown of systems and procedures on election day, including those associated with vote counting, adequate numbers of trained polling staff, counting and collection centres; and spoiled ballots and ink finger print issues on the voting ballot.⁶⁹

The Pink Sheet

One issue raised in discussions with polling agents was the failure of the training to cover completion of the Declaration of Results Form (the "Pink Sheet"), the primary form for documenting or registering objections to the ballot count at the polling station.⁷⁰ According to the Electoral Commission, the Pink Sheet was not used in the training because the forms, which had to be imported, had not arrived at the time of the training. However, samples of the Pink Sheet could easily have been used for the training. As the Pink Sheet is the key document used at the polling station, and the form on which all polling agents must record their agreement or objection to the vote tallies, all polling agents (as well as the Presiding Officers) should have been trained on the proper way to use and complete the form. Not incidentally, improperly completed or unsigned Pink Sheets emerged as one of the key issues at the centre of the post-election dispute and litigation.

⁶⁴ STAR Ghana Management Team Meeting, February 15, 2013; UNDP Meeting October, 2012

⁶⁵ STAR-Ghana End of Project Report, July 2013

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ EC Polling Agent Focus Group Discussion Notes February 12, 2013; Polling Agent Survey 2013.

⁶⁸ The Evaluation Team did not hold surveys within focus group discussions due to time constraints. However, questions that gathered a large amount of discussion were asked 'do you all agree with this point raised?' and interviewees expressed that they did. This was noted in field interview notes.

⁶⁹ Several meetings and focus group discussions drew the same conclusion of the issue around the EC systems. CODEO, Polling Agents, UNDP, EU, DFID, February 2013

⁷⁰ Polling Agents Focus Group Discussion, February 12, 2013. Meeting with EC, February 12, 2013.

Conclusions on the Effectiveness of the GESP

While all five GESP components delivered towards their objectives and overall met their targets, the Police, CODEO and civil society interventions were the most effective and made the biggest difference in terms of addressing the problems that undermine free, peaceful and fair election processes.

Key Recommendations on the Effectiveness of the GESP

1. A coordination function across the components was largely lacking during the implementation and delivery of GESP. The components worked in silos as opposed to collectively. The evaluation team recommends that any future design will put in place a function to promote coordination across mutual areas of work and common areas of impact. A specific output dedicated to coordination should be incorporated into logframes to hold the programme and components to account, and monthly coordination meetings could be held with brief reporting, action points and agreed follow-up. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) could play an initial important role in coordinating components but also sit in quarterly meetings to get a sense of how work is progressing and help resolve any issues that may arise.
2. Reconsider the approach of GESP as a one-year election programme and extend into a full election support programme, which would consider the entire election cycle. Components and stakeholders overall pointed to the importance that support to elections needs to not be time bound and restricted to a certain stage of the election. There are opportunities to work well before the election year, particularly with voter education and providing MIS or IT guidance to improve the quality of the Electoral Commission systems in place. Post-election, the EWG could be a key contributor to this effort and continue the dialogue with institutions and civil society to discuss key concerns and challenges, priorities and workplans for the upcoming election 2016.

3.4 Efficiency

3.4.1 To what extent did the GESP represent good value for money? How could this have been improved?

Value for money is an analytical framework that assesses the use of resources to achieve an intended outcome. It is the optimal use of resources to achieve intended outcomes.⁷¹ The National Audit Office and DFID have characterised this as a balance of the three criteria of Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness across the life of the project.⁷²

- **Economy:** Are we or our agents buying inputs of the appropriate quality at the right price?
- **Efficiency:** How well do we or our agents convert inputs into outputs?
- **Effectiveness:** How well are the outputs from an intervention achieving the desired outcome?

This assessment scrutinises and evaluates the question of ‘could we have done more with less’.

Assessing value for money in the area of governance programming presents significant challenges.

- Governance work is often less tangible and quantifiable than building schools or bore-holes and the impact of governance may develop over longer time periods;
- Governance programmes display necessarily diverse and complex pathways to successful outcomes, making the issue of contribution and attribution particularly important; and
- Governance programmes operate in contexts where it may not be appropriate to compare unit costs with internationally agreed standards or between different country contexts. *“It is easier to use comparative data in a health or education programme both because some of the elements of such programming are universal, and because data have been produced for decades. In the case of governance programmes, cost and outcome comparisons have usually not been made.”*⁷³

⁷¹ National Audit Office, Analytical Framework for Assessing Value for Money (2010).

⁷² “DFID’s Approach to Value for Money (VfM)”, Department for International Development (July 2011).

⁷³ Briefing Note, “Indicators and VfM in Governance Programming, UK Department for International Development (July 2011) at: http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Outputs/Mis_SPC/60797_GovernanceIndicatorsVfMNoteFINAL.pdf

In recognition of the difficulties of assessing governance programmes outlined above, we have selected a methodology that evaluates that elements of Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness across criteria that are logically associated with good VFM, and which incorporate quantitative measures where possible⁷⁴. These criteria are both process and impact focused.

Economy

The economy metric in the assessment of value for money is primarily concerned with the costs of inputs and was measured by criteria ensuring that inputs have been procured appropriately in line with standard or better than standard cost rates.

Criterion 1: Procurement

➤ *Were costs managed and economies identified through a standardised procurement process?*

The evidence indicates that standardised and robust procurement processes were generally employed and that there was a 'due diligence' process undertaken for each component partner – i.e., to assess capacity to handle funds, assessment of the technical and financial capacity, etc.

The Electoral Commission (the largest recipient of programme funding) and the Judicial Service are regulated by the Public Procurement Act 2003 (Act 663) and the Electoral Commission also had an Entity Tender Committee that ensured all procurement follows the statutory requirements. The Ghana Electoral Support Business Case noted that two recent "micro-assessments" determined that management systems within the Electoral Commission and Judicial Service were satisfactory – the USAID assessment described the "legislative and regulatory framework for procurement [to be] well established and strong." Additionally, a 2010 assessment by the World Bank of GoG procurement systems found that procurement requirements are applied largely according to international standards.⁷⁵

The Annual Review noted that "CDD-Ghana used its procurement guidelines and best practices from the industry in conducting procurements during the project" and that "they also made bulk purchases of goods that will be used over a period of time, ensuring discounts and reducing actual cost of the goods." STAR-Ghana likewise followed a robust procurement process that covered the major aspects of grant distribution and that included assessment of grantee unit costs and STAR-Ghana programme unit costs.⁷⁶

➤ *Have procurement and costs been monitored on an on-going basis?*

Evidence indicates that procurement and programme costs were monitored by DFID and the GESP components on an on-going basis.

A strong programme team within the Good Governance team in the DFID Ghana office oversaw the administration of finances and various project budgets under GESP. Financial support, guidance and discussions on expenditure were all in place from DFID to the components. There was clear financial guidance from DFID Ghana's programme team to the management of the components. Authority levels to sign amounts exist depending on the amount needing approval. Components' exercised tight control of costs and maximised efficiency through careful management of overheads. Component staff commented that 'a rigid but flexible system is in place to ensure costs are spent appropriately and for the right purpose.'⁷⁷

Budgets of components were consistently checked quarterly using the DFID Ghana Good Governance team quarterly reporting template and direct support from DFID to track expenditure. This approach automatically worked out under and over spend on the programme and expenses were monitored and discussed on a needs basis with components so everyone could assess the effectiveness and efficiency of expenditure. Rate of return and cost effectiveness were discussed in component (financial) planning and monitoring meetings, reviewed quarterly and

⁷⁴ This methodology is adapted from the analytical frameworks outlined in "DFID's Approach to Value for Money (VfM)", Department for International Development (July 2011) and "Measuring the Impact and Value for Money of Governance and Conflict Programmes, ITAD (December 2010).

⁷⁵ World Bank, "Ghana: Assessment of Stage 1– World Bank - Use of Country Systems in Bank Supported Operations" (draft August 27, 2010) – "The public procurement law of Ghana to some extent ensures that public procurement is carried out in accordance with the principles of economy, efficiency, and transparency. This is demonstrated by its wide applicability and accessibility, existence of procurement oversight, requirement for procurement planning and procurement methods and procedures, which are applied largely according to international standards."

⁷⁶ STAR-Ghana Procurement Manual at <http://www.starghana.org/userfiles/files/publications/OVERALL%20APPROACH%20TO%20VFM.pdf>

⁷⁷ STAR-Ghana, EC, Judiciary meeting notes on Value for Money and the administration support from DFID to ensure costs are accounted for and well thought through, February, 2013

with a strong internal system in place, expenditure was regularly checked. These expenditures were tracked for financial management, budgets and reporting purposes.

Criterion 2: Unit Costs

➤ ***Were benchmarked unit costs established against which to compare project unit costs and were unit costs consistent with these benchmarks?***

There is little evidence against which to assess whether unit costs are comparable to costs for similar programmes because there are no international benchmarks against which to compare the vast majority of the GESP expenditures and the expenditures that comprise the bulk of GESP spend were highly contextualised.

For example, there is no metric commonly accepted that the evaluation team identified against which to compare the cost of training and equipping election poll workers.⁷⁸ However, even if such a metric were available, it is not clear it would be appropriate for GESP, where the training had to encompass the introduction of a biometric voter registration.

Likewise, it is difficult to compare expenditure across components as budget categories are not consistent enough in character to allow fruitful comparison, and even where budget lines do appear similar, as in the case of smaller scale expenses of refreshments, vehicle hire, etc., the different contexts in which these costs may have occurred make comparison of limited utility.

While there is insufficient information to draw a general conclusion, there is evidence that DFID and the GESP components utilised low-cost alternatives in the delivery of some component activities. Examples of this include:

- the utilisation of an existing funding mechanism (STAR-Ghana) to provide grants to NGOs;
- the use by the Electoral Commission of local community centres, chapels and classroom blocks as training venues to reduce costs⁷⁹; and
- participants to the Electoral Commission trainings were provided with money for transportation based on public transport rates.⁸⁰

A better demonstration of VFM could be achieved in the future if programmes were required by DFID to provide benchmarks for their costs against local market conditions and similar activities that they have previously undertaken.

➤ ***Have economies of scale been achieved through programme investments or contracts?***

There is good evidence that economies of scale were achieved throughout the programme, including by DFID itself. Evidence of achieving economies of scale include:

- the selection by DFID of STAR-Ghana to fund grants to civil society organisations and non-state actors capitalised on STAR-Ghana existing networks and linkages with civil society;
- the revision and updating of the election adjudication manual was done using the authors of the first edition, with help from current members of the judiciary. This allowed the Judicial Service to take advantage of its previous investment in producing the original version;
- The Institute for Democratic Governance's (IDEG) media partners providing in-kind contributions, including a free live broadcast of the High Level Meeting that birthed the Kumasi Declaration; and
- the social media tracking component (SMTC) tapped into existing relationships with international consultants, who waived their fees for the services they provided and used in-house expertise to support the SMTC at no cost to the project.

Efficiency

Criterion 1: Productivity

➤ ***Were more/fewer resources employed than expected?***

⁷⁸ The Evaluation Team notes that 273,490 polling agents were trained and equipped at a total cost (excluding administration) of £1,945,157 or £7.11 per polling agent. While this cost seems relatively modest to the Evaluation Team, without a benchmark for similar trainings, there is not evidence with which to draw the conclusion that this represents an economical unit cost.

⁷⁹ Electoral Commission of Ghana Project Completion Report (28 June 2013).

⁸⁰ Ibid.

➤ ***Was performance in terms of outputs greater/less than expected?***

The evidence indicates that the GESP moderately exceeded its output objectives with a marginal underspend on the programme as a whole.

GESP achieved a significant majority of the intended outputs at an underspend against the project budget. The GESP Annual Review assessed each of the five outputs as having achieved or moderately exceeded the milestones in the GESP logframe, although this understates the measure of productivity, as the Electoral Commission, whose activities accounted for nearly half of the programme budget, exceeded its output milestones. Specifically, the Electoral Commission:

- trained 273,490 polling agents against a project target of 276,000;
- produced and distributed 400,000 election guidelines for polling agents against a project target of 300,000, and did so on budget through a reduction in the expected unit cost; and
- engaged and trained 3,459 civil society and community-based organisations in their roles in achieving credible elections against a project target of 2,524.

Of the programme components, only the support to the British High Commission over-ran its budget and the total cost of this overrun was minimal in the context of the whole programme (approximately £14,000).

While the GESP was productive in the sense that it achieved its outputs at lower than expected costs, as this evaluation notes above, opportunities for synergy were lost due to the lack of a central coordinating mechanism within the GESP to ensure components' activities reinforce one another where possible. VFM (both efficiency and effectiveness) could be enhanced in the future if such a coordination mechanism were established.

➤ ***Have the outputs been delivered in a timely manner and according to the workplan?***

The evidence indicates that most partners delivered their outputs largely to plan and expectation.

An assessment made during the October 2012 field visit of the progress of GESP to achieving its outputs found at that time that most of the outputs were delivering as expected, and ultimately, nearly all outputs achieved their milestones by the December 2012 election. Several of the Project Completion Reports and the Annual Review note that delays were encountered early in the programme and that these delays were largely the result of the programme's late design and fast implementation.⁸¹ However, these delays were largely overcome over the course of the programme and it is not apparent that the delays had a significant impact on the eventual programme delivery.

Criterion 2: Risk Analysis and Mitigation

➤ ***Was risk analysis conducted that identified, assessed and mitigated the major risks to the programme?***

There is evidence that risks were identified and assessed, and mitigation measures established by DFID at the beginning of GESP. DFID produced a 30 November 2011 Ghana Election Risk Register that assesses and proposes mitigation measures for 15 individual risks encompassing conflict, political and social risks arising from the GESP. Another risk assessment was contained in the Ghana Election Support Business Case produced in March 2012 that covers a much smaller number of potential risks to the programme and does not assess the extent to which proposed mitigation measures are likely to reduce risks across the programme.

There is little evidence that the GESP components comprehensively identified, assessed or established measures to mitigate risks. A review of the proposals from the Electoral Commission, the Judicial Service and CDD, and the scoping and inception reports for the police component show only a cursory assessment of programme risk. Although risks to the components are highlighted in each of these documents in passing, there does not appear to have been furnished to DFID or the evaluation team a systematic and comprehensive assessment of risk.

➤ ***Were risks monitored throughout the programme on an on-going basis?***

There is no evidence that risks were monitored in a systematic fashion on an on-going basis throughout the programme. The component progress reports provided to the evaluation team largely do not contain sections devoted to risk identification, assessment and mitigation, and no risk matrices or similar tools appear to have been utilised.

⁸¹ E.g., Electoral Commission of Ghana Project Completion Report (28 June 2013); STAR-Ghana End of Project Report, July 2013; GESP Annual Review 2013;

As section 3.3.3 makes clear, there were a number of programme and component issues that arose during the implementation of GESP (e.g., lack of engagement with political parties, insufficient communication between programme components, lack of capability on the part of CSOs to engage with the media, etc.) that were either could have been foreseen or might have been addressed more effectively by the DFID programme management team had risk analysis and mitigation been more systematically undertaken. In the future, better VFM could be achieved through a more comprehensive and systematic approach of the full spectrum of programme risks - including conflict, political, social and financial risks.

Effectiveness

Criterion 1: Impact

➤ *To what extent did the programme have a fully developed theory of change and intervention logic?*

GESP was based upon a theory of change that was coherent, backed by evidence and based on a plausible results chain. The five outputs can be seen as individual parts of the outcome defined as “Security, Judiciary, Civil Society, Electoral Commission - improving their capacity to influence and deliver free, fair and peaceful election and processes which are part of the lead up to the election.” In turn, this was expected to contribute to the impact of “a sixth consecutive peaceful elections in Ghana”.

For each programme component, there was a theory outlining how the activities undertaken would lead to the objectives of the component. While initially these were not explicitly stated, the evaluation team was able to develop in collaboration with programme stakeholders explicit and clearly laid out component theories during the August 2012 Inception Phase visit. These impact logics were further refined based upon primary and secondary research conducted by the evaluation team in October and December and are included as Annex A.

➤ *To what extent was the programme effective in achieving its intended outcome and impact?*

GESP achieved its overall outcome; “enhanced capacity of Ghana’s state and non-state institutions to deliver free, fair and peaceful elections”. The evaluation team reviewed the progress of component activities against workplans and focused on tracking the results of the programme at outcome level based on theories of change by components and the overall GESP theory of change. The GESP had an impressive pace of programme implementation and was able to provide inputs on a timely basis on the basis of its workplans and in response to a challenging and busy context for all components.⁸² The activities that components implemented and carried out improved the capacity of citizens, judiciary, security agencies, election management body including observers, and polling agents.⁸³ UK support to the 2012 Ghana election contributed to the impact of a peaceful election process by targeting the correct institutions, and targeting the correct investment in capacity building, equipment and key actors (e.g. Electoral Commission, Police, Civil Society).⁸⁴ These two streams (capacity building and key institutions and actors) combined contributed to the business case vision of success → peaceful elections, inclusion of all sections of society, trust in the election management body and elections disputes handled effectively and efficiently by the police and judiciary.

Component Level Value for Money

STAR-Ghana achieved Value for Money by focusing on achieving ‘results’ and reducing risks. This was evident in its approach to monitoring and evaluation, which tried to gain tangible quantitative evidence of election support to citizens that supports qualitative outcomes. It was also evident in its planning and risk assessment, which gave election grant partners more of a say on how money should be spent because they were on the ground, understand the issues and know what can work in getting results. STAR-Ghana also focused on well-known partners with satisfactory performance and organisational assessments to enhance results.

Criterion 2: Leverage

➤ *To what extent are the benefits of the programme sustainable beyond the life of the programme?*

While the impact of successful election on embedding democracy in Ghana should not be minimised, we find that there will be other more direct outcomes from the GESP that are sustainable – in part because of the episodic nature of elections. These sustainable benefits include:

⁸² Component Quarterly and End of Project Reports; Polling Agent Survey; GESP Annual Review 2013; Interview Notes February 2013

⁸³ Component Quarterly and End of Project Reports; Polling Agent Survey; Interview Notes February 2013

⁸⁴ Interview notes February 2013

- The training delivered to Electoral Commission permanent field staff in public outreach programmes has increased the capability of these officials in a manner that will improve their on-the-job performance in a sustainable manner in what is a recurring role in subsequent elections.⁸⁵
 - The training of polling agents will likely have sustainable benefits. The survey of polling agents indicated that over 30% of polling agents had previously performed the role. If this “retention” rate is achieved during the next electoral cycle, the benefits of the training that these agents have received will outlive the programme.
 - The development of both the “Manual on Election in Adjudication in Ghana” and “A Guide to Candidates and their Agents” documents will continue to provide benefits post-election, as each contains information that can inform the election process going forward.
 - The training of judicial staff in election adjudication will contribute to a more professional and expeditious judicial service in a manner that should persist, especially considering the likely lower turnover that one would expect in a more specialist organisation.
 - The use of the Electronic Case Distribution System to the election adjudication provide an opportunity to train and acquaint additional staff at the Judicial Service on the use of this system, which should facilitate the uptake and enhanced capacity of court staff to use this system going forward.
- ***To what extent is there potential for additional benefits to be realised from the programme, either through replication or lesson-learning?***

DFID will continue to fund governance and democracy initiatives in Ghana, and the Annual Review indicates that the lessons learned from the implementation of GESP will inform the design of an upcoming democracy programme. In this way, DFID may capitalise on additional benefits beyond the life of the programme. Additional benefits would be gained through lessons learning workshops generally within DFID and specifically with the governance cadre focused on democracy-building activities. The inclusion of a coordinating central mechanism with a dissemination budget allocation would also be appropriate.

In the future, better VFM could be achieved through holding a lessons learning workshop of programme participants, with the results of this workshop encapsulated into a short report that could be distributed within DFID and perhaps publicly.

3.4.2 Was the balance of investment in each of the components proportionate to their effectiveness and impact on the programme’s aim and objectives?

Yes. The business case for GESP was designed to work in partnership with the GoG and laid out key institutions that would be priority based on lessons, previous experience and analysis during the design of GESP. Funding and impact weighting was appropriate given the aims of each component and relevance. Building trust amongst citizens in the BVR electoral process was the responsibility largely of the Electoral Commission (40% of funding) with the support of civil society (15% of funding) while legal issues and security issues were handled by security agencies and the judiciary (totally 25% funding to Police and 10% Judiciary).

Conclusions on the Efficiency of the GESP

The evaluation finds that GESP offers good value for money at each of the three levels of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. While VFM could be improved in some respects (risk management, dissemination of lessons learned), GESP has been able to deliver its outputs in an economical and cost-efficient manner. There is evidence of very good value for money at the effectiveness level. The value for money assessment has also indicated that there is good evidence that economies of scale were achieved throughout the programme, including by DFID itself. Finally, that there will be other more direct outcomes from the GESP that are sustainable – in part because of the episodic nature of elections.

⁸⁵ Electoral Commission of Ghana Project Completion Report (28 June 2013).. In addition to permanent staff, temporary EC staff were also trained in public outreach, although the sustainable benefits from training temporary staff are difficult to assess.

3.5 Coverage

3.5.1 To what extent do the results reflect the inequities and inequalities identified in the problem analysis?

Overall, GESP did not advance a social inclusive approach for women and other socially excluded groups in the election process through its components. Institutions did not demonstrate or integrate a social inclusive approach in selection of participants in the Electoral Commission training or in the selection of high court judges trained.⁸⁶

Those interviewed in the Electoral Commission described the challenge as structural; a patriarchal approach undermines the potential for a more inclusive approach in election management and preparations. A significant challenge remains within the Electoral Commission and the Judiciary, which is male-dominated with senior responsibility predominantly held by men.

The evaluation only found evidence of progress to integrating issues of gender and social inclusion through STAR-Ghana civil society partners.⁸⁷ 22 of the 45 projects that STAR-Ghana funded under its election call specifically targeted exclusion issues. Election advocacy issues successfully advanced by STAR-Ghana election partners included:

- Ghana Federation of the Disabled (GFD) supported the design of 3,400 tactile ballot jackets and 5,000 sample ballot papers and trained an average of 40 persons in each of the 170 districts nationwide;
- 119 voting centres out of 180 centres monitored by members of GFD were accessible;
- 100 deaf and hearing impaired persons (40 females and 60 males) were trained to train other 1,000 deaf trainer members on the electoral process;
- a total of 2,605 persons with disabilities and their assistants were sensitised on the BVR exercise and empowered to participate in their civic duties;
- 30,000 materials produced by the Independent Election Commission for people with psycho-social disabilities participating in the BVR exercise were distributed to identified sections of the public; and
- 200 copies of accessibility guidelines were developed, produced and distributed to Electoral Commission officials.

Along with people living with disabilities, STAR-Ghana partners worked with youth on reducing election violence and maintaining peace; mining communities and politicians to discuss issues on mining resulting in an improved manifesto that reflects environment, mining and community rights; and with female candidates to increase awareness of the need for female parliamentarians and local leaders.⁸⁸

CODEO published in its final statement (Nov 29th, 2012) on the biometric registration, delivering an overall positive assessment of the process and the quality of the list: *“CODEO is of the view that while the Biometric Voter Register may not be a perfect document, its quality is substantial and therefore an improvement that would contribute to credible and peaceful 2012 elections.”*⁸⁹ CODEO concluded that the registration process was generally inclusive, although some lower turnouts were observed in remote rural areas, and that procedures were generally followed with consistency.

There is room for improvement in regards to a more integrated gender-social inclusion approach.

- GESP could have considered engaging with the Ministry of Women and / or Women’s Affair Committees to scale up capacity to address gender inclusion related issues pre, during and post elections.
- There was a lack of gender specific indicators presented in the GESP logframe. The civil society STAR-Ghana component did assess ‘demand side activity amongst STAR-Ghana election partners on strengthening the gender-social inclusion enabling environment’ during elections. The evaluation team however would have preferred the logframe and the GESP monitoring framework take a stronger gender-social inclusion focus within each component.
- GESP components could have adopted a gender-social inclusion approach when considering developing component activities, looking at gender and inequality related election issues and how components will

⁸⁶ EC Management Team interview meeting notes, February 12, 2013.

⁸⁷ STAR-Ghana Grant Partner reports and results based framework have a Gender and Social Inclusion category in which all partners have to track and make a priority on how it can align and connect to their overall project outcome / objective.

⁸⁸ STAR-Ghana Grant Partners Quarterly Reports

⁸⁹ CODEO Final Statement on the Observation of Nationwide Biometric Voter Registration Exercise (November 29, 2012).

address them. For example, the Electoral Commission was aware of the male-dominance of the political parties that remained an impeding factor in having an equal balance of female and male participation in election related activities and training.

- There is a further need to build the capacity of media on gender-social inclusion reporting. This is an essential element of building awareness and a more enabling environment for progress on gender-social inclusion issues during the elections. The STAR-Ghana component has supported this to some degree but it could be scaled up further.

Conclusions on the Coverage of the GESP

The effectiveness of the programme’s targeting of inequities related to participation in the electoral process was mixed. The civil society interventions led through STAR Ghana demonstrated a focus on addressing inequality and promoting gender equality and social inclusion. As well, CODEO published a statement that indicated that the registration process was inclusive. The other interventions although aware of the target to achieve greater female representation and inclusion were unable to achieve a balanced representation in training efforts. This in part is due to the make-up of the Security and Electoral Commission components that are largely male dominated institutions.

Key Recommendations on the Coverage of the GESP

Future programme designs should consider opportunities to highlight the importance of fair and inclusive elections. Component workplans and trainings should demonstrate strong evidence of this commitment and seek to integrate issues of gender and social inclusion in key aspects of the project.

There is room for a number of improvements in regards to a more integrated gender-social inclusion approach:

- GESP could have considered engaging with the Ministry of Women and / or Women’s Affair Committees to scale up capacity to address gender inclusion related issues pre, during and post elections.
- The GESP logframe should have included a greater number of gender specific indicators.
- GESP components could have adopted a gender-social inclusion approach when considering developing component activities, looking at gender and inequality related election issues and how components will address them.
- There is a further need to build the capacity of media on gender-social inclusion reporting. This is an essential element of building awareness and a more enabling environment for progress on gender-social inclusion issues during the elections.

3.6 Impact

3.6.1 What were the perceived benefits to the recipients of the training provided under the programme?

Overall, the training provided to polling agents, high court judges, security and civil society organisations has increased the knowledge obtained and skills of these individuals and organisations since the beginning of GESP⁹⁰. The trained participants were able to effectively apply knowledge and engage actively in election activities. Those interviewed were clearly aware of the election procedures, their specific duties, responsibilities and their capacity to deliver on election day was more successful as a result of the training provided.

Examples of capacity change include:

Electoral Commission: Trained polling agents report that the training equipped them with the appropriate knowledge and understanding of their roles, responsibilities and limits in the conduct of elections at the polling station and instilled them with confidence in the performance of their duties. A survey of polling agents highlights that polling agents felt the training was especially important in instructing them:

- how to conduct themselves;
- the correct processes;
- the importance of vigilance; and

⁹⁰ Polling Agents Survey, EC CSO Interview Notes Feb 12th, STAR Ghana CSO Interview Notes February 13th & 14th; Conducting A Monitoring And Evaluation For British High Commission’s Election Security Project 2012/2013; Judiciary Interview Notes February 14th

- the applicable rules and regulations.

Importantly, trained party agents did not interfere or attempt to usurp the official duties of the Electoral Commission presiding officers. As they were instructed and understood from their training, their role on election day was strictly limited to representing their party or candidate in ensuring the integrity of the process at the polling station; while they had a right to register an objection, they had no authority to decide on matters relating to the conduct of the election or the declaration of the results.⁹¹

Judicial Service: Both judges and courtroom staff reported that the training helped to update their knowledge of current election adjudication laws and procedures and heightened their awareness of the urgency and sensitivity of expediting the handling of election petitions. As evidence of this new sense of urgency regarding election adjudication, election petitions were separated from the general case docket, assigned a separate desk within the Registry, and processed on a ‘fast track’ basis.⁹²

The training done by the Electoral Commission for smaller civil society organisations (e.g., federations, associations) was well received. All focus group participants expressed that because of the Electoral Commission training there was greater public awareness, participation and turnout for voting.⁹³ Some of participants indicated that they already had general understanding but that the Electoral Commission training enhanced their knowledge base further and gave them “the inspiration to bring the knowledge to their homes, communities, schools and colleagues”.⁹⁴ They expressed that “had they not had access to the capacity building of this nature they would not have had the opportunity to develop these civic education skills.”⁹⁵ The CSOs expressed that while they did not feel as confident in their civic education duties before the training, they subsequently had greater knowledge about the voting procedures and understood the BVR process and the machine and what to expect from polling agents and staff on election day. *“We were prepared to know what the EC was doing so we could share it with our communities and networks (CSO focus group discussion comment).”*⁹⁶

Participants of the Electoral Commission training gained knowledge about voter registration, how to use a thumbprint, who would be at the polling station, how the polling staff count the papers, and the procedures of the ballot paper. This election training and knowledge was then shared more widely back in their local communities, through local dialogues (e.g., durbars, soccer matches, Sunday mass, and schools). For example, the Muslim Women’s Federation (MWF) had a real challenge of bringing Muslim women out of the house to vote. After the training the MWF spoke to other Muslim women and importantly their husbands to encourage wives to vote, explaining the process and educating them on their right to vote, what the BVR machine was, etc. There were many communities and citizens who believed that the BVR machine would cause illness and the training helped demystify these worries and concerns. People became familiar with what to expect and *“the confidence of communities in the voting process was evident particularly when Muslim women went out to vote where before our training and discussions with them they were not going to vote.”*⁹⁷

3.6.2 In retrospect, what changes, if any, would beneficiaries have sought from the training provided?

Several changes were recommended by those who had received training.⁹⁸ A brief summary of the recommendations is provided below.

Electoral Commission Polling Agents

The Electoral Commission polling agents who were trained indicated that:

- There was a wide variation in the length of training from place to place - ranging from a single 2-hour training session to other polling agents having two separate training sessions, each lasting 4 hours. Some

⁹¹ Polling Agents Focus Group Discussion, February 12, 2013.

⁹² Trained Judicial Service Staff Focus Group Discussion, February 13, 2013. Trained Superior Court Judges Focus Group Discussion, February 14, 2013.

⁹³ EC CSO focus group discussion, February 12, 2013

⁹⁴ EC CSO focus group discussion, February 12, 2013

⁹⁵ EC CSO focus group discussion, February 12, 2013

⁹⁶ EC CSO focus group discussion, February 12, 2013

⁹⁷ EC CSO focus group discussion comment, February 12, 2013

⁹⁸ Focus group discussions with CODEO (Feb 11), Polling Agents (12th), EC CSOs (12th), February 2013

focus group participants and survey respondents indicated that the length of some trainings was too short.⁹⁹

- 13% of all respondents to the open-ended question “If there was one change you could make to any aspect of the training, what would it be?” responded that the training was scheduled too close to the election.¹⁰⁰
- The methodology was typically by lecture and trainers usually read verbatim from the relevant portions of the “Guide for polling agents”, although the opportunity for “Q & A” allowed for some discussion. Training participants were of the view that trainees would have gained more from the training if it had been designed to include simulation and hypothetical cases as well as use of audio-visuals. The lecture plus Q & A method favoured trainees with better literacy abilities, yet such trainees were the ones for whom the training offered little that they could not obtain on their own from reading the distributed booklet.¹⁰¹
- Trainees complained about the poor level of competence of some of their trainers.¹⁰²
- Some trainee participants to the focus group discussions found the content of the training limiting. Training was confined to the portions of the Guide dealing with polling agents. Some trainees believe, however, that polling agents should have received instruction or training on the entire election-day process and the roles, authority, and responsibilities of the various players along the process, including security personnel and collation centre operations. In hindsight, trainees also believe they should have been trained on the Pink Sheet and that the trainers should have used sample forms or copy as demonstration in the training.¹⁰³
- Some trainee participants to the focus group discussions were of the opinion that they, as well as Electoral Commission polling staff, also should have been trained to troubleshoot and fix some of the routine problems or tasks associated with the BVR machines, such as how to replace a battery. Inability to identify or fix routine operational problems of the BVR machines caused unnecessarily long disruptions and postponement of voting in some polling stations on election day.¹⁰⁴
- Trainees would have liked to be trained together with the temporary Electoral Commission polling staff who were assigned election day duty as Presiding Officers.

Judicial Staff

For the Judicial staff, suggested changes to their training of election petitions and law was minimal. They were very positive about the content, methodology and approach used. The only change they suggested was that the training be extended in future to include court cashiers, as they are the first point-of-contact for filers of election petitions.¹⁰⁵ Similarly, since election case processing and adjudication applies to cases that are criminal in nature, it was suggested that the Police, who are responsible for commencing criminal cases, be included among future training participants.

CSOs trained by the Electoral Commission

CSOs trained by the Electoral Commission were overall very positive about the training and how it supported their ability to carry out civic education on the election process and what to expect during election day.¹⁰⁶ However, there were changes suggested which may support future training:

- Practical materials to use for civic education were not provided to participants of the training. For example, the ballot paper would have been useful to show communities on how to vote and what to expect. A photo of the BVR machine or a poster illustrating the BVR was not given but it would have been helpful to have these in order to educate communities about the BVR machine and how it supports the registration of citizens and that is not a health hazard.

⁹⁹ 10% of respondents to the open to the open-ended question “If there was one change you could make to any aspect of the training, what would it be?” responded that the training was too short or that more time was required to cover the materials adequately. EC Polling Agents Survey.

¹⁰⁰ EC Polling Agent Survey.

¹⁰¹ Focus group discussions with Polling Agents, February 12, 2013.

¹⁰² Focus group discussions with Polling Agents, February 12, 2013.

¹⁰³ Focus group discussions with Polling Agents, February 12, 2013; roughly 8% of respondents to the EC Polling Agent Survey stated that they would have been able to perform their role as well without the EC polling agent training.

¹⁰⁴ Focus group discussions with Polling Agents, February 12, 2013.

¹⁰⁵ Trained Judicial Service Staff Focus Group Discussion, February 13, 2013.

¹⁰⁶ EC CSO focus group discussion, February 12, 2013

- It was agreed by all participants that the training should begin much earlier. The suggestion was to have training 6 months before elections as opposed to 1 or 2 months before. All participants would have liked more time for civic education activities to have a greater reach and build awareness for more people and communities.

3.6.3 How did the GESP activities impact on beneficiaries' performance/ achievements relating to the election process?

Trained polling agents generally credited the Electoral Commission training they received with equipping them with the knowledge to carry out their tasks diligently and responsibly on election day¹⁰⁷, especially in not exceeding the limits of their role or interfering with the authority of the Presiding Officer. In some instances, trained polling agents relying on their training were able to detect errors or discrepancies attributable to others, including the Presiding Officer.¹⁰⁸

All trained judges and courtroom staff shared that the training has raised their sensitivity to the urgency of handling election petitions expeditiously. Court registries have already created separate desks to handle election petitions. As to whether the actual adjudication of the cases will proceed with exceptional speed once the hearing of the petitions commence, the judges say it is too early to tell. The fact that lawyers are now filing their election petitions properly and thus avoiding dismissal of their cases is however a notable and positive development which the judges and court registrars attribute to the publication and timely dissemination of the revised election adjudication manual.

Supporting CSOs through STAR-Ghana did promote greater public participation and reduced violence¹⁰⁹. STAR-Ghana election partners (CSOs) engaged officials, security, local leadership and political parties ensuring that duty bearers and communities were able to meet and discuss key concerns and priority issues which citizens felt the running parties needed to address during elections. For example:

- election party leaders met with young people and networks expressing a strong commitment to engaging young people and dialogued on issues of election violence;
- several of the STAR-Ghana funded partners worked on sensitising youth and having a wide collaboration with traditional authorities, police and civil society - "It was a big change to see this peace and collaboration with key players in our communities." (STAR-Ghana focus group discussion in Northern Ghana, Tamale); and
- Pan-Africa Organisation for Sustainable Development (POSDEV) organised and held a political 'love walk' in Western Ghana which was organised between CSOs, the Electoral Commission, police, and political parties.¹¹⁰ This encouraged political parties to use public education to promote peaceful elections and ensure the more excluded and vulnerable of Ghanaian society get a voice.

Supporting CSOs enhanced civic/voter education and turn out.¹¹¹ For example:

- GFD was able to influence public participation through the work with the Electoral Commission to have ramps at polling sites and ensure that polling stations are laid out in such a way for those persons who live with a disability can come out and vote.

Supporting CSOs enhanced and influenced policy and party manifestos¹¹². For example:

- STAR-Ghana CSOs influenced political party manifestos by joint working with political parties in developing and inputting into manifestos such as the policy mapping of education issues to tease out critical and dominant policy prescriptions in education (since 2006). These included the following:
 - The International Social Development Centre (ISODEC) (Social Pact on long term development plan);
 - Ghana Federation for the Disabled (GFD) (electoral franchise of persons with psychosocial disabilities)

¹⁰⁷ 82.7% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that the EC training "positively changed [their] knowledge and awareness of [their] duties as a polling agent". EC Polling Agent Survey.

¹⁰⁸ DFID Annual Review, EC Polling Agent Survey

¹⁰⁹ STAR Ghana Quarterly and End of Project Reports; CSO Interview Notes February 12 & 13th, 2013; STAR Ghana CSO Quarterly Reports

¹¹⁰ POSDEV Media Clipping – The Mirror, September 22, 2012 "Political Love Fest at Agona Nkwanta"

¹¹¹ STAR Ghana CSO Quarterly Reports; STAR Ghana Quarterly and End of Project Reports

¹¹² STAR Ghana CSO Quarterly Reports; STAR Ghana Quarterly and End of Project Reports

- National Catholic Secretariat/ Institute of Economic Affairs (NCS/IEA) (passage of Presidential Transition bill)
- Child Rights International (CRI) (Education policy priorities in political party manifestoes)
- Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) (constituency re-demarcation, extension of BVR exercise)
- Legal Rights Centre (LRC) (specialised courts for elections adjudication)
- Centre for Environmental Impact Analysis (CEIA/WACAM) (mining priorities in political party manifestoes)
- Centre for the Promotion of Democratic Governance (CENPRODEG) (women centred priorities in political party Manifestoes),
- Development Gateway International (DEGAIN) (youth focused priorities in political party Manifestoes); and
- Alliance for Reproductive Health Rights (ARHR) (reproductive health priorities in political party manifestoes).
- Grantees that made the most traction here include CRI that ensured the uptake of 7 of its policy recommendations in to the NDC manifesto, GFD that secured the electoral franchise for persons with psychosocial disabilities, NCS/IEA with the passage of the Presidential Transition Bill and appointment of an administrator, and IDEG and LRC that contributed to advocacy and consultations with the respective IGIs to push for extension of the BVR exercise to avoid disenfranchising some citizens and in the set of specialised courts for elections adjudication respectively.

STAR-Ghana support to media partners brought about more professional media handling of the political campaigning on airwaves through media monitoring. The media sector is largely unregulated in Ghana and several cases of inflammatory language were reported on talk shows broadcast by the two main party-affiliated FM radios stations. In spite of this, media partners undertook various initiatives (e.g. MWFA media monitoring) that were successful in assuring that media adopted a more professional approach in their general elections coverage compared to previous elections.¹¹³

The election security training was relevant for the security activities that took place during election day. Eighty-five per cent of respondents from the security training indicated that they had been more confident, learned new ideas on security related matters, were able to be with the public in a professional manner being more tolerant, neutral and capable.¹¹⁴

3.6.4 Did GESP contribute to a free and fair election process?¹¹⁵

The Ghana 2012 elections were judged by domestic and international observers to reflect the will of the voters¹¹⁶ and it is the determination of this evaluation that GESP contributed to this result. GESP activities were designed to address key challenges in the 2012 election and GESP by and large successfully delivered its activities and outputs. Additionally, the key Outcome-level assumptions underlying the programme theory remained valid.

GESP operated as a supportive mechanism to the elections via its components, providing a whole series of capacity building inputs to each component key stakeholders/ target beneficiaries. Through this important mechanism, GESP has achieved grassroots national outreach; supported the Judiciary to achieve handling of election disputes more effectively; supported the Electoral Commission to support civic education and local organisations to spread and disseminate information about the election process, BVR and respect for election

¹¹³ STAR-Ghana Grant Partner (MWFA) Quarterly Report and End of Project Report

¹¹⁴ Nana Ama Oppong-Duah. Conducting an M&E for British High Commission Security Project 2012 – 2013.

¹¹⁵ Out of the 4 Impact Research Questions, this is the most challenging to respond to and give a final assessment on. Largely because at the time of research and analysis (February 2013) the election results were being disputed in court till August 29th, 2013. Given this constraint the evaluation team assessed this question using contribution analysis with verification of interviews, polling agent survey and final documentation from components in July 2013.

¹¹⁶ African Union Election Observer Mission to the 7th December 2012 General Elections in the Republic of Ghana, Preliminary Statement (December 8, 2012) (“[T]he 7th December 2012 General Elections in the Republic of Ghana were conducted in a peaceful and credible manner and was largely a reflection of the wishes and aspiration of the people of Ghana.”); Ghana Presidential and Parliamentary Elections Report of the Commonwealth Group (February 15, 2013) (“The 2012 elections in Ghana met many of the benchmarks for democratic elections. While aspects of the administrative system and the environment for the polls can still be improved further these elections were credible.”); CODEO Preliminary Statement on Ghana’s December 7 on 8, 2012 Presidential and General Elections (December 9, 2012) (“[I]n spite of the logistical and technical challenges, CODEO is of the view that the December 7 Presidential and General Elections have been well-conducted.”)

results.¹¹⁷ The capacity building and ‘training’ approach through five key institutions has been a key distinguishing feature of GESP that has contributed to the election process.

GESP provided grants (for 45 projects) to civil society organisations to implement election focused projects which thematically were decided by the grantees themselves and provided training to support election management, observation and prevention of election-related violence to 273,490 polling agents, 199 judges, 2,524 CSOs, 650 trained overseers / observers and 16,090 police officers.¹¹⁸

Individually, GESP components and projects have worked on all levels of governance processes from the community based organisations engaging at the sub-district levels, to the national level organisations operating at the regional and national levels, including engaging with Traditional Authorities, local parties, security forces and the media. There have been some notable examples of success with individual component projects as outlined above. Although not every component activity has been successful in the relatively short timeframe of its operation, as a whole the GESP components report significant change in their own capacity to understand, influence and support delivering free, fair and peaceful elections.¹¹⁹ They have therefore been affected beyond their individual component - project cycles, and have been equipped to implement and support free, fair and peaceful elections in the longer term.

The GESP Theory of Change was based upon a number of assumptions, many of which were not within the capacity of evaluation team to assess, both for reasons of time and availability of evidence. However, the key assumptions upon which the logframe outcome statement was based (and which are relevant to the Theory of Change) remained valid: the political environment remained favourable for free, fair and peaceful elections¹²⁰, there is a proactive and vibrant civil society¹²¹, and donors are committed to building and supporting with the Electoral Commission and other state institutions elections which are peaceful and professionally run¹²².

Conclusions on the Impact of the GESP

The design and architecture of GESP has proven to be an effective and impactful approach in supporting a peaceful election process. Aligning with GoG priorities and working alongside key state institutions along with the citizens of Ghana through a strong grant mechanism (STAR-Ghana) and supporting these key components with a capacity building strategy has proven successful. There is general agreement amongst informed stakeholders that it is through GESP support that election disputes were handled more effectively and that voter education and participation of excluded groups was greater than any other election. In this regard, the GESP achieved its outcome objectives and contributed in a substantial way towards a 6th consecutive peaceful election process.

Recommendation on the Impact of the GESP

Future training and capacity building for large numbers will need to be well thought out and given appropriate time as quality can be compromised due to the large numbers that need training.

3.7 Sustainability

3.7.1 To what extent will the results and benefits of the programme continue to be realised beyond the 2012 election process?

In assessing GESP’s sustainability, it is important to recognise that the programme is intended to act as demonstration of support to key institutions that can be maintained and replicated without large scale external assistance. Consequently, the key test of sustainability is whether the support was appropriate, viable and

¹¹⁷ See sections 3.3.1 (Table 7), 3.3.6, 3.6.1, and 3.6.3.

¹¹⁸ See section 3.3.1 (Table 6).

¹¹⁹ Component End of Project Reports, Interview notes February 2013

¹²⁰ STAR Ghana CSO Focus Group Discussion Notes February 13 -14th, 2013; AU Election Observer Mission Preliminary Statement (“The Political and electoral environment before and on election day was calm and peaceful.”); The Carter Center Election Observation Mission Preliminary Statement (December 9, 2012) (“In the months leading up to the elections, the incidents of electoral violence decreased and the general political environment improved significantly. This can in part be attributed to the involvement of civil society organizations, especially the religious institutions, and the expression of their views regarding increased confidence in democratic and electoral processes.”)

¹²¹ STAR Ghana CSO Focus Group Discussion Notes February 13 -14th, 2013. With respect to the election and governance activities, civil society remained involved throughout the 2012 election cycle, as evidenced by the prominent role of CODEO and its members in the election cycle, the role of civil society members in organising debates during the election and the high response rate to the STAR-Ghana election call.

¹²² See section 3.2.1 for discussion of the donor support to the EC; Interview with DFID, UN, EU, February 7, 8, 15th, 2013. Meeting with EC, February 12, 2013.

replicable, and whether the supported institutions and stakeholders will be in a position to use this support in the absence of a future DFID electoral support programme.

GESP's approach focused on particular state institutions (Electoral Commission, Police, Judiciary) with a parallel process of supporting civil society and election observers. This combination of capacity building and support of various key actors for a smoother election process are now somewhat in place. Some of the changes brought about by GESP are likely to be sustained without further DFID assistance, especially where GESP has instilled knowledge and capacity in institutions and organisations, or facilitated relationships and networks, that will be utilised during the next election cycle. For example, CSOs are now well versed in civic education and violence prevention, the police now have equipment which can be used in the future for securing a stable election environment, and the Electoral Commission polling agents if volunteering in the next election¹²³ can bring forward their knowledge and experience from the election and BVR process. Investment in strategic programme development of GESP with various stakeholders in the design phase has led to an innovative, sustainable approach that meets differing sets of needs. DFID has taken a facilitative approach to working with these actors as opposed to a 'doing' approach. This means that relationships and skills are left behind and that there is minimal dependence on DFID as a donor.

GESP's model of support to institutions of the Judiciary, Security, Electoral Commission and civil society should contribute to long-term sustainability. GESP has been careful to avoid creating dependency on the programme by limiting its funding to time bound and specified activities, and by supporting capacity development through training. Those interviewed such as CODEO observers and civil society groups on the training they received expressed that they can operate independently and no longer need further training support.¹²⁴

However, it is clear that the Electoral Commission still has a long way to go in supporting its election staff to ensure voting day procedures and processes run smoothly. The sustainability of the training itself is less certain, as it depends on parties and candidates retaining the same polling agents from one election to the next.¹²⁵ For the Judiciary, the Manual is beginning to serve as a desk reference for lawyers and candidates involved in elections and election disputes. Subsequent changes or additions to the law can easily be incorporated into the Manual by way of periodic revision. In addition, support in the form of capital equipment will enhance the institution's capacity beyond the term of GESP. Low turnover in the judiciary and Judicial Service generally also means that the value of the training will be retained in the organisation beyond the immediate or short-term.

Greater sustainability will require key institutions to come together and support each other's objectives. The Electoral Commission, NCCE, Judiciary, Police, Media Commission, Civil Society all have a vested interest in supporting a transparent and fair election. However, the coordination and cooperation amongst the institutions remains poor. In general, these institutions do not cooperate and work within their own mandates and for their own priorities. Bringing a number of groups to this level will be a critical test of the viability and sustainability of GESP's approach. Reflecting the level of development of cooperation and partnership. GESP did not give much attention to the types of support required to create 'election partnerships', including partnership development and capacity building to manage and mobilise funds.

GESP's work with the Electoral Commission poses particular challenges for sustaining the benefits so far achieved. The turnover of staff for elections is significant – as most are called upon short-term and only when elections come, it is difficult to sustain capacities and justifies GESP's strategy of focusing on institutional systems building and working with the Electoral Commission staff to a degree. Realistically it will take changes internally within the Electoral Commission and other institutions for improvements in the Electoral Commission and a partnership approach across the institutions to become embedded. An immediate priority is to ensure that the valuable experience gained by GESP will not be lost when the programme closes. It would have been desirable to deliver an approach that enhanced a partnership agreement or model to maintain and further develop the lessons and experience gained by GESP components and to transfer this to future elections and support programmes.

¹²³ 39.7% of respondents in the Polling Agent Survey indicated that they had previously served as a polling agent.

¹²⁴ CODEO Focus Group Discussion, February 11, 2013; STAR-Ghana Focus Group Discussions February 12 & 13, 2013.

¹²⁵ Information obtained through the Polling Agent survey indicates it is common for polling agents to subsequently perform the role, but the process of polling agent selection is not sufficiently understood to be certain that this will be the case in the future.

Conclusions on the Sustainability of the GESP

The GESP activities were delivered with a focus on sustainably - building the capacity of individuals and institutions without creating an over reliance on donor funding. While this approach was appreciated by many of the programme beneficiaries, the nature of the election process means that it is beyond the capability of the programme to ensure that these benefits are carried forward to the next election process.

In order to improve the sustainability of election support activities, future election support programmes need to take a strategic approach to facilitative partnership between government institutions and other election bodies in the design stage.

Recommendation on the Sustainability of the GESP

In order to improve the sustainability of election support activities, future election support programmes need to take a strategic approach to facilitative partnership between government institutions and other election bodies in the design stage.

3.8 Comparative assessment

3.8.1 Would other countries benefit from a similar programme of election support?

GESP has provided the evaluation team and collaborators in DFID with much-needed learning and innovation. It is hoped that readers will learn from the DFID Ghana experience, from what has worked, as well as from what has worked less well, in order to ensure that future election support is of the quality expected and inclusive as it needs to be. A key feature that other countries can benefit from is the design of GESP and its approach. Specifically the design:

- assessed previous lessons and experiences from the 2008 election;
- identified key areas which would be supportive towards supporting a peaceful election process;
- identified key institutions and already existing mechanisms which could operate effectively and efficiently;
- developed a capacity building strategy / approach for each component to ensure delivery on the day of election.

Other factors specific to the Ghanaian context also contributed to the success of the programme and should be considered when adopting this model in other contexts. Specifically:

- there was buy in from state institutions such as the Electoral Commission, security agencies and the Judiciary from the outset of the programme and GESP's objectives were aligned with those of the GoG;
- the civil service (including prominently the EC) is highly professional with adequate levels of transparency and accountability; and
- the Ghanaian security forces are professional and demonstrated high levels of vigilance, thereby contributing to a peaceful environment on election day.

Finally, a factor which hindered the delivery of GESP is related to the design as well. There is a need for an electoral cycle approach that supports a more encompassing timeframe embedding capacity building and training well in advance and as part of the cycle. This would require moving beyond a yearly project focus and take a cyclical long-term approach to election support. The following section on lessons presents this in more detail.

In disseminating and informing other DFID country offices of GESP outcomes and learning, several options are being considered, including:

1. amongst DFID Governance Advisors hold a Whitehall – DFID Ghana meeting on main lessons emerging from GESP which could be considered and adapted in various contexts and settings for upcoming elections (e.g. Malawi);
2. publication of GESP evaluation on the DFID Website and shared broadly with Donor Partners in Ghana;
3. DFID to possibly coordinate a meeting of GESP component leads and EWG leads to review and assess the support provided, lessons learnt and consider alternative approaches to improve future support;

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4. CDD/CODEO belongs to a regional (West African) network of election observers and it would be useful to engage with CODEO on sharing lessons and learning from the Ghana BVR experience within their network;
5. STAR-Ghana to hold Election Grant Partner Convention to review and assess overall impact and findings of the election theme results. STAR-Ghana plans to carry out a specific thematic evaluation on its election support; and
6. An Election Security Conference may be held amongst trained police and security officials looking at their approach and impact on supporting the delivery of a peaceful and conflict free election.

4 Lessons learned

The Table below summarises key lessons within the evaluation criteria that align to the main findings in Section 3.

Table 8: Key Lessons Learned

Relevance	<p>Bringing political parties into GESP in a more strategic coordinated way, whether as a component or as an informal but well established body/platform would have helped to support further buy-in, understanding and coordination around election process events and issues. Political parties play important roles in the organisation of government. They matter for the organisation of elections. Donors had mentioned the importance of working with political actors directly but there is a challenge in doing this as donors cannot directly fund political parties.</p> <p>Ensure a robust political analysis, analysing risk and building on previous election lessons when developing a business case for an electoral support programme.</p>
Coordination	<p>The EWG could have done more to harmonise efforts and specific election priorities in order to bridge gaps and nudge opportunities for various partners (e.g., Electoral Commission, civil society, security sector) to combine efforts. The EWG can with its various donor and state institutions and civil society actors enhance and build an argument for gradualism – pursuing state-building and democratisation simultaneously in small increments. So that national political stakeholders (Electoral Commission, security sector, CODEO, civil society, judiciary), continue to decide on key priorities and what support will be most needed towards a peaceful, fair and free election.</p>
Effectiveness	<p>Issues that were raised during implementation had mostly to do with two things: time (election pace and project length) and institutional (capacity and coordination). Please see the detailed critical lesson on the election project cycle and component harmonisation of workstream lesson after the table.</p>
Efficiency	<p>In the future, better VFM could be achieved through a more comprehensive and systematic approach of the full spectrum of programme risks - including conflict, political, social and financial risks.</p>
Coverage	<p>The state institutions that were supported are heavily male-oriented with some female presence (e.g. Police, Electoral Commission and Judiciary). Knowing the institutional make-up and challenges of gender equity and social inclusion it was important to have constant discussions, consultations and negotiations among GESP stakeholders to understand how they were working to promote inclusion and meet targets of gender equality through their training needed to happen more regularly. However, more than discussions it was important right from the onset to set realistic targets and come up with inclusion strategies for more inclusive training. Components should be given a workplan to engage with and be measured against to ensure understanding of the importance of gender equity and social inclusion in practice.</p>
Impact	<p>It would have been helpful to have a detailed training analysis and workplan overall for the GESP that was aligned to key outcomes that GESP wanted to achieve in its capacity building support to state institutions. Many challenges around training occurred due to numbers needing to be trained and training taking place too close to election day. A capacity building framework would have supported a more coherent approach on content and quality of training implemented and delivered.</p>

In discussions with key stakeholders, one of the main overall lessons that was regularly expressed was to start early.

There is a need for an **electoral cycle approach** that supports a more encompassing timeframe embedding capacity building and training well in advance and as part of the cycle. This would require moving beyond a yearly project focus and take a cyclical long-term approach to election support – with three phases: the pre-election phase, voting phase and post-election phase. Components and stakeholders overall pointed to the importance that

support to elections needs to not be time bound and restricted to a certain stage of the election. There are opportunities to work well before the election year, particularly with voter education as well as providing MIS or IT guidance to the quality of the Electoral Commission systems in place.

An example raised by donor partners was to keep the EWG post-election and keep the dialogue alive that can support lesson-learning environment, using the working group as a platform or space for institutions and civil society to share and discuss key concerns and challenges. Institutions and donors can share priorities and workplans of their electoral development assistance, allowing for donors to understand well in advance of the next election what the plans and focus of support will be.

Table 9: Elements and Phases of an Electoral Cycle

PRE-ELECTION PHASE	VOTING PHASE	POST ELECTION
<p>Planning & Implementation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Election Date • Security • Budget & Finance • Logistics • Judiciary <p>Training & Education</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Electoral Commission • Judiciary • Security • Observers • Volunteers • Citizen groups 	<p>Voting operations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Voting • Polling site logistics • Voter Registration <p>Verification of Results</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vote counting • Vote tabulation • Vote verification / result • Complaint / Objection of Results • Litigation • Official Results 	<p>Legal Framework</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Constitution • Electoral Bodies • Electoral System <p>Evaluation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review Training • Review of Public Institutions • Review Voter Turn out • Audits • Review Campaign Expenditure • Review of donor support <p>Capability Strengthening</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support key Institutions • Support key platforms

The **second lesson** that components shared is that more coordination of GESP components would have helped a **harmonisation of work streams**. Learning and sharing what components were doing would have potentially created opportunities to align work. For example, linkages could have been exploited between:

- the Legal Resource Centre (STAR-Ghana CSO) and the Judiciary on court case or petitions;
- election laws and civic education on the petition process;
- Electoral Commission priorities with STAR-Ghana civil society actors (particularly media) in order to re-enforce civic education and participation in the election process and/or linking election observation of CODEO; and
- Electoral Commission registration process and STAR-Ghana voter registration coordination.

Coordination and collaboration targets and sharing of materials could have enhanced the work of the three components that aim to increase voter turnout, public participation and a smooth election process. Electoral Commission trained CSOs did not connect to STAR-Ghana CSOs on voter education. Yet the opportunity to link and discuss priority regions and focal areas would have been more effective in the reach that CSOs had and the tangible contribution to increase citizen confidence in the register.

The police-security component and STAR-Ghana CSOs could have done to coordinate approaches in regards to understanding what priorities the police-security component had and how CSOs who were working on reducing violence and awareness raising on peaceful elections. Coordination around understanding where the hot spots for tensions were and how both components could prioritise approaches and engaging vulnerable youth did not happen.

Overall, these are just a few examples of connections that were not made due to the lack of a coordinating function within GESP itself even though the EWG had the opportunity to influence this and bring component managers together.

The following are specific lessons and learning applicable to each of the components:

Electoral Commission Lessons

- Trained party polling agents must go hand-in-hand with well-trained and competent Electoral Commission polling staff. The Electoral Commission was widely criticised by separate focus groups of party polling agents and CODEO observers for the overall low calibre and poor performance of its polling station staff (specifically, Presiding Officers) on election day.¹²⁶ The Electoral Commission itself acknowledges as much.¹²⁷ The Electoral Commission appears to have under-invested in the recruitment and training of official (temporary) polling station staff, possibly believing or assuming that the credibility of the election-day process and ballot count is adequately secured by the presence, vigilance, and participation of rival party agents in polling station activities. Trained party polling agents, however, cannot make up for poorly trained Electoral Commission polling staff.

While the Electoral Commission's practice of relying on temporary hires to serve as Presiding Officers may be justifiable in light of the episodic or cyclical occurrence of general elections, it is important that the Electoral Commission recruit such staff from a pool of applicants with dependable numeracy and literacy skills and invest sufficient time and resources to train them in their election-day duties and tasks. It is not clear by what criteria and method the Electoral Commission's temporary polling staff were selected or why persons who served in similar capacities in past elections were not rehired. The value of any training investment made in party polling agents is unlikely to be realised when the Electoral Commission polling staff, who alone possess decision-making authority at the polling station, are themselves unqualified or ill-trained.

- No part of the election-day process or chain of activities must be taken for granted. The Electoral Commission had assumed, due to the novelty of the BVR and the controversy surrounding its introduction, that the BVR would present the greatest challenge or source of difficulty in the 2012 elections. Consequently, it concentrated much of its attention on BVR, possibly downplaying other routine or mundane matters.¹²⁸ While some BVR machines malfunctioned on Election Day, these mechanical problems were generally easily resolved once the cause was identified. Instead of BVR, it is the seemingly simple Pink Sheet, about which the Electoral Commission had paid little attention, which now appears to have generated much of the post-election dispute.
- There was significant variation in the quality of party polling agents. While some local party officials employed literacy and numeracy tests in order to select their party polling agents, the general practice is to select on the basis of demonstrated loyalty to the local party bosses. Although polling agents who must represent a party's or candidate's interests on election day must necessarily be selected by the respective parties and candidates, the actions and omissions of party polling agents also have a direct and significant bearing on the effectiveness and credibility of the Electoral Commission officials. For this reason, it should be possible for the Electoral Commission to specify in advance some basic numeracy and literacy requirements, as well as completion of the Electoral Commission training, as a condition for serving as a party polling agent on election day.
- This being the first time elections were being conducted in Ghana using BVR, the Electoral Commission should have anticipated problems and hiccups and made appropriate provision for resolving or dealing with these on election day, including training its polling staff to troubleshoot and fix minor technical problems with the BVR system. CODEO's BVR observation findings and reports detailed these problems, and CODEO appropriately communicated its concerns and findings, with recommendations, to Electoral Commission officials and other stakeholders. The Electoral Commission, however, failed to take timely and appropriate remedial or preventative action in response to CODEO's BVR observation reports and findings. With so much in Ghana's elections resting on public and parties' trust and confidence in the competence of the Electoral Commission,¹²⁹ this omission on the Electoral Commission's part proved costly on election day. In particular, the Electoral Commission's unprecedented step of postponing or extending voting in several polling stations by a day, primarily due to delays caused by problems with BVR machines (many of which turned out to be minor) created public anxiety and raised questions and doubts about the Electoral Commission's competence.¹³⁰

¹²⁶ Notes of meeting with Polling Agent, CODEO, CDD February 2013

¹²⁷ Notes of Meeting with EC, February 12, 2013.

¹²⁸ Notes of Meeting with EC, February 12, 2013.

¹²⁹ USAID Ghana Democracy and Governance Assessment, Final Report, p. 1.

¹³⁰ Election Day Media Reports.

Judiciary Component

- Despite the publication of the Manual, public reaction to the filing of the Presidential Election Petition suggests a widespread lack of knowledge about the use of the judicial process to contest disputed presidential election results. While the Manual appears well disseminated among lawyers and politicians, the general public does not appear to have been targeted for dissemination. A condensed, lay-friendly version of the election adjudication law and process, disseminated through the popular press and civil society platforms, could help enhance public knowledge and understanding of the role of the judiciary in election dispute resolution.
- The absence of a strict and legally binding timeline for the judiciary to complete election petition cases means that the prospect of expediting election dispute adjudication is still left to the good judgement and discretion of the judiciary. Thus, despite all the good intentions and expectations, the pace of election adjudication may remain unduly slow. As of the time of this report, the substantive hearing of the presidential election petition filed at the end of December 2012 had still not commenced in the Ghana Supreme Court. Similarly, adjudication of the parliamentary election petitions filed in various High Courts so far continues to be held up by delays in service of process to the MPs whose election are being challenged.¹³¹

Civil Society / STAR-Ghana Component

- Be more directive in bringing CSOs together on election issues. STAR-Ghana did make an effort to encourage CSOs to work together, however both CSOs and STAR-Ghana shared that there is much more that can be done on encouraging CSOs to work on issues collectively. Individual projects focusing on the same issue, same stakeholders, and same geographical areas is not an effective way of operating an election project with a specific one-year timeframe.
- There is great variation in the quality of CSOs' analysis, projects and delivery of results. There is a general lack of interest in analysis and the learning process of 'what happened as a result of our work'. CSOs collectively do not seem to want to engage in learning unless STAR-Ghana somehow directs this. Gathering evidence for STAR-Ghana remains a challenge as CSOs see evidence gathering as cumbersome.

Security – Police Component¹³²

Engaging Police Service at several levels

- Engaging police service at all levels specifically on distribution of equipment and other documentation might be useful. Although BHC drew the attention of the police service to lapses in the distribution of equipment and documents, ineffective communication to the district and regional offices could have resulted in fewer personnel receiving the Aide Memoir. In the future, the High Commission might have to follow-up on distribution within the police service and other security agencies to ensure items get to the target group as scheduled.

Combination of Local and Foreign trainers and contents

- Training needs would best be met when local expertise is combined with foreign expertise in training. This was evidenced by the respondent's suggestions to include both local and foreign examples during training.

Provision of Hand outs

- Hand outs are very necessary to serve as reminders after training and also to support training of trainers. This was again indicated by several participants during the first half of the security awareness training. Subsequently, training material was provided and this led to the eventual training of the final batch of about 2,700 police staff.¹³³

Residential Courses

- Providing residential training programmes might be useful. This was suggested by several participants in the Public Order and Intelligence training who went further to indicate that courses should be held in the

¹³¹ Notes on Meeting with Judicial Service Staff, February 13, 2013.

¹³² The lessons are drawn from the Lesson section in Conducting A Monitoring And Evaluation For British High Commission's Election Security Project 2012/2013

¹³³ Oppong-Duah, Nama, et al., Evaluation Report for British High Commission's Election Security Project 2012/2013 (May 2013).

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same location where staff is housed. It would be preferable for courses are taken to the outskirts where participants would not have to attend to other duties when they are in session.¹³⁴

¹³⁴ Ibid.

5 Conclusions & Recommendations

The evaluation provides a favourable assessment of the results of GESP. GESP met its output milestones, and targets with some exceeding their targets. DFID Ghana has developed a viable model for election support to state institutions and civil society election work. It avoids the risk of creating dependence on donor support and distorting state and civil society agendas. This demonstrates the value of 'behind-the-scenes' support and brokering of partnerships, and nurturing of state institutional partnerships through the use of training, mentoring and selective funding of partner activities that are aligned to GoG priorities. Another major achievement of GESP has been to strengthen the state institutions capacity to deliver towards its election priorities of a well-managed election process with security and law enforcement intact. Through the various channels of communication and interaction that have happened because of GESP between civil society, government, the media and GoG institutions there are greater prospects for collaboration in the next election process.

GESP made an effective contribution to its project outcome. There is evidence of improvements in capacity amongst state institutions; evidence of greater inclusion and participation of excluded groups; strengthened civil society skills in the voter education processes; re-enforced understanding of roles and responsibilities of the Police and Security Agencies. These improved processes generated results in supporting a peaceful election process.

The evaluation finds that GESP offers good value for money at each of the three levels of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. The GESP has been able to deliver its outputs in an economical and cost-efficient manner. There is evidence of very good value for money at the effectiveness level.

The evaluation has identified parts of the GESP where although targets were met, part of the process met with challenges. This applies largely to the Electoral Commission and the extent to which the Electoral Commission should have anticipated problems and hiccups and made appropriate provision for resolving or dealing with these on Election Day, including training its polling staff to troubleshoot and fix minor technical problems with the BVR system. Additionally, while the Electoral Commission's practice of relying on temporary hires to serve as Presiding Officers may be justifiable in light of the episodic or cyclical occurrence of general elections, it is important that the Electoral Commission recruit such staff from a pool of applicants with dependable numeracy and literacy skills and invest sufficient time and resources to train them in their election-day duties and tasks. Bringing about lasting improvements will require long-term engagement with previous polling agents and an approach that has appropriate criteria and/or a method for potentially rehiring previous election workers.

Finally, it is critical to reconsider the approach of GESP as a one-year election programme and extend into a full election support programme that would consider the entire election cycle. Components and stakeholders overall pointed to the importance that support to elections needs to not be time bound and restricted to a certain stage of the election. There are opportunities to work well before the election year, particularly with voter education as well as providing MIS or IT guidance to strengthen the Electoral Commission systems in place. Engaging with the EWG post-election would contribute to this cycle and keep dialogue alive that can support space for institutions and civil society to share and discuss key concerns and challenges, priorities and workplans for the upcoming election 2016.

Recommendations

1. **Relevance of the GESP** - Engage the national party leadership directly in the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC), an informal but well-established body comprising representatives of all registered political parties and the Electoral Commission that meets to discuss, agree on, and advise the Electoral Commission on election matters.
2. **Coherence and Coordination of the GESP** - The EWG is unique and the donors interviewed were not aware of any other group like it in Africa, especially during non-election years. The EWG could coordinate and build support for the coming 2016 election if a cyclical approach was considered as opposed to a linear one-year election approach. A platform with civil society, institutions and donors could be developed now to continue dialogue on election-related issues. Each institution could share workplans and donor partners could look at mutual governance priorities and how these align to GoG priorities, drawing lessons from the 2012 election to inform support during the next electoral cycle.
3. **Effectiveness of the GESP** - A coordination function across the components was largely lacking during the implementation and delivery of GESP. The components worked in silos as opposed to collectively. We recommend that any future design put in place a coordination function to plan around mutual areas of work and

common areas of impact. A specific output dedicated to coordination should be incorporated into logframes to hold the programme and components to account, and monthly coordination meetings could be held with brief reporting, action points and agreed follow-up. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) could play an initial important role in coordinating components but also sit in quarterly meetings to get a sense of how work is progressing and help resolve any issues that may arise.

4. **Effectiveness of the GESP** - Reconsider the approach of GESP as a one-year election programme and extend into a full election support programme that would consider the entire election cycle. Components and stakeholders overall pointed to the importance that support to elections needs to not be time bound and restricted to a certain stage of the election. There are opportunities to work well before the election year, particularly with voter education and providing MIS or IT guidance to improve the quality of the Electoral Commission systems in place. Post-election, the EWG could be a key contributor to this effort and continue the dialogue with institutions and civil society to discuss key concerns and challenges, priorities and workplans for the upcoming election 2016.
5. **Recommendation on the Coverage of the GESP** – Future programme designs should identify opportunities to address the importance of fair and inclusive elections. Programme and component workplans should demonstrate a strong commitment to integrating issues of gender and social inclusion into programme activities. There is room for a number of improvements in regards to a more integrated gender-social inclusion approach:
 - GESP could have considered engaging with the Ministry of Women or Women’s Affair Committees to scale up capacity to address gender and social inclusion related issues before, during and after elections;
 - The GESP logframe lacked gender specific indicators, although the civil society STAR-Ghana component assessed the ‘level of demand side activity amongst STAR-Ghana election partners on strengthening the gender-social inclusion enabling environment’ during elections. The evaluation team would have preferred the logframe and the GESP monitoring framework to take on a stronger gender-social inclusion focus within each component;
 - GESP components could have adopted a gender-social inclusion approach when developing component activities and assessed gender and inequality-related election issues and how components would address these. For example, the Electoral Commission was aware of the male-dominance of the political parties that remained an impeding factor in having an equal balance of female and male participation in election related activities and training.
 - There is a need to build the capacity of the media on gender and social inclusion reporting. This is an essential element of building awareness and a more enabling environment for progress on gender and social inclusion issues during the elections. The STAR-Ghana component supported this to some degree but these efforts could be scaled up to address exclusion during elections.
6. **Recommendation on the impact of the GESP** - Future training and capacity building for large numbers will need to be well considered and given appropriate time, as quality and content can be compromised due to the large number of persons that require training. We recommend that a capacity building framework be developed as support to state institutions was a key approach for the GESP.
7. **Recommendation on the sustainability of the GESP** - In order to improve the sustainability of election support activities, future electoral support programmes should take a strategic approach to facilitating partnerships between government institutions and other election bodies. It would also be beneficial to have an end of project workshop with all implementing partners to capture lessons, learning and innovative practices to take forward for the next election.

Annex A

Theory of Change and Research Plan Report

Evaluation of DFID's Ghana Electoral Support Programme 2012 - 2013

Overview of the GESP Theory of Change and Research Plan
January 2013

coffey  international development
SPECIALISTS IN DEVELOPING COMMUNITIES



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Annex A: Detailed Research Plan

Annex B: Impact Logics for the Police and CDD Programme Components

1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

The Ghana Election Support Programme (GESP) is a £6,265,000 DFID-led programme designed to support a 'peaceful and generally accepted electoral outcome' in the elections that took place in December 2012 in Ghana. Coffey is leading an independent evaluation which is designed to assess the implementation of the Ghana Election Support Programme (GESP) (process evaluation) and the impact of the GESP and its contribution it makes to a fair, free and peaceful election (impact evaluation).

Coffey commenced the evaluation process in August 2012, and to date has provided the following deliverables:

- A theory of change workshop for all stakeholders in August 2012;
- An Inception Report detailing Coffey's approach to the evaluation in August 2013; and
- An Interim Report based on Coffey's field visit in October 2013.

The final evaluation visit is scheduled for February 2013 and the purpose of this paper is to set out Coffey's approach to testing the theory of change underpinning the GESP and to provide a detailed research plan for the February visit.

1.1 Summary of the evaluation approach

As set out in the inception report, the impact of the GESP will be assessed using a theory-based evaluation approach. In collaboration with DFID and other stakeholders, impact logics for how the programme components will contribute to the programmes overarching goals were developed. The evaluation will:

- Test hypotheses and assumptions which underpin these impact logics in order to assess the contribution of GESP to the election process. This is referred to as a deductive approach.
- Use the data and evidence gathered through primary and secondary research to refine and revise the theories of change and provide insight into how and why the GESP-funded activities have been successful or unsuccessful, for who and under what circumstances. This is referred to as an inductive approach.

The evaluation will also assess the implementation process: how activities were carried out and perceived by beneficiaries, and how they might be improved in future.

1.2 Structure of the Paper

This Paper seeks to demonstrate how the various programme components contribute to the overarching programme objectives and articulates the hypotheses and assumptions that are implicit in DFID's theory of change for the GESP. The paper is structured as follows:

- **Section 1: Higher level objectives of the GESP** – this section summarises DFID's higher level objectives for the GESP. The programme will be evaluated according to the extent to which it meets these objectives, and the extent to which these objectives are relevant given the problem that the programme is trying to address.
- **Section 2: Objectives of the GESP Components** – this section articulates the theory behind how the objectives of the 5 Programme Components contribute to the higher level objectives outlined in Section 1. Section 2 provides diagrammatic representations of the overall programme theory and a list of the hypotheses and assumptions which underpins it. Key hypotheses and assumptions will be tested as part of the impact evaluation.

INTRODUCTION

- **Section 3: GESP Component Impact Logics** – based on the Theory of Change workshop held with Stakeholders in August, draft impact logics were developed for each of the Programme Components. These were refined based on the desktop review of programme documentation and the October field visit.¹ Section 3 provides diagrammatic representations of these impact logics and a list of the hypotheses and assumptions that underpin them. Key hypotheses and assumptions will be tested as part of the impact evaluation.
- **Section 4: Evaluation questions** – the evaluation questions agreed to in the Inception Report are based on the OECD DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance.² Based on the hypotheses and assumptions which underpin the theory of change for the GESP, a number of specific research questions have been developed. This section provides an overview of how the overarching evaluations relate to the more specific programme component evaluation questions. The full set of questions are listed in Annex A.
- **Section 5: Next steps** – this section sets out the next steps to be taken in order to progress the evaluation and provides an indicative schedule for the evaluation visit to be undertaken in February.

Attached to this report is Annex A which provides a detailed Research Plan which is based on the original evaluation matrix submitted as part of the Inception Report. The Research Plan sets out:

- The overarching evaluation questions (structured according to the OECD DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance);³
- Evaluation questions which are specific to the programme components;⁴
- The hypotheses and assumptions that the component-specific evaluation questions are designed to test;
- The research questions that will be used to gather evidence to report on the evaluation questions;
- The research methodology that will be employed;⁵
- The sources of data that will be used; and
- Coffey's approach to managing the risks associated with the project – particularly the risks of bias associated with gathering evidence from programme beneficiaries and stakeholders.

¹ These impact logics will continue to be revised and refined based on the data gathered during primary research. The theory of change is an iterative process aimed at developing impact logics detail how and why activities work, for whom and under what circumstances. This level of detail make the impact logics helpful tools for programme evaluation as well as future programme planning and design.

² OECD DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance,

<http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluationofdevelopmentprogrammes/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

³ These questions were agreed to in the Inception Report submitted in September 2012


⁴ Due to resource constraints, it has been agreed that the Evaluation will focus on the programme components related to the Electoral Commission, the Judiciary and Civil Society. The impact of the components supporting the Police Services and CDD will not be assessed in detailed.

⁵ It should be noted that both primary and secondary research has already been conducted during evaluation visits which took place in August and October.

2 SECTION 1: HIGHER LEVEL OBJECTIVES OF THE GESP

The GESP Business Case sets out DFID’s theory of change for funding the GESP and a logframe which provides the performance management framework.

Theory of Change: Ghana Electoral Support Programme



HIGHER LEVEL OBJECTIVES OF THE GESP

The anticipated impact of the GESP is “*the occurrence of the sixth consecutive peaceful election in Ghana*”. An extract from the DFID Business Case below sets out DFID’s anticipated outcomes of the GESP:

1. The 2012 general election is likely to be at least as closely contested as the 2008 election, though with even higher political and economic gains at stake. This, coupled with the experience of previous elections, suggests there is at least a moderate risk of a disputed election result.
2. DFID and others’ work in a range of countries and evidence from elsewhere suggests achieving the following outcomes can significantly reduce the problem in which GESP is trying to address which is to reduce the *risk of electoral disputes and greatly enhance the integrity of, and public trust in electoral processes*. These conditions include:
 - Competent and impartial Election Commission
 - Transparency and accountability as well as stakeholder and inclusive public participation in electoral processes (including political parties)
 - Adequate voter education
 - Professional media handling
 - Effective conflict management with respect for human rights.
 - Timely and sound elections dispute resolution
3. These outcomes are each necessary, but not sufficient, to achieve DFID’s higher level objective of *a peaceful and generally accepted electoral outcome*. Further, responsibility for the achievement of these conditions is dispersed amongst a number of state institutions with some responsibility also falling on non-state actors.
4. DFID’s support is mainly preventative (i.e. minimising risks of electoral dispute and violence). It will seek to help achieve each of the outcomes above through a package of distinct but mutually reinforcing interventions.

A key purpose of the evaluation will be to test the validity of this theory of change and GESP’s contribution to the election process. In order to do this, there needs to be a clear understanding of how the individual programme components contribute to the higher level programme objectives (discussed in Section 2).

3 SECTION 2: OBJECTIVES OF THE GESP COMPONENTS


Each Programme Component has an anticipated outcome and set of objectives: these are set out in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Outcome and Objectives identified under each component

<p>Outcome 1. Electoral Commission (EC)</p> <p>Trust in fair elections and acceptance of final results by candidates and the electorate.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Polling agents vigilant on election day - Polling agents cooperate with polling staff on election day - Polling agents accept declared results 	<p>Outcome 2. Biometric Voter Registration (CDD)</p> <p>Promote transparency and peace in the registration process as well as the development of a credible voter register ahead of the December 7 2012 general elections.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Citizens trust BVR voting process - Observation findings effectively addressed by relevant agencies - Observations analysed; reports developed and shared with the public 	<p>Outcome 3. Judiciary</p> <p>Reduction in cases appealed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Disputed accepts judgment and case closed - Easier and speedier case disposition
<p>Outcome 4. Civil Society (STAR Ghana)</p> <p>Voters turn out and tallying is fair and transparent</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CSO monitoring and campaigning - Voter / civic education on elections process - Inclusive approach / process for voting at polling stations for PWDs 	<p>Outcome 5. Police Security Sector</p> <p>Voter trust and confidence in the election process</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Voter confidence in the police - Perpetrators persecuted or discharged in court - Issues are solved peacefully or referred to for further action 	

Each of the Programme Components contributes to the overarching Programme objectives and this is depicted in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Depiction of the overarching GESP Theory of Change



There are a number of hypotheses and assumptions underpinning the overarching GESP Theory of Change. These are listed in Table 2 below. One of the key purposes of the Evaluation is to test these hypotheses and assumptions and as such, they form the basis of the evaluation questions. Annex A clearly demonstrates how the hypotheses and assumptions link to the evaluation questions.

Table 2: Hypotheses and assumptions underpinning the overarching GESP Theory of Change

Hypothesis	Assumptions	Research Questions
If DFID provide support to the judiciary, then they will be better able to manage election disputes more effectively and in turn increase the legitimacy of the election process	<p>The judiciary are seen as independent and legitimate by other stakeholders</p> <p>Disputes are dealt with through judicial processes</p>	<p>Were the problems identified in the business case evidence based?</p> <p>Were the activities aligned to specifically address the problems?</p>

OBJECTIVES OF THE GESP COMPONENTS

<p>If DFID provide support to EC then they will be better able to run a smooth election process more effectively and in turn increase the legitimacy of the elections</p>	<p>EC is capable of supporting and running BVR elections</p> <p>Strong logistics and logistical support for polling stations and BVR mechanism exist on election day</p> <p>EC polling agent officers are confident in their performance during the elections</p> <p>EC polling agent officers will not be party biased during election disputes</p> <p>EC is transparent and withstands political pressure</p>	<p>Were the problems identified in the business case evidence based?</p> <p>Were the activities aligned to specifically address the problems?</p>
<p>If DFID provide support to Civil Society then they will be better able to advocate and engage in the election process more effectively and in turn increase the legitimacy of the election process</p>	<p>Political parties are open to CSOs advocacy and issues</p> <p>CSOs are capable of raising key concerns and issues</p>	<p>Were the problems identified in the business case evidence based?</p> <p>Were the activities aligned to specifically address the problems?</p>
<p>If DFID works closely with other donor partners, then the support they provide will be more effective because the activities funded will address different dimensions of the problem</p>	<p>Other donors have the same understanding of the problem as DFID</p> <p>Other donors are willing to cooperate and be open and transparent about their programmes</p>	<p>Who else is providing funding to the EC and what activities are they funding?</p> <p>Is there any duplication/complementarity of effort?</p> <p>Who else is providing funding to STAR Ghana partners and what activities are they funding?</p> <p>Is there any duplication/complementarity of effort?</p>
<p>If training on the handling election related disputes is provided to judges and court staff, then this will build their capacity to manage election related disputes fairly and efficiently</p>	<p>The judicial system will operate effectively and efficiently during election process</p> <p>Judges and court staff do not already have the knowledge and capacity to deal with election</p>	<p>Does GESP align with current judicial priorities and systems ?</p>

OBJECTIVES OF THE GESP COMPONENTS

	related disputes	
If the EC funded activities are aligned with the EC systems and approach then coordination of BVR and support to the election process is more likely to be effective	Polling agents and observers staff are neutral and will work together to support the polling station's voting process on election day. EC is capable of supporting and running BVR elections	Does GESP align with EC priorities and systems?
If DFID allocates the majority of funding to the EC, while still providing support to a range of other stakeholders, then the GESP will achieve its diverse objectives	There are other donors funding activities and stakeholders in order to support a free, fair and peaceful election process	How was the amount of funding determined for the Programme Components? Why was a large proportion of the funding provided to the EC? Was the allocation of funding based on the problem the programme components were trying to address?
If programme components take an inclusive approach in their activities then inequalities and issues of inequity may be better addressed	Components are confident that their approaches, training and activities address inequalities and inequity	To what extent did programme components factor in issues of exclusion and gender?
If citizens are provided with information and support through the full election cycle (from registration, to campaigning, to voting, to managing disputes, to understanding results), then they will be able cast an informed vote according to the legislation, and will be able to understand and accept the election results	The election results are transparent and fair Citizens want to engage in the election process	

OBJECTIVES OF THE GESP COMPONENTS

<p>Knowledge gained and attitudinal shift by judges will influence conduct of judiciary beyond the election process.</p>	<p>Turnover in Judiciary is minimal. Knowledge gained on legal framework is not forgotten prior to next election and legal framework does not change significantly.</p>	<p>To what extent is your training on electoral disputes applicable to other fields? Is it likely you will be engaged in electoral disputes which arise as a result of the next election?</p>
<p>If media agencies employ 'good' reporting practice relating to the elections (ie reporting based on evidence), then they will continue this practice after the elections have finished</p>	<p>The reasons for 'poor practice' or sensationalist media are not related to a lack of capacity in media agencies</p>	
<p>If GESP approach addresses the problem identified in the design then the approach may be replicable in other contexts with a similar election problem</p>	<p>GESP Approach can be replicated in similar election contexts in Africa</p>	<p>Are the problems identified in Ghana present in other contexts? What might be some issues that are unique to Ghana?</p>

4 SECTION 3: GESP COMPONENT IMPACT LOGICS

For each Programme Component, there is a theory for how the activities undertaken will lead to the objectives of the Programme Component. This is referred to as the Programme Component impact logic. Impact logics for each programme component were developed in collaboration with programme stakeholders during a theory of change workshop facilitated by Coffey in August 2012. The impact logics were further refined based further primary and secondary research conducted by Coffey in October and December.

The Programme Component impact logics and the hypotheses and assumptions which underpin them are provided below. Impact logics were initially developed for the Programme Components relating to Police and CDD and these are provided in Annex B. It has been agreed with DFID that due to resource constraints, these Programme Components are not within the scope of the Evaluation.

4.1 Electoral Commission Component impact logic

Figure 2: The Impact logic for providing support to the Electoral Commission




Table 3: They hypotheses and assumptions underpinning the impact logic for the Electoral Commission Component

Hypothesis	Assumptions	Research Questions
<p>If the EC introduces the use of biometric technology in compiling a voter register for the 2012 elections, this will help reduce challenges of the electoral process such as multiple registrations and multiple voting</p>	<p>EC is capable of supporting and running BVR elections</p> <p>Strong logistics and logistical support for polling stations and BVR mechanism exist on election day</p> <p>Citizens will feel comfortable approaching EC polling agent officers</p> <p>EC polling agent officers are confident in their performance during the elections</p> <p>EC polling agent officers will not be party biased during election disputes</p> <p>EC is transparent and withstands political pressure</p>	<p>To what extent did the BVR voting support fair and free elections?</p> <p>To what extent did the BVR reduce multiple registrations and multiple voting to ensure fair elections?</p> <p>If the BVR did not exist what would have happened? Did the BVR make a difference?</p>
<p>If the EC polling agents cooperate with others (observers, polling staff) on election day then disputes on votes will be less likely</p>	<p>Polling agents and observers staff are neutral and will work together to support the polling station's voting process on election day</p>	<p>To what extent did the training support enable EC agents and officers to collaborate on issues that came up during elections?</p> <p>To what extent did training support EC polling agents and officers to minimise disputes during elections?</p>
<p>If EC officers understand the election rules and BVR process then they will be able to advise and assist citizens during voting in an unbiased manner</p>	<p>Citizens will feel comfortable approaching EC polling agent and officers</p> <p>EC polling agent officers are confident in their performance during the elections</p> <p>EC polling agent officers will not be party biased during election disputes</p>	<p>To what extent did training enable EC polling agents and officers to advise citizen on voting?</p> <p>To what extent did training enhance EC polling agents and officers knowledge to perform their specific election duty?</p> <p>To what extent is the training applicable beyond the elections?</p> <p>Are there any other aspects of the training that you think made a difference? If so, in what way?</p> <p>What would have happened if you did not receive the training?</p>
<p>If CSO's are aware of election laws and processes, then they will</p>		<p>To what extent did the training enable CSOs to provide support to their beneficiaries?</p>

Hypothesis	Assumptions	Research Questions
pass information on to their beneficiary groups - in particular marginalised groups who are difficult to reach through mainstream media		Who were the beneficiary groups targeted by CSOs? To what extent were women and people with a disability targeted?

4.2 Judiciary Component

Figure 3: The Impact logic for providing support to the Judiciary




Table 4: They hypotheses and assumptions underpinning the impact logic for the Judiciary Component

Hypothesis	Assumptions	Research Questions
If elections laws are better understood by judges then cases will be addressed and appealed according to the law	<p>Judges are confident in their performance during the elections</p> <p>Judges will not be biased to certain political parties</p> <p>Not previously knowledgeable about laws</p> <p>Training effective</p> <p>Cases filed, & public knowledgeable about</p>	<p>To what extent did training enable judges to address court cases according to the law?</p> <p>To what extent did training enhance judges' knowledge to perform their specific election case duties and judgements?</p> <p>To what extent is the training for judges applicable beyond the elections?</p> <p>Are there any other aspects of the training that you think made a difference? If so, in what way?</p>

GESP COMPONENT IMPACT LOGICS

Hypothesis	Assumptions	Research Questions
	<p>laws</p> <p>Judicial impunity</p>	<p>What would have happened if you did not receive the training?</p>
<p>If judges address election cases according to the law cases will close quicker as claimants will accept final judgement</p>	<p>The judicial system will operate effectively and efficiently during election process</p> <p>Cases filed</p>	<p>To what extent did the training enable cases to close quicker?</p> <p>To what extent has the manual support the expedience of cases?</p> <p>What would have happened to the court case process if you did not receive the training?</p>
<p>If judges understand the election laws, then they will be able to advise citizens and political parties of the laws and appropriate behaviours.</p>	<p>Citizens believe in the judicial system ability to pass fair and non-bias judgment during election process</p> <p>The electoral process is transparent, fair and accountable to citizens and political parties equally.</p>	<p>To what extent has the training supported you to advise citizens on election laws?</p> <p>To what extent has the training and manual supported you to advise political parties of the proper procedures and elections laws?</p> <p>What would have happened if you did not receive the training?</p> <p>With training knowledge and skills what changed as a result of how the judiciary system handle cases?</p>
<p>If judges understand the election laws, then they will be a decrease in frivolous election cases.</p>	<p>The judicial system will operate effectively and efficiently during election process</p>	<p>To what extent has the training supported less frivolous elections cases from coming forward?</p> <p>What would have happened if you did not receive the training?</p> <p>With training knowledge and skills what changed as a result of how the judiciary system handles frivolous cases?</p>

4.3 Civil Society (STAR Ghana) Component

Figure 4: The Impact logic for funding the Civil Society through STAR Ghana




Table 5: The hypotheses and assumptions underpinning the impact logic for the Civil Society Component

Hypothesis	Assumption	Research Question
If civil society receives voter education then there will be an increase in voter turnout	<p>Voter education is necessary for a higher turnout of voters</p> <p>Citizens are open to being educated about the election process and their influence / role as voters</p> <p>Voter apathy does not get in the way of civic education exercises</p>	<p>To what extent did voter education support the increase in voter turnout?</p> <p>What specifically could you say made new voters go to polling stations? Was it linked to the voter education STAR partners did or another factor was at play?</p> <p>To what extent did voter education develop awareness so that citizens understood the role of the EC and security sector in management a fair and free election process?</p>

Hypothesis	Assumption	Research Question
If citizens are educated on BVR voting there will be a greater turn out and understanding of the BVR voting on election day.	<p>BVR machines and process will run smoothly</p> <p>Citizens feel confident in the BVR polling staff and the BVR process of voting</p> <p>Citizen capability</p> <p>Media capability</p>	<p>To what extent did learning about BVR support the voting process on election day?</p> <p>To what extent did the BVR process make elections run smoother for voters?</p> <p>To what extent did the BVR make a difference towards fair, free and accessible elections?</p> <p>If you were not educated on the BVR process would it have made a difference?</p> <p>To what extent did the media coverage support the awareness raised for voters on BVR, and women's and people living with disabilities civic right to vote?</p>
If voter education raises awareness on socially excluded groups need to vote then socially excluded groups will turn out to BVR and vote.	<p>CSO monitoring is effective and raises citizen concerns and views</p> <p>Appetite for social inclusive approaches within the BVR election process (e.g. accessibility for People Living with Disabilities (PWDs))</p>	<p>To what extent was voting and polling sites socially inclusive?</p> <p>To what extent did knowledge on civic rights enhance socially excluded persons to vote?</p>
If CSOs campaign on specific election issues, which need to be taken up by political parties then these issues, will be part of the political campaign and addressed by political parties running for election.	<p>Political parties are open to CSOs advocacy and issues</p> <p>CSOs are capable of raising key concerns and issues</p> <p>Can provide high quality training</p>	<p>To what extent did the various citizen campaigns on issues to raise during the elections bring about changes in political campaigners agenda and responsiveness?</p>
If media support civic election education then voters will understand their civic rights and vote	<p>Voters interested and willing to vote</p> <p>Communities open to sensitisation activities from media organisations and civil society organisations</p> <p>Media capability</p> <p>CSO with media; for civil societies voice to be heard, stories need to be interesting.</p>	<p>To what extent did media support increase citizens awareness on the importance of voting during the election?</p> <p>To what extent did media coverage increase knowledge and transparency of key issues arising during the election?</p> <p>To what extent did media monitoring support more credible and fair elections?</p> <p>To what extent did raising awareness for an inclusive election process (women, PWD) improve the turnout of those usually less excluded?</p> <p>If the media monitoring did not happen what would have happened?</p>

5 SECTION 4: EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The overarching evaluation questions were agreed in the Inception Report and are based on the OECD DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance. These are listed below in Table 6. Annex A provides detailed evaluation questions for each programme component and shows how the evaluation questions are linked to the hypotheses and assumptions listed above.

Table 6: Overarching evaluation questions

Criteria	Evaluation Questions
Relevance	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To what extent has the GES Programme effectively identified the problems around the election? 2. To what extent does the GESP and its component parts address the problems identified?
Coherence	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. To what extent does the design of the GESP complement the existing work of other partners?
Coordination	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. To what extent is the design of the GESP aligned with the existing work, priorities and systems of the Government of Ghana?
Effectiveness	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Are the activities and services being delivered in accordance with what was originally intended? 6. Were activities under the programme completed to time and budget? 7. Were there any issues identified in the implementation of the components? If so, how successfully were these addressed by the project implementers? 8. How many people received direct support from DFID (corroboration of the projected results and monitoring system)? 9. Were indicators in the Logframe met? What evidence exists to support this? 10. What were the most effective interventions in improving the election process? Why?
Efficiency	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 11. To what extent does the GESP represent good value for money? How could this have been improved? 12. Was the balance of investment in each of the components proportionate to their effectiveness and impact on the programme's aim and objectives?
Coverage	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 13. To what extent do the results reflect the inequities and inequalities identified in the problem analysis?
Impact	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 14. What were the perceived benefits to the recipients of the training provided under the programme? 15. In retrospect, what changes, if any, would beneficiaries have sought from the training provided?

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

Criteria	Evaluation Questions
	16. How did the GESP activities impact on beneficiaries' performance/ achievements relating to the election process? 17. Was the election process more free and fair as a result of GESP activities?
Sustainability	18. To what extent will the results and benefits of the programme continue to be realised beyond the 2012 election process?
Comparative assessment	19. Would other countries benefit from a similar programme of election support?

6 SECTION 5: NEXT STEPS

This Evaluation began in August 2012 and a significant amount of research has already been conducted.

The final evaluation visit is scheduled for February and an indicative schedule is provided in Table 7 below.

Some challenges have arisen in conducting some of the planned primary research, namely the survey with Electoral Commission Polling Agents who received training. This has been addressed separately to DFID.

Table 7: Indicative schedule for February Evaluation visit

Day	Activity	Areas to Cover
Day 1 – Sunday Feb 3	➤ Renee Kantelberg arrives evening (Alisa Hotel)	
Day 2 – Monday Feb 4 PDA	➤ Renee with PDA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review schedule • Review logistics, meeting rooms booked etc. • Final schedule confirmed • Meeting with PDA on Survey (tbc as survey has yet to be carried out) • Meeting with PDA on Media Log • Meeting with PDA on Observer activities during election day
Day 3 – Tuesday Feb 5 Civil Society	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Renee meets STAR Ghana Election Team ➤ Interview Head of STAR Ghana (Tanko) – (45 minutes) ➤ Focus group discussion with M&E and Thematic Election team – (Wendy, Gideon, Dorcas - 2hrs) ➤ Focus group discussion with STAR Ghana Election Campaign Partners (approximately 6 partners - 2.5 hrs) ➤ Allow 15-30 minutes break in between interviews ➤ Reading and writing notes ➤ Collecting reports, materials and evidence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Component Civil Society Research Questions • VFM • Effectiveness • Impact
Day 4 – Wednesday Feb 6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Renee meeting STAR Ghana Media Partners (4 – 6 partners) (2.5 hrs) ➤ Renee meeting STAR Election Voter Registration Partners (4 – 6 partners) (2.5 hrs) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Component Civil Society Research Questions • Impact • Effectiveness

NEXT STEPS

Civil Society Media	hrs) ➤ Reading and writing notes ➤ Collecting reports, materials and evidence ➤ Allow 1 hr between meetings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustainability
Day 5 – Thursday Feb 7 DFID Donor Partners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Renee meets DFID Ghana ➤ Michael, Rita and Lucy (1.5 hrs) ➤ Renee meets Police Administration FCO (Donor Liaison) (1 hr) Keith Ashong. ➤ Renee meets UNDP governance advisor (1 hr) ➤ Renee meets DANIDA governance advisor (1 hr) ➤ Reading and writing notes ➤ Collecting reports, materials and evidence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DFID Component Research Questions • Relevance • Coherence • Coordination • Effectiveness • Sustainability • Impact
Day 6 – Friday Feb 8th Security Donor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Renee meets M&E consultants for Security Component (1 hr) ➤ Renee meets EU governance advisor (1 hr) ➤ Gather any evidence and reports from Security / Police consultants available and completed. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security Component Research Questions • Relevance • Impact • Effectiveness • Sustainability
Day 7 & 8 - Saturday 9th + Sunday 10th	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Kwasi Prempeh arrives ➤ Reading and writing notes 	
Day 9 – Monday Feb 11 CDD CODEO Observers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Kwasi & Renee meet together (1 hr) ➤ Kwasi & Renee meet CDD Election Team (2 hrs) ➤ Kwasi & Renee meet CODEO BVR Observers 10 – 15 observers (3-4 hrs) – particularly important if survey does not happen 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Renee updates Kwasi, approach, schedule etc. • BVR – CDD / CODEO Component Research Questions • Relevance • VFM
Day 10 – Tuesday Feb 12 Judiciary	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Kwasi meets Judicial Service Team ➤ Justice Opoku-Akyeampong (Judicial Secretary) Joe Ampomg-Fosu (2 hrs) ➤ Kwasi & Renee meet high court judges (3-4 hrs) ➤ Reading and writing notes ➤ Collecting reports, materials and evidence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Judiciary Component Research Questions • Relevance • Effectiveness • Impact • VFM • Sustainability

NEXT STEPS

Day 11 – Wednesday Feb 13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Kwasi meets DFID Ghana ➤ Michael, Rita and Lucy (1.5 hrs) ➤ Kwasi & Renee meet EC team (2-3 hrs) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relevance • Coherence • Coordination • EC Component Research Questions • Relevance • Effectiveness • Impact • VFM
Day 12 – Thursday Feb 14	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Kwasi & Renee meets EC Polling Agents x 10 agents (3 hr) ➤ Kwasi & Renee meet EC Polling Agents x 10 agents (3 hr) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EC Component Research Questions • Relevance • Effectiveness • Impact • VFM
Day 13 – Friday Feb 15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Kwasi & Renee preparing for DFID ➤ Summary debrief to DFID late morning (1 hr) ➤ Kwasi & Renee meet on key analysis, any missing gaps, filling out evaluation matrix, agree draft lay out report format and key sections ➤ Renee returns UK evening 1030pm 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PPT of preliminary findings from field visit
Day 14 – Saturday Feb 16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Kwasi returns to US 	
Report Writing		
Feb 18 – 28th	Coffey Team Report Writing	
Thursday Feb 28th	Send First Draft to DFID	
Friday March 15th	DFID comments back to Coffey	
Monday March 18th	Discuss comments with DFID Ghana if necessary	
Friday March 22nd	Final Report sent to DFID	

ANNEX A: Research Plan

The Research Plan will provided in a separate Excel file.

Overarching evaluation question		Component evaluation questions		Relevant hypotheses	Assumptions	Research questions	Data sources	Risk management approach
No.	These questions were agreed to in the inception report		Component-specific evaluations which will be used to structure the evaluation.	This column contains the hypotheses that underpin DFID's Theory of Change	This column contains the key assumptions that are implicit within DFID's theory of change	This column details the specific research questions that will guide the research to be undertaken	This column details the data sources available	This column summarises how bias risks associated with the research methodology will be managed and mitigated
Relevance								
1	To what extent has the GES Programme effectively identified the problems around the election?	1a	To what extent did the business case take into account the perspectives of multiple stakeholders, lessons learned from previous election and the current context?	If DFID design considers other perspectives, lessons and learning from previous support in 2008 election then the current design will be more effective and realistic in its approach and practice.	DFID takes into consideration past learning from 2008 elections.	To what extent does DFID's problem analysis take into account the views of multiple stakeholders? To what extent is the programme design based on existing knowledge in the sector?	Interview with Michael Ohene-Effah USAID Governance Adviser. UNDP Governance Adviser. DANIDA Governance Adviser. Ghana Elections Business Case, GES Logframe, CODEO Statement on Pre-Election Environment, EIU Ghana Report 2012, EU EOM Final Report	The DFID programme officer has an interest in the success of the programme and may overstate the extent to which alternative views were considered in identifying the problem. This can be mitigated by interviewing a broader selection of respondents.
2	To what extent does the GESP and its component parts address the problems identified?	2a	To what extent did the Judiciary's GESP-funded activities address problems identified in the judiciary related to election management?	If DFID provide support to the judiciary, then they will be better able to manage election disputes more effectively and in turn increase the legitimacy of the election process	The judiciary are seen as independent and legitimate by other stakeholders Disputes are dealt with through judicial processes	Were the problems identified in the business case evidence based? Were the judiciary activities aligned to specifically address the problems?	Interview with the Chief Justice. Ghana Elections Business Case, GES Logframe, CODEO Statement on Pre-Election Environment, Judiciary Component Reports, USAID Assessment of the Ghana Electoral Commission, Pre-Disbursement Assessment of the Judicial Service of Ghana (Danida GHRPII) March 2009 PwC, EU EOM Final Report	Interviewees may answer overly positively both to justify their involvement with the programme and out of courtesy to DFID. This will be addressed by asking interviewees to consider other contributing factors.
		2c	To what extent did the EC's GESP-funded activities address problems identified in the Electoral Commission related to election management?	If DFID provide support to EC then they will be better able to run a smooth election process more effectively and in turn increase the legitimacy of the elections	EC is capable of supporting and running BVR elections Strong logistics and logistical support for polling stations and BVR mechanism exist on election day EC polling agent officers are confident in their performance during the elections EC polling agent officers will not be party biased during election disputes EC is transparent and withstands political pressure	Were the problems identified in the business case evidence based? Were the activities aligned to specifically address the problems?	Interview Dr. Afari-Gyan, EC Chairman. Mr. Kwasi Afiyie-Badu Ghana Elections Business Case, GES Logframe, CODEO Statement on Pre-Election Environment, EC Component Reports	Interviewees may answer overly positively both to justify their involvement with the programme and out of courtesy to DFID. This will be addressed by asking interviewees to consider other contributing factors.
		2d	To what extent did the portfolio of grantees selected by STAR address the problems identified in relation to the civil society's engagement in the election process?	If DFID provide support to Civil Society then they will be better able to advocate and engage in the election process more effectively and in turn increase the legitimacy of the election process	Political parties are open to CSOs advocacy and issues CSOs are capable of raising key concerns and issues	Were the problems identified in the business case evidence based? Were the activities aligned to specifically address the problems?	Interview Ibrahim Tanko Ghana Elections Business Case, GES Logframe, CODEO Statement on Pre-Election Environment, STAR Ghana and STAR Election Partner Reports	Interviewees may answer overly positively both to justify their involvement with the programme and out of courtesy to DFID. This will be addressed by asking interviewees to consider other contributing factors.
Coherence								
3	To what extent does the design of the GESP complement the existing work of other partners?	3a	To what extent do the activities funded through the GESP complement the existing work of other partners with the Electoral Commission?	If DFID works closely with other donor partners, then the support they provide will be more effective because the activities funded will address different dimensions of the problem	Other donors have the same understanding of the problem as DFID Other donors are willing to cooperate and be open and transparent about their programmes	Who else is providing funding to the EC and what activities are they funding? Is there any duplication/complementarity of effort?	Interview Michael Ohene-Effah (DFID). USAID Governance Adviser. UNDP Governance Adviser. DANIDA Governance Adviser. Joe Ampong-Fosu. UNDP Governance Adviser. GES Logframe, EC reports, Election Working Group Reports / Meeting Minutes	The DFID programme officer has an interest in the success of the programme while other donors may assign responsibility to external parties to justify their own actions/inactions. This can be mitigated by interviewing a broader selection of respondents.
		3b	To what extent did STAR's funding to grant partners for specified activities complement the existing activities or funding sources for these partners?			Who else is providing funding to STAR Ghana partners and what activities are they funding? Is there any duplication/complementarity of effort?	Michael Ohene-Effah (DFID). USAID Governance Adviser. UNDP Governance Adviser. DANIDA Governance Adviser. Ibrahim Tanko STAR Election Logframe, STAR Election Reports, STAR Partner Reports	The DFID programme officer has an interest in the success of the programme while other donors may assign responsibility to external parties to justify their own actions/inactions. This can be mitigated by interviewing a broader selection of respondents.
Coordination								
4	To what extent is the design of the GESP aligned with the existing work, priorities and systems of the Government of	4a	To what extent are the activities funded through the GESP aligned with the existing work and priorities of the Judiciary?	If training on the handling election related disputes is provided to judges and court staff, then this will build their capacity to manage election related disputes fairly and efficiently	The judicial system will operate effectively and efficiently during election process Judges and court staff do not already have the knowledge and capacity to deal with election related disputes	Does GESP align with current judicial priorities and systems?	Interview Justice Opoku-Akyeampong (Judicial Secretary) Joe Ampong-Fosu Component Logframe, GESP Logframe, Judicial Reports, EU EOM Final Report	The interviewees may be reluctant to answer frankly out of courtesy or may seek to answer in a way that is viewed as "politically correct." We will mitigate these risks by advising the respondent that they should be frank, creating a social context that is conducive to the free airing of opinions.

Overarching evaluation question	Component evaluation questions	Relevant hypotheses	Assumptions	Research questions	Data sources	Risk management approach
Systems of the Government of Ghana?	4b To what extent are the activities funded through the GESP aligned with the existing work and priorities of the Electoral Commission?	If the EC funded activities are aligned with the EC systems and approach then coordination of BVR and support to the election process is more likely to be effective	Polling agents and observers staff are neutral and will work together to support the polling station's voting process on election day. EC is capable of supporting and running BVR elections	Does GESP align with EC priorities and systems?	Interview Deputy Chairman (EC) EC Quarterly Reports, PDA Media Log	The interviewees may be reluctant to answer frankly out of courtesy or may seek to answer in a way that is viewed as "politically correct." We will mitigate these risks by advising the respondent that they should be frank, creating a social context that is conducive to the free airing of opinions.
Effectiveness						
5 Are the activities and services being delivered in accordance with what was originally intended?	5a To what extent was training of judges and courtroom staff on election adjudication delivered according to what was originally planned?			How many judges received training? How many courtroom staff received training?	Interviews with Justice Opoku-Akyeampong (Judicial Secretary) Justice Marful-Sau (JTI). Judicial Services documentation: - training attendance registers - training reports	Component implementers have incentives to overstate the success of their projects. This can be mitigated through triangulation with programme documentation.
	5b To what extent was training of judges and courtroom staff on ICT delivered according to what was originally planned?			How many judges received training? How many Courtroom staff received training? What is the ICT practice now? How has it made the judiciary system more effective and efficient?	Interviews with Justice Opoku-Akyeampong. Provider of ICT training Joe Ampong-Fosu Judicial Services documentation: - training attendance registers - training reports	Component implementers have incentives to overstate the success of their projects. This can be mitigated through triangulation with programme documentation. Reviewing ICT approach and practice.
	5c To what extent was the review, printing and distribution of the manual on election laws and adjudication delivered according to the original plan?			How many manuals printed? With whom were they shared?	Interview Bimpong Buta (outside consultant). Revised elections adjudication manual; Approved work pla, distribution list and strategy for dissemination	Component implementers have incentives to overstate the success of their projects. This can be mitigated through triangulation with programme documentation and interviews with recipients of the training.
	5d To what extent was the training of trainers and training of party polling delivered according to the original plan?			How many trainers were trained? What was the content of the training?	Interview with Kwasi Afriyie Badu and Kwadwo Sarfo – Kantanka (Deputy Chairman) EC training records, EC training reports.	Component implementers have incentives to overstate the success of their projects. This can be mitigated through triangulation with programme documentation and interviews with recipients of the training.
	5e To what extent was the training of CBOs and CSOs completed according to the original plan?			How many CSOs and CBOs were trained? What was the content of the training? How did the training support the delivery of the objectives set out in grant partner election proposals to STAR? How did it align to the original plan for STAR election support to	Interview STAR M&E Team (Wendy, Gideon, Dorcas) STAR Grant Training records, STAR Grant Training and activity reports	Component implementers have incentives to overstate the success of their projects. This can be mitigated through triangulation with programme documentation and interviews with STAR Ghana recipients of the training.
	5f To what extent was the election call and related grants delivered according to the original plan?			How many election call proposals were approved? How much in total was spent?	Interview STAR M&E Team (Wendy, Gideon, Dorcas) STAR Election Calls - Grants Subcommittee Report; Quarterly and Semester Reports; Details of grants provided to media grantees and Calls for Proposals; Elections Call approvals with description and contact details of grantees	
	5g To what extent did the election call grantees deliver their activities according to their work plans?			To what extent did the election call grantees deliver their activities according to their work plans? What worked well? What did not go as plan? Why? Lessons?	Interview STAR M&E Team (Wendy, Gideon, Dorcas) STAR Election Calls - Grants Subcommittee Report; Quarterly and Semester Reports; Details of grants provided to media grantees and Calls for Proposals; Elections Call approvals with description and contact details of grantees	Component implementers have incentives to overstate the success of their projects. This can be mitigated through triangulation with programme documentation and interviews with grant partners of STAR Election call.
6 Were activities under the programme completed to time and budget?	6a To what extent did the training of judges and staff (on election adjudication manual and on ICT) complete on schedule and within budget?			When was training completed? What was the final cost?	Justice Opoku-Akyeampong (Judicial Secretary) Joe Ampong-Fosu. - 1st / 2nd Quarterly reports, Financial report on programme expenditure, Revised elections adjudication manual, List of participants who attended the launch of the manual, Judiciary Training Reports and Revised Work plan	
	6b To what extent the training of CBOs and CSOs was completed on schedule and within budget?			When was training completed? What was the final cost?	Interview STAR M&E Team (Wendy, Gideon, Dorcas). Possibly interview Finance manager if M&E team do not have detail of final costs. Grant Partner Training reports, 1st / 2nd Quarterly Report. List of trained organisations.	

Overarching evaluation question	Component evaluation questions	Relevant hypotheses	Assumptions	Research questions	Data sources	Risk management approach	
7	Were there any issues identified in the implementation of the components? If so, how successfully were these addressed by the project implementers?	7a	Whether there were any issues or challenges identified or encountered in the implementation of the Judiciary component of the GESP. If so, the extent to which the issues were successfully addressed by the Judicial Service.		What issues came up during implementation? How were they dealt with? Lessons?	Interview: Joe Ampong-Fosu Michael Ohene-Effah. Judiciary Quarterly reports, Final Quarterly Report.	Component implementers may seek to attribute failures to external factors, may overstate their roles and capabilities in responding to challenges, or may be unwillingly to frankly address issues of a sensitive nature out of courtesy to others or concerns about retaliation. These potential biases will be mitigated by interviewing both component implementers and those trained (judges and court staff), advising the respondent that they should be frank, creating a social context that is conducive to the free airing of opinions.
		7b	Whether there were any issues or challenges identified or encountered in the implementation of the EC's component of the GESP. If so, the extent to which the issues were successfully addressed by the EC.		What issues came up during implementation? How were they dealt with? Lessons?	Interview Deputy Chairman (EC). Kwasi Afriyie-Badu. Michael Ohene-Effah/ EC Quarterly Reports, EC Final Report (4th Quarterly Report)	Component implementers may seek to attribute failures to external factors, may overstate their roles and capabilities in responding to challenges, or may be unwillingly to frankly address issues of a sensitive nature out of courtesy to others or concerns about retaliation. These potential biases will be mitigated by interviewing both the EC implementing staff of GESP work but also polling agents (survey) and external respondents such as CDD. Advising the respondent that they should be frank, creating a social context that is conducive to the free airing of opinions.
		7d	Whether there were any issues or challenges identified or encountered in the implementation of the GESP by STAR. If so, the extent to which STAR successfully addressed these issues.		What issues came up during implementation? How were they dealt with? Lessons?	Interview Ibrahim Tanko Rita Tetteh, Michael Ohene-Effah/ STAR Quarterly Reports, STAR Grantee End of Project Reports, STAR Ghana GESP End of Project / final Quarterly Report	Component implementers may seek to attribute failures to external factors, may overstate their roles and capabilities in responding to challenges, or may be unwillingly to frankly address issues of a sensitive nature out of courtesy to others or concerns about retaliation. These potential biases will be mitigated by interviewing a broader selection of respondents, advising the respondent that they should be frank, creating a social context that is conducive to the free airing of opinions.
8	How many people received direct support from DFID (corroboration of the projected results and monitoring system)?	8a	The number of judges and courtroom staff who received training on election adjudication (and on ICT).		How many judges received training? How many Courtroom staff received training?	Interviews with Justice Opoku-Akyeampong. Provider of ICT training Joe Ampong-Fosu. List of trained participants	
		8b	The number of people who received copies of the revised election adjudication manual?		How many manuals printed? With whom were they shared?	Interviews with Justice Opoku-Akyeampong. Distribution list/ recipient list for manual - by name, affiliation, and geography	
		8c	The number of trainer of trainers/party polling agents/CSOs and CBOs that received appropriate EC capacity building training?		Who received training? When?	STAR Ghana M&E Team (Wendy, Gideon, Dorcas and Team Leader Amidu Tanko) Training reports and grantee list of training received.	
		8d	The number of party agents who received copies of election guidelines?		How many manuals printed? With whom were they shared?	Kwasi Afriyie-Badu. Distribution list/ recipient list for election guidelines - by name, party, and geography	
		8e	The number of CSOs and CBOs that received grants in the STAR election call?		The number of CSOs and CBOs that received grants in the STAR election call?	STAR Ghana M&E Team (Wendy, Gideon, Dorcas) STAR Election Calls - Grants Subcommittee Report, STAR Ghana Semester Report, STAR Ghana Elections Call approvals with description	
9	Were indicators in the Logframe met? What evidence exists to support this?	9a	With questions 20 – 24 they are really related to the logframe targets. Therefore the overall questions are to what extent were the indicators in the Logframe met? Evidence which exists to support this?		Were the targets set in the logframe met? The above questions *8a - 8e address the specific targets per their component.	Logframe, Final Component Reports, List of trained participants per component, list of training received per component, distribution lists.	
10	What were the most effective interventions in improving the election process? Why?	10a	In the component what specifically worked well and why?		What was the most effective approach/ approaches used in carrying out the work for supporting fair and free elections? What was the most effective aspect of the training? Why?	STAR Ghana Grant Partner FGDs and Interview M&E Team (Wendy, Gideon, Dorcas and Team Leader Amidu Tanko) Final Component Reports / 4th Quarter Reports. STAR Grant Partner Final Reports	Component implementers may seek to attribute failures to external factors, may overstate their roles and capabilities in responding to challenges, or may be unwillingly to frankly address issues of a sensitive nature out of courtesy to others or concerns about retaliation. These potential biases will be mitigated by interviewing a broader selection of respondents, advising the respondent that they should be frank, creating a social context that is conducive to the free airing of opinions.
Value for Money (VFM)							
11	To what extent does the GESP represent good value for money? How could this be improved?	11a	To what extent is the GESP support to the judiciary cost effective?		What is the unit cost of training for judges benchmarked against training of a similar nature? What is the unit cost of training for courtroom staff benchmarked against training of a similar nature? Was there a clear rationale for choosing the judges to be trained and the content of the training?	Interview Joe Ampong - Fosu. GESP Business Case; Project Monitoring Reports and budget documents; Training assessment report	
		11b	To what extent is the GESP support to the Electoral commission cost effective?		What is the unit cost of training for CSOs benchmarked against other training against training of a similar nature (e.g., by STAR)? What is the unit cost of training for polling agents benchmarked against training costs from previous elections or costs carried out in similar environments?	STAR Finance Manager (Enoch) and / or M&E Team (Wendy, Gideon) GESP Business Case; Project Monitoring Reports and budget documents; Training assessment report	

Overarching evaluation question	Component evaluation questions	Relevant hypotheses	Assumptions	Research questions	Data sources	Risk management approach
money? How could this have been improved?	11e To what extent has the allocation of grants across the portfolio lead to the following effects: - Synergetic effects – the funding modality has led to synergetic benefits and as such achieved either within portfolios, between portfolios and/or with other DFID-funded programmes; - Catalytic effects – the funding modality has resulted in changes in attitudes and behaviours amongst other organisations and stakeholders in the sector either through influencing or coordination type activities - Leadership effects – the funding modality has resulted in mainstreaming of policy and practice and as such led to greater sustainability of the benefits realised across the portfolio;	If STAR Ghana strategically selects the portfolio of grantees under the election window, then the effect of the funding at portfolio level will be 'greater than the sum of its parts'.	Grantees receiving funding have the resources to participate in the sector more broadly.	Is there evidence of synergetic benefits either within portfolios, between portfolios and/or with other DFID-funded programmes? Is there evidence of changes in attitudes and behaviours amongst other organisations and stakeholders in the sector either through influencing or coordination type activities? Is there evidence of mainstreaming of policy and practice and as such led to greater sustainability of the benefits realised across the portfolio?	Interview Michael Ohene-Effah (DFID) Joe Ampong-Fosu (Judiciary) Deputy Chairman (EC). Kwasi Afriyie-Badu. (EC) Ibrahim Tanko (STAR) Kojo Asante (CDD)	The DFID programme officer has an interest in the success of the programme while other donors may assign responsibility to external parties to justify their own actions/inactions. There may also be courtesy or social desirability bias at play if respondents believe it would be inappropriate to answer questions frankly or suspect a specific answer is being sought. We will mitigate these risks by seeking multiple suspects, triangulating with documentary evidence, and advising the respondent that they should be frank, creating a social context that is conducive to the free airing of opinions.
12 Was the balance of investment in each of the components proportionate to their effectiveness and impact on the programme's aim and objectives?	12a Was the funding provided to the EC appropriate to meet the problem the activities were trying to address?	If DFID allocates the majority of funding to the EC, while still providing support to a range of other stakeholders, then the GESP will achieve its diverse objectives	There are other donors funding activities and stakeholders in order to support a free, fair and peaceful election process	How was the amount of funding determined for the Programme Components?	Documentary evidence from Q11 above.	
	12b Was the funding provided to the Judiciary appropriate to meet the problem the activities were trying to address?			Why was a large proportion of the funding provided to the EC?	Documentary evidence from Q11 above.	
	12c Was the funding provided to the Star Ghana appropriate to meet the problem the grants were trying to address?			Was the allocation of funding based on the problem the programme components were trying to address?	Documentary evidence from Q11 above.	
Coverage						
13 To what extent do the results reflect the inequities and inequalities identified in the problem analysis?	13a What inequities / inequalities were identified in the problem analysis?	If programme components take an inclusive approach in their activities then inequalities and issues of inequity may be better addressed	Components are confident that their approaches, training and activities address inequalities and inequity	To what extent did programme components factor in issues of exclusion and gender? How was this done in practice? What changes came about as a result of a more socially inclusively approach?	Interview Michael Ohene-Effah (DFID) Joe Ampong-Fosu (Judiciary) Deputy Chairman (EC). Kwasi Afriyie-Badu. (EC) Ibrahim Tanko (STAR) Kojo Asante (CDD) Component Final Reports / 4th Quarterly Reports Component Reports	
Impact						
14 What were the perceived benefits to the recipients of the training provided under the programme?	14a What are the judges' perceptions of the benefits of the training?			Did training positively change recipients' knowledge, attitudes and discharge of duties?	Interviews with training participants; Training Assessment Report	Training participants may be reluctant to answer questions frankly out of courtesy or appreciation of the support provided by DFID or may believe the interviewer is seeking a "right" answer. We will mitigate these risks by triangulating with documentary evidence and advising the respondent that they should be frank, creating a social context that is conducive to the free airing of opinions.
	14b What are Court staff's perceptions of the benefits of the training?			Did training positively change recipients' knowledge, attitudes and discharge of duties?	Interviews with training participants; Training Assessment Report	Training participants may be reluctant to answer questions frankly out of courtesy or appreciation of the support provided by DFID or may believe the interviewer is seeking a "right" answer. We will mitigate these risks by triangulating with documentary evidence and advising the respondent that they should be frank, creating a social context that is conducive to the free airing of opinions.
	14c What are CSO's perceptions of the benefits of the training?			Did training positively change recipients' knowledge, attitudes and discharge of duties?	Interviews with training participants; Training Assessment Report	Training participants may be reluctant to answer questions frankly out of courtesy or appreciation of the support provided by DFID or may believe the interviewer is seeking a "right" answer. We will mitigate these risks by triangulating with documentary evidence and advising the respondent that they should be frank, creating a social context that is conducive to the free airing of opinions.
	14d What are Polling agent's perceptions of the benefits of the training?			Did training positively change recipients' knowledge, attitudes and discharge of duties?	Interviews with training participants; Training Assessment Report	Training participants may be reluctant to answer questions frankly out of courtesy or appreciation of the support provided by DFID or may believe the interviewer is seeking a "right" answer. We will mitigate these risks by triangulating with documentary evidence and advising the respondent that they should be frank, creating a social context that is conducive to the free airing of opinions.
15 In retrospect, what changes, if any, would beneficiaries have	15a In retrospect, what changes would judges have sought from the training?			What changes to content (inc background material), timeliness, training method, and selection of trainees are recommended?	Interviews with training participants; Training Assessment Report	Training participants may be reluctant to answer questions frankly out of courtesy or appreciation of the support provided by DFID or may believe the interviewer is seeking a "right" answer. We will mitigate these risks by triangulating with documentary evidence and advising the respondent that they should be frank, creating a social context that is conducive to the free airing of opinions.
	15b In retrospect, what changes would court staff have sought from the training?			What changes to content (inc background material), timeliness, training method, and selection of trainees are recommended?	Interviews with training participants; Training Assessment Report	Training participants may be reluctant to answer questions frankly out of courtesy or appreciation of the support provided by DFID or may believe the interviewer is seeking a "right" answer. We will mitigate these risks by triangulating with documentary evidence and advising the respondent that they should be frank, creating a social context that is conducive to the free airing of opinions.

Overarching evaluation question	Component evaluation questions	Relevant hypotheses	Assumptions	Research questions	Data sources	Risk management approach	
15	sought from the training provided?						
	15c	In retrospect, what changes would CSOs have sought from the training?			What changes to content (inc background material), timeliness, training method, and selection of trainees are recommended?	Interviews with training participants; Training Assessment Report	Training participants may be reluctant to answer questions frankly out of courtesy or appreciation of the support provided by DFID or may believe the interviewer is seeking a "right" answer. We will mitigate these risks by triangulating with documentary evidence and advising the respondent that they should be frank, creating a social context that is conducive to the free airing of opinions.
	15d	In retrospect, what changes would polling agents have sought from the training?			What changes to content (inc background material), timeliness, training method, and selection of trainees are recommended?	Interviews with training participants; Training Assessment Report	Training participants may be reluctant to answer questions frankly out of courtesy or appreciation of the support provided by DFID or may believe the interviewer is seeking a "right" answer. We will mitigate these risks by triangulating with documentary evidence and advising the respondent that they should be frank, creating a social context that is conducive to the free airing of opinions.
16	16a	What is the impact of training on judges performance in dealing with election-related disputes?	If elections laws are better understood by judges then cases will be addressed and appealed according to the law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Judges are confident in their performance during the elections Judges will not be biased to certain political parties Not previously knowledgeable about law Training effective Cases filed, & public knowledgeable about laws Judicial impunity 	<p>To what extent did training enhance judges' knowledge to perform their specific election case duties and judgements?</p> <p>What would have happened if you did not receive the training?</p>	Interviews with training participants. Judiciary Training Assessment Report.	Training participants may be reluctant to answer questions frankly out of courtesy or appreciation of the support provided by DFID or alternatively, may seek to attribute their failures to an external actor (DFID). We will mitigate these risks by advising the respondent that they should be frank, creating a social context that is conducive to the free airing of opinions, and by seeking the views of multiple participants.
			If judges address election cases according to the law cases will close quicker as claimants will accept final judgement	<p>The judicial system will operate effectively and efficiently during election process</p> <p>Cases filed</p> <p>Candidates and political parties will resort to the law courts to settle election disputes.</p> <p>Training of judges and court staff will lead to quick resolution of electoral disputes.</p>	<p>To what extent did the training enable cases to close quicker?</p> <p>What would have happened to the court case process if you did not receive the training?</p> <p>What percentage of election petitions will receive judgement/ruling</p>	Interviews with training participants. Judiciary Training Assessment Report.	Training participants may be reluctant to answer questions frankly out of courtesy or appreciation of the support provided by DFID or alternatively, may seek to attribute their failures to an external actor (DFID). We will mitigate these risks by advising the respondent that they should be frank, creating a social context that is conducive to the free airing of opinions, and by seeking the views of multiple participants.
			If judges understand the election laws, then they will be able to advise citizens and political parties of the laws and appropriate behaviours.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Citizens believe in the judicial system ability to pass fair and non-bias judgment during election process The electoral process is transparent, fair and accountable to citizens and political parties equally. 	<p>To what extent has the training supported you to advise citizens on election laws?</p> <p>To what extent has the training and manual supported you to advise political parties of the proper procedures and elections laws?</p> <p>What would have happened if you did not receive the training?</p>	Interviews with training participants. Judiciary Training Assessment Report.	Training participants may be reluctant to answer questions frankly out of courtesy or appreciation of the support provided by DFID or alternatively, may seek to attribute their failures to an external actor (DFID). We will mitigate these risks by advising the respondent that they should be frank, creating a social context that is conducive to the free airing of opinions, and by seeking the views of multiple participants.
			If judges understand the election laws, then they will be a decrease in frivolous election cases.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The judicial system will operate effective 	<p>To what extent has the training prevented less frivolous elections cases from coming forward?</p> <p>What would have happened if you did not receive the training</p>	Interviews with training participants. Judiciary Training Assessment Report.	Training participants may be reluctant to answer questions frankly out of courtesy or appreciation of the support provided by DFID or alternatively, may seek to attribute their failures to an external actor (DFID). We will mitigate these risks by advising the respondent that they should be frank, creating a social context that is conducive to the free airing of opinions, and by seeking the views of multiple participants.
	16b	What is the impact of training on court staff's performance in dealing with election-related disputes?	If the court staff are aware of their duties in relation to election related disputes and understand the systems and processes in place for dealing with them, then administrative process for election related disputes will be expedited.	Court staff are confident in their performance during the elections	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent has the training supported less frivolous elections cases and disputes from coming forward? What would have happened if you did not receive the training? With training knowledge and skills what changed as a result of how the judiciary system handles frivolous cases? 	Interviews with training participants. Judiciary Training Assessment Report.	Training participants may be reluctant to answer questions frankly out of courtesy or appreciation of the support provided by DFID or alternatively, may seek to attribute their failures to an external actor (DFID). We will mitigate these risks by advising the respondent that they should be frank, creating a social context that is conducive to the free airing of opinions, and by seeking the views of multiple participants.
	16c	What is the impact of the manual on increasing awareness of electoral laws?	If manual is produced and share with judges and other judiciary stakeholders then a greater understanding of elections laws may happen and a decrease in unnecessary court cases may take place	The manual will support greater understanding of election laws	How is the manual being used to support awareness and knowledge around the election laws and process? Is it user friendly and appropriate for the targetted audiences? To you knowledge has is the manual being used in practice even after the elections now?	Justice Opoku-Akyeampong (Judicial Secretary) Justice Marful-Sau (JTI)	Respondents may be reluctant to answer questions frankly out of courtesy or appreciation of the support provided by DFID . We will mitigate this risk by advising the respondent that they should be frank, creating a social context that is conducive to the free airing of opinions,
	16d	What is the impact of training on Polling agents?	If the EC polling agents cooperate with others (observers, polling staff) on election day then disputes on votes will be less likely	<p>Polling agents and observers staff are neutral and will work together to support the polling station's voting process on election day</p> <p>EC officials will be impartial and withstand political influence.</p>	<p>To what extent did the training support enable EC agents and officers to collaborate on issues that came up during elections?</p> <p>To what extent did training support EC polling agents and officers to minimise disputes during elections?</p>	Survey of random selection of Polling Agents Election Observation	<p>Polling agents may not believe that the interview is actually confidential or may believe there is alternative "political" purpose to the questions. We will address this fully describing the purpose of the surveys and providing assurances of confidentiality.</p> <p>They may also understate the effectiveness of the training to justify their own shortcomings or to build up their own accomplishments. By surveying multiple polling agents, we will mitigate this bias somewhat.</p>

Overarching evaluation question		Component evaluation questions		Relevant hypotheses	Assumptions	Research questions	Data sources	Risk management approach
16	How did the GESIP activities impact on beneficiaries' performance/ achievements relating to the election process?			If EC officers understand the election rules and BVR process then they will be able to advise and assist citizens during voting in an unbiased manner	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Citizens will feel comfortable approaching EC polling agent and officers EC polling agent officers are confident in their performance during the elections EC polling agent officers will not be party biased during election disputes 	<p>To what extent did training enable EC polling agents and officers to advise citizen on voting?</p> <p>What would have happened if you did not receive the training?</p>	<p>Survey of random selection of Polling Agents</p> <p>Election Observation</p>	<p>Polling agents may not believe that the interview is actually confidential or may believe there is alternative "political" purpose to the questions. We will address this fully describing the purpose of the surveys and providing assurances of confidentiality.</p> <p>They may also understate the effectiveness of the training to justify their own shortcomings or to build up their own accomplishments. By surveying multiple polling agents, we will mitigate this bias somewhat.</p>
		16e	What is the impact of training on CSOs on their outreach to beneficiaries?	If CSOs are aware of election laws and processes, then they will pass information on to their beneficiary groups - in particular marginalised groups who are difficult to reach through mainstream media	Beneficiaries and communities are open to CSO election outreach work	To what extent did training enhance CSO outreach to beneficiaries? To what extent is the training applicable beyond the elections? Are there any other aspects of the training that you think made a difference? If so, in what way? What would have happened if you did not receive the training?	STAR Grant Partner FGDs, Interview Ibrahim Tanko, STAR Ghana M&E Team STAR Election Partner Reports from Grant Partners, STAR Final Report	The Implementing Partner has an interest in the success of the programme and may overstate the extent to which alternative views were considered in identifying the problem. This can be mitigated by triangulating with other data sources.
		16f	What is the impact on CSOs receiving funding through STAR Ghana?	If civil society receives voter education then there will be an increase in voter turnout	Voter education is necessary for a higher turnout of voters Citizens are open to being educated about the election process and their influence / role as voters Voter apathy does not get in the way of civic education exercises	To what extent did voter education support the increase in voter turnout? What specifically could you say made new voters go to polling stations? Was it linked to the voter education STAR partners did or another factor was at play? To what extent did voter education develop awareness so that citizens understood the role of the EC and security sector in management a fair and free election process?	Interview Ibrahim Tanko FGD with STAR Grant Partners STAR Election Voter Education Reports from Grant Partners, STAR Final Report	The Implementing Partner has an interest in the success of the programme and may overstate the extent to which alternative views were considered in identifying the problem. This can be mitigated by triangulating with other data sources.
				If citizens are educated on BVR voting there will be a greater turnout and understanding of the BVR voting on election day.	BVR machines and process will run smoothly Citizens feel confident in the BVR polling staff and the BVR process of voting Citizen capability Media capability	To what extent did learning about BVR support the voting process on election day? To what extent did the BVR process make elections run smoother for voters? To what extent did the BVR make a difference towards fair, free and accessible elections? If you were not educated on the BVR process would it have made a difference? To what extent did the media coverage support the awareness raised for voters on BVR, and women's and people living with disabilities civic right to vote?	Interview Kojo Asante (CDD) Election Observation	The Implementing Partner has an interest in the success of the programme and may overstate the extent to which alternative views were considered in identifying the problem. This can be mitigated by triangulating with other data sources, but that is difficult in this case.
				If voter education raises awareness on socially excluded groups need to vote then socially excluded groups will turn out to BVR and vote.	CSO monitoring is effective and raises citizen concerns and views Appetite for social inclusive approaches within the BVR election process (e.g. accessibility for People Living with Disabilities (PWDs))	To what extent was voting and polling sites socially inclusive? To what extent did knowledge on civic rights enhance socially excluded persons to vote?	Interview Kojo Asante (CDD)	The Implementing Partner has an interest in the success of the programme and may overstate the extent to which alternative views were considered in identifying the problem. This can be mitigated by triangulating with other data sources, but that is difficult in this case.
				If CSOs campaign on specific election issues, which need to be taken up by political parties then these issues will be part of the political campaign and addressed by political parties running for election.	Political parties are open to CSOs advocacy and issues CSOs are capable of raising key concerns and issues Can provide high quality training	To what extent did the various citizen campaigns on issues to raise during the elections bring about changes in political campaigners agenda and responsiveness?	STAR Grant Partner FGDs Ibrahim Tanko STAR Final Report / 4th Quarter Report	The Implementing Partner has an interest in the success of the programme and may overstate the extent to which alternative views were considered in identifying the problem. This can be mitigated by triangulating with other data sources, but that is difficult in this case.
				If media support civic election education then voters will understand their civic rights and vote	Voters interested and willing to vote Communities open to sensitisation activities from media organisations and civil society organisations Media capability CSO with media; for civil societies voice to be heard, stories need to be interesting.	To what extent did media support increase citizens awareness on the importance of voting during the election? To what extent did media coverage increase knowledge and transparency of key issues arising during the election? To what extent did media monitoring support more credible and fair elections? To what extent did raising awareness for an inclusive election process (women, PWD) improve the turnout of those usually less excluded? If the media monitoring did not happen what would have happened?	STAR FGDs, Interview STAR M&E Team, Ibrahim Tanko, STAR Final Report / 4th Quarter Report	The Implementing Partner has an interest in the success of the programme and may overstate the extent to which alternative views were considered in identifying the problem. This can be mitigated by triangulating with other data sources, but that is difficult in this case.
17	Was the election process more free and fair as a result of GESIP activities?	17a	What is the cumulative impact of grantees on each phase of the election continuum?	If citizens are provided with information and support through the full election cycle (from registration, to campaigning, to voting, to managing disputes, to understanding results), then they will be able cast an informed vote according to the legislation, and will be able to understand and accept the election results	The election results are transparent and fair Citizens want to engage in the election process	To what extent have citizens been provided with the appropriate information to support them in voting? How did STAR activities specifically support this cumulative approach? How did the Judiciary support this cumulative approach? How has the EC support to citizens contributed to the impact of GESIP? If we look at the full package of support within the election cycle which area would you say had the greatest result and why? What makes this stand out against the others?	Interview Michael Ohene-Effah (DFID) Joe Ampong-Fosu (Judiciary) Deputy Chairman (EC). Kwasi Afriyie-Badu. (EC) Ibrahim Tanko (STAR) Kojo Asante (CDD) Component Final Reports / 4th Quarterly Reports	Interviewees may answer positively and overstate on aspects. This will be addressed by asking interviewees to consider other contributing factors. Verified by component reports, cross check of interviewees responses and media reports.
Sustainability								

Overarching evaluation question		Component evaluation questions		Relevant hypotheses	Assumptions	Research questions	Data sources	Risk management approach
18	To what extent will the results and benefits of the programme continue to be realised beyond the 2012 election process?	18a	To what extent and in what ways will training on the election laws influence the ability of judges to perform their function beyond the election process?	Knowledge gained and attitudinal shift by judges will influence conduct of judiciary beyond the election process.	Turnover in Judiciary is minimal. Knowledge gained on legal framework is not forgotten prior to next election and legal framework does not change significantly.	What has specifically supported you and the judiciary approach to election laws which you will take forward and replicate in other ways after the election? To what extent is your training on electoral disputes applicable to other fields? Is it likely you will be engaged in electoral disputes which arise as a result of the next election?	Judges & Court Staff FGDs Joe Ampong-Fosu (Judiciary) Component Final Reports / 4th Quarterly Reports	
		18b	To what extent and in what ways will the financial support provided through STAR Ghana influence the behaviour of media agencies and CSOs beyond the election process?	If media agencies employ 'good' reporting practice relating to the elections (i.e. reporting based on evidence), then they will continue this practice after the elections have finished	The reasons for 'poor practice' or sensationalist media are not related to a lack of capacity in media agencies	What has specifically supported you and what will you take forward and replicate in other ways after the election? To what extent is your training and election work applicable to other fields? Is it likely you will be engaged in civic education on elections, election monitoring and media work during the next election?	STAR Grant Partners FGDs STAR M&E Team (Wendy, Gideon, Dorcas) Ibrahim Tanko (STAR) Lesson Learned sections of final component reports. End of Project Reports / End of Quarter Reports.	
		18c	To what extent and in what ways will support provided to polling agents influence their perceptions and behaviour beyond the election process?	If polling agents practice and use the knowledge they have gained through training on election day and lessons learned, then they will continue this practice into the next election	Polling agents will be the same for the next elections. Lessons will be remembered for future election.	What has specifically supported you and the polling agent approach to the election process which you will take forward and replicate in other ways in the next election? In what ways does this support your work beyond the elections? How will you be taking the learning forward?	Survey of random selection of Polling Agents	
Lessons / Learning								
19	Would other countries benefit from a similar programme of election support?	19a	To what extent would the support and approach provided through GESP be relevant to other countries?	If GESP approach addresses the problem identified in the design then the approach may be replicable in other contexts with a similar election problem	GESP Approach can be replicated in similar election contexts in Africa	Are the problems identified in Ghana present in other contexts? What might be some issues that are unique to Ghana?	Lesson Learned sections of final component reports. End of Project Reports / End of Quarter Reports.	

ANNEX B: Impact logics for the CDD and Security Sector Programme Components

6.1 Biometric Voter Registration (CDD – CODEO) Component

Figure 5: The Impact logic for providing funding CDD to support the BVR process




Table 8: They hypotheses and assumptions underpinning the impact logic for the CDD Component

BVR CDD Component		
Hypothesis	Assumption	Research Question
If BVR observers are trained there is a greater chance of transparency and peace in the registration process as well as the development of a credible voter register ahead of the December 7 2012 general elections	The Biometric Voter Registration (BVR) is far better than the previous system of voter registration BVR will enhance the transparency, flow and overall voting process during election day The Biometric Voter Registration (BVR) system will help promote peaceful and credible elections in 2012	To what extent did training support a credible <i>registration</i> process during election day? Are there any specific aspects of the training in which observers were able to employ during registration which enhanced the process?
If BVR observers are trained then they will be able to raise critical issues during the monitoring of elections that may arise	Citizens trust the BVR process which will ensure fair elections	To what extent did observation training support a credible <i>voting</i> process during election day? Are there any specific aspects of the training that made a difference? What would have happened if observers were not part of the BVR registration process?
If the EC, police and the BVR observers collaborate on any issues arising during registration or BVR voting during the elections will contribute to fair and peaceful voting process during election day	Key stakeholders (police, EC and observers) will work together to enhance the BVR voting process on election day	To what extent did collaboration with the security, police, EC and the BVR observers enhance the fairness of the BVR voting process? What would have happened if this collaboration did not happen?
If CODEO with media highlight and raise the profile of the BVR observer	CODEO and media will collaborate during the election process	To what extent did working with the media to raise the profile of BVR observers and coverage of the BVR registration exercise enhance citizen trust in

BVR CDD Component		
Hypothesis	Assumption	Research Question
<p>role in the registration process citizens will be more likely to trust the credibility of results</p> <p>If CODEO with the media highlight and raise issues experienced during and post election results government transparency and accountability will be appropriately ensured.</p>	<p>Media will report and monitor elections in an unbiased professional manner</p>	<p>the process?</p> <p>To what extent did the media coverage support the BVR education for citizens?</p> <p>To what extent did the media coverage contribute to transparency of issues experienced during the BVR voting?</p>

6.2 Security Sector Component

Figure 6: The Impact logic for providing support to the Security Sector




Table 9: They hypotheses and assumptions underpinning the impact logic for the Security Sector Component

Security Component		
Hypothesis	Assumption	Research Question
If police officers understand the election rules, then they will be able to advise citizens of the laws and appropriate behaviours	<p>Citizens will feel comfortable approaching police officers</p> <p>Police officers are confident in their performance during the elections</p> <p>Police officers will not be party biased during election disputes</p>	<p>To what extent did training enable police officers to advise citizen on election laws?</p> <p>To what extent did training enhance police officers knowledge to perform their specific election security duty?</p> <p>To what extent is the training for security applicable beyond the elections?</p> <p>Are there any other aspects of the training that you think made a difference? If so, in what way?</p> <p>What would have happened if you did not receive the training?</p>
If all security agencies work together during elections then the potential for insecurity and public disorder are less likely to cause disruption	Security agencies will collaborate and work together to have approaches for maintaining order	<p>To what extent did security agencies collaborate and work together?</p> <p>With training knowledge and skills what changed as a result of how the security agencies handle disputes?</p> <p>To what extent did the training enable security agencies to understand each other's roles and collaborate more effectively to ensure public order during elections?</p>
If national communication base stations are established this will reinforce strategic communication during elections for security and public safety	<p>Communications stations will run as planned during elections</p> <p>Staff working at communication stations will have contingency plans in place in case of machine failure or power outages</p>	<p>To what extent did having communications stations support the election process?</p> <p>To what extent did the communication stations provide strategic security?</p> <p>To what extent did the security services improve their responsiveness due to the communication stations?</p>
If the capacity of the security agencies throughout the country is built then they can deal with unforeseen security challenges before, during and after the Presidential elections	Police officers are confident in their performance during the elections	To what extent has the capacity building supporting security agencies to perform their duties?
If police officers are	Police officers will feel	To what extent did supplying communication

Security Component		
Hypothesis	Assumption	Research Question
well equipped and have proper communication equipment then election disputes and / or disruptions in public will be handled effectively and police response time to disputes will be quicker.	ready and prepared for disputes Citizens will feel safe and public order will be maintained	equipment support to the police enhance security responsiveness and maintain public order? To what extent was the communication equipment used? For what purposes? How did it ensure public management and order was maintained? What were the actual benefits of the communication equipment in the security of the polling stations?

Annex B

Evaluation Matrix

	Evaluation Criteria	#	Evaluation Question	Programme area	#	Judgement criteria	Indicator	Sources of evidence
RATIONALE	RELEVANCE	1	To what extent has the GES Programme effectively identified the problem around the election?	Overall	1.1	Extent to which the business case takes into account the perspectives of multiple stakeholders	Business case based on consultation with stakeholders from: - political parties - government institutions - civil society - private sector Business case takes into account existing literature on: - elections in similar countries - elections in Ghana - Ghana's political environment	Interview Michael Ohene-Effah Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 2, 4, 9, 11, 13, 99 Document to be requested
DESIGN	RELEVANCE	2	To what extent does the GESP and its component parts address the problem identified?	JUDICIARY	2.1	Extent to which the Judiciary's GESP-funded activities address problems identified in the judiciary related to election management	Judiciary has a goal/objectives for how petitions from the election process will be managed Judiciary has a plan for managing election petitions and an awareness of the 'problem' / capacity gaps Judiciary's GESP-funded activities are aligned with the gaps identified	Interview The Chief Justice. Focus groups Supervising High Court judges Documents have/waiting for 19, 79 Document to be requested
DESIGN	RELEVANCE	2	To what extent does the GESP and its component parts address the problem identified?	ELECTORAL COMMISSION	2.2	Extent to which the EC's GESP-funded activities address problems identified in the Electoral Commission related to election management	EC has a goal/objectives for how the election process will be managed EC has a plan for managing the election process EC's GESP-funded activities are aligned with the gaps identified	Interview Dr. Afari-Gyan, EC Chairman. Mr. Kwasi Afriyie-Badu Focus groups Political party executives. CODEO observers (2008) Documents have/waiting for 20, 99, 100. Document to be requested
DESIGN	RELEVANCE	2	To what extent does the GESP and its component parts address the problem identified?	POLICE	2.3	Extent to which the Police/ Security Sector's GESP-funded activities address problems identified in the police/security sector related to election management	Police/ Security sector have a goal/objectives for how the election process will be managed Police/ Security sector have a plan for managing the election process Police/ Security Sector's GESP-funded activities are aligned with the gaps identified	Interview Representative of Police Administration responsible for elections. Keith Ashong Focus groups Party polling agents (2008). CODEO observers (2008) Documents have/waiting for 21, 76. Document to be requested
DESIGN	RELEVANCE	2	To what extent does the GESP and its component parts address the problem identified?	CIVIL SOCIETY - STAR	2.4	Extent to which the portfolio of grantees selected by STAR is appropriate to address the problems identified in relation to the civil society's engagement in the election process	STAR has a clear goal/objective for providing funding for CSOs working on election specific activities STAR has a transparent selection process for grantees aligned with the goal/objectives for election funding The choice of grantees is aligned with STAR's overarching goal/objective	Interview Ibrahim Tanko Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 2, 4, 10, 22, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74 Document to be requested
DESIGN	RELEVANCE	2	To what extent does the GESP and its component parts address the problem identified?	BVR - CDD	2.5	Extent to which BVR observation and monitoring responds to problems (potential or actual) identified with the pre-BVR registration	Goals/ objectives for the BVR have been articulated Potential issues with the BVR process have been identified based on: - experience with BVR in similar context - an understanding of the political and social environment in Ghana Number of and sample of polling stations observed is appropriate to address problem Training needs of the observers and supervisors are identified Training programme responds to the capacity needs and skills gaps of the observers and supervisors	Interview EC Chairman or deputy. Gabby Otchere-Darko (Danquah Institute, leading advocate of BVR, NPP affiliate). Kojo Asante (CDD-CODEO). Focus groups BVR observers. Selected BVR registered voters Documents have/waiting for 2, 4, 6, 23 Document to be requested

DESIGN	COHERENCE	3	To what extent does the design of the GESP complement the existing work of other partners?	Overall	3.1	Extent to which the design of the GESP complements the existing work of other donors?	Stakeholder mapping undertaken during the design process Consultation with donor partners in designing the GESP There is no duplication in the activities funded GESP does not fund what would have been undertaken without donor support GESP interventions complement other donor activities so that the anticipated results will be greater than the sum of their parts	Interview Michael Ohene-Effah (DFID). USAID Governance Adviser. UNDP Governance Adviser. DANIDA Governance Adviser. Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 2, 9. Document to be requested
DESIGN	COHERENCE	3	To what extent does the design of the GESP complement the existing work of other partners?	JUDICIARY	3.2	Extent to which the activities funded through the GESP complement the existing work of other partners with the judiciary	No duplication with existing activities underway of the judiciary Activities do not fund what would have been undertaken without donor support Activities increase the efficiency of the judiciary Activities are designed to complement other activities so that the anticipated results will be greater than the sum of their parts	Interview Joe Ampong-Fosu. UNDP Governance Adviser. Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 91 Document to be requested Current portfolio of donor-funded activities:
DESIGN	COHERENCE	3	To what extent does the design of the GESP complement the existing work of other partners?	ELECTORAL COMMISSION	3.3	To what extent do the activities funded through the GESP complement the existing work of other partners with the Electoral Commission	No duplication with existing activities underway of the EC Activities do not fund what would have been undertaken without donor support Activities increase the efficiency of the EC Activities are designed to complement other activities so that the anticipated results will be greater than the sum of their parts	Interview Kofi Kye-Duodu (Donor Liaison, EC) Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested Current portfolio of donor-funded activities:
DESIGN	COHERENCE	3	To what extent does the design of the GESP complement the existing work of other partners?	POLICE	3.4	Extent to which the activities funded through the GESP complement the existing work of other partners with the Police/ Security Sector	No duplication with existing activities underway of the Police/ Security Sector Activities do not fund what would have been undertaken without donor support Activities increase the efficiency of the Police/ Security Sector Activities are designed to complement other activities so that the anticipated results will be greater than the sum of their parts	Interview Police Administration (Donor Liaison) Keith Ashong. Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested Current portfolio of donor-funded activities
DESIGN	COHERENCE	3	To what extent does the design of the GESP complement the existing work of other partners?	CIVIL SOCIETY - STAR	3.5	Extent to which STAR's funding to grant partners for specified activities complements the existing activities or funding sources for these partners	Grant partners not receiving multiple sources of funding for the same activity without justification	Interview Ibrahim Tanko Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested Data on Grant partners' current portfolio of donor-funded activities.
DESIGN	COHERENCE	3	To what extent does the design of the GESP complement the existing work of other partners?	BVR - CDD	3.6	Extent to which CDD's BVR observation exercise complements BVR activities supported by other partners	No duplication with other observation training or activities Observation would not have been undertaken without donor support Observation (and reports on observation) enhances the likelihood of a successful BVR process	Interview Franklin Oduro (CDD). Deputy chairman (EC) Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested Data on non-GESP donor funding for BVR
DESIGN	COORDINATION	4	To what extent is the design of the GESP aligned with the existing work, priorities and systems of the Government of Ghana?	JUDICIARY	4.1	Extent to which the activities funded through the GESP are aligned with the existing work and priorities of the Judiciary	Alignment / consistency with current judicial priorities and systems Alignment / consistency with existing activities being carried out by the: - the judiciary; - government departments working closely with the judiciary.	Interview Justice Opoku-Akyeampong (Judicial Secretary) Joe Ampong-Fosu Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 19 Document to be requested Strategic Plan document of the Judicial Service. Annual Report of the Judicial Service (2011)
DESIGN	COORDINATION	4	To what extent is the design of the GESP aligned with the existing work, priorities and systems of the Government of Ghana?	ELECTORAL COMMISSION	4.2	Extent to which the activities funded through the GESP are aligned with the existing work and priorities of the Electoral Commission	Alignment / consistency with current priorities and systems of the Electoral Commission Alignment / consistency with existing activities being carried out by the: - the Electoral Commission; - government departments working closely with the Electoral Commission.	Interview Deputy Chairman (EC) Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 20 Document to be requested Strategic Plan of the EC. Annual Report of the EC.

DESIGN	COORDINATION	4	To what extent is the design of the GESP aligned with the existing work, priorities and systems of the Government of Ghana?	POLICE	4.3	Extent to which the activities funded through the GESP are aligned with the existing work and priorities of the Police	Alignment / consistency with current priorities and systems of the Police Alignment / consistency with existing activities being carried out by the: - the Police; - government departments and security services working closely with the police.	Interview Representative of Police administration or Ministry of Interior. Keith Ashong. Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 21, 76. Document to be requested
DESIGN	COORDINATION	4	To what extent is the design of the GESP aligned with the existing work, priorities and systems of the Government of Ghana?	CIVIL SOCIETY - STAR	4.4	Extent to which the activities funded through the GESP are aligned with Government policy for civil society engagement	Alignment / consistency with government policy on civil society engagement	Interview Michael Ohene-Effah Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
DESIGN	COORDINATION	4	To what extent is the design of the GESP aligned with the existing work and priorities of the judiciary and overarching GoG policy?	BVR - CDD	4.5	Extent to which support for the BVR process is aligned with the Government of Ghana's policy and existing systems	Alignment / consistency with Government's objectives for BVR Alignment / consistency with existing activities being carried out by the: - the Electoral Commission; - government departments working on the BVR process.	Interview Deputy chairman (EC). Michael Ohene-Effah. Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested EC documents on BVR.
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	5	Are the activities and services being delivered in accordance with what was originally intended?	JUDICIARY	5.1	Extent to which training of judges and courtroom staff on election adjudication has been delivered according to what was originally planned.	Training of judges and judicial staff in election adjudication has been delivered according to original training work plan.	Interview Justice Opoku-Akyearmpomg (Judicial Secretary) Justice Marful-Sau (JTI). Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 19, 90, 96 Document to be requested
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	5	Are the activities and services being delivered in accordance with what was originally intended?	JUDICIARY	5.2	Extent to which training of judges and courtroom staff on ICT has been delivered according to what was originally planned.	Training of judges and judicial staff on ICT has been delivered according to original ICT training work plan.	Interview Justice Opoku-Akyearmpomg. Provider of ICT training Joe Ampong-Fosu Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 19, 90, 96 Document to be requested
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	5	Are the activities and services being delivered in accordance with what was originally intended?	JUDICIARY	5.3	Extent to which the review, printing and distribution of the manual on election laws and adjudication has been delivered according to the original plan.	Election adjudication manual has been revised and printed according to original plan. Election adjudication manual has been distribution according to original plan.	Interview Bimpong Buta (outside consultant). Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 79, 84, 85, 88, 96. Document to be requested
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	5	Are the activities and services being delivered in accordance with what was originally intended?	ELECTORAL COMMISSION	5.4	Extent to which the training of trainers and training of party polling agents has been delivered according to the original plan.	Training of trainers has been delivered according to work plan. Training of party agents has been delivered according to work plan.	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 59, 60. Document to be requested Initial activity/work plan
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	5	Are the activities and services being delivered in accordance with what was originally intended?	ELECTORAL COMMISSION	5.5	Extent to which the training of CBOs and CSOs has been completed according to the original plan	Training of CBOs and CSOs has been delivered according to the work plan.	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 59, 60. Document to be requested Initial activity/work plan
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	5	Are the activities and services being delivered in accordance with what was originally intended?	POLICE	5.6	Extent to which the training of categories of security services personnel has been delivered according to the original plan,	Training of appropriate category of security service personnel has been delivered according to the original plan.	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 27, 33. Document to be requested Initial work plan

DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	5	Are the activities and services being delivered in accordance with what was originally intended?	CIVIL SOCIETY - STAR	5.7	Extent to which election call and related grants have been delivered according to the original plan?	Award of grants for election call has been delivered according to original plan.	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 28, 30, 71, 74, 98. Document to be requested
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	5	Are the activities and services being delivered in accordance with what was originally intended?	CIVIL SOCIETY - STAR	5.8	Extent to which election call grantees have delivered their activities according to their work plans.	Each grant partner in election call has delivered its planned activities according to the original work plan.	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 10, 28, 30, 71, 74, 98. Document to be requested
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	5	Are the activities and services being delivered in accordance with what was originally intended?	BVR - CDD	5.9	Extent to which baseline experience survey has been carried out according to original plan? Extent to which BVR observers have been trained and deployed according to the original plan.	Baseline experience survey has been conducted as originally planned. Training of 620 monitors and 30 regional supervisors for BVR has been conducted and completed as originally planned. BVR Observer-monitored polling stations have been properly selected. Trained monitors have been deployed at polling selections as planned.	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 29, 34, 45. Document to be requested Initial activity/work plan
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	6	Were activities under the programme completed to time and budget?	JUDICIARY	6.1	Extent to which training of judges and staff (on election adjudication manual and on ICT) completed on schedule and within budget. Extent to which manual on election adjudication has been revised, printed and distributed on schedule and within budget.	Training of judges and judicial staff on election adjudication (and on ICT) has been completed on schedule and within budget. Manual on election adjudication has been revised, printed and disseminated on schedule and within budget.	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 25, 78, 79, 84, 90, 96. Document to be requested
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	6	Were activities under the programme completed to time and budget?	ELECTORAL COMMISSION	6.2	Extent to which training of CBOs and CSOs completed on schedule and within budget. Extent to which training of trainers and party polling agents has been completed on schedule and within budget.	Training of CBOs and CSOs has been completed on schedule and within budget. Training of trainers and party polling agents has been completed on schedule and within budget.	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 59, 60. Document to be requested 2d Quarter Report (narrative and financials) Interview
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	6	Were activities under the programme completed to time and budget?	POLICE	6.3	Whether various categories of training for security services personnel were completed on schedule and within budget?	Training of categories of security services personnel has been completed on schedule and within budget.	Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 27, 33, 101 Document to be requested
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	6	Were activities under the programme completed to time and budget?	CIVIL SOCIETY - STAR	6.4	Whether election call grants to CSOs and CBOs were completed on time and budget.	Election call grants to CSOs and CBOs have been made on schedule and within budget.	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 10, 28, 30, 66. Document to be requested
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	6	Were activities under the programme completed to time and budget?	BVR - CDD	6.5	Whether training and deployment of BVR monitors and supervisors was completed on schedule and budget.	Training and deployment of 620 monitors and 30 regional supervisors has been completed on schedule and budget.	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 29, 32, 34. Document to be requested
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	7	Were there any issues identified in the implementation of the components? If so, how successfully were these addressed by the project implementers?	JUDICIARY	7.1	Whether there were any issues or challenges identified or encountered in the implementation of the Judiciary component of the GESP. If so, the extent to which the issues were successfully addressed by the Judicial Service.	Judicial Service systematically monitored programme implementation. Challenges and problems encountered in activity implementation have been identified and timely reported and addressed.	Interview Joe Ampong-Fosu Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	7	Were there any issues identified in the implementation of the components? If so, how successfully were these addressed by the project implementers?	ELECTORAL COMMISSION	7.2	Whether there were any issues or challenges identified or encountered in the implementation of the EC's component of the GESP. If so, the extent to which the issues were successfully addressed by the EC.	EC systematically monitored programme implementation. Challenges and problems encountered in capacity-building training for polling agents and for CSOs/CBOs have been identified and timely reported and addressed.	Interview Deputy Chairman (EC). Kwasi Afriyie-Badu. Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested

DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	7	Were there any issues identified in the implementation of the components? If so, how successfully were these addressed by the project implementers?	POLICE	7.3	Whether there were any issues or challenges identified or encountered in the implementation of the Police component of the GESP. If so, the extent to which the Police successfully addressed these issues.	Police systematically monitored programme implementation. Challenges and problems encountered in installation and deployment of intelligence communications equipment have been identified and timely reported and addressed. Challenges and problems encountered in training of security service personnel have been identified and timely reported and addressed.	Interview Police administration responsible for GESP. Police M & E consultants Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	7	Were there any issues identified in the implementation of the components? If so, how successfully were these addressed by the project implementers?	CIVIL SOCIETY - STAR	7.4	Whether there were any issues or challenges identified or encountered in the implementation of the GESP by STAR. If so, the extent to which STAR successfully addressed these issues.	STAR systematically monitored programme implementation. Challenges and problems encountered in elections call implementation have been identified and timely reported and addressed.	Interview Ibrahim Tanko Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested Internal communication/staff notes on implementation difficulties.
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	7	Were there any issues identified in the implementation of the components? If so, how successfully were these addressed by the project implementers?	BVR - CDD	7.5	Whether there were any issues or challenges identified or encountered in the implementation of the BVR component of the GESP? If so, the extent to which CDD/CODEO addressed these issues.	CDD-CODEO systematically monitored programme implementation. Challenges and problems encountered in training and deployment of BVR monitors have been identified and timely reported and addressed.	Interview Kojo Asante Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested Internal communication on BVR implementation challenges
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	8	How many people received direct support from DFID (corroboration of the projected results and monitoring system)?	JUDICIARY	8.1	Number of judges and courtroom staff who received training on election adjudication (and on ICT).	96 judges and 100 judicial staff received training in use of revised election adjudication manual (and ICT).	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 89 Document to be requested
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	8	How many people received direct support from DFID (corroboration of the projected results and monitoring system)?	JUDICIARY	8.2	Number of people who received copies of the revised election adjudication manual.	3000 stakeholders have received copies of the revised election adjudication manual.	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 85 Document to be requested
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	8	How many people received direct support from DFID (corroboration of the projected results and monitoring system)?	ELECTORAL COMMISSION	8.3	Number of trainer of trainers/party polling agents/CSOs and CBOs that received appropriate EC capacity building training. Number of party agents who received copies of election guidelines.	1060 trainer of trainers trained; 276,000 political party agents trained. 2,524 CSOs and CBOs trained in their roles in ensuring credible elections. 300,000 manuals on guidelines for party agents distributed to party agents.	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 59, 60, 102. Document to be requested
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	8	How many people received direct support from DFID (corroboration of the projected results and monitoring system)?	POLICE	8.4	Number of officers who received the various categories of training under the Police component of GESP?	16,000 officers trained in election laws. 90 officers trained in tactical public order and intelligence capability 20,000 officers on election day duty provided with laminated pocket-size election laws.	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 27, 101. Document to be requested
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	8	How many people received direct support from DFID (corroboration of the projected results and monitoring system)?	CIVIL SOCIETY - STAR	8.5	Number of CSOs and CBOs that received grants in the STAR election call.	Number of election call grantees.	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 10, 30, 98. Document to be requested
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	8	How many people received direct support from DFID (corroboration of the projected results and monitoring system)?	BVR - CDD	8.6	Number of observers who received training and were deployed for BVR observation.	620 monitors and 30 supervisors trained and deployed.	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 29, 34, 38, 95 Document to be requested
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	9	Were indicators in the Logframe met? What evidence exists to support this?	JUDICIARY	9.1	Extent to which indicators in the Logframe were met. Evidence which exists to support this.	Training of judges and courtroom staff has been completed and documented in Judicial Service training reports (training participants' lists). Printing and distribution of election adjudication manuals has been completed and documented in a distribution log.	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 14, 85, 89. Document to be requested

DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	9	Were indicators in the Logframe met? What evidence exists to support this?	ELECTORAL COMMISSION	9.2	Extent to which indicators in the Logframe were met. Evidence which exists to support this.	Training of 1060 trainers and 276,000 polling agents has been completed and documented in training reports. Training of CBOs/CSOs has been completed and documented in training reports.	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 15, 59, 60. Document to be requested
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	9	Were indicators in the Logframe met? What evidence exists to support this?	POLICE	9.3	Extent to which the indicators in the Logframe were met. Evidence which exists to support this.	Training of categories of security services personnel has been completed and is documented in training reports.	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 16, 27, 101 Document to be requested
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	9	Were indicators in the Logframe met? What evidence exists to support this?	CIVIL SOCIETY - STAR	9.4	Extent to which the indicators in the Logframe were met. Evidence which exists to support this.	Election call grants to qualified CSOs and CBOs have been made and is documented in quarterly and semester reports.	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 17, 28, 30, 66. Document to be requested
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	9	Were indicators in the Logframe met? What evidence exists to support this?	BVR - CDD	9.5	Extent to which the indicators in the Logframe were met. Evidence which exists to support this.	Training and deployment of BVR monitors has been completed and is documented in quarterly reports, training reports, and stakeholder briefing reports.	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for 18, 29, 34, 38. Document to be requested
DELIVERY	EFFECTIVENESS	10	10. What were the most effective interventions in improving the election process? Why?	Overall	10.1			
IMPACT	EFFICIENCY	11	To what extent does the GESP represent good value for money? How could this have been improved?	Overall	11.1	Allocative efficiency of programme funding	Synergetic effects – the funding modality has led to synergetic benefits and as such achieved either within portfolios, between portfolios and/or with other DFID-funded programmes; Catalytic effects – the funding modality has resulted in changes in attitudes and behaviours amongst other organisations and stakeholders in the sector either through influencing or coordination type activities Leadership effects – the funding modality has resulted in mainstreaming of policy and practice and as such led to greater sustainability of the benefits realised across the portfolio; Clearly justified and rationalised management costs to run the programme	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	EFFICIENCY	11	To what extent does the GESP represent good value for money? How could this have been improved?	JUDICIARY	11.1	Cost effectiveness of: - training for judges - training for courtroom staff - production and dissemination of the manual	Unit cost of training for judges benchmarked against other training on new legislation Unit cost of training for courtroom staff benchmarked against other training of a similar nature Effective procurement process for the manual to achieve best price Clear strategic rationale for selection of judges to be trained (ie regional judges) which demonstrates an understanding of cost drivers and links between costs-incurred and performance Clear strategic rationale for dissemination of the manual (ie media events) which demonstrates an understanding of cost drivers and links between costs-incurred and performance	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	EFFICIENCY	11	To what extent does the GESP represent good value for money? How could this have been improved?	ELECTORAL COMMISSION	11.1	Cost effectiveness of: - training for CSOs - training for polling agents - production and dissemination of guidelines	Unit cost of training for CSOs benchmarked against other training carried out by the electoral commission, other institutions or donors ie through STAR Unit cost of training for polling agents benchmarked against training costs from previous elections or costs carried out in similar environments Effective procurement process for the production of the guidelines to achieve best price	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	EFFICIENCY	11	To what extent does the GESP represent good value for money? How could this have been improved?	POLICE	11.1	Cost effectiveness of: - training police and security sector personnel - production and dissemination of pocket books - communications infrastructure	Unit cost of training for policy and security sector personnel benchmarked against other similar training Effective procurement process for the pocket books to achieve best price Effective procurement process for the pocket books to achieve best price Clear strategic rationale for selection of police to be trained and their deployment (ie regional judges) which demonstrates an understanding of cost drivers and links between costs-incurred and performance	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested

IMPACT	EFFICIENCY	11	To what extent does the GESP represent good value for money? How could this have been improved?	CIVIL SOCIETY - STAR	11.1	Allocative efficiency of grants	<p>Synergetic effects – the funding modality has led to synergetic benefits and as such achieved either within portfolios, between portfolios and/or with other DFID-funded programmes;</p> <p>Catalytic effects – the funding modality has resulted in changes in attitudes and behaviours amongst other organisations and stakeholders in the sector either through influencing or coordination type activities</p> <p>Leadership effects – the funding modality has resulted in mainstreaming of policy and practice and as such led to greater sustainability of the benefits realised across the portfolio;</p> <p>Clearly justified and rationalised management costs to run the programme</p>	<p>Interview</p> <p>Focus groups</p> <p>Documents have/waiting for</p> <p>Document to be requested</p>
IMPACT	EFFICIENCY	11	To what extent does the GESP represent good value for money? How could this have been improved?	BVR - CDD	11.1	Cost effectiveness of: - training observers and supervisors - media events	<p>Unit cost of training for observers and supervisors benchmarked against training in other similar countries</p> <p>Clear strategic rationale for communication on BVR (media events, press releases etc) which demonstrates an understanding of cost drivers and links between costs incurred and performance</p> <p>Clear strategic rationale for selection of polling stations to be observed which demonstrates an understanding of cost drivers and links between costs-incurred and performance</p>	<p>Interview</p> <p>Focus groups</p> <p>Documents have/waiting for</p> <p>Document to be requested</p>
IMPACT	EFFICIENCY	12	Was the balance of investment in each of the components proportionate to their effectiveness and impact on the programme's aim and objectives?	Overall	12.1			
IMPACT	COVERAGE	13	To what extent do the results reflect the inequities and inequalities identified in the problem analysis?	Overall	13.1			
IMPACT	COVERAGE	13	To what extent do the results reflect the inequities and inequalities identified in the problem analysis?	JUDICIARY	13.2			
IMPACT	COVERAGE	13	To what extent do the results reflect the inequities and inequalities identified in the problem analysis?	ELECTORAL COMMISSION	13.3			
IMPACT	COVERAGE	13	To what extent do the results reflect the inequities and inequalities identified in the problem analysis?	POLICE	13.4			
IMPACT	COVERAGE	13	To what extent do the results reflect the inequities and inequalities identified in the problem analysis?	CIVIL SOCIETY - STAR	13.5			
IMPACT	COVERAGE	13	To what extent do the results reflect the inequities and inequalities identified in the problem analysis?	BVR - CDD	13.6			
IMPACT	IMPACT	14	What were the perceived benefits to the recipients of the training provided under the programme?	JUDICIARY	14.1	Judges' perceptions of the benefits of the training	<p>Judges' perception of how training has positively changed their:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Knowledge/ awareness - Attitude - Anticipated behaviour / discharge of duty 	<p>Interview</p> <p>Focus groups</p> <p>Documents have/waiting for</p> <p>Document to be requested</p>
IMPACT	IMPACT	14	What were the perceived benefits to the recipients of the training provided under the programme?	JUDICIARY	14.2	Court staff's perceptions of the benefits of the training	<p>Court Staff's perception of how training has positively changed their:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Knowledge/ awareness - Attitude - Anticipated behaviour / discharge of duty 	<p>Interview</p> <p>Focus groups</p> <p>Documents have/waiting for</p> <p>Document to be requested</p>
IMPACT	IMPACT	14	What were the perceived benefits to the recipients of the training provided under the programme?	ELECTORAL COMMISSION	14.3	CSO's perceptions of the benefits of the training	<p>CSO's perception of how training has positively changed their:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Knowledge/ awareness - Attitude - Anticipated behaviour / discharge of duty 	<p>Interview</p> <p>Focus groups</p> <p>Documents have/waiting for</p> <p>Document to be requested</p>

IMPACT	IMPACT	14	What were the perceived benefits to the recipients of the training provided under the programme?	ELECTORAL COMMISSION	14.4	Polling agent's perceptions of the benefits of the training	CSOs perception of how training has positively changed their: - Knowledge/ awareness - Attitude - Anticipated behaviour / discharge of duty	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	IMPACT	14	What were the perceived benefits to the recipients of the training provided under the programme?	POLICE	14.5	Police's perceptions of the benefits of the training	Police's perception of how training has positively changed their: - Knowledge/ awareness - Attitude - Anticipated behaviour / discharge of duty	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	IMPACT	14	What were the perceived benefits to the recipients of the training provided under the programme?	POLICE	14.6	Security sector personnel's perceptions of the benefits of the training	Security sector personnel's perception of how training has positively changed their: - Knowledge/ awareness - Attitude - Anticipated behaviour / discharge of duty	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	IMPACT	14	What were the perceived benefits to the recipients of the training provided under the programme?	BVR - CDD	14.7	Observer's perceptions of the benefits of the training	Security sector personnel's perception of how training has positively changed their: - Knowledge/ awareness - Attitude - Anticipated behaviour / discharge of duty	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	IMPACT	15	In retrospect, what changes, if any, would beneficiaries have sought from the training provided?	JUDICIARY	15.1	Changes to training suggested by trained judges	Changes to training recommended by High Court judges, supreme court judges and vacation judges in terms of: - content (inc background material) - timeliness - location - training environment - training method - training provider/ facilitator - trainees selected for training - applicability for work beyond the elections	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	IMPACT	15	In retrospect, what changes, if any, would beneficiaries have sought from the training provided?	JUDICIARY	15.2	Changes to training suggested by trained court staff	Changes to training recommended by court staff in terms of: - content (inc background material) - timeliness - location - training environment - training method - training provider/ facilitator - trainees selected for training - applicability for work beyond the elections	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	IMPACT	15	In retrospect, what changes, if any, would beneficiaries have sought from the training provided?	ELECTORAL COMMISSION	15.3	Changes to training suggested by trained polling agents	Changes to training recommended by polling agents in terms of: - content (inc background material) - timeliness - location - training environment - training method - training provider/ facilitator - trainees selected for training - applicability for work beyond the elections	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	IMPACT	15	In retrospect, what changes, if any, would beneficiaries have sought from the training provided?	ELECTORAL COMMISSION	15.4	Changes to training suggested by trained CSOs	Changes to training recommended by CSOs in terms of: - content (inc background material) - timeliness - location - training environment - training method - training provider/ facilitator - trainees selected for training - applicability for work beyond the election:	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	IMPACT	15	In retrospect, what changes, if any, would beneficiaries have sought from the training provided?	POLICE	15.5	Changes to training suggested by trained police	Changes recommended by Officers trained in electoral laws, public order and intelligence in terms of: - content (inc background material) - timeliness - location - training environment - training method - training provider/ facilitator - trainees selected for training - applicability for work beyond the elections	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested

IMPACT	IMPACT	15	In retrospect, what changes, if any, would beneficiaries have sought from the training provided?	POLICE	15.6	Changes to training suggested by security sector personnel	Changes recommended by security sector personnel receiving training in terms of - content (inc background material) - timeliness - location - training environment - training method - training provider/ facilitator - trainees selected for training - applicability for work beyond the elections	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	IMPACT	15	In retrospect, what changes, if any, would beneficiaries have sought from the training provided?	BVR - CDD	15.7	Changes to training suggested by trained supervisors	Changes recommended by supervisors trained in terms of - content (inc background material) - timeliness - location - training environment - training method - training provider/ facilitator - trainees selected for training - applicability for work beyond the elections	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	IMPACT	15	In retrospect, what changes, if any, would beneficiaries have sought from the training provided?	BVR - CDD	15.8	Changes to training suggested by trained observers	Changes recommended by observers trained in terms of - content (inc background material) - timeliness - location - training environment - training method - training provider/ facilitator - trainees selected for training - applicability for work beyond the elections	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	IMPACT	16	How did the GESP activities impact on beneficiaries' performance/ achievements relating to the election process?	JUDICIARY	16.1	Impact of training on judges performance in dealing with election-related disputes	Quality of judgements delivered Prioritisation of electoral disputes	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	IMPACT	16	How did the GESP activities impact on beneficiaries' performance/ achievements relating to the election process?	JUDICIARY	16.2	Impact of training on court staff's performance in dealing with election-related disputes	Expediency of processing election-related disputes	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	IMPACT	16	How did the GESP activities impact on beneficiaries' performance/ achievements relating to the election process?	JUDICIARY	16.3	Impact of the manual on increasing awareness of electoral laws	tbd	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	IMPACT	16	How did the GESP activities impact on beneficiaries' performance/ achievements relating to the election process?	ELECTORAL COMMISSION	16.4	Impact of training on Polling agents	tbd	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	IMPACT	16	How did the GESP activities impact on beneficiaries' performance/ achievements relating to the election process?	ELECTORAL COMMISSION	16.5	Impact of training on CSOs on their outreach to beneficiaries	tbd	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	IMPACT	16	How did the GESP activities impact on beneficiaries' performance/ achievements relating to the election process?	POLICE	16.6	Impact of training and distribution of pocket-books on electoral laws on the performance of police officers	Indicators currently being finalised by the independent evaluator to the High Commission	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested

IMPACT	IMPACT	16	How did the GESP activities impact on beneficiaries' performance/ achievements relating to the election process?	POLICE	16.7	Impact of training and distribution of pocket-books on electoral laws on the performance of security sector personnel	Indicators currently being finalised by the independent evaluator to the High Commission	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	IMPACT	16	How did the GESP activities impact on beneficiaries' performance/ achievements relating to the election process?	POLICE	16.8	Impact of communications infrastructure on mobility and responsiveness of police force on election day	Indicators currently being finalised by the independent evaluator to the High Commission	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	IMPACT	16	How did the GESP activities impact on beneficiaries' performance/ achievements relating to the election process?	POLICE	16.9			Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	IMPACT	16	How did the GESP activities impact on beneficiaries' performance/ achievements relating to the election process?	CIVIL SOCIETY - STAR	16.10	Cumulative impact of grantees on each phase of the election continuum		Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	IMPACT	16	How did the GESP activities impact on beneficiaries' performance/ achievements relating to the election process?	BVR - CDD	16.11	Impact of observers on the BVR	Number of multiple registrations - observed polling station v un-observed polling stations Satisfaction of parties with voter register - observed polling station v un-observed polling stations	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	IMPACT	16	How did the GESP activities impact on beneficiaries' performance/ achievements relating to the election process?	BVR - CDD	16.12			Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	IMPACT	17	Was the election process more free and fair as a result of GESP activities?	General	17.1			
IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY	18	To what extent will the results and benefits of the programme continue to be realised beyond the 2012 election process?	JUDICIARY	18.1	Extent to which training will build the capacity of judges to perform their function beyond the election process		Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY	18	To what extent will the results and benefits of the programme continue to be realised beyond the 2012 election process?	JUDICIARY	18.2	Extent to which training will build the capacity of judges to perform their function beyond the election process		Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY	18	To what extent will the results and benefits of the programme continue to be realised beyond the 2012 election process?	ELECTORAL COMMISSION	18.3	Extent to which training will build the capacity of EC staff to perform their function beyond the election process		Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY	18	To what extent will the results and benefits of the programme continue to be realised beyond the 2012 election process?	POLICE	18.4	Extent to which training will build the capacity of police to perform their function beyond the election process		Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested

IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY	18	To what extent will the results and benefits of the programme continue to be realised beyond the 2012 election process?	CIVIL SOCIETY - STAR	18.5	Extent to which training will build the capacity of civil society actors to perform their function beyond the election process		Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY	18	To what extent will the results and benefits of the programme continue to be realised beyond the 2012 election process?	BVR - CDD	18.6	Extent to which training will build the capacity of CDD to perform its function beyond the election process		Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested
LEARNING	COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT	19	Would other countries benefit from a similar programme of election support?	Overall	19.1	Extent to which the support provided through GESP would be relevant to other countries	<p>Countries face similar political and social issues around the election including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - political significance of elections - a 'winner takes all' situation - likelihood that the election process will be questioned - a risk of violence around the election - mistrust and likelihood of interference from political parties <p>The capacity of state and non-state institutions to manage a peaceful and inclusive election process is low. This might be evidenced by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - a weak legal framework for dealing with election-related issues - judges with limited capacity to deal with election-related issues - police force with poor awareness of election laws and police responsibilities - civil society organisations requiring financial support to educate and empower voters <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - untrained/poorly trained polling agents who are susceptible to influence from political parties - marginalised population who face barriers to participating in the election process - newly initiated biometric voter registration system <p>Partner governments request election support from donors</p> <p>Other actors are not already supporting partner governments</p> <p>Types of interventions supported by GESP would be appropriate in other country contexts:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - training - grant funding for civil society organisations - production and dissemination of written materials - procurement and installation of communication equipment 	Interview Focus groups Documents have/waiting for Document to be requested

Annex C

Evaluation Schedule and Timeline

Time	Activity	Areas Covered
August 2012	➤ Inception (UK + Ghana)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop Evaluation Methodology and Approach • Develop Evaluation Matrix and Research Plan • Revise further GESP Theory of Change • Meetings with key stakeholders (DFID + Components)
September 2012	➤ Document Collection and Review (UK + USA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collect GESP documents • Reading of key GESP documents
October 2012	➤ Process Evaluation (Ghana)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview key stakeholders of GESP
December 2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Election Observation (Ghana) ➤ Survey Development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Observe polling stations on election day • Collect and review media clippings • Design of Polling Agent Survey
February 2013	➤ Impact Evaluation (Ghana)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interview GESP stakeholders • Draft Report Writing
March 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Gathering of final GESP documentation ➤ Report Writing ➤ Roll – Out of Polling Agent Survey 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Final Report Writing • Polling Agent Survey data collection and final analysis

Annex D

List of Documents Reviewed

1.	DFID, Ghana Electoral Support, Business Case March 2012
2.	Ghana Electoral Support Logical Framework
3.	Conducting a Monitoring and Evaluation for British High Commission's Election Security Project - 2012/2013. Inception Report June 2012
4.	Interim Statement Issued By The Coalition Of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO) On The On-Going Biometric Voter Registration Exercise (April 2012)
5.	STAR Ghana Elections Call Grant Sub Committee Meeting (Dec 2011)
6.	The Coalition Of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO) BVR Provision Statement On The On-Going Biometric Voter Registration Exercise (May 2012)
7.	CODEO Pre-Election Environment Observation Report for May/June 2012
8.	EIU Ghana Report 2012
9.	USAID Assessment of the Ghana Electoral Commission
10.	Pre-Disbursement Assessment of the Judicial Service of Ghana (Danida GGHRPII) March 2009 PwC
11.	EU EOM Final Report
12.	CDD – ANNEX A. Report on Training for CODEO observers
13.	CDD – ANNEX B. Report on Training for CODEO observers
14.	Annex C. CODEO Observer Training Manual for BVR
15.	Annex D. CODEO BVR Voter Registration Checklist
16.	Annex E. CODEO BVR Questionnaire for Registrants
17.	Annex F. CODEO BVR Incident Report Form
18.	Annex G. CODEO Police action on BVR violent incidents June 2012
19.	Annex H. Preliminary Statement on the On-Going Nationwide BVR Exercise (Media Release) March 2012
20.	Annex I. CODEO Interim Statement on the On-Going Nationwide BVR Exercise (Media Release) April 2012
21.	Annex J. CODEO Provisional Report Media Briefing May 2012
22.	Annex M. CODEO Quarterly Report to DFID April – June 2012
23.	Annex N. CODEO Pre-election Environment Report May – June 2012
24.	Annex O. CODEO Pre-election environment report July 2012
25.	Annex P. Stakeholder response to BVR related issues

26.	Annex Q, R, S. CODEO BVR Media Clipping March – May 2012
27.	CODEO BVR Logframe
28.	Judicial Service Of Ghana Quarterly Narrative Reports (Quarter 1, 2, 3)
29.	Judicial Service Proposal
30.	Judicial Training Institute – Activity Report
31.	DFID Scoping Study - Electoral Support To Ghana’s Security Sector Nov 2011
32.	STAR-Ghana Quarterly Narrative Reports (Quarter 1,2,3)
33.	STAR-Ghana Election Grantee Reports (Quarter 1, 2)
34.	Electoral Commission Quarterly Narrative Reports (Quarter 1,2,3)
35.	CODEO – CDD Quarterly Narrative Reports (Quarter 1,2,3)
36.	STAR-Ghana Grant Partner End of Project Reports, February 2013
37.	Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA), End of Project Report, February 2013
38.	Partners in Participatory Development (PAPADEV), End of Project Report, February 2013
39.	Ghana Federation of the Disabled (GFD), End of Project Report, February 2013
40.	Child Rights International, End of Project Report, February 2013
41.	The Education Agenda 2015 Project (EA-2015), End of Project Report, February 2013
42.	EC Polling Agent Guidelines and Manual, 2012
43.	Manual on Election Adjudication in Ghana, 2012
44.	Draft Polling Agent Survey, March 2012
45.	Police Pocket Manual, FCO, 2012
46.	STAR-Ghana Beneficiary Responses, Summary Report, February 2013
47.	CODEO BVR Observation Exercise: Registered Voters Experiential Survey 2012
48.	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), Africa Renewal Article, September 2012
49.	Election Security Training Report on Ghana Election Security Support Programme, Safety and Security International, Oct 2012
50.	World Bank, “Ghana: Assessment of Stage 1– World Bank - Use of Country Systems in Bank Supported Operations” (draft August 27, 2010)
51.	Progress Report on Election Security, FCO, Unclassified, Oct 18, 2012

ANNEX D

52.	STAR-Ghana Procurement Manual
53.	Electoral Commission of Ghana Project Completion Report (28 June 2013)
54.	Judicial Service of Ghana Project Completion Report (July 2013)
55.	STAR-Ghana Project Completion Report (July 2013)
56.	Ghana Election Support Annual Review, UK Department for International Development (July 2013)

Annex E

GESP Evaluation Participant List

	Name	Organisation	Position
1.	Nayra Nazzar	-	CODEO Observer
2.	Gakpefor Precious	-	CODEO Observer
3.	Stephen Geraldo	-	CODEO Observer
4.	Sanusi Alidu	-	CODEO Observer
5.	Adua Sakyi	-	CODEO Observer
6.	Ezckiel Quaynor	-	CODEO Observer
7.	Mahmuda Ainod	-	CODEO Observer
8.	Joseph Wemakor	-	CODEO Observer
9.	Nayat Ibrahim	-	CODEO Observer
10.	Eric Adelguaye	-	CODEO Observer
11.	Solomon Pobee	-	CODEO Observer
12.	Nurudan Allason	-	CODEO Observer
13.	Eric Yaokumaih	-	CODEO Observer
14.	Kweoadui Afai	-	CODEO Observer
15.	Mensah Isaac Jnr	-	CODEO Observer
16.	Albert Akrong	CPP Polling Agent	Coordinator
17.	Amankwaph Stephen	NPP Polling Agent	Coordinator
18.	Vivian Akpayanah	NDP Polling Agent	Women Leader
19.	Ephaim M. Williams	NDC Polling Agent	Youth Organiser
20.	Gideon Lampiey	PPP Polling Agent	-
21.	Albert Amm	CPP Polling Agent	Youth Organiser
22.	Felicia Lumar	NDC Polling Agent	-
23.	Joel Howard	CPP Polling Agent	1 st Vice Chairman
24.	Frances Nartey	NDC Polling Agent	Executive Member
25.	Donnhenu Godfred	PPP Polling Agent	Secretary
26.	Musah B. Osumanu	NDC Polling Agent	Secretary
27.	Ishmael Masugburdzi	NDC Polling Agent	Secretary

	Name	Organisation	Position
28.	Dziedzorm Agborli	NDP Polling Agent	Secretary
29.	Roxford Asumedu	PPP Polling Agent	Coordinator
30.	Amidu Ayuba	CPP Polling Agent	Youth Organiser
31.	Mii Odartey	NPP Polling Agent	Coordinator
32.	Amos Peprah	NDP Polling Agent	-
33.	Iddmoss Zulkarnaini	NPP Polling Agent	-
34.	Okiusu Fordjour	NPP Polling Agent	-
35.	Amervor Michael	CPP Polling Agent	-
36.	Eddie Nelson	Calvary Baptist Church	Youth Coordinator
37.	Joseph Lartey	A/G Abansu Quarter	Lay Pastor
38.	Rose Karikari	A/G Abansu-Pokuase	Youth Executive
39.	Abu Pele Bajigah	Adabraka Central Mosque Community	Secretary
40.	Richlode Larnyo	Ghana National Tailors & Dressmaker Association	Treasurer
41.	Felicia Quaye	Ghana National Tailors & Dressmaker Association	Executive Member
42.	Rosemary Laryea	-	Dec 31 st Market
43.	Emily Mensu	Christian Mother Association	Representative
44.	Zeinab Netey	Federation of Muslim Womens Association in Ghana	Secretary
45.	Hajia Ramatu Rahman	Federation of Muslim Womens Association in Ghana	Representative
46.	Faustina Debrah	Presby Church W/F	President
47.	Beatrice Boatemah	Presby Church W/F	Woman Organiser
48.	David Acquah	Youth Club (FDA)	Youth Executive
49.	Juliana Amoako	Presby Church W/F	Vice President
50.	Kwasi Afriye	KAB Consult	Electoral Commission Consultant
51.	Kofi Kye-Duodu	Electoral Commission	Development Partner Liaison

	Name	Organisation	Position
			Officer
52.	Kwadwo Sarfo – Kantanka	Electoral Commission	Deputy Chairman of Operations
53.	Joe Ampong – Fosu	Judiciary	Deputy Director Judicial Reforms & Projects
54.	Keith Ashong	Foreign Commonwealth Office	Police Liaison Officer
55.	Nana Ama Oppong Duah	Independent	Police M&E Consultant
56.	Amidu Tanko	Strengthening Transparency Accountability & Responsiveness Ghana (STAR – Ghana)	Team Leader
57.	Dorcas Ansah	STAR Ghana	Results & Communication Manager
58.	Wendy Otu	STAR Ghana	M&E Officer Thematic Lead Elections
59.	Gideon Porbley	STAR Ghana	M&E Officer
60.	Ayireje Cletis	Ahenbonsoso	Project Manager
61.	Charles V.Nyante	Voice Ghana	Programme Coordinator
62.	Prince Odoom	GPCC	Project Officer
63.	Nantomah EK Mahmoud	PAPADEV	Project Officer
64.	Hannah Opoku Gyamjo	IDEG	Programme Admin
65.	Beatrice Amoah	MFWA	Programme Officer
66.	Linefu Ofori-Kwafo	Ghana Integrity Initiative	Programme Manager
67.	Vitus A. Azeem	Ghana Integrity Initiative	Executive Director
68.	Francis Amejibar	GMA	Programme Coordinator
69.	Alhamon Awul	NORSAAC	Director
70.	Kwadwo Konadu	DEGAIN	Project Manager
71.	Joe Otoo	DEGAIN	Executive Director
72.	Hannah Owusu Koranteng	WACAM	Ass.Executive Director
73.	Haja Barikisu Shardow	ONCI	Chairperson Women & Children
74.	Aba Oppong	CEDEP	Project Coordinator

	Name	Organisation	Position
75.	Bright Appiah	CRI	Director
76.	Nui Sarpei	ARHR	Programme Coordinator
77.	Kwesi Jonah	IDEG	Senior Research Fellow
78.	Dela Kokoko Gle	ARHR	Programme Manager
79.	Richard Azina Nartey	YOWE	Executive Director
80.	Nibaradun Abiba	CENPRODEG	Executive Director
81.	Daphne Lariba Nabla	Legal Resource Centre	Executive Director
82.	Kinna Likimani	Blogging Ghana	Project Lead
83.	Doris Dartey	-	Columnist
84.	George E. Paintsil	GIBA	Consultant
85.	Kwasi Gyan Apenteng	-	Columnist
86.	Bright Delewa	Ghana Journalist Association	General Secretary
87.	Father Patrick Amos	National Catholic Secretary	Director
88.	Dr. Rausford Gyampo	IEA	Research Fellow
89.	Courage Abilous	SYPPA	Project Officer
90.	Innocent Adamadu	SYPPA	Project Officer
91.	Justin Bayo	WANEP	-
92.	Gbene Ali Malik	ASWDEV	Programme Coordinator
93.	Alexander Williams	Ghana Federation of the Disabled	Project Coordinator
94.	Mohammed Seigly	Choice Ghana	Executive Director
95.	Gerald Anhsah	GIBA	Executive Director
96.	Rita Tetteh	Department for International Development (DFID) Ghana	DFID Programme Officer
97.	Michael Ohene-Effah	DFID Ghana	Governance Advisor
98.	Lucy Booth	DFID Ghana	Results & Evaluation Manager
99.	Torcoli, Francesco	European Union (EU) Ghana	Programme Officer – Institutional Support, Rule of Law, Migration and Security Sector - Governance Section

	Name	Organisation	Position
100.	Lawrence Lachmansingh	United Nation Development Programme (UNDP)	Governance Advisor
101.	Benjamin Kauffeld	USAID Ghana	Democracy & Governance Officer
102.	Rexford Gyimah	Judiciary	Registrar, Fast Track Court
103.	Francis Brakwa	Judiciary	Registrar, High Court, Accra
104.	Isaka Shaibu	Judiciary	Acting Chief Bailiff, Fast Track Court
105.	Jemiradu Chilala	Judiciary	Deputy Chief Court Recorder, High Court
106.	Emmanuel Ntim	Judiciary	District Registrar, Tema High Court
107.	Solomon N.A. Botchway	Judiciary	Assistant Registrar, High Court
108.	Janet Aggor	Judiciary	Deputy Chief Court Recorder, High Court
109.	Julius Ansah	Judiciary	Supreme Court
110.	S. N. Gbadegbe	Judiciary	Supreme Court
111.	Dennis Adjei	Judiciary	Court of Appeal
112.	Mariama Owusu	Judiciary	Court of Appeal
113.	S.H. Ocran	Judiciary	High Court
114.	George A. Mills-Graves	Judiciary	High Court
115.	Daniel Mensah	Judiciary	High Court
116.	Kofi Essel Mensah	Judiciary	High Court
117.	Nicholas Abodakpi	Judiciary	High Court
118.	K.A. Ofori Atta	Judiciary	High Court
119.	Edward Asante	Judiciary	High Court
120.	U. P. Derry	Judiciary	High Court

Annex F

Methodological Report on the phone survey of polling agents

Evaluation of the Ghana Election Support Programme: Telephone Survey of Polling Agents Methodological Report

by Participatory Development Associates, March 2013

Participatory Development Associates was contracted by Coffey International Development in November 2012 to undertake a series of activities in support of their contract to evaluate the Ghana Election Support Programme of DFID Ghana. This included a telephone survey of 84 polling agents to determine the effectiveness of the training programme they had received. This report outlines how this survey was undertaken.

1. PREPARATION

Lists of polling agents

After almost three months of trying, the lists of polling agents were secured from the Electoral Commission. The sensitive nature of the election process (a close result contested in court) was the major cause of this difficulty.

Enumerators

The enumerators were all graduates and given orientation and training by the PDA staff member responsible for the survey. They undertook the survey at the PDA offices in Accra.

Contributions to survey design

PDA staff made several contributions to the content of the survey, through email exchanges with Coffey staff and associates, during December mostly.

Translation

The surveys were translated into Twi and Ga. The translation was cross-checked through mock interviews in the local language.

Logistical preparation

Printing – 150 copies of the questionnaires were made. These were used by the enumerators and have been filed and stored securely on PDA premises.

Inexpensive mobile phones were purchased for the enumerators in order to avoid the use of personal numbers and to reduce call costs.

2. TRAINING

Telephone survey training was held on the 18th of February. The team was taken through a full days training. The content included:

- background information on the GESPP, EC, Coffey and DFID),
- contextual analysis (why this project was being undertaken and why it was important).
- the content of the survey Instrument and how it was to be used, nos each day etc
- translation into the local languages Twi and Ga.
- guidelines about the importance of quality
- how to deal with the different responses they might receive (rude, abusive, long answers).
- Questions from the enumerators answered or if clarification sought from Coffey.

During the training, the team developed an introductory passage together that would help explain who they were and why they were calling. They also role-played a phone survey to equip each person in the team to deal with tricky situations and receive feedback and then each member of the team did a live interview while the other team members listened. This was followed by self-evaluation and feedback from colleagues.

The pilot surveys were conducted as part of the training process. Each member of the team undertook one successful survey; any operational or suitability issues that arose out of these were then discussed and Coffey was contacted for clarification as needed.

3. COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA

Data collection

Each member of the team was provided with a list of numbers that related to a polling agent on the list of contacts.

Approximately 15 surveys were completed by each team member on each day of the survey. Once the list was exhausted, which occurred due to numbers not going through, callers not wishing to answer or wrong numbers, the team members were provided by Coffey with a second list of numbers to continue with.

At the end of each day all surveys were collected from each team member by the team leader. No team member was allowed to take the mobile phone, list of contacts or surveys home. Each survey was undertaken within PDAs offices.

By Monday 21st February 150 surveys were complete, exceeding the target of 84 by 66.

During the survey process the team leader frequently (every hour) checked on the members to ensure that any challenges that were encountered were quickly dealt with, especially in relation to interviews that were started and ended half way through for various reasons- these were discarded. This maintained the quality of the data being collected.

In addition to this 15 participants were called back at random to confirm that the survey took place. They were asked 1) if the surveyor was professional, 2) whether they explained the purpose of the survey, 3) if the surveyor answered any questions they had and 4) whether the surveyor said thank you at the end of the interview. All those who were called answered positively to all the questions; however in 4 cases question 3 was not applicable.

Data entry

This was done by PDA into an Excel sheet developed by Coffey.

Timeframe

It was anticipated that the survey would be undertaken in December 2012 within two weeks of the conclusion of the elections on December 7, and that the final results of the survey would be provided to Coffey by the 10th of January 2013. In the event, Coffey was not able to secure the lists of polling agents needed to undertake the survey from the Electoral Commission prior to the election, and the close election result leading to court action by the Opposition immediately following made it very difficult to secure the lists afterwards. The lists were finally obtained on 13th February 2013. The final data from the survey was sent to Coffey on 27th February 2013.

Celia Marshall and Frances Quarcoopome, 19th March 2013

Annex G


Polling Agent Survey Descriptive Statistics and Analysis

Ghana Election Support Program

Beneficiary Survey (polling agents attending training) – December 2012


Gender distribution

The table and the chart below show the gender distribution of the polling agents who responded to the survey. Of a total of 147 respondents, 133 are male and 14 are female. That is, nine out of ten polling agents are male.




Age Distribution

The chart below shows the age distribution of the polling agents. The largest age group is 25 and under, and as the age increases there are fewer agents in each age group. The average age of the respondents is 30 years.




Ethnic Affiliation

A large number of ethnicities are represented in the survey. Of a total of 39 ethnicities, ten are represented by more than three people. The largest representation is Akan, followed by the Dagomba, Fanti and Ewe, with 26, 19, 16 and 15 respondents respectively.



Regional Affiliation


The second table below shows the spread of regions in Ghana where the respondents live.



ANNEX G: POLLING AGENT SURVEY DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS


Profession

There is a wide range of professions represented among the polling agents, where most of the professions are only represented by one polling agent. There are some groups which are notably more represented, including 'Student', 'Teacher', 'Trader' and 'Unemployed'.




Number of Times as a Polling Agent

Of 150 respondents, 92 answered that this was the first time they had worked polling agents. 21 respondents had done it once before. 12 of respondents had worked as a polling agent three times, the same amount of respondents had worked six times, and 11 respondents had worked as a polling agent four times before.




Relationship between age and a positive attitude towards training

Positive training attitude is measured on a scale from one to six, where six is the most positive. The survey shows that most of the respondents have a positive or very positive attitude towards the training. The negative attitudes are found predominantly in the larger and younger age groups but the responses are similar across all age groups. Attitude towards the training is the most positive among the oldest respondents. The chart below shows the responses.




Previous experience and whether or not polling agents would have managed without the training

The below table shows how different groups (based on experience, i.e. how many times they have been polling agents) said they would have managed without the training. The scale goes from 1, would not have managed, to 5, would have managed very well (and 6, do not know) . The answers are similar across the groups; most answering that they would not have managed well without the training. However, 20 people in the largest and most inexperienced group said they would have managed well without training.





Gender and helpfulness of training

The chart below shows the respondent's attitude towards the usefulness of the training disaggregated by gender, where 1 is the training was not useful, and 5 is the training was very useful. A larger proportion of female respondents found the training very useful, but most of male and female respondents answered that the training had been useful or very useful.



Previous experience as a polling agent and whether training changed knowledge, success and attitude


The chart below shows to what extent respondents considered the training as positively contributing to knowledge and awareness of the duties as a polling agent, where 1 is not at all and 5 is very much.. The answers are similar across all groups, where the most common answer is that respondents agree or agree strongly. 10 respondents in the largest and most inexperienced group found that the training was not useful. The second chart shows if the respondents' attitudes as polling agents have changed positively.



Questions on the impact of the polling agent training

Below are listed specific questions from the survey and a chart representing the respondents' answers to each question.


What specifically from the training helped you carry out your duties during the election?



In the next election, how important do you think it would be for all poll workers to participate in such training?




Would you attribute the training as the key factor to your success in carrying out your duties?




The content of the training organised is easy to follow


(1 – Disagree strongly: 5 Agree strongly: 6 – don't know)



The training was helpful in preparing me for the work at the polling station




I would have managed the work at the polling station just as well without the training



The training positively changed my knowledge and awareness of my duties as a polling agent.



The training has positively changed my attitude as a polling agent



I would recommend the training to anyone who would like to be a polling agent at the next elections

