HM Government

Evacuation and shelter guidance

Non-statutory guidance to complement
Emergency preparedness and
Emergency response and recovery

January 2014

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Non-statutory guidance to complement *Emergency preparedness* and *Emergency response and recovery*

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Chapter 1: Executive summary

1.1 This guidance updates the 2006 *Evacuation and Shelter Guidance* for local emergency planners. It sets out the issues that local planners will need to consider and tailor to local circumstances, and has been produced to support responders in meeting their legal responsibilities. It is intended to help responders to develop flexible plans for evacuation and shelter that can be used in a wide range of scenarios and that reflect work undertaken across the country to develop evacuation and shelter plans. It also shares good practice. The guidance contains the following sections.

Context

1.2 There are a number of guiding principles for planning evacuation and shelter that are common to the various risks that could prompt a decision to evacuate. These principles are set out here. In addition, the section sketches the overarching legal framework that governs evacuation and shelter planning.

Risk-based planning

1.3 Local risk assessment and planning are well established in the UK. Evacuation and shelter is a common consequence of a range of risks, and planning should be proportionate to the level of risk. Generic plans allow for a flexible response to a wide range of scenarios and should be developed at a multi-agency level.

Evacuation

1.4 Evacuation is not a new concept for emergency planners, and successful evacuations take place regularly in the UK. This guidance is designed to build on this experience in order to assist planners in developing plans that could be used in both small- and large-scale evacuations; it includes advice on the decision to evacuate, on transport, vulnerable people and sites, and on support for evacuees, pets and animals.

Shelter

1.5 Shelter provision will be required following an evacuation, or there may be a need to support people who have been advised to shelter in place. Shelter focuses on the short term (up to 72 hours), and this section concentrates on the immediate challenges and requirements, such as buildings, staff and support for evacuees. Medium-term (weeks or months) shelter is likely to be needed for smaller numbers, but evacuees may need help with accommodation, access to insurance companies, welfare, schooling, employment and access to services. Long-term (over a year) shelter is covered in the section **Return and recovery**.

General issues

1.6 There are a number of cross-cutting issues in evacuation and shelter planning. These are relevant to all aspects of planning, and include the registration of evacuees, logistics, security, local resilience, business continuity, volunteers, infrastructure and the role of central government. Consideration of these topics will help in understanding the wider impacts and interdependencies that surround an evacuation.

Communications and the media

1.7 The communication of risk and of the action that the population should take in the event of an evacuation will improve the effectiveness of any evacuation. This section provides advice on communicating with the public, on message templates, and on engaging with the media.

Return and recovery

1.8 The return of evacuees as soon as is safe will aid the recovery of the local area. It is also necessary to consider those who are unable to return home because their property has been either lost or significantly damaged. Insurance and cost recovery for local authorities also need to be considered in the wake of an evacuation.

Chapter 2: Context

The purpose of evacuation and shelter

2.1 The purpose of evacuation is to move people and (where appropriate) other living creatures away from an actual or potential danger to a place that is safer for them. Shelter is a place where evacuees can stay and receive support. There are various risks that may call for evacuation, and the different nature and severity of those risks will determine the level of support that people require. This guidance reflects the range of options – immediate dispersal of people, evacuation of properties, shelter in place and longer-term shelter needs.

2.2 The guiding principles for evacuation and shelter planning and decision making are:

- **Public safety comes first:** public safety must be the over-riding priority in planning and operational decision making.
- **Coordinate activity across boundaries:** the scale of risks associated with evacuation and shelter will require coordinated planning and response across partner organisations and geographical boundaries.
- **Prepare proportionately to local risk:** evacuation and shelter planning should be relevant and proportionate to locally identified risks.
- **Scale arrangements to the reasonable worst case:** local planning should be generic and be geared to the consequences of the reasonable worst case scenario, with a firm understanding of the potential number of people involved.
- **Be flexible:** flexibility and scalability are core to good practice, and mutual aid arrangements need to be considered.
- **Plan for loss of essential services:** plans need to take account of the potential loss or degradation of essential services and of the impact on communities, as well as of the resilience of responder organisations and individuals.
- **Factor in human behaviour:** the best possible understanding of behaviour is essential to avoid flawed assumptions in planning and response.
- **Think broadly about public communications:** planning should consider the full range of channels for communication with those affected, since speed of warning, informing and public response is critical.

- **Recovery considerations need early and sustained attention:** the direction and coordination of recovery activity will be a priority from the outset.
- **Create the conditions for informed decision making:** as far as possible, information requirements should be identified in advance, and the means of servicing and sustaining them need to be considered carefully.
- **Train and then exercise:** plans need to be associated with training, and people, plans and capabilities need to be exercised and validated.

2.3 An evacuation should only be carried out if the benefit of leaving an area significantly outweighs the risk of sheltering in place. This guidance outlines the considerations that should underpin the decision to evacuate.

2.4 The over-riding priority must be the safety of the public. Evacuation should not be assumed to be the best option for all risks, and it may not be the safest. Buildings offer significant protection against most risks, and immediate shelter may be safer for the public, at least initially. Evacuation can be traumatic, especially for vulnerable people, and it can be disruptive to business and the local economy. The guidance here sets out measures that need to be considered in order to support people advised to shelter in buildings. Evacuation and shelter remain a local responsibility, but in some scenarios large-scale evacuation can take place across broad geographical areas and across administrative and emergency-planning boundaries. In such an event, mutual aid and assistance and coordination from central government may be required. Central government support in certain circumstances does not remove the need for appropriate planning at the local level.

Figure 1: Stages of evacuation



2.5 Evacuation and shelter planning is part of broader emergency planning and preparedness. It should take account of:

- local risk assessments;
- the National Resilience Planning Assumptions; and
- the National Risk Assessment.

2.6 Where other guidance or information is relevant, it is referenced in the text, and a range of guidance and information is included in the annexes. Specifically, the guidance should be read in conjunction with the following Cabinet Office publications:

- *Emergency preparedness*; and
- *Emergency response and recovery*.

Legal framework

2.7 The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and Regulations require Category 1 responders to maintain plans for preventing emergencies; for reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of emergencies; and for taking other action in the event of emergencies. In deciding what plans are required, Category 1 responders must have regard to their assessment of risk. They are also required to maintain arrangements to warn the public and to provide it with information and advice in the event of an emergency or if one is likely to occur.

Devolved administrations

2.8 The guidance is generic and can be used by planners across the United Kingdom. There are variations in organisational structures between England and the devolved administrations, and some references to responsibilities may not be relevant for all parts of the UK. Where specific agencies or responsibilities are cited, the guidance does not also reference potential devolved variations, but planners should be aware of the relevant local agencies and responsibilities and should refer to the resilience teams in the devolved administrations.

Changes since the 2006 guidance on evacuation and shelter

2.9 There have been no significant changes to the principles or the process of evacuation and shelter planning, and it is therefore not expected that existing plans will require major revision. But this update does provide an opportunity to revisit existing plans in light of what has been learned since 2006. Information is included that is based on lessons gleaned from events and the development of plans since 2006. The 2013 guidance provides greater focus on certain key issues, such as interdependencies between sectors, the voluntary sector, private-sector assets and commissioned services, short-term shelter and rest centre management.

Chapter 3: Risk-based planning

3.1 Evacuation and shelter planning should be proportionate to the risk identified locally. The scale of evacuation and shelter planning will depend on the types of risk that local areas face. These will range from small-scale local events to risks that have national consequences and that require large-scale evacuation and shelter. The National Risk Assessment (NRA) identifies some generic risks, in order to inform local risk assessment. The need for evacuation and shelter is a common consequence of a range of NRA risks, and the National Resilience Planning Assumptions set out the generic planning for those risks. Further guidance on local risk assessment is available through the local risk-assessment guidance. These documents are not publicly available, but they can be accessed by local resilience forums, including on the National Resilience Extranet. The National Risk Register[1] summarises the NRA and is publicly available (see Annex C).

Figure 2: Risk and planning process



3.2 A generic evacuation and shelter plan should be relevant for a range of risks, including:

- natural hazards: coastal floods, river or surface water floods, dam or reservoir failures;
- industrial accidents: radiological, biological or chemical releases, fires or explosions; and
- terrorist attacks.

[1] The National Resilience Extranet will be replaced by Resilience Direct in spring 2014.

3.3 It is not necessary to develop a plan for every risk or eventuality. Generic plans – based on the worst risk that could reasonably be expected to arise in a local area – should be scalable in order to manage the range of risks identified locally. For some risks there may be characteristics that are unique to that event and that require specific plans, alongside generic ones. Plans should reflect such variables as:

- the notice period before the risk occurs;
- the time of day;
- the merits of evacuation against shelter in place;
- the number of people to be evacuated, dispersed or sheltered;
- complex sites such as hospitals and prisons;
- the distance to a place of safety;
- the duration of the incident during which support is required;
- the resilience of local infrastructure;
- existing site emergency plans;
- the readiness of the public; and
- understanding of the evacuation zone.

Planning for specific risks

3.4 Planning should be considered for specific risks that have unique consequences or where the location of the risk impact area has been identified in advance. Generic evacuation and shelter plans should reference risk-specific issues if detailed plans have been prepared or if a specific response is required. These could include the risks set out in the following table.

Flooding	Flood-risk zones allow for the identification of a population at risk. Specific plans could cover pre-identified evacuation routes, such as roads that are on high ground, or the identification of specialist resources that will be required to assist in the evacuation.
Industrial accidents	A designated zone around a site could be identified as at risk from an accident such as an explosion. Understanding factors such as 'blast radius' will help to determine the best locations for rest centres. Evacuation routes could be identified that do not conflict with access to the site for the emergency services.
Release of hazardous materials	The health implications of exposure, the distance that material could travel, the period of danger and how to keep the public informed all need to be considered.

3.5 Some risks will have specific characteristics that should be included in plans, as highlighted in the table below.

Advance warning	In some cases, a warning period will be possible, or there may be a slow build-up. Plans could include responder or public access to warning and alert systems, a process for accessing advice and information, and decision points in the course of an unfolding event.
Scientific advice	Scientific advice on the specific incident and its hazards will inform the evacuation decision. Locally, a Science and Technology Advice Cell (STAC) will provide advice to local responders. If called upon, the national Scientific Advisory Group in Emergencies (SAGE) will do the same for ministers.
Communicating the risk	Whenever possible, information on a specific risk should be communicated to the public. This could include information on specific response plans, publicly available alert systems, and the action that may be required to prepare for (and respond to) an event. As well as area-specific information campaigns, existing community risk registers could be used to inform and prepare the public.

Multi-agency planning

3.6 Local resilience forums (LRFs) need to consider how to structure their evacuation and shelter planning activities and how to link them to local risk assessment. Successful evacuation and subsequent sheltering require coordinated planning and response across Category 1 and 2 responders. Those organisations with knowledge and expertise that is relevant to evacuation and shelter should be identified and engaged during planning. In some cases, much of the detailed planning activity will be coordinated at a sub-LRF level, for example at city or district level. In addition, the LRF should set up a group comprising the relevant agencies to develop and coordinate evacuation and shelter planning. Category 2 responders will have useful information on such areas as local infrastructure, vulnerable people and specialist transport capacity.

3.7 The consistent use of commonly understood terms will enable more coherent planning and implementation of emergency arrangements. Conversely, if different terminology is used to describe the same thing in different partner organisations and neighbouring areas, there is scope for confusion and lack of integration, and that could endanger life when clarity of communications is of paramount importance. For this reason, all emergency responder organisations and staff are urged to adhere to the terms and definitions contained in the UK civil protection lexicon (see Annex C). If a term is not included or if definitions are disputed, responders should contact the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, which maintains the lexicon and acts as a single point of reference for the profession and all interested parties.

Cross-border impacts, mutual aid and strategic alliances

3.8 An event may affect more than one LRF, or it may be necessary to evacuate into an LRF area unaffected by the event. During planning, the affected LRF should consider the cross-boundary impacts of an event, the need to coordinate with neighbouring LRFs, and the management of mutual aid. Coordination should seek to ensure that neighbouring LRFs are aware of any planning that could have an impact on them, and that evacuation and shelter plans complement each other. In some cases it may be beneficial to develop joint plans. Further information can be found in Cabinet Office guidance on mutual aid (see Annex C).

Strategic alliance work – Lincolnshire LRF

Partners across the East Coast are developing strategic alliances to support the response to a significant coastal inundation and subsequent impacts and consequences for evacuation. Lincolnshire LRF has engaged with neighbouring LRFs to develop a mutual aid agreement that goes beyond the generic statements and that establishes a common understanding of what Lincolnshire will require of its neighbours during a significant coastal flood. This has enabled the county's neighbours to assess their own capabilities of responding to such an 'ask'. The outcome is a detailed and common understanding of one another's positions and a framework for action which will deliver a speedy and effective mutual aid response, should the need arise. The work has also involved the military, the voluntary sector and highways partners. The core of the work has focused on developing the necessary policies and procedures to ensure that there is an efficient and effective interface between supporting LRFs, and on building those procedures that would benefit from being the same across the boundaries. It is recognised that once this is established, the methodology could be used for other similar events that require evacuation and shelter. The headline elements covered in the strategic alliance framework include:

Planning assumptions

- The numbers – how many?
- Detail of demographics

Movement of people issues

- Interfaces at the geographical boundaries
- Timelines
- Transportation numbers and types of vehicle
- Traffic (evacuation) routes and traffic management at the boundaries

Accommodation issues

- Length of stay
- Resourcing staff
- The type of mutual aid required
- Pre-identified resources

Governance and process

- Command and control
- Registration processing

Other

- Policy on pets and animals
- Interface between organisations
- Repatriation

Involving the voluntary sector and community organisations

3.9 The voluntary sector and community organisations (including faith-based organisations) can play a significant role in managing an evacuation and in providing humanitarian assistance during an emergency. Experience shows that the active engagement of the voluntary sector and community organisations in emergency preparedness work such as planning, training and exercising enables them to be more effective in the event of an emergency. The roles that voluntary organisations can play range from offering practical and emotional support, assisting with rest centres, supplying food and refreshments, helping with animals and providing equipment. Community groups and leaders can also promote self-help within affected communities and among vulnerable community members. As *Emergency response and recovery* sets out, LRFs are obliged to 'have regard' to the voluntary sector in their planning under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. They should have in place effective arrangements through which they can engage with the large and diverse voluntary and community sector.

3.10 In order to provide a framework for engagement between government, the emergency services, local authorities and voluntary organisations, the Cabinet Office and the British Red Cross have established the Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum (VSCPF). This is a cohesive platform for those national voluntary organisations that have a role to play in the UK's emergency planning and response. The VSCPF is chaired by the British Red Cross and provides an effective link across these voluntary organisations. It can assist in coordinating the contribution of the voluntary sector in emergencies and, if appropriate, can support initiatives at the local level. By following this national cohesive approach at the local level, the voluntary sector member of the LRF should be able to speak on behalf of other voluntary organisations operating in the area.

Working with the voluntary sector

Broadland District and South Norfolk Council have a memorandum of understanding with the British Red Cross that covers:

- agreed joint working arrangements;
- joint exercises;
- training for Broadland District and South Norfolk Council rest centre personnel; and
- 24/7 response by the British Red Cross.

The rest centre roles for British Red Cross staff include:

- registration of persons using the centre;
- provision of first aid;
- psychosocial support and additional individual assistance, as required;
- provision of hot drinks and biscuits;
- support for the initial setting-up of a rest centre through the Red Cross Fire and Emergency Support Service team, a specialist vehicle to offer refreshment, and initial practical and emotional assistance; and
- coordination of suitable volunteer offers at centres.

Planning actions and tools

Mapping evacuation zones	Once an area at risk has been identified, it may be useful to divide it into evacuation zones, drawing on the information gained when assessing the risk – for example, some areas may be more liable to flooding than others, or some areas may be at greater risk of contamination following an industrial accident. Having maps that define possible evacuation zones, either in the planning document or developed during the response, will help to ensure that all those involved in the response have a shared understanding of the exact area under threat.
Area information	The mapping of risk areas facilitates a good understanding of the size and demographics of the population at risk. This should help to ensure that the planning put in place is appropriate to the local circumstances. Key information about the evacuation zone includes: • daytime and night-time population; • location of nurseries, schools, care homes, hospitals, prisons; • location of other vulnerable people; • types of building; • population density; • road systems; • transport modes; and • critical local and national infrastructure.
Modelling	Modelling can help to build detailed understanding of areas that could be affected. It can provide such vital information as the zones that might require immediate evacuation, the roads that may become unusable, and the best place in which to locate rescue assets.
Geographic information systems (GIS)	GIS provide a valuable tool in planning for, responding to and recovering from incidents that may require evacuation and shelter. GIS can: • help emergency managers identify and take account of the demographic aspects of an emergency (such as its location, extent, consequences and who will be affected); and • enable geographical information from multiple sources and agencies to be integrated, in order to allow an informed response. For the successful application of GIS, it is essential to have access to data of an appropriate quality. It is also vital that data can be moved across both geographical and organisational boundaries. LRFs should, where relevant, ensure that data is shared between neighbouring areas, bearing in mind that emergencies are no respecters of administrative boundaries.

Population modelling to inform evacuation needs – Lincolnshire LRF

Lincolnshire LRF worked with Aston University's CRISIS Centre to identify how vulnerable people can be supported in their evacuation preparations. The study involved interviews with residents, businesses and officials, and a sample of 192 people representative of vulnerable groups (including people with disabilities, the over 65s and carers) was consulted. The study identified the proportion of people who may need assistance with evacuation, whether shelter would be needed, and expectations of what people would need in a shelter.

Lincolnshire LRF has used the modelling work to inform and underpin planning and decision making.

Site-specific plans

3.11 Most sites and buildings will have specific evacuation plans, and in some cases the operator is required by law to have plans (see Annex C). These include:

- industrial sites;
- hospitals and care homes;
- prisons and other secure facilities;
- high-risk flooding zones; and
- locations and events where large numbers of people congregate, such as major sporting events, shopping centres or town centres.

3.12 At the site level, plans may be coordinated with the emergency services, and planners should consider how the site-specific plans would interact with generic evacuation plans. Site-specific plans may have a narrow focus and might not include wider evacuation considerations. They may rely on the resources that local plans intend to use and could adversely affect local plans – for example, by dispersing people or moving vehicles into or out of the site; major events (such as sporting fixtures) could also affect the local population size.

Influx from outside the local area and from overseas

3.13 The risks faced by neighbouring LRF areas should be considered, even if there is no direct impact on the local area. An influx of people from outside the area might be expected in some circumstances. Coordination with neighbouring LRFs will help to identify risks where mutual aid in the form of shelter may be required or where specific planning is necessary.

3.14 An influx of British nationals from overseas would be managed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), and/or the devolved administrations. Arrangements will be made to disperse non-resident British nationals across several local authority areas. Rest centres are unlikely to be appropriate or necessary, as any overseas event that requires evacuation is unlikely to be resolved within hours or days, and so return in the immediate future is improbable. It is likely that there will have been prior warning, consultation with DCLG, and time to prepare.

Chapter 4: Evacuation

4.1 Evacuation may pre-empt an event or occur in the wake of an incident. Plans should remain flexible, so that they can be tailored to the requirements of the situation. The evacuation process carries with it inherent risks. Decisions to evacuate need to be based on a proper assessment of all the risks and on the availability of alternative public protection measures. Often this will have to be a dynamic assessment, undertaken as events unfold on the ground. It will almost always be improved by planning and work done in advance.

Dispersal

4.2 Dispersal is a form of evacuation in which people are simply directed away from the real or perceived source of danger. Although any evacuation is likely to include some dispersal, this guidance focuses rather on managed evacuation, and many of the issues arising from that will be common (or scalable) to dispersal. Dispersal of the non-resident population (such as from businesses or retail centres) can pose a challenge to responders: although many people may be able to use public transport for their onward journey home, there could be disruption due to the event, and the volume of people may overwhelm transport in the short term. Temporary shelter or muster points may be necessary to manage those dispersed. Medical support may be required, families and groups might be separated, and people could be unable to access vehicles or have to leave their personal belongings behind, including money and identification.

Decision to evacuate

4.3 Evacuation is likely to have an impact on a range of services and to require a multi-agency response. For no-notice events, the decision to evacuate or shelter in place (see the section on **Shelter**) may have to be taken quickly, and the LRF should confirm which agencies can instigate an evacuation. If time allows, the strategic coordinating group (SCG) or relevant lead agency will take the decision to evacuate an area, and this should be in consultation with the local authorities, to facilitate decisions on shelter. Wherever possible, the judgement should involve other agencies, as the response (and its financial implications) will require a number of organisations. If it is not possible to consult partners before the decision is taken, they must be informed as soon as possible afterwards.

4.4 The decision should be based on an assessment of the threat to life and the impact (or anticipated impact) of an event. The merits and challenges of evacuation and subsequent shelter should be assessed, in particular against the alternative of shelter in place. Wherever possible, the decision should be coordinated with plans for shelter, and shelter plans will benefit from early awareness of the potential numbers to be evacuated.

4.5 In addition, local impacts should be considered, such as the disruption to daily life and the local economy. Once the decision is taken, the public should be notified (see the section on **Communications and the media**).

4.6 There may be some risks where it is useful to understand the 'trigger point' for a decision to evacuate. For example, for some chemicals and other substances (radiological and nuclear materials) there are levels at which it is agreed that they are harmful to human health. Another trigger could be the height of a river: knowing the level at which an at-risk area should be evacuated will ensure that the evacuation takes place safely, before the area floods. In cases of specific risk, plans should consider using warning and alerting procedures or systems, such as flood-warning or severe-weather alerts.

Multi-agency response command and control

4.7 The range of agencies involved in managing an evacuation means that an effective command and control structure is needed. Evacuation and shelter plans have to identify the organisation responsible for developing and executing the evacuation plan and have to know who else needs to be involved.

4.8 Communication and information sharing is important to ensure an effective evacuation. This means knowing whom to contact and how. If use is to be made of public telephone networks, a resilient fall-back procedure needs to be in place.

Managing the evacuation

Phased evacuation

4.9 In some circumstances, particularly if there is a period of warning, a phased evacuation could be considered. Priority could be given to the vulnerable, those at greatest risk due to location, or those whom it will take longest to evacuate. Although a phased evacuation may be desirable, it could prove difficult to manage self-evacuees, who could leave at any time. Phased evacuation may be limited to those being assisted with evacuation.

Evacuation routes

4.10 Understanding the capacity of the strategic routes away from the affected area is central to planning. The anticipated capacity of routes will inform any decision on whether self-evacuation is advisable or on how to manage it.

4.11 Evacuation planning should consider potential choke points, the management of major junctions, traffic flows and how to use transport infrastructure effectively, including the capacity of local public transport. Urban traffic management and control systems and CCTV may assist in monitoring routes and identifying choke points.

4.12 Routes can be closed to general use and devoted to the evacuation, and the direction of traffic flow can be changed to increase capacity. Highways authorities manage the road network and should be involved in planning and response.

4.13 It is important to maintain the flow of traffic on evacuation routes. Stationary traffic can reduce the effectiveness of an evacuation and potentially expose evacuees to greater risk. In some cases, to control traffic volume it may be desirable to specify which junctions should be used to manage access onto the route and which should be closed to access, so that traffic on the evacuation route can flow. Plans should take account of whether pre-identified evacuation routes are, for example, prone to flooding or close to an industrial site that has been identified as a hazard. Plans should also include the provision of accident/breakdown response and recovery and consider how this would be coordinated.

4.14 Flexible road signage along the evacuation route, using existing infrastructure such as electronic matrix displays, can help facilitate evacuation. Planners should consult communications experts to ensure that any traffic messages developed for use during an evacuation do not cause unnecessary alarm or panic. If an evacuation is expected to cross local boundaries, it will be important to coordinate messages and ensure consistency of information for evacuees.

4.15 It will also be necessary to maintain and manage routes into the evacuation area for emergency responders, essential staff or transport for the evacuation.

Effective use of roads for mass evacuation – Lincolnshire and North Norfolk LRFs

Getting the population out of danger and getting essential services, responders and equipment into those same areas has been a long-standing challenge for coastal communities in Lincolnshire and Norfolk. Emergency planners have worked with GIS and highways colleagues to model traffic flows in response to major coastal flooding. The research confirms the benefits of traffic management. Optimum routes for mass evacuation outside flood areas have now been identified and research has been carried out into active traffic management, potential congestion points and the best location in which to deploy support services (for example, fuel and medical supplies).

Transport

4.16 Planning should consider how many people may require transport assistance with evacuation. Available transport (including local authority transport, school buses and social care vehicles) should be assessed against what may be required. Publicly owned transport assets could be limited, and commercial transport capabilities and services may be required for effective evacuation. Call-off contracts with providers may be needed, and transport assets may have to be diverted from normal services. Routine local services could be affected by decisions made in the evacuation plan; if so, this should be agreed with the relevant transport provider or service area. Contractual, regulatory or health and safety requirements could place constraints on plans.

4.17 Using railway capacity could relieve the strain on the road network and allow the transport of large numbers of people. But road transport may still be required for travel to and from railway stations. The management of rail capacity should be discussed with local train operators and Network Rail.

4.18 Transport hubs, such as main railway or bus stations, could play an important role in evacuation both at the embarkation and the disembarkation stage. Plans should reflect the location of hubs and whether they will be affected by the incident either directly or indirectly. However, in many cases the number and capacity of hubs within or close to the evacuation area will be limited. Detailed planning will be needed to assess the capacity of the existing infrastructure that supports the hub, access roads, parking, how evacuees will get to the hub and by what routes, and how they will be marshalled on arrival. In some cases, information on the location of hubs may be sensitive, or the hub used may vary depending on the event. Consideration should be given to those issues if evacuation plans are to be published.

4.19 It may be preferable to discourage people from using their own transport in order to reduce congestion on evacuation routes, or if vehicles could spread contamination. But this may create other challenges. Planners should consider the following:

- It might be difficult in practice to persuade people to leave their cars at home. Personal transport will be seen by many as more desirable to evacuate a family and its personal belongings. Cars left behind may also be at risk of damage by the event.
- It might be difficult to enforce restrictions on personal vehicles (or it may require significant resources to do so).
- Private transport could accommodate several people, such as family members. Those with spare capacity could be encouraged to transport neighbours, friends or family without private transport, thus reducing the number requiring assistance with evacuation.
- The transport capacity needed could be greater if people do not use their own vehicles and it may take extra time to evacuate large numbers.
- There could be an impact on shelter requirements: people who are helped with evacuation (and who therefore do not have their own transport) are more likely to need assistance with shelter, as it will be harder for them to make arrangements for, or to get to, alternative shelter with friends or family.

Specialist transport

4.20 In some circumstances, specialist transport will be needed. To reduce the burden on capacity, those with their own transport (such as disabled access vehicles) could be encouraged to use them, even if people are otherwise being discouraged from using their own transport. Mutual aid and national coordination structures may be activated to manage NHS and prison transport requirements (see below), and this would be done by the relevant service.

4.21 Many specialist assets will not be publicly owned, and there will be limited capacity and possibly multiple requests for assets. Relevant capability in the private and voluntary sectors should be considered. In order to ensure that those people with the greatest need or at the greatest risk receive priority for specialist transport, it may be necessary to conclude contracts with providers of such transport and/or to coordinate with users in the private sector if contracts are already in place.

4.22 The Ambulance Service will focus on triaging, treating and transporting casualties in the immediate aftermath of an incident, and will not be available to provide transport for vulnerable people or non-critical patients. Transport needs should be assessed in order to ensure that only those who need specialist transport receive it, and that those who can use non-specialised forms of transport do so.

4.23 Local authorities should plan and commission transport services. At the local level, the NHS should coordinate with the local authorities to ensure that appropriate support is on hand from suitably qualified staff (such as a GP or pharmacist) for the safety of passengers during the journey.

4.24 Regulations, qualifications and any insurance required for transporting vulnerable people, such as the elderly or those with medical conditions, should be considered, and carriers with the relevant capability should be identified.

Fuel

4.25 Access to fuel in the evacuation area may be limited by the impact of the event, and it may be difficult to restock supplies in the evacuated area. If normal bunkered stocks are not accessible, or if public demand is high, business continuity plans may need to be activated or alternative arrangements made.

Vulnerable people

4.26 Plans should establish in advance the mechanisms for identifying vulnerable people in an emergency. Guidance (entitled *Identifying people who are vulnerable in a crisis*) was issued by the Cabinet Office in 2008 and this should be consulted when developing evacuation plans (see Annex C). In summary, the guidance sets out four key stages:

1. Build networks	Identify vulnerable people by working with those best placed to have up-to-date records of individuals and an awareness of their needs. This may range from care homes (older people) to the local hotel industry (tourists).
2. Create lists of lists	Not possible to maintain central up-to-date list of vulnerable people. Details of organisations and establishments which can be contacted in an emergency to provide information should be recorded.
3. Agree data sharing protocols and activation triggers	Flexible data sharing procedures should be put in place, which can be adjusted to changing circumstances with clear agreed triggers between responders.
4. Determine scale and requirements	Potential scale of requirements of vulnerable people should be estimated in advance without divulging information about individuals. This information can be fed into planning of resources and equipment.

4.27 In any evacuation, it is likely that there will be vulnerable people who do not appear on existing lists: those without transport, elderly or frail people in their homes or people with temporary medical conditions. Plans should consider how such people can be identified, for example through self-identification or door-knocking. Communications could reflect this by asking family, friends and neighbours to assist with the identification or evacuation of such people.

4.28 If vulnerable people are **not** evacuated, planners will need to consider how support is provided to people and sites in the evacuated area.

Providers of NHS funded care

4.29 Providers of NHS funded care have a duty to plan for the partial or complete evacuation of a site and for the shelter of patients. These plans should be aligned with the organisation's major incident plans and should be shared with responders who may have a role to play in the response.

4.30 The high dependency of many patients makes this a particularly complex task, and the complete evacuation of a hospital or other health facility would only be considered under extreme circumstances. Hospitals and other facilities that accommodate dependent patients have been designed as a series of compartments that provide a degree of fire resistance. Thus patients could be moved horizontally from an affected area to a different compartment on the same floor. This principle is called 'progressive horizontal evacuation' and has been widely adopted by hospitals and other health facilities as a means of minimising the disruption of an evacuation.

4.31 Where a full evacuation is required, the decision would be made locally, taking into account the overall risk to patients, the availability of appropriate transport, patient-tracking mechanisms and whether a suitably equipped destination can be identified. It will be important to consider and coordinate the impact of a full or partial evacuation of a hospital and how that will affect the resources available to evacuate those people with medical needs from other care institutions or their homes.

Evacuation of the Royal Marsden Hospital, 2008 – NHS London

The Royal Marsden Hospital (RMH) is a world-renowned cancer centre with 240 beds. It is located in London, very close to the Royal Brompton Hospital (RBH) and near to the Chelsea and Westminster NHS Foundation Trust Hospital. On 2 January 2008, at 1pm, a fire broke out in the roof area of the RMH. This coincided with the seasonal holiday period and reduced levels of services. There were 78 inpatients and around 120 outpatients on site; the RBH had several wards closed for Christmas. Unusually, the fire necessitated the complete evacuation of all patients, staff and visitors from the building, including three patients who were in the operating theatres and six patients in intensive care. The evacuation was successfully completed in 28 minutes. Over 150 emergency services personnel were involved in the response.

The evacuation: Patients were moved either to the RBH or to St Paul's church (which is 100m from the hospital and which offered a temporary shelter and triage centre). Patients continued to be looked after by RMH staff, and all were either discharged or returned to the RMH within seven days. Normal services resumed at the RMH three days later, but it was estimated that full site recovery would take two years.

Shelter: It was clear from this event that hospitals should consider and plan for complete evacuations in their major incident plans, and that this should include suitable triage and sheltering areas outside the hospital building. Planning should also identify the staff required in these areas in order to ensure continued medical care for sheltered patients.

Care homes

4.32 All care homes should have business continuity plans to manage an evacuation. Privately operated care homes are responsible for managing an evacuation, but coordination and assistance may be necessary in wide-area evacuation. If there is more than one care home within a likely evacuation area, or if the plan is for the evacuation of a wide area, the potential overlap between individual care home plans should be taken into account, particularly in terms of the use of specialist assets.

Home care

4.33 Knowledge of the people receiving home care (whether local authority or privately arranged) will aid the evacuation and the coordination of specialist assets. Coordination with, and engagement of, private operators in the planning will help in identifying all those people who may require assistance in an evacuation.

4.34 Coordination with care homes or home care providers will help to identify spare capacity in the local area in the event of an evacuation.

4.35 Any decision to evacuate will need to consider the benefits of staying in place, as well as the providers' ability to offer adequate support to evacuated individuals. There may be specialist shelter requirements, and that could increase evacuation distances. The distance to a place offering adequate provision will be a factor in any evacuation decision.

Schools

4.36 For a no-notice event occurring during the school day, it may be necessary to evacuate pupils from schools, including from those outside local authority control. While there is no legal requirement for schools to have an emergency plan in place, the Department for Education in England recommends it. It is up to individual schools to develop their own emergency plans, depending on local circumstances. Such plans should enable them to respond to a range of emergencies – national (for example, flu pandemic, fuel shortage), regional (flooding, outbreak of infectious illness), or very local (fire, violent incident). A significant proportion of any plan – communications, contacts, objectives – will be applicable to any type of emergency. Planners should liaise with schools about wide-area evacuation plans and what may be required of schools beyond existing plans. If there is adequate warning of an incident, it may be viable for parents to collect their children, but this would depend on the nature of the event, whether parents are able to enter the evacuation zone and the proximity of the working and residential populations.

4.37 Teachers have a common-law duty to act in place of the parent and will need to accompany pupils if parents are unable to collect them. The evacuation of schools should be recorded and monitored to ensure that accurate information is held on how many pupils have been evacuated and on their destination. In a wide-area evacuation, schools may be able to use elements of site evacuation plans (such as recording the movement of pupils). To prevent confusion and to avoid parents putting themselves at unnecessary risk, it will be important to communicate information on the evacuation of pupils. Planners should also consider areas whose evacuation would not directly affect the school but would affect the ability of parents to collect their children or of children to return home.

Children's homes

4.38 As well as schools, planners should consider and work with children's home providers, both in the public and the private sector, residential special schools, boarding schools, and secure children's homes in order to understand their evacuation plans and possible needs in a wide-area evacuation.

Prisons

4.39 Prisons and other secure facilities would normally move inmates within the secure perimeter of the site, rather than evacuate the entire site. But it is mandatory for prison governors to have plans for total evacuation, should that ever be needed. Prison Service guidance advises prison governors who are considering evacuation to consult emergency planners. The police are responsible for evacuating people being held in police stations, and the relevant private contractor will have an evacuation plan for a court building. The National Offender Management Service (NOMS) will assist with the coordination of a prison evacuation, should that be necessary.

4.40 Local planners should take prisons into account in their wide-area evacuation planning, as prison evacuation needs may overlap with wider evacuation needs. Prison plans may include contracts with local transport firms or arrangements with the emergency services to facilitate an evacuation. In the event of a wide-area evacuation, resources could be stretched and priorities will need to be considered and coordinated.

Immigration detention and removal centres

4.41 Immigration detention and removal centres follow a similar approach: a mutual aid protocol is in place between the Prison Service and Home Office Immigration Enforcement, which allows the Prison Service crisis-management structures to support senior Immigration Enforcement staff in dealing with an incident at a detention and removal centre. Each centre is required, under Immigration Enforcement guidance, to have contingency plans for total evacuation.

Evacuee support

4.42 If appropriate and possible, people evacuated from their own homes should be asked to pack spare clothes and basic toiletries in case they are unable to return home soon. This will ease the pressure on local supplies. Those with sleeping bags could also be asked to bring them. Evacuees on medication should be asked to take enough supplies to last for several days.

Pets and animals

4.43 Evacuation and shelter planning should also address animal welfare issues, in order to minimise suffering and to assist owners in complying with evacuation instructions. During an emergency, pet owners have a legal obligation to care for their animals and should be reminded of this, especially if they decide to self-evacuate or choose not to leave. Only in the most extreme circumstances is it realistic to expect evacuees to leave their pets behind, and communication, transport and shelter plans should bear this in mind.

4.44 The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), the Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories Agency (AHVLA), and voluntary organisations such as the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) could provide capabilities for the transport and rescue of livestock and other animals, and could assist with the development of media and community information strategies.

4.45 All livestock keepers should take reasonable steps to address animal-welfare contingency planning as part of their business planning. For practical reasons, farm livestock will generally be left behind in an evacuation, and animal keepers must therefore take every practical measure to ensure their survival and to safeguard their welfare. If time permits, livestock could be moved to safety (higher ground or indoors) and provision made for fodder and water. Most events will not require a lengthy evacuation, but for those that do, the various options for attending to livestock (such as allowing farmers back into the area for short periods) should be considered.

4.46 Engagement with zoos and other large commercial owners of animals should be considered, so that owners can take appropriate action if an evacuation is required.

Animal welfare in evacuation – Avon and Somerset LRF

In 2008, the Avon and Somerset LRF evacuation and shelter planning included the development of an effective response to animal welfare during an evacuation. The Animal Welfare Support Network was set up and included the British Horse Society, the National Farmers' Union, HorseWorld, World Horse Welfare, the National Animal Welfare Trust, the RSPCA, the Royal Bath and West of England Society, Rill UK, Countess Mountbatten's Own Legion of Frontiersmen, local authority animal health and welfare, the AHVLA, the Farming Community Network, and the Environment Agency. Devon and Somerset Fire and Rescue added their capabilities to the guidance.

The key learning identified by the group was: a need to include pets, equines and livestock in planning; the considerable resources offered by the voluntary sector and its willingness to assist; and the skills and resources that are available in the large agricultural showgrounds of the UK.

Avon and Somerset LRF produced guidance that included:

- encouraging voluntary and statutory agencies to work together;
- planning for the response to cover animals left at home or abandoned;
- integration of animal welfare into the formal command structure;
- roles and responsibilities;
- financial implications and liabilities;
- key considerations for each animal type; and
- description and contacts for the Animal Welfare Support Network.

In addition, a set of leaflets was produced to offer guidance to owners of pets, equines and livestock on steps they can take to help themselves. These leaflets drew on the expertise of a consultant vet with international experience in disaster response.

Chapter 5: Shelter

5.1 Shelter includes buildings, humanitarian assistance and support for individuals. It may be required for a few hours, through to several weeks (or even longer). It is important to coordinate shelter with evacuation planning. Knowledge of evacuation routes and the potential number of evacuees will significantly aid both evacuation and shelter plans. It is unlikely that the entire evacuated population will require shelter; wherever possible, those who are able and willing to make their own shelter arrangements should be assisted in doing so. Plans should consider the management of evacuees who:

- need transport assistance and are evacuated to shelter;
- need transport assistance with evacuation but, with support, could make their own shelter arrangements;
- self-evacuate but need shelter;
- make their own shelter arrangements, but subsequently seek assistance from authorities for shelter or other support; or
- self-evacuate and make their own shelter arrangements.

Shelter in place

5.2 Shelter in place should be considered for no-notice events when:

- there is no time to undertake an evacuation before the hazard arrives;
- going outside would expose people to greater harm or dangerous conditions; or
- the immediate risk is unclear.

5.3 Buildings can provide significant protection against most risks, and the public may be safer seeking shelter in the nearest suitable building, rather than dispersing or evacuating immediately. Once the risk is understood, a decision needs to be made about how long the population should remain indoors and whether an evacuation is necessary and could be conducted without exposing the population to increased risk.

5.4 The advantages of shelter in place will vary, depending on the event. In some scenarios, once the immediate danger has passed it will be safe to go outdoors; in others, shelter may be the safest option for several hours or longer. Evacuation after shelter in place may be necessary for vulnerable people or for the entire population affected.

5.5 Priority support or evacuation should be considered for vulnerable groups, and in particular for those who require support at home and for those sheltering in commercial premises or in schools. For prolonged periods of shelter, people may need basic supplies, such as food, water or medicines. People able to shelter in residential properties are most likely to be able to sustain themselves, although the situation could change if basic utilities (gas, electricity or water) are affected by the event. The sustainability of shelter in workplaces and commercial premises (including shops) will be more limited. If a general evacuation is not deemed necessary, smaller-scale evacuations from workplaces may still be required. The provision of supplies or the management of an evacuation may necessitate the diversion of resources or specialist capabilities from the response.

A different approach to evacuation and shelter – Greater Manchester

Greater Manchester comprises ten unitary authorities, some of which have specific town or city centre evacuation plans and all of which have their own arrangements to provide shelter, mainly through Reception Centre Plans. Over a six-month period, the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum, with the support of the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities Civil Contingencies and Resilience Unit, has been working to bring these individual plans together into a cohesive strategic framework relevant to the whole of Greater Manchester. This has resulted in:

1. the Greater Manchester Sheltering Evacuees (Reception Centre) Plan – this provides a common template, allowing for local adaptation;
2. the Greater Manchester Strategic Evacuation Plan – providing the strategic framework for evacuation; and
3. a revision of the Manchester City Centre Evacuation Plan (developing this as a toolkit for tactical commanders, with the potential for further development into a standard model for other town centre evacuation plans).

The benefits of this have been to:

- provide common systems underpinned by a generic framework, which allows boroughs to focus on planning for those elements of evacuation and shelter that are unique to them;
- open up the ability to use resources – both staff and assets – more intelligently across a wider area;
- provide an opportunity for speedy and efficient transfer and deployment of resources across administrative boundaries, wherever the need is greatest, and for the delivery of a flexible resource;
- reduce duplication of systems and processes, and develop consistency of approach;
- codify common standards for the setting up and administration of rest/reception centres;
- develop opportunities to provide universal training for the whole of Greater Manchester; and
- establish a more sustainable approach to emergency response for evacuation and shelter capability.

Short-term shelter

5.6 Following an evacuation, shelter may be required for evacuees in the short term (up to 72 hours), until they are able to return home or until medium-term arrangements are made.

Buildings

5.7 Plans should identify suitable buildings, such as schools, leisure centres or community halls, that could be used as rest centres. Where practical, buildings across the planning zone should be pre-identified. This will reduce the time it takes to set up rest centres in the wake of an incident. Agreement should be sought with the building operators or owners and the necessary activation arrangements made. If schools are identified, planners should consider the additional disruption that would be caused by activation and what arrangements need to be put in place for the pupils if the school is closed.

5.8 The pre-identification of buildings allows issues such as health and safety, fire and change-of-use regulations to be addressed, additional requirements to be identified and organised, and for the storage or pre-deployment of equipment and supplies.

5.9 Where specific risks in an area are identified (such as industrial plants or flood zones), planners should ensure that rest centres will not be affected by the event. As well as the direct impact of the event on rest centres, planners should look at the ability to maintain the supply of power and water and the resilience of access roads.

5.10 Where only small numbers of people require shelter, or where the capacity of rest centres is only slightly exceeded, it may be more cost-effective to use hotels, rather than to open up another rest centre. Planners should maintain a list of local hotels that could be used and should consider arranging call-off contracts with accommodation providers.

5.11 Buildings need to have adequate **sanitation** for the numbers expected. It may be possible to accommodate large numbers of people in some buildings, but the basic sanitation capacity (the number of toilets and washing facilities) will govern the number of people that can be sheltered.

5.12 Adequate levels of **catering** for the duration of the shelter period should be planned. Existing facilities at shelters could be used, but plans should consider the requirements for trained catering staff and food and hygiene standards.

5.13 Planners should also consider arrangements for the **routine maintenance** of the building, such as cleaning and repairs. Normal arrangements for the building might not be resilient enough or adequate for the change in use.

Communications

5.14 Telephone and internet access at the site can help responders organise the evacuation, communicate information about evacuees, and keep up to date with the event. Evacuees could also contact their relatives and friends and organise alternative shelter for themselves. Good mobile telephone coverage and wireless internet would enable evacuees to use personal mobile devices and so reduce the pressure on equipment used for management of the shelter. Evacuees would also be able to contact insurance companies.

Supplies

5.15 Agreements or call-off contracts with providers would enable access to a range of supplies as the need arises. Where practical, planners should consider the purchase and storage of certain basic supplies, such as camp-beds and blankets. Locally owned supplies would not need to match the expected requirement for the worst risk identified, but they would allow a quick response to the event while other arrangements were activated. Plans should reflect the location of supplies, the timeframe for activating contracts, and the transport time to rest centres.

5.16 It is probably impractical to store consumables such as food and water for use in an emergency. Agreements with local suppliers (supermarkets or wholesalers) would be a practical and cost-effective alternative, with supplies purchased as required. The needs of all groups in the community should be considered when providing consumables. Faith communities may be able to advise on, or help with, the provision of food, if required.

Storage of evacuation equipment – Reading Borough Council

Reading has adopted a model for the purchase and storage of equipment needed in the event of a rest centre being activated. It has used this model to improve flexibility, ease access to mutual aid and expedite the setting-up of rest centre operations.

Recognising that evacuations require a lot of equipment, Reading has worked to identify the 'must have' equipment for use in rest centres. Moreover, issues arising from the transportation of equipment from storage to rest centre have been resolved by grouping the equipment into suitable, easily transportable containers (wheelie bins), enabling efficient deployment and thus speeding up the emergency response time.

Reading packs four of everything into one wheelie bin – airbeds, sleeping bags, pillows, toiletry kits (plus an airbed pump). It then stores the wheelie bins in a shipping container. If, for example, it is faced with 40 evacuees, it simply collects ten wheelie bins and puts them in the back of a vehicle bound for the rest centre. This requires fewer people and makes transportation of the evacuation equipment much quicker and easier.

There are additional benefits:

- Standardising the equipment purchased means there is a set minimum standard for rest centres; variable standards are a thing of the past.
- Standardising rest centre equipment storage in shipping containers allows easier provision of mutual aid over much larger geographical distances.
- The council's volunteers, who make up the bulk of the emergency response team, find the new system much simpler.
- The council is better placed to assist others with mutual aid.

Staffing

5.17 Rest centre managers and support staff will need some training to allow for the safe and effective running of buildings. Plans should consider staffing levels for rest centres and the training requirements for each role. Where training is required, staff should be identified and trained; if necessary, roles could be augmented through mutual aid or call-off contracts with other providers, such as voluntary organisations. For roles that require no formal training, volunteers can be sought among local authority staff or within the wider community. Staffing plans will need to reflect the various potential durations of an event, shift or rota arrangements, and whether pre-identified staff could themselves be affected by the evacuation.

Medical assistance and medication

5.18 Depending on the nature of the incident, some evacuees may require basic first aid and triage support at rest centres. The capacity of hospitals, medical staff and ambulances to manage casualties will depend on the nature of the event. Plans should consider the provision and level of medical support at rest centres, in conjunction with health and ambulance services. Having staff trained in first aid or basic triage at rest centres would relieve the strain on the health services and would help with the rapid identification of those who require additional medical support.

5.19 Wherever possible, evacuees should be asked to provide their own prescription medication. If this is not possible, medical needs should be assessed at rest centres and arrangements made to provide prescriptions. Self-evacuees who have made their own accommodation arrangements may also need help in accessing medical services and prescriptions.

Vulnerable people

5.20 Basic shelter in rest centres will not be suitable for some vulnerable people, such as the frail or those with specific medical or support requirements. In some cases, vulnerable people will have been evacuated in specialist transportation, and shelter arrangements should be coordinated to allow for evacuation direct to suitable accommodation.

5.21 Within the rest centre, planners should consider what additional support vulnerable people might need, such as disabled access and facilities.

5.22 If evacuees are assessed on arrival at the rest centre, alternative shelter arrangements can be made. This process should reflect the following:

- Friends or family may be able to provide accommodation, but assistance with arrangements might be needed.
- Hotels or bed and breakfast establishments could be appropriate for people who require no specialist support but for whom a rest centre may not be suitable – for example, elderly or frail people who live at home without support, or pregnant women.
- Rest centres may not be appropriate for people who receive support at home, and sheltered accommodation (such as in care homes) may be required.
- Children may be separated from family or friends and may require assessment or supervision. In some cases, appropriate adults such as teachers (especially if schools have been evacuated) or foster parents could look after small groups at rest centres.

Parking

5.23 Self-evacuees without accommodation are likely to seek shelter at rest centres, and so parking arrangements should be considered (for example, buildings may have car parks or adjacent land, such as school playing fields). Where on-site parking is limited or not available, parking in the surrounding area will need to be arranged and managed.

Security

5.24 Planners should assess the security needs at rest centres. Existing security arrangements for the site may be adequate, or they may need to be augmented. Police might be needed on site or they may need to be available in the local area.

Welfare

5.25 The level of support for evacuees is likely to depend on the event. In itself, an evacuation could be traumatic for some people, particularly in no-notice incidents, for those separated from their families, or if there is damage to property and the environment, casualties or a potential risk to health.

5.26 Welfare assistance could include:

- information about what has happened;
- financial and legal support;
- emotional support;
- advice and direction on how to get further help and assistance;
- facilitating communication between affected people;
- a point of contact for longer-term support and advice; and
- faith-based support.

Support for evacuees

5.27 Planners should consider the level of support for evacuees that might be needed. The support that evacuees can provide for themselves will depend on the notice period before evacuation and on whether they were at home at the time. Whenever possible, evacuees should be asked to bring with them such essentials as a change of clothes, toiletries, medicines and mobile phones. As well as personal items, evacuees may need help to access banking facilities, so that they are able to support themselves. They may also require assistance in contacting insurance providers.

Pets and animals

5.28 Some people will evacuate with their pets, and arrangements to care for animals need to be built into plans. For public health and sanitation reasons, animals should not be sheltered in the same area of a building as people. Separate arrangements for animals will need to be made and should include:

- provision of pet shelters at one or more rest centres;
- options to board pets in kennels or with households in unaffected areas;
- the direction of people with pets to rest centres with pet shelters;
- the capacity to transport pets arriving at rest centres to pet shelters;
- systems to register and track animals;
- the means to keep each animal separate;
- food and sanitation requirements;
- animal welfare and availability of trained staff, such as vets and voluntary sector support; and
- provision and arrangements for assistance dogs.

5.29 Rest centre capacity will vary, and it may not be possible for all owners to stay at the same shelter as their pets. Sometimes their pets will be sheltered in kennels or households in unaffected areas. It will therefore be important to reassure evacuees that their pets will be cared for.

Evacuation in Great Yarmouth, November 2007 – Norfolk County Council

Following flood warnings and discussions with the Environment Agency, the decision was taken to evacuate parts of Great Yarmouth in anticipation of coastal flooding. An evacuation cell consisting of the relevant agencies was set up and it decided which areas would need to be evacuated. Over the Norfolk area there are 50,000 properties at risk of flooding, with 42,000 at risk of tidal flooding. The evacuation area consisted of 7,500 properties at risk in Great Yarmouth. As part of the response:

- rest centres outside the flood risk zones were identified and activated;
- pre-arranged transport was used to take evacuees to rest centres;
- mutual aid arrangements were activated, including for the provision of resources for rest centres and rest centre managers and staff from councils within Cambridgeshire; and
- voluntary sector organisations, including the Red Cross and Salvation Army, provided support to rest centres.

Existing plans, procedures and infrastructure, supported by training and exercising, allowed the evacuation to be managed effectively and over a thousand people were moved to shelter.

Assistance with shelter arrangements

5.30 Even though evacuees may have needed help with evacuation, they may be able and willing to find and arrange alternative accommodation for themselves. Wherever possible, they should be helped to do so, through the provision of telephone or internet access to make arrangements or book accommodation. It may be that commercial transport is devoted to the evacuation and is not available to take evacuees from rest centres to alternative accommodation; therefore assistance with booking private hire taxis or the use of volunteers could be considered. Access to the rest centre could be limited due to traffic management or disruption caused by the evacuation, and planners may need to bear this in mind when assisting people to leave the rest centre for other accommodation.

Medium-term shelter

5.31 Shelter for days or weeks after an event may be necessary if it is not possible for evacuees to return home immediately. If homes have been damaged and are in need of repair, insurance companies will make an assessment and arrange suitable accommodation. But in some circumstances – if the property is undamaged but it is not safe to return home at once – evacuees may need help in finding accommodation. Short-term arrangements made by self-evacuees – hotel accommodation or staying with family or friends – might not be practical or sustainable in the medium term.

5.32 Medium-term accommodation should be provided as close to the evacuees' original area of residence as possible. This will make it easier for people to return to employment and schooling, and to stay connected to the local community. If that is not possible, issues to consider include:

- access to welfare support;
- schooling;
- employment support; and
- access to local services, including medical.

Chapter 6: General issues

Registration

6.1 The number of people listed as missing might be high in the immediate aftermath of an event. Effective registration of evacuees and sharing of information will help to reduce the number unaccounted for. Effective arrangements should be established to register people entering or leaving a rest centre, and planners should consider the arrangements that will allow self-evacuees and those who choose not to evacuate to register. Local authorities should have registration forms ready in advance and have pre-agreed responsibilities for capturing data. Data collection should be consistent across rest centres, and arrangements should be in place to collate information in order to provide an overview of evacuees. If a casualty bureau is set up by the police, the information needs to be passed to it as soon as possible, to help in matching evacuees with people reported missing and so that the police can take witness statements, if required.

Logistical support

6.2 LRFs might set up logistic support cells to plan for the provision of supplies and services that may be required to support displaced persons. When an event occurs, a central logistics and brokerage centre can coordinate needs and available capability, and undertake procurement to assist in the deployment of resources. Evacuation planners should consider the resilience of contractors and suppliers, as well as the location of personnel and assets.

Sharing information on resources – Thames Valley LRF

Thames Valley LRF (TVLRF), with its complex local authority structure, identified a need for the effective recording of resources available in an emergency. A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet offered TVLRF a simple and effective method of recording resources that was also cheap and quick to set up. The benefits to emergency planning have been:

- improved access to information and a quicker response during an emergency, since resources are listed on a single database;
- improved cooperation within the TVLRF emergency preparedness community and better sharing of information on resources held, allowing a joined-up approach; and
- an indication of the level of resilience for different emergencies.

Security

6.3 Convincing members of the public that their property will be safeguarded in their absence could be essential in persuading them to evacuate in an emergency. Demands on the police may be high, and there may be limited resources available to protect vacated homes and businesses. Evacuation and shelter plans should therefore incorporate plans for law and order. These might include:

- a multi-agency crime prevention strategy (local community safety partnerships could be involved in this);[1]
- communication to reassure homeowners and deter potential lawbreakers, including during the return and recovery stages. If people are told that their homes are secure, responders must be confident that this is actually the case;
- highly visible police enforcement strategies; and
- a review of the ability of private security companies to provide a security presence within their normal remit, as they do at buildings and sites, or at large events.

6.4 Information should be issued on how to secure an evacuated home and how to indicate to the emergency services that a building has been completely vacated.

6.5 Many businesses use private contractors for their building or site security. In the event of an evacuation, it must be assumed that no distinction will be made between these personnel and the rest of the population, and that they will also be advised to evacuate. Planners should consider how specific sites or vulnerable areas within the evacuation zone could be managed during the period of evacuation and the return (for example, allowing private contractors back as soon as possible), and whether an additional police presence is necessary.

Resilience of responders

6.6 Evacuation decisions will need to reflect the requirements for personnel to manage the evacuation. The evacuation itself may require significant resources, and business continuity planning should assume that some of the staff required may be in the evacuation zone and may need to evacuate themselves and/or their families. There could be a particular strain on the emergency services or on those that perform specialist duties (such as prison officers). Relief staff might need to be brought in from outside the local area, and planners should consider how this should be coordinated (such as through mutual aid) and managed. If it is decided not to evacuate an area, specific sites or vulnerable people, the capability to draft the necessary personnel into the affected area will need to be included in plans. Plans should also ensure coordination to allow essential staff to enter the evacuation zone.

6.7 Responding organisations should also consider the resilience of their services. Staff might themselves be evacuated or diverted from their normal duties to support the evacuation process, and this could place a strain on other services. Buildings used for the response may be in the risk areas or be affected by the event, and business continuity plans should be linked to evacuation plans in order to ensure that the expected level of service can be maintained.

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[1] Section 6 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 requires the responsible authorities (commonly referred to as 'community safety partnerships') in a local government area to work together to formulate and implement strategies to tackle local crime and disorder in that area.

Business continuity

6.8 The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 also imposes a duty on Category 1 responders to maintain plans to ensure that they can continue to exercise their functions in the event of an emergency, so far as is reasonably practicable. This means that local authorities also need to provide advice on the business continuity implications of evacuation for those organisations that provide the services for which the local authority is directly or indirectly responsible, such as schools, social care providers and environmental services.

6.9 An evacuation is likely to have a major impact on local businesses, in terms of their business premises either being evacuated or used as a place of shelter. As part of their duty to provide business continuity advice, local authorities should develop procedures to engage businesses and help them plan for risks that may give rise to evacuation and shelter. These procedures should include arrangements for businesses to be kept informed during an evacuation. Business continuity plans may also include useful systems to alert people and provide advice, such as 'telephone trees', construction of public address systems or other alert systems. Businesses may also have vehicles or supplies that could be utilised in support of their own employees or the wider evacuation.

Volunteers and donations

6.10 In some events, volunteers may be able to help evacuate and shelter affected populations. These volunteers might be drawn from community or voluntary organisations, from the evacuated population or from people in the shelter areas. A system for managing offers of assistance and coordinating volunteers and donations should be in place, and ways of helping the response should be communicated. Without management, volunteers might place a burden on the response by turning up where they are not needed. Plans should set out which roles need specialist training or clearance.

6.11 Donations (such as clothing, food or entertainment) might not be appropriate or needed, and if unsolicited could place an additional burden on the response. Messages to prospective volunteers and advice on donations could be included in communications plans. The voluntary sector could assist with coordination – for example, through voluntary sector representatives (see the section above on **Involving the voluntary sector and community organisations**).

Critical infrastructure

6.12 Understanding critical infrastructure that might be at risk will enable plans to be developed to protect or manage the impact on infrastructure. There are two types of infrastructure to consider.

Local infrastructure

6.13 The impact of the event on local infrastructure could affect evacuation decisions or plans. Local infrastructure to consider when planning should include:

- roads and rail;
- electricity, gas and water supplies; and
- telecommunications.

6.14 Plans should reflect the direct impact of the event on infrastructure, as well as how evacuation decisions and shelter plans could be affected.

Critical national infrastructure

6.15 The UK's critical national infrastructure (CNI) is defined by government as: 'those facilities, systems, sites and networks necessary for the functioning of the country and the delivery of the essential services upon which daily life in the UK depends'.

6.16 CNI sites could be the source of the event, in which case planning should consider this through the risk-assessment process. In other scenarios, CNI sites could be affected by an event, just like local infrastructure. Although the impact might be national, it is likely to have a similar impact at the local level. A formal information sharing framework and protocols are in place to share CNI information with local responders (Category 1 and 2) in order to support effective emergency planning and the response to civil emergencies. The framework is outlined in the Cabinet Office's publication *Keeping the country running: natural hazards and infrastructure.*

Resource coordination

6.17 Plans should identify where multiple demands on resources are to be expected and how these demands will be addressed and prioritised. Where gaps are identified, mutual aid should be considered and arrangements put in place.

6.18 Where the local response may be overwhelmed and wider support may be required, or if an emergency could affect a number of neighbouring strategic coordinating groups, the national concept of operations (see Annex C) provides a route to enhance coordination, structures and support via a multi-SCG response coordinating group (ResCG).

Community resilience

6.19 Many local authorities have produced booklets and have provided information on websites offering advice for communities on how to prepare for and respond to an emergency. This is especially the case where communities are prone to flooding (for example, people are encouraged to register for the Environment Agency's free flood-warning schemes and to learn the flood-warning codes). In addition, the preparatory work undertaken by local authorities and communities at the planning stage has proved very beneficial when an incident occurs, since communities are more likely to identify what needs to be done prior to the arrival of the emergency services and feel confident in their ability to be self-sufficient for a period of time.

6.20 In an evacuation, residents could be encouraged to help friends, family members or neighbours who may need assistance with evacuation (but who do not have specific medical or transport needs). As mentioned in other sections, in order to ensure self-sufficiency, whenever possible people should evacuate with basic supplies, such as a change of clothes, toiletries and medication.

Community-managed 'emergency accommodation centres' – Avon and Somerset LRF

Somerset's large-scale evacuation plan provides a framework for local authorities and other supporting agencies to respond positively to a request to care for large numbers of evacuees. Rest centre plans cope effectively with evacuations on a small scale, but are quite staff intensive, using local authority, health and voluntary agencies to care for evacuees. It would not be possible to open sufficient rest centres to cope with large numbers of people. Mutual aid might help with this, but evacuees prefer to be close to home.

The six Somerset local authorities, working together in a formal civil contingencies partnership, devised a plan and policies to recognise the willingness of local people to help in emergency situations. 'Emergency accommodation centres', run by the community but supported by the local authority, can operate separately or alongside rest centres. The community resilience programme in Somerset and the wider LRF identifies skills and expertise, as well as willingness on the part of communities to be involved.

The planning allows for two voluntary agency representatives within each centre (one trained in first aid to link with the wider health response and to offer support). In addition, a local authority coordinator links with up to five centres to offer logistical and operational support (food, bedding, help with transport, help with animal care, whatever the community needs to manage the care of evacuees). These centres do not and will not replace emergency rest centres, but they do offer an alternative in managing large numbers of evacuees.

Central government assistance

6.21 When a large-scale evacuation and shelter operation is necessary, support and coordination may be required through devolved administrations, national response arrangements and central government. Central government would be involved in the response if:

- local capacity has been overwhelmed;
- the response requires coordination across a wide area; or
- the consequences are complex and need national capabilities or specialist support.

6.22 A central government response does not reduce the need for effective local planning; nor does it relieve LRFs of responsibility for evacuation and shelter. If an event is likely to overwhelm local capacity, mutual aid should be used in the first instance.

6.23 The central government response will vary. In some cases, existing national response plans and centres will be activated without the need for additional central government response or coordination (such as for the emergency services). For the most severe events, central government response arrangements will be activated to provide support and coordination, including through Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) meetings. The aim will be to assist the local response, through the provision of national assets and the coordination of resources that may be required across a wide area. This could include assistance with, and coordination of, transport assets, additional staff resources, liaison with transport and utility companies, and identification of shelter points.

6.24 Plans should not assume that legislative restrictions will be relaxed or lifted, or that national emergency plans will be activated. If **legislative issues** are identified, planners should liaise with the appropriate organisations locally, with devolved administrations, or through DCLG's Resilience and Emergencies Division (RED) (for central government departments) on assumptions, expectations and procedures. In many cases, it is not certain that restrictions will be lifted (such as on driver hours or fuel usage) or plans activated; but local plans should identify the procedure or requirements for doing so.

6.25 There should be no expectation that government will use its **emergency powers** under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 to facilitate an evacuation. The use of emergency powers is an option of last resort for dealing with the effects of the most serious emergencies. A considerable amount of sector-specific emergency legislation is on the statute books, and the need to resort to emergency powers is therefore unlikely.

Mass evacuation and shelter

6.26 Mass evacuation and shelter is not the focus of this guidance and will only be relevant to certain risks. Although many of the issues identified here will be relevant, it is likely that specific planning that goes beyond generic plans will be necessary for those risks. The scale of an emergency is likely to require significant national input, coordination and support. Where LRFs have identified a risk that may require mass evacuation, further advice and support should be sought from DCLG RED, the devolved administrations and the Cabinet Office.

Chapter 7:
Communications and the media

7.1 Category 1 responders have a duty under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 to communicate with the public, and specifically to ensure that:

- the public is made aware of the risks of emergencies and of how Category 1 responders are prepared to deal with them if they occur; and
- arrangements are made to warn the public, and that the public is provided with information and advice, as necessary, if an emergency is likely to occur or has occurred.

7.2 Chapter 7 of *Emergency preparedness* provides details, tips, examples and case studies on communicating with the public. Chapter 8 of *Emergency response and recovery* provides information on managing the relationship with the media. The Defence Science and Technology Laboratory's (DSTL) 'Smart Tips' provide advice on using social media in an emergency (see Annex C).

7.3 Evacuation planning should consider the range of channels for communication with the affected population, the content of messages and engagement with the media.

7.4 In the event of a no-notice incident, responders should seek to alert and advise the public affected as quickly as possible, in order to allow them to take action to protect themselves. If time allows, messages tailored to specific groups or geographical areas could be considered. Clear and consistent messages are important if members of the public need to take certain action to ensure their own safety or if a particular public reaction would increase the risk (such as large numbers of people attempting to self-evacuate when it would be safer for them to remain indoors). Pre-prepared 'alert message templates' can be used to reduce the time lag between an event occurring and advice being issued. Examples of templates are available to local responders on the National Resilience Extranet.

Public communications

7.5 In most scenarios, evacuation and shelter will be voluntary. Communications should come from a single source that is regarded as authoritative and that represents the response. A consistent message is important, and a communications group representing all agencies could be set up to ensure that communications reflect all pertinent issues. Plans should identify a lead organisation for delivering those messages. One message reflecting the whole response, delivered from one authoritative point, will reduce the risk of miscommunication or conflicting messages.

7.6 Characteristics of the messages will include:

Information on the evacuation decisions	• Why the public is being asked to take a certain course of action. • Though local people might not find the evacuation route the most obvious one, alternative routes may be threatened by the event, be dedicated to the emergency services or be unsuitable for large volumes of traffic. • Shelter in place may seem counterintuitive to people in the affected area, even if it is the safest option; clear advice (including health advice) about the risks will help to reduce panic and confusion.
Manage expectations	• Roads may be busy and traffic could be slower than normal; evacuees should be reassured that this is factored into the plans and that deviating from the recommended routes could cause further problems. • Evacuees should be aware that accommodation could be basic and communal; this might also encourage those who can arrange their own accommodation to do so.
Advice on how the public can help	• This might include: – evacuating with spare clothes and medication; or – helping vulnerable family members, friends or neighbours.
Reassurance on issues such as safety and security	• See the section above on **Security**, p36.
Information during the evacuation	• This will help to avoid unnecessary worry and may discourage people from attempting to return before it is safe to do so.
Two-way communication	• This should include encouraging self-evacuees to register through the appropriate channels and to keep in touch for updated advice.

7.7 Alongside the content of messages, planners should consider:

Publishing and publicising risk information	• Increase local awareness, especially if certain geographical areas face specific risks. • Use the community risk register to highlight evacuation and shelter information. • Consider how much detail may be in the public domain and whether it could create confusion if the event requires a change to the published plan (for example, if a pre-identified road cannot be used) or exposes potential vulnerabilities (such as where crowds may gather). • Multi-agency partners should be consulted on the publication of risks and plans to ensure that sensitive site-specific risks, information on vulnerabilities or commercially sensitive information are not inadvertently published.
Media awareness	• Briefing the media on local risks, for example when the community risk register is updated. • Improve understanding on what risks mean and what responses they will elicit. • How the media can help to raise public awareness and provide information during an event.
Media liaison	• Plans should identify a single point for media liaison that represents the evacuation and shelter response and all agencies. • A single point will ensure consistency of message and will reduce the burden on individual agencies to liaise with the media.
Social media	• Social media offer a useful way of getting information direct to people and should form part of a communications plan. • However, they can also be a source of user-generated content that may contradict or confuse official information; consideration should be given to how to mitigate this.
Resilience communication methods and equipment	• Public messages should be relayed across a range of media channels and should take account of the impact the risk may have on telecommunications and power infrastructure. • Resilience of communications equipment before, during and after the event needs to be considered. • There may be a surge on mobile telephone networks and websites. • Plans should not rely on one communication method and should take account of the impact of the risk on communications.

Chapter 8:
Return and recovery

Phased return

8.1 To support an effective and efficient recovery, planning should consider those people who need to return first, such as key workers across essential services and those who can assist with the recovery effort, including reconstruction or site clearance. Business continuity planning should take account of this. Planners should also give consideration to a phased return of the population, for example based on the damage to an area or the availability of local services (though, as with a phased evacuation, it may be difficult to influence when self-evacuees choose to return).

Decision to return

8.2 Throughout the evacuation process, consideration should be given to the return of people to their homes and of businesses to their commercial properties. A recovery coordination group could be set up at the start of the emergency to consider recovery issues and, where relevant, to factor them into response decisions. The SCG should take the decision to return, basing its decision on the safety of the area and the ability to provide basic services, such as law and order. Local authorities should prepare for the return at the earliest opportunity. Many self-evacuees are likely to want to return home as soon as they can, and people can probably not be prevented from returning unless a specific risk remains in certain areas of the evacuation zone.

Return logistics

8.3 The return of evacuees is likely to be a multi-agency effort and will require a similar logistical operation to the evacuation. Local authorities and emergency services, in partnership with Category 2 responders, will need to ensure that basic services are available to the returning population. In some situations, additional support might be needed, such as the provision of drinking water or temporary shops for the purchase of food. Liaison with utilities and suppliers may also be necessary.

8.4 It might not be possible for vulnerable people to return as quickly as the rest of the population, and plans should consider their needs before return is arranged.

8.5 To support the commercial sector (and other services reliant on the local population), the early reopening of schools will allow parents to return to work and the local area to begin to get back to normal.

8.6 Local authorities' business continuity advice to commercial and voluntary organisations should include information on evacuation and return. Businesses should be encouraged to plan to secure and protect their assets and valuables while the premises are evacuated, so that business can resume as quickly as possible.

8.7 Damage caused by the event may result in some properties being uninhabitable. Sometimes the damage can be repaired, sometimes not. Insurance arrangements ought to cover temporary relocation to suitable accommodation, but additional support in the immediate aftermath of the event may be required. Long-term recovery issues are dealt with in the emergency response and recovery guidance (see Annex C).

Recovery: financial issues

8.8 The issue of who pays for different elements of the response is complicated and will vary, depending on the circumstances and causes of the incident. Local authorities will often incur significant costs in dealing with the clean-up, providing security to damaged properties, supplying temporary accommodation, repairing the infrastructure and providing humanitarian assistance (to name just some of the issues). Therefore, it is up to local authorities to assess their own risk and to put in place the right mix of insurance, self-insurance and reserves to provide both security and value for money for their communities.

8.9 In the event of an exceptional emergency, individual departments will consider providing financial support for various aspects of the recovery effort. The activation of any funding arrangements will be at the discretion of ministers. Activation will not be automatic, and activation of its arrangements by one department will not necessarily trigger activation by other departments – it will depend on the impact of an emergency on a particular sector. Furthermore, there is no automatic entitlement to financial assistance, even if arrangements are activated: local authorities will have to demonstrate need against criteria laid down by the department running a particular scheme.

8.10 The **Bellwin Scheme** only applies in the response phase of an incident, since its grant is limited under Section 155(2) of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989. Precautionary actions and longer-term clean-up action are ruled out under the terms of the statute. The scheme allows ministers to make additional revenue support available to local authorities to assist with certain immediate and unforeseen costs in dealing with the aftermath of an emergency incident in a local authority area. In Wales the Emergency Financial Assistance Scheme (EFAS) is operated on similar lines to Bellwin.

8.11 The scheme is discretionary. It exists to give special financial assistance to local authorities that would otherwise be faced with an undue financial burden as a consequence of taking immediate action to safeguard the lives or the property of people in the local authority area, or to prevent severe inconvenience to them. However, local authorities are expected to have funds in place to deal with emergencies. Accordingly, grants are paid only if the authority has spent 0.2% of its revenue budget on eligible works in the financial year. Once this threshold has been crossed, grants may cover 85% of eligible expenditure. There is no automatic entitlement to assistance – ministers are empowered to decide whether or not to activate the scheme after considering the circumstances of each individual case.

8.12 The Bellwin Scheme is unlikely to be applicable to terrorist incidents – in fact, the scheme's guidance notes rule it out, on the grounds that local authorities can still obtain insurance cover for terrorist incidents. Government has previously helped local authorities with costs associated with major terrorist incidents, but this has not been through the Bellwin Scheme.

Insurance

8.13 It is the responsibility of landowners and occupiers to ensure that they have adequate insurance cover to meet the cost of dealing with the consequences of an emergency (including terrorist incidents). As part of their business continuity duty (under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004), local authorities should emphasise to local businesses the importance of securing appropriate insurance cover.

8.14 The Pool Re Scheme was set up in 1993 by the insurance industry, in partnership with the UK Government, to ensure that insurance cover continues to be offered to commercial properties affected by acts of terrorism. The cover includes clean-up costs following a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear incident.

8.15 Nearly all household policies include cover for damage caused by terrorist activity, but exclude the costs associated with contamination. In such circumstances, local authorities will normally lead on arranging decontamination.

8.16 The response and recovery operation should ensure that the insurance industry is engaged at an early stage. This can be coordinated through the Association of British Insurers, which should, if appropriate, be invited to attend any recovery coordination group meeting.

Annex A: Scales of evacuation

The 2006 guidance identified broad scales for evacuation. The scales are not meant to be prescriptive and there will be variations. Local planners may find it more helpful to classify evacuations on the basis of the resources required or whether the local response could be overwhelmed; but the table below provides a guide.

Definition	Decision to trigger taken by	Resources likely to be required for this magnitude	Example
Small-scale/local evacuation	Incident controller or SCG	Local responders	One or two streets evacuated, eg gas leak
Medium-scale evacuation	SCG	Local responders, possibly with mutual aid or national support	Evacuation or dispersal of parts of a city or large industrial site
Large-scale evacuation	SCG	Local responders, with mutual aid or national support	Evacuation in response to a major chemical release
Mass evacuation	SCG in coordination with central government	Local responders, mutual aid and national support	Evacuation in response to significant flooding

Annex B:
Suggested roles and responsibilities for evacuation and managing displaced persons

Within the document, certain roles and responsibilities are suggested or highlighted. The following table summarises these.

Role/responsibility	Organisation
Evacuation	
Decision to evacuate (p21)	SCG, relevant emergency service, and other agencies, as determined by the LRF
Evacuation route planning (p22)	Highways authorities
Use of publicly owned transport (p23)	Local authority
Use of railways and stations (p23)	Train operating companies and Network Rail
Specialist medical vehicles (p25)	NHS, commissioned service providers, voluntary sector
Hospitals (p26)	NHS
Care homes (p26)	Provider
Home care (p27)	Local authority, in coordination with NHS and commissioned service providers
Schools (p27)	School
Children's homes (p27)	Service provider
Prisons (p28)	Prison Service and NOMS
Immigration detention and removal centres (p28)	Prison Service, in coordination with Home Office
Shelter	
Provision of short-term shelter	Local authority
Registration of evacuees	Local authority

Figure 3: Overview of the roles and responsibilities in an evacuation



Annex C: Legislation and guidance

Legislation

Site-specific evacuation	• Control of Major Accident Hazards (Amendment) Regulations 2005. • Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996. • Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPPIR).[1] • Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 and the Fire Safety and Safety of Places of Sport Act 1987 govern the safety of spectators who visit sports grounds for sporting and other events (like pop concerts). These set out local authority responsibilities in relation to the inspection of sports venues, including emergency evacuation procedures.[2]
Person-specific evacuation	• It is part of an employer's duty of care to ensure that all building users can evacuate a building in the event of an emergency, and therefore should have tested evacuation plans in place. • The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 requires that those who would have difficulty in evacuating a building (eg those with mobility impairments) have a 'personal emergency evacuation plan'. • The Disability Discrimination Act 2005 is also relevant, as it requires the public sector to actively promote disability equality.
Animals and livestock	• Farm livestock is subject to the Welfare of Farmed Animals (England) Regulations 2007.[3] This makes it an offence to cause or allow any unnecessary pain or distress to farm animals on agricultural land and requires owners and keepers to take all reasonable steps to ensure the welfare of such animals. The local Animal Health Office of AHVLA can be contacted for advice on the welfare of farmed animals. • The Zoo Licensing Act 1981 provides for a local authority-run licensing and inspection regime for zoos that are licensed under that Act. The Act includes a broad requirement for zoos to put in place measures to be taken in the event of any escape of animals, but does not include specific provisions or duties relating to major incidents or emergencies. Decisions should therefore be taken on the basis of what is the best option in each circumstance. Zoos also have a duty (under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981) to prevent the release of any non-native species that they may house, and this makes them a special case in an emergency. • Travelling circuses with wild animals are subject to the Welfare of Wild Animals in Travelling Circuses (England) Regulations 2012. The Regulations impose a duty on travelling circus proprietors to ensure that their wild animals are 'protected from pain, suffering, injury and disease'.

1 The risks covered by these three regulatory regimes are excluded from consideration under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, though Category 1 responders may use this Act to supplement these separate regimes. More detailed information on the regimes can be found at: www.hse.gov.uk/radiation/ and at www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/ and at www.hse.gov.uk/comah

2 Guidance on setting up events, taking into account evacuation planning, can be found at: www.safetyatsportsgrounds.org.uk

3 The Welfare of Farmed Animals (England) Regulations 2000 (SI 2000 No. 1870) (as amended); the Welfare of Farmed Animals (Scotland) Regulations 2000 (SI 2000 No. 442); the Welfare of Farmed Animals (Wales) Regulations 2001 (SI 2001 No. 2682); and the Welfare of Farmed Animals (Northern Ireland) Regulations 2000 (SI 2000 No. 270).

Provision of shelter

Local authorities have general powers to provide temporary shelter in the form of rest centres for people who have been temporarily evacuated from their homes because of an emergency.

Homelessness legislation imposes a duty on local housing authorities in England and Wales to assist people who are homeless or are likely to become homeless and who apply to the local housing authority for assistance. A person is deemed by the Housing Act 1996 to be threatened with homelessness if it is likely that he or she will become homeless within 28 days. These provisions will apply where authorities need to meet the accommodation needs of people made homeless by an emergency, beyond the need for very short-term temporary evacuation.

Housing authorities must secure suitable accommodation for eligible applicants who are unintentionally homeless and who fall within a priority need group. The latter includes applicants who are homeless as a result of an emergency, such as flood, fire or other disaster.

Local housing authorities can seek the assistance of another authority to help them carry out their homelessness functions. This could, for example, enable a local authority in an affected area to provide homelessness assistance for its residents by arranging for another local authority to provide accommodation for them.

Children and Education Acts

Local authorities and other local organisations, including schools, prisons, NHS bodies and the police, have duties arising from the Education Act 2002 and the Children Act 2004 to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. Statutory guidance documents have been published, and these set out how the duties are to be implemented. Local organisations have a considerable amount of flexibility in implementing the duties. In the context of an evacuation, plans should ensure that children are safeguarded and their welfare promoted.

Guidance

Additional guidance and information are available from government and non-government organisations. This list is not exhaustive and should not be read as official endorsement of guidance or advice provided by organisations outside government. Some documents will not be publicly available, but will have been distributed to local responders and be available on the **National Resilience Extranet**, an online private ‘network’ for Category 1 and 2 responders. See www.gov.uk\resilient-communications

Emergency response and recovery guidance	www.gov.uk/emergency-response-and-recovery includes: • insurance; • financial; • data protection; • resilient communications; • humanitarian assistance; and • working with the media.
Emergency preparedness	www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-preparedness
Emergency response and recovery	www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-response-and-recovery
National Risk Register	www.gov.uk/government/collections/national-risk-register-of-civil-emergencies
Mutual aid guide	www.gov.uk/government/publications/local-authority-mutual-aid-a-short-guide
National concept of operations	www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-central-government-s-concept-of-operations
Identifying people who are vulnerable in a crisis	www.gov.uk/government/publications/identifying-people-who-are-vulnerable-in-a-crisis-guidance-for-emergency-planners-and-responders
Keeping the country running: natural hazards and infrastructure	www.gov.uk/government/publications/keeping-the-country-running-natural-hazards-and-infrastructure
Generic evacuation plan	Available to Category 1 and 2 responders via the National Resilience Extranet
Humanitarian assistance in emergencies	www.gov.uk/government/publications/humanitarian-assistance-in-emergencies
Voluntary sector engagement guidance note	www.gov.uk/government/how-volunteers-can-help-in-emergencies
Evacuation planning for hospitals	http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20091207163737/http://dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/documents/digitalasset/dh_098425.pdf
Guidance on psychosocial care	http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/documents/digitalasset/dh_103563.pdf
Emergency responder interoperability: lexicon	www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-responder-interoperability-lexicon
Alert message templates and guidance	Available to Category 1 and 2 responders via the National Resilience Extranet
National flood emergency framework	www.gov.uk/government/policies/reducing-the-threats-of-flooding-and-coastal-change/supporting-pages/planning-for-and-dealing-with-flood-emergencies
Development and flood risk practice guide	www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7772/pps25guideupdate.pdf
Flood advice for caravan sites	www.gov.uk/government/publications/improving-flood-awareness-and-safety-at-caravan-and-camping-sites- in-england-and-wales
Nuclear emergency planning: consolidated guidance	www.gov.uk/government/publications/nuclear-emergency-planning-consolidated-guidance
DSTL smart tips for using social media in emergencies	http://repository.disaster20.eu/section/relevance/dstl-march-2012-smart-tips-category-1-responders-using-social-media-emergency
The needs of faith communities in major emergencies	www.gov.uk/government/publications/humanitarian-assistance-in-emergencies
Logistic operations for emergency supplies	www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/logistic-operations-emergency-supplies
Schools Nottinghamshire County Council	www.schoolemergencies.info
Evacuation Responsiveness by Government Organisations (ERGO) self-assessment toolkit	DCLG RED can provide access to the guidance and toolkit
SPHERE Project handbook on humanitarian response	www.sphereproject.org/resources/?search=1&keywords=&language=0&category=22&subcat-22=23&subcat-29=0&subcat-31=0&subcat-35=0&subcat-49=0
Animals	www.rspca.org.uk/allaboutanimals/helpandadvice/floods/-/article/em_floodwarningadvice

Devolved administrations

Scottish Government guidance on resilience	www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2012/03/2940
Wales Resilience	http://walesresilience.gov.uk/?skip=1&lang=en
Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies	www.ofmdfmni.gov.uk/index/making-government-work/civil-contingencies.htm

Case study references

Avon and Somerset LRF	www.avonandsomersetprepared.org/
Broadland District Council	www.broadland.gov.uk/environment/316.asp
Greater Manchester	www.agma.gov.uk/greater-manchester-prepared
Lincolnshire LRF	www.lincolnshireprepared.co.uk
Norfolk LRF	www.norfolkprepared.gov.uk/
South Norfolk Council	www.south-norfolk.gov.uk/environment/1507.asp
Thames Valley LRF	Case study is available on the National Resilience Extranet http://thamesvalleylrf.org.uk/