Ministry of Defence

JSP 471

DEFENCE
NUCLEAR EMERGENCY RESPONSE

By Command of the Defence Council

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Directorate of Business Resilience
(Nuclear Security and Emergency Planning)

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### RECORD OF CHANGES

Changes to be recorded here:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Version</th>
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<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>First issue of revised JSP 471. Published prior to vesting day on 30 Apr 12.</td>
<td>14 Dec 11</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
<td>First review of JSP 471. Inclusion of DNSR’s role in the provision of technical advice. Further minor amendments throughout.</td>
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### VERSION CONTROL

The 2013 revision of JSP 471 was completed in October 2013 and is reflected in this document.

Changes may need to be made to this document from time-to-time. For this reason the website version is the only authorised version.

To avoid any confusion and provide some form of version control over the guidance, every page in this paper copy is marked as ‘uncontrolled if not viewed on the GOV.UK website’. It is the responsibility of each individual to cross reference any copy with the most up to date version published on the MOD website.

Where amendments are made to the document, these will be published on the MOD website and stakeholders will be alerted to the changes.

### DOCUMENT REVIEW

This JSP will be reviewed annually by DBR - DefSy to maintain its currency against national standards and / or wider departmental or government policy for crisis management and response.

### EQUALITY & DIVERSITY

This document has been fully equality and diversity impact assessed in accordance with the Department’s Equality and Diversity Impact Assessment Tool.
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Record of Changes</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document Review</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality &amp; Diversity Statement</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contents</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1 OVERVIEW</td>
<td>1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Emergency Planning – Policy Requirements</td>
<td>1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Tasks</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Nuclear Incidents and Emergencies - Definitions</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy of Nuclear Emergency Documentation</td>
<td>1-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1 Definitions – Defence Nuclear Incidents and Emergencies</td>
<td>1-A-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2 PRINCIPLES OF NUCLEAR EMERGENCY RESPONSE POLICY AND PLANNING</td>
<td>2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Statement</td>
<td>2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office for Nuclear Regulation</td>
<td>2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator</td>
<td>2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Nuclear Emergency Response Policy and Plans</td>
<td>2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departmental Responsibilities</td>
<td>2-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead Government Department</td>
<td>2-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Related Licensed Sites</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3 COMMAND AND CONTROL</td>
<td>3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Crisis Management Organisation</td>
<td>3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Agency Co-ordination and the SCG/TCG</td>
<td>3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military (MOD if civilian) Co-ordinating Authority</td>
<td>3-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department for Communities and Local Government</td>
<td>3-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standing Joint Commander (United Kingdom) (SJC (UK))</td>
<td>3-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Regional Forces (RF)</td>
<td>3-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical advice - DNSR</td>
<td>3-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3 Military/MOD Coordinating Authority (MCA) Terms of Reference</td>
<td>3-A-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3 Roles and Responsibilities of the Department for Communities and Local Government</td>
<td>3-B-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B Government (DCLG) Representative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4 CENTRAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSE – LEAD GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT</td>
<td>4-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Council (Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies)</td>
<td>4-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact Management Group (IMG) and Recovery Group (RG)</td>
<td>4-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of Central Government Scientific and Technical Advice</td>
<td>4-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Role of the Devolved Administrations</td>
<td>4-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4 Central Government Organisation and Interaction with Local Strategic Co-ordinating Centre</td>
<td>4-A-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4 Central Government and Scottish Government Co-ordination</td>
<td>4-B-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5 INFRASTRUCTURE</td>
<td>5-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alerting Responders to a Defence Nuclear Incident or Emergency</td>
<td>5-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mapping / Geographic Information System (GIS) Capability</td>
<td>5-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Emergency Response Information Management System (NERIMS)</td>
<td>5-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6 MISCELLANEOUS</td>
<td>6-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preservation of Records</td>
<td>6-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Met Office PACRAM Service 6-1
Standard Statement 6-1
Visiting Forces / US and French Nuclear Powered Warships 6-1
Security 6-2
Terrorist Initiated Nuclear Incidents or Emergencies 6-2
Neither Confirm nor Deny 6-2
Deconfliction 6-2
Business Continuity Planning 6-2
Third Tier Arrangement 6-3
International Conventions and Notifications 6-3
The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) 6-3
Liability and Claims 6-5
Post Emergency Investigations 6-5
Ministerial Notification and Reporting of Defence Nuclear Incidents 6-5
Chapter 6 Statement by the United Kingdom on Operation of Nuclear Powered Warships 6-A-1
Annex A Warships in Foreign Ports 6-B-1
Chapter 6 Guidance on the Operational Application of the ‘Neither Confirm nor Deny’ Policy in the Context of an Incident or Emergency Involving a Nuclear Weapon 6-B-1
Annex B Deconfliction of Transport of Defence Nuclear Materials 6-C-1

Chapter 7 EXERCISES AND ASSESSMENT 7-1
Exercises 7-1
Assessment 7-1
Chapter 7 Nuclear Emergency Response – Exercise Definitions 7-A-1
Annex A

Chapter 8 MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS 8-1
MOD Public Relations and Media Management 8-1
Preparation of Information 8-1
Responsibilities for Disseminating Information 8-1
Content of Information 8-2
Central Government Coordination of Media and Public Information 8-2
Local Strategic Co-ordination of Media and Public Information 8-2
MOD Emergency Website 8-2
SQEP MOD Personnel 8-3

Chapter 9 OPERATIONS IN THE UK: DEFENCE CONTRIBUTION TO RESILIENCE 9-1
Standing Joint Commander (UK) 9-1
Military Aid to the Defence Nuclear Emergency Organisation 9-1
Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) 9-1
Regional Forces (RF) Support to Resilience Operations 9-2

Chapter 10 ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF DIRECTORATE OF BUSINESS RESILIENCE (DBR) 10-1
Policy and Plans 10-1
Exercises and Training 10-1
Services in Support of MOD DNEO 10-1
Other MOD Operations 10-2
Liaison with Other Government Departments and National Bodies 10-2
Liaison with Overseas and UK Dependency Governments 10-2

Appendix 1 Defence Ministerial Reporting Criteria A1-1

GLOSSARY OF TERMS
ABBREVIATIONS
CHAPTER 1 - OVERVIEW

Introduction

1. Safety and security are paramount across the Ministry of Defence’s nuclear propulsion and weapons programmes. Both programmes are highly regulated and emergency arrangements are in place which are regularly tested to meet UK statutory regulations¹ and / or wider departmental or government policy.

2. Regardless of whether an emergency involving Defence nuclear assets or material arises from an accident, negligence or a malevolent act, recovery from such an event can only be achieved by taking effective life saving actions, mitigating radiation exposure, regaining control and providing useful, accurate and timely information to the media and the public. These actions can only be performed effectively if there are sound and tested plans in place which are effectively integrated as part of the national resilience framework. Such arrangements will need to give due regard to the immense media, public, political and international attention that emergencies involving Defence nuclear assets will receive.

3. The operational, or local response, will differ depending on the location, type of emergency, material / asset, etc. This response will be in accordance with site or operational specific emergency response plans integrated with wider crisis management arrangements and / or specific Local Authority off-site plans which will include reference to local / regional emergency response plans and / or responder organisations.

4. In addition to the local response, on declaration of an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency (OSNE) / Nuclear Transport Emergency (NTE), MOD will stand up a national strategic level response co-ordinated through both the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) and MOD Main Building. Regardless of the type of emergency, it will require a wide range of military and MOD civilian assets as part of the response and may be augmented by additional Defence assets force generated by the Standing Joint Commander (United Kingdom) (SJC(UK)).

Nuclear Emergency Planning - Policy Requirements

5. Planning for, and the response to, an emergency involving Defence nuclear assets is to:

   a. Meet the Department’s statutory / legal obligations i.e. the regulatory requirements of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR);

   b. Where statutory regulations are not applicable, meet the regulatory requirements of the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DNSR);

   c. Ensure the safety of nuclear programmes by preventing emergencies happening and making arrangements to respond to an incident or emergency which might also arise as a result of a terrorist event;

   d. Ensure that MOD’s nuclear emergency response arrangements and planning assumptions are fully aligned with Authorisees / Defence Related Licensees, local / regional response, wider departmental / government crisis management and / or cross government co-ordination arrangements;

   e. Have due regard to the consequences of a Defence nuclear emergency for national Defence policy and the public expectations of a government department;

f. Ensure that the Department is able to effectively discharge its Lead Government Department (LGD) role and responsibilities.

The purpose of this JSP is to set the policy, context, planning and doctrine to meet the above.

Military Tasks

6. Within the overall framework of National Security, the contribution of the Armed Forces is further defined through seven Military Tasks which describe what the Government may ask the Armed Forces to undertake. The Military Tasks which, by implication, require a nuclear emergency response capability to be maintained in support of them are:

a. MT 1 – Providing Strategic Intelligence.
b. MT 2 – Providing Nuclear Deterrence.
c. MT 3 – Defence of the UK and Overseas Territories.
d. MT 6 – Defending UK Interests by Projecting Power Strategically and Through Expeditionary Interventions.
e. MT 7 – Providing Security for Stabilisation.

Defence Nuclear Incidents and Emergencies - Definitions

7. Nuclear incident and emergency definitions are detailed at Chapter 1 Annex A. Declaration of an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency (OSNE) or Nuclear Transport Emergency (NTE) is to be treated, as a minimum, as a Serious Emergency\(^2\) (see chapter 4, para 3) for formally standing-up the UK Central Government response arrangements.

Language

8. The capability to respond to a Defence nuclear incident or emergency will comprise military personnel, MOD Police (MDP), MOD civilians and / or Defence contractors, hereafter referred to as MOD personnel. External agencies (e.g. police, fire, ambulance, local authorities and members of the public etc) will have the descriptor “civil” where this aids identification.

9. Within this document the term “is to” or “are to” implies a mandatory requirement.

Funding

10. The funding, staff and equipment needed to maintain and implement nuclear emergency response plans and arrangements (including cost recovery for off-site plans to meet statutory and MOD policy requirements) are to be provided by relevant Duty Holders and / or allocated forces where appropriate.

\(^2\) Defined as an event that has, or threatens, a wide and prolonged impact requiring sustained central Government co-ordination from COBR under the leadership of the LGD and support from a number of Departments or Agencies.
Hierarchy of Nuclear Emergency Response Documentation

11. Figure 1.1 shows where this JSP sits in relation to statutory regulation, MOD and wider Government policy and detailed emergency response plans.

* All applicable statutory regulations (including Health & Safety regulations).

Fig 1.1 – Hierarchy of Nuclear Emergency Response Plans and Documentation.
### Definitions - Defence Nuclear Incidents and Emergencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Safety Alert (SA)</strong>&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>An abnormal event which poses a potential threat to, or causes serious concern for reactor plant, nuclear weapon, or special nuclear material safety.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Site</strong>&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Site Nuclear Incident (SNI)</strong></td>
<td>An abnormal event giving rise to a radiological hazard or potential radiological hazard which is confined in its effect to within the site boundary and which requires the site / operators response plan, or parts thereof, to be implemented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Off-Site Nuclear Emergency (OSNE)</strong></td>
<td>A hazardous condition which requires the implementation of urgent countermeasures to protect the public.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Transport</strong>&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nuclear Transport Incident (NTI)</strong></td>
<td>An abnormal event, arising during the transport of Defence nuclear materials, giving rise to a radiological hazard or potential radiological hazard which is confined in its effects to the container(s) and/or load carrying vehicle(s).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nuclear Transport Emergency (NTE)</strong></td>
<td>A hazardous condition, arising during the transport of Defence nuclear materials, which requires the implementation of urgent countermeasures to protect the public from a radiological hazard.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. It is envisaged that a Reactor Safety Alert may progress through to declaration of an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency without a Site Nuclear Incident being separately declared. In this situation, on declaration of the Off-Site Nuclear Emergency, the site / operator’s response plan and the off-site response plan would be implemented simultaneously.<sup>4</sup>

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1 This would be reported as a Reactor Safety Alert, a Nuclear Weapon Safety Alert or a Special Nuclear Material Safety Alert as appropriate.
2 Defined as the licensed / authorised site, including a nuclear submarine when at a fixed point mooring or alongside berth. A nuclear submarine is deemed to be its own site when a mooring or berth does not form part of a licensed / authorised site. Deployed submarines (i.e. those outside the boundaries of UK Ports where specific nuclear emergency response arrangements are in place) are included in this definition.
3 Defined as the movement of Defence nuclear materials (by road, rail or air), from the time loaded onto the vehicle for the purpose of transportation until finally unloaded. Any transfer of materials (e.g. from road to rail or air and vice versa) is considered part of the transport activity.
4 Defence NEAG Paper 05/09 Issue 3.
Reactor
Weapon
Special Nuclear Material (to be defined on declaration)

Supplementary Qualifiers of an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency / Nuclear Transport Emergency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualifier</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radiation Hazard Confirmed</td>
<td>An Off-Site Nuclear Emergency / Nuclear Transport Emergency in which a radiation hazard has been detected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Release of Radioactive Material Confirmed</td>
<td>An Off-Site Nuclear Emergency / Nuclear Transport Emergency in which a release of radioactive material to the environment has been detected.</td>
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Reporting Format

2. Reporting of an Incident or Emergency using the above definitions is to be in the format:

   *Event – Asset – (Road/Rail/Air for Transport scenarios) – Qualifier*

For example:


CHAPTER 2 - PRINCIPLES OF NUCLEAR EMERGENCY POLICY AND PLANNING

Policy Statement

1. The Secretary of State (SofS) for Defence is answerable to Parliament for all health, safety and environmental protection (HS&EP) matters in Defence\(^1\). Specifically, SofS requires that:

   a. Within the United Kingdom (UK) we comply with all applicable HS&EP legislation;

   b. Overseas we apply our UK arrangements where reasonably practicable and, in addition, respond to host nations' relevant HS&EP expectations.

2. Where Defence has exemptions, derogations or dis-applications from HS&EP legislation, we maintain Departmental arrangements that produce outcomes that are, so far as reasonably practicable, at least as good as those required by UK legislation.

Office for Nuclear Regulation

3. The primary national legislation under which nuclear sites are regulated is the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (HSWA) and the 1965 and 1969 Nuclear Installations Act (NIA). HSWA is the enabling legislation for subsequent regulations and empowers the HSE, via the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), as the statutory nuclear regulator through certain provisions of the NIA. Under Section 1 of the NIA, ONR licenses operators of nuclear facilities.

4. Relevant subsidiary legislation, from which the MOD is not exempt, comprises the Ionising Radiation Regulations, 1999, (IRR), and the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPIR). ONR regulate all MOD sites, contractor operated and those under Crown control, and Nuclear Powered Warships (NPW) within UK territorial waters against this legislation.

Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator

5. Those safety aspects of Defence nuclear programmes which are exempt from legislation and therefore require ‘Departmental arrangements’ come under the purview of the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DNSR). DNSR’s regulatory requirements, including specific aspects of operational nuclear emergency response plans and associated guidance, are set out in JSP 518 (Regulation of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programme) and JSP 538 (Regulation of the Nuclear Weapon Programme) and are specifically not addressed within this JSP.

Defence Nuclear Emergency Policy and Plans

6. In response to statutory requirements, MOD and / or wider government policy, the MOD is to: plan for the range of nuclear emergency scenarios for which it is appointed as LGD; identify the risks; and understand the environment in which they will operate. MOD maintains a capability, including detailed ‘operational’ response plans, to respond to incidents and emergencies involving the following Defence nuclear assets:

   a. **UK Nuclear Reactors.** Submarine reactors worldwide, both when berthed alongside and when at sea, and Vulcan Naval Reactor Test Establishment (NRTE).

   b. **US and French Nuclear Reactors.** Reactors of US and French nuclear powered vessels when visiting the UK, within UK territorial waters or UK Overseas Territories.

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\(^1\) In accordance with SofS H&S Policy statement dated June 2013.
c. **Defence Nuclear Material.**

i  **Nuclear Weapons.** UK nuclear weapons within the UK and worldwide and US weapons transported by US military aircraft, ships, submarines and support vessels in UK airspace or territorial waters together with any US nuclear weapons that may be stored in the UK pursuant to approved programmes for co-operation for use by US forces or, under custodial arrangements, for use by other NATO states.

ii  **Special Nuclear Materials.** Defence Category I and II Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) and, in specific circumstances, other radioactive material. This includes new and used fuel for RN submarine reactors, in storage, during fuelling / defueling operations and transit.

The policy for incidents and emergencies involving other Defence assets, including sealed radioactive sources and Defence Category III and IV SNM, are not included within the scope of this JSP.

**Departmental Responsibilities**

7. The SofS for Defence has overall responsibility for nuclear safety in the MOD, including the effectiveness of the Department’s nuclear emergency response arrangements. The Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Min AF) has ministerial responsibility for nuclear emergency response arrangements. Permanent Under Secretary (PUS) is the Process Owner for safety, including emergency arrangements. The Director of Business Resilience (DBR) is responsible for high level nuclear emergency response policy\(^2\), which is overseen on a day-to-day basis by DBR - Defence Security – Nuclear Security and Emergency Planning (DBR-DefSy-NucSy&EP).

8. Authorisees and / or nominated Duty Holders are responsible for developing and maintaining adequate operator’s emergency response plans to meet statutory and / or DNSR requirements.

9. In addition to specific statutory and / or DNSR requirements MOD, as a Department of State, has to consider the sensitive and, in some circumstances, the unique political and operational nature of its activities, together with the wider consequences of an incident or emergency involving Defence nuclear assets for Defence operations and / or wider policy together with the Department’s reputation.

**Lead Government Department**

10. In addition to its statutory and operational responsibilities, MOD is appointed as the LGD for emergencies involving Defence nuclear assets (other than an emergency arising as a result of a terrorist event where the Home Office is appointed as the LGD). This is in line with the Central Government’s Concept of Operations.\(^3\) The MOD’s responsibility as LGD is for the response phase of the emergency. Again, in line with the Central Government Concept of Operations, the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) is the LGD appointed for the recovery phase (the process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency) in England. The relevant Devolved Administration (DA) will be the LGD for the recovery phase for an emergency outside of England.

11. MOD is to ensure that its LGD responsibilities are included in departmental business planning and that detailed operational response plans scope and fully align with local, regional, devolved and national crisis management arrangements, including operational / on-site plans and Local Authority off-site plans (which include local / regional emergency responders).

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\(^2\) Including alignment with generic crisis management and specific cross government coordination arrangements.

Defence Related Nuclear Licensed Sites

12. The Defence related Licensed sites have contractual and legal obligations (NIA65 and other statutory provisions) for the cooperation and provision of emergency arrangements. As the LGD for Authorised and Defence Related Licensed sites the MOD will support arrangements made under Authorisation/Licence Condition 11.
CHAPTER 3 - COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. It is a principle of the UK’s democratic system of government that the Armed Forces remain under the control of Central Government and that civilian Defence Ministers are publicly accountable for the actions of the Armed Forces. The command structure of the Armed Forces is a single chain, stretching from the Secretary of State for Defence to the individual unit and Service personnel. The emergency services follow the Lead Government Department (LGD) principal and will term their own command and control levels, in ascending order, BRONZE, SILVER and GOLD (B / S / G). The B / S / G structure is a single-agency chain of command which allows the emergency services to exercise a command function over their own personnel and assets. Single-agency B / S / G may be co-located if the location is suitable and agreed. MOD command and control arrangements in response to a Defence nuclear emergency should mirror these arrangements.

Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO)

2. The MOD Headquarters Defence Nuclear Emergency Organisation (MOD HQ DNEO) within the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) is directed by DCDS (Operations), under the guise of Director of Operations (D Ops). On declaration of an emergency involving a Defence nuclear asset, MOD HQ DNEO is to:

   a. Advise on MOD operational policy and provide military advice to the Central Government crisis management organisation;

   b. Provide strategic guidance and direction for the military response and interpret policy decisions into clear unambiguous direction;

   c. Advise Defence Ministers and senior officials on the status of the emergency, including any mitigating actions;

   d. Represent the Department’s LGD role within the Central Government response.

3. The role and responsibilities of the MOD HQ DNEO, together with the command structure of the Armed Forces, render it an integral part of the operational response to all emergencies involving Defence nuclear assets. All Duty Holders are to ensure that their operational nuclear emergency response plans include the interface with the MOD HQ DNEO. All authorisees / licensees are to provide DBR-DefSy with an electronic copy of the relevant operator and Local Authority emergency response plans. following every review cycle.

Multi-Agency Co-ordination and the SCG / TCG

4. In response to a major incident multi-agency meetings will be convened to co-ordinate the involved agencies’ activities and, where appropriate, define strategy and objectives for the multi-agency response as a whole. The multi-agency meeting at the GOLD level is termed the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) and the equivalent at SILVER level is termed the Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG). The SCG will exercise overall co-ordination and strategic direction of the local emergency response phase until public safety can be assured. The MOD’s representative at the SCG will be the Military (or MOD if civilian) Co-ordinating Authority (MCA). Once the emergency moves into the recovery phase, by agreement, co-ordinating responsibility may pass to the Chief Executive of the relevant Local Authority who will also assume chairmanship of the SCG. In parallel, the MOD lead will at this point change from the MCA to the Joint Regional Liaison Officer (JRLO) or Regional Forces (RF) Brigade (Bde) Commander.
Military (MOD if civilian) Co-ordinating Authority (MCA)

5. The MCA is the appointed Executive Director of the MOD’s operational response in the incident area and is to be a 1* OF6 officer (or Senior Civil Servant [SCS] equivalent). This may be delegated to an OF5 (B1/B2 if Civilian) duty roster, however the duty MCA must be relieved by the appointed 1* MCA as soon as is reasonably practicable following the declaration of an OSNE/NTE. The terms of reference for the MCA are at Annex A.

6. The Central Government and DCMO / HQ DNEO interaction with the MCA and SCG is detailed at Chapter 4 Annex A.

Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG)

7. The DCLG Representative will be located at Police GOLD. He / she will work closely with the MCA and other members of the Government Liaison Team (GLT), and will also liaise closely with representatives of other Government agencies. The main duties of the DCLG Representative are detailed at Annex B.

Standing Joint Commander (United Kingdom) (SJC (UK))

8. Commander in Chief Land Forces (CinC(LF)) is appointed as SJC (UK) for most Defence operations in the UK. As such they are the operational-level hub for all issues of UK Operational policy, doctrine, activity and UK Operations training. SJC (UK)’s primary operational role is the force generation of assets in support of the civil authorities. As such, once ministerial authorisation has been given, SJC (UK) will scope a response most appropriate to the circumstances of the incident, and force generate from across the Front Line Commands and Defence agencies. SJC (UK) will continue to exercise OPCOM of Defence assets for the duration of any incident. For a Defence Nuclear Emergency, a number of pre-identified MOD assets will be automatically deployed in accordance with emergency plans. SJC (UK) will force generate any MOD assets which are required in addition to those already scoped and resourced. SJC (UK) conducts UK Operations in accordance with JDP02, Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience.

Army Regional Forces (RF)

9. For most UK resilience challenges, the Joint Regional Liaison Officer (JRLO) is the primary focus for the integration of Military Forces with the civil authorities within his / her area of responsibility. The Armed Forces are represented by the Regional Forces (RF) Brigade (Bde) Commander or JRLO in Regional Resilience Forums (RRF), Local Resilience Forums (LRF) and their equivalents in Scotland and Wales. However, in the event of a Defence nuclear emergency, the MCA is the primary focus for the operational control and direction of all MOD response activities in the incident area. The roles of RF including the JRLO and local Bde Commander during a Defence nuclear emergency are detailed in Chapter 9.

10. The provision of contingent military Force Elements (FE) additional to those pre-identified in existing emergency plans, is the responsibility of CINC Land Forces in the role as Standing Joint Commander for UK Operations (SJC(UK)). The conduit for requests for such support will be the RF representatives. This may be the JRLO or Bde Commander at the Strategic Co-ordinating Centre (SCC) or a RF Military liaison Officer (MLO) at the Tactical Co-ordinating Centre (TCC).

11. Strategic overview of requests from both military and civil responders will be undertaken by the DNEO Ops cell (containing D CT & R personnel) at HQ DNEO.
Technical Advice – DNSR

12. The responsibility for the provision of technical advice during a Defence nuclear emergency remains with the operator throughout. Accordingly, the MOD does not appoint a Government Technical Adviser. This differs from policy at Civil nuclear sites.

13. **DNSR Role:** DNSR is to attend the Technical Guidance Group (TGG) in order to validate the technical assessments which they develop. Any differences of opinion are to be resolved at this stage to avoid separate duty-holder and regulator assessments from going forward. This role is be supplemented by:

   a. DNSR inspection of the adequacy of this TGG assessment process under AC 11;

   b. Additional training for nominated DNSR personnel in the detailed TGG and Rolls Royce technical assessment processes.

14. Additionally, DNSR is to attend the SCC to provide independent regulatory technical advice to the multi-agency response. The modus operandi for achieving this should normally be via the following steps:

   a. Direct liaison between DNSR and the TGG to ensure a common understanding of the assessment and corresponding advice;

   b. Presentation of this assessment and advice (including the prognosis of the emergency and advice on the declaration of the end of the emergency phase) to the multi-agency response by the operator;

   c. A clear statement by the operator that this assessment and advice is specifically endorsed by DNSR as the independent nuclear safety regulator of the plant.

   d. In addition, the DNSR representative is to be prepared to re-iterate this assessment and advice directly if required.
CHAPTER 3 ANNEX A – Military / MOD Coordinating Authority (MCA) Terms of Reference

1. Duty Holders are required to appoint an executive Director termed the MCA to be responsible in the event of a Defence nuclear emergency for the control and direction of all MOD response activities in the area. The MCA is to:

   a. In preparation:

      (1) Be a senior official of 1* OF6 level (or SCS equivalent);

      (2) Ensure that effective plans are in place appropriate to the emergency scenario for which they are appointed;

      (3) Have a working knowledge of the response plan and the assets at their disposal;

      (4) Understand the roles and responsibilities of other responding agencies;

      (5) Have an understanding of the Department’s LGD role.

      (6) Maintain currency in the role of MCA by appropriate training and participation in exercises of the plan.

   b. In the event of an emergency:

      (1) Be the MOD’s senior representative at GOLD level;

      (2) Provide authoritative and timely advice concerning the progress or development of the emergency and the potential implications, including mitigation, of operations to make safe and recover the asset during a transport emergency;

      (3) Provide the Department’s LGD input to the SCG.

      (4) Keep MOD HQ DNEO informed on the status of the emergency and of the operational response to it;

      (5) Act on strategic direction from MOD HQ DNEO and seek any additional military FE required through the JRLO / RF Bde Cdr.

The MCA will co-locate with the senior police officer and attend SCG meetings.
CHAPTER 3 ANNEX B - Roles and Responsibilities of the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) Representative

1. The main duties of the DCLG Representative are:

   a. In the Emergency Phase:

      (1) To support the MCA and GLT in the delivery of their duties.

      (2) To assist in the co-ordination and provision of information on local consequence management to Central Government, ensuring DCLG and Cabinet Office are fully briefed.

      (3) To assist in recovery planning from the outset of preparation; this might be expected to start in the emergency phase. For this, the DCLG Representative will attend meetings of the Recovery Working Group in a supporting and continuity role with other representatives of the MCA / GLT.

      (4) Where necessary, DCLG Resilience and Emergencies Division (RED) will activate an operations centre to facilitate national coordination and assurance for situation reporting on national consequence management; support DCLG staff in discharging their role; engage other necessary bodies; and communicate Top Line Briefs to LRFs.

      (5) Where local responders are overwhelmed, or cross boundary or border coordination is necessary, the DCLG Representative will facilitate preparation for and implementation of a response through the Response Co-coordinating Group

   b. In the Recovery Phase:

      (1) To support the MCA / GLT and ensure the hand over of the GLT function to recovery at an appropriate stage as agreed with MOD.

      (2) DCLG RED will undertake the transition from response to recovery by ensuring an effective handover from the DCLG RED Government Liaison Officers (GLOs) to Lead Government Department Officials taking up responsibility for supporting local responders and any Recovery Coordinating Group(s).
CHAPTER 4 - CENTRAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSE – LEAD GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT

1. Lead Government Departments (LGDs) for the response to foreseeable emergencies are nominated by Cabinet Office in accordance with procedures set out in the Cabinet Office document “The Lead Government Department and its Role – Guidance and Best Practice”.

2. The UK Central Government response to an emergency involving Defence nuclear assets will be handled in accordance with the LGD principle. Individual departments and devolved administrations remain responsible for their respective policy areas.

3. The Central Government strategic objectives in response to a ‘serious’¹ (National Tier Level 2) or ‘catastrophic’² (National Tier Level 3) emergency are to:
   a. Protect human life and, so far as possible, property and alleviate suffering.
   b. Support the continuity of everyday activity and the restoration of disrupted services.
   c. Uphold the rule of law and the democratic process.

4. The MOD and Central Government response to an emergency involving Defence nuclear assets will be conducted from a number of dedicated emergency operations centres, maintained in a state of constant readiness. At the Central Government level they consist of:
   a. Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR).
   b. Impact Management Group (IMG) and Recovery Group (RG).
   c. The Defence Crisis Management Centre (DCMC) and dedicated meeting rooms in MOD Main Building, Whitehall.

5. All Other Government Departments (OGDs), Devolved Administrations, Agencies, Regional and Local Authorities that will be involved in responding to a Defence nuclear emergency have developed, and maintain, their operational plans and procedures to ensure that they are able to respond effectively to a Defence nuclear emergency.

6. The Central Government organisation, including LGD / HQ DNEO structure and its interaction with Strategic Command (GOLD), is detailed at Annex A. For a defence nuclear emergency in Scotland, the Central and Scottish Government organisation is detailed at Annex B.

National Security Council (Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies)

7. The National Security Council (Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies) (NSC THRC) Committee will be activated in support of the MOD in response to any level 2 or 3 Defence nuclear emergency. The initial meeting of the NSC THRC is drawn from across government and will be chaired by the MOD in its role as LGD; it will be held in COBR within 2-4 hours of the emergency. MOD LGD responsibilities will be discharged through the COBR facilities while HQ DNEO will provide the support and secretariat roles from MOD Main Building. Additional MOD support³ will be provided in the MOD cell in the COBR facility who will act as a conduit for information from HQ DNEO (see Chapter 4 Annexes A and B).

¹ Defined as an event that has, or threatens, a wide and prolonged impact requiring sustained central Government co-ordination from COBR under the leadership of the LGD and support from a number of Departments or Agencies.
² Defined as one which has an exceptionally high and widespread impact and requires immediate Central Government direction and support. The Prime Minister would lead the national response from COBR.
³ Provided from within the Ops Directorate.
Impact Management Group (IMG) and Recovery Group (RG)

8. An Impact Management Group (IMG) and Recovery Group (RG), formed as part of the Central Government response in conjunction with the activation of the NSC THRC Committee at COBR, will, where appropriate, operate as part of the wider Central Government crisis management machinery and support the senior decision making body in COBR. The IMG will provide detailed coordinated advice on all aspects of the Government's contribution to the emergency response and will ensure that any necessary central government preparations for the recovery phase are addressed, including establishment of an RG at an appropriate point and the timely appointment of a lead government department. The IMG will have an important role in the early stages of a complex emergency in advising the Strategy Group / CCC on measures to reassure the public, minimise disruption, and restore key services. Once a separate RG has been established, the role of the IMG in recovery will normally cease. This transition will take place in consultation with the Cabinet Office and the relevant LGDs.

Provision of Central Government Scientific and Technical Advice

9. The MOD is responsible for ensuring that consistent, well founded, and timely scientific and technical advice is available to crisis managers in Central Government. This is provided via the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) to the central crisis management organisation (i.e. COBR, IMG and RG). Such advice is to draw on expert sources, as appropriate, including OGDs and external experts. As the lead Department, MOD is responsible for ensuring the quality of the advice, seeking independent input as necessary and resolving, as far as possible, any differences between scientific and technical experts before it is considered by crisis managers.

10. The SAGE for Defence nuclear emergencies will be chaired by the MOD’s Chief Scientific Advisor (CSA) and its membership is to include:

   b. Department of Health (DH).
   c. Public Health England – Centre for Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards (PHE CRCE).
   d. Health and Safety Executive – Office for Nuclear Regulation (HSE ONR).
   e. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA).
   f. Food Standards Agency (FSA).
   g. Environment Agency (EA).
   i. UK Meteorological Office (UKMO).
   j. Government’s Chief Scientific Advisor’s (CSA) representative.
   k. COBR secretariat.

Defence Science and Technology Laboratory – Environmental Sciences Division (DSTL ESD) are to provide the Technical Secretary to the SAGE.
11. The Chair of SAGE is to attend other relevant meetings in COBR and summarise the Group's conclusions. They may, where necessary, ask other SAGE members to brief at COBR meetings where they believe that person is better qualified to do so. In any event, OGDs and agencies around the COBR table reserve the right to comment on this advice where it affects their statutory or other responsibilities.

12. SAGE is to maintain a close linkage with local STACs, where established, in local SCGs. Representation by MOD on the STAC is to be determined as part of the multi-agency response plan but is to, as a minimum, include suitable technical expertise to provide authoritative advice regarding the prognosis of the emergency together with the actions being undertaken within the response phase of the emergency.

13. The disclosure of nuclear related information is limited in accordance with UK security classification policy and / or relevant bilateral Agreements4 – this includes the release or disclosure of information including; categories of Special Nuclear Materials, release fractions, source terms, reactor inventories, design details, etc. These restrictions are to be rigorously applied during all tests and / or exercising of emergency plans, including in discussions with SAGE and STAC members.

14. In the event of a Defence nuclear emergency being declared, MOD will arrange for relevant classified nuclear related information to be released / disclosed to ensure the protection of the public and / or the environment.

The Role of the Devolved Administrations

15. The Devolved Administrations (DAs) in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland will, within their competencies and in areas within the responsibility of the administration, play a full role in responding to a Defence nuclear emergency5. They will have particular interest in the recovery phase and anything impacting upon it. They will, as necessary, have representation on the central co-ordinating body of COBR and in SAGE. Relevant Defence nuclear emergency plans are to take full account of the DA organisations and their responsibilities.

16. The relevant UK Central Government territorial department (Scotland Office, Wales Office and Northern Ireland Office) will play an important role in managing the liaison between the UK Central Government and the DA.

17. Any requests from Scottish or Welsh police forces for additional Defence assistance will be routed to MOD via the Home Office. In Northern Ireland, such requests would go via the Northern Ireland Office. All other requests for military assistance would normally be made via the relevant UK territorial department.

18. The DAs will mirror many of the tasks of the UK central crisis mechanism as well as fulfilling the same tasks as the English Regional structures. In every case, the precise balance of activity will depend on the competence of the DA involved (i.e. the terms of their devolution settlement) and the nature of the incident. The DAs maintain their own facilities to support their response to emergencies within their competence or affecting their territory.

19. In practice, even where formal accountability rests with UK ministers and Westminster, the devolved legislatures will expect to be briefed on developments where these significantly affect their territory. Likewise, national and local media will expect comments by devolved ministers, necessitating close co-operation and information sharing between UK departments and their counterparts in the DAs. The UK territorial departments – Scotland Office, Wales Office and Northern Ireland Office – will play an important role in facilitating this process.

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5 Matters of Government retained by Westminster are ‘reserved’ issues.
CHAPTER 4 ANNEX A

Central Government Organisation and Interaction with the Local Strategic Co-ordinating Centre

- Prime Minister
- NSC (THRC)
- Defence Ministers/Senior Officials
- MOD Cell
- MOD HQ
- DEFENCE NUCLEAR EMERGENCY ORGANISATION (DNEO)
  - DNEO Sec
  - DNEO Ops
  - Nuclear Safety
  - Mapping
  - CCT (Nuclear)
- CCT Director
- DMC
- COG
- SPG
- SAGE
- SJC (UK)
- MOD
- JRLO / Regional Brigade Commander
- MCA
- STAC
- OGDs / Agencies / DAs
- Local Strategic Co-ordinating Centre

NSC THRC = National Security Council - Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies
COG = Current Operations Group
SAGE = Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies
SPG = Strategic Planning Group
CCT = Current Commitments Team
SMAC = Strategic Media Advisory Cell

STAC = Scientific & Technical Advice Cell
NCC = News Co-ordination Centre
IMG = Impact Management Group
RG = Recovery Group
MCA = Military/MOD Co-ordinating Authority
JRLO = Joint Regional Liaison Officer
CHAPTER 5 - INFRASTRUCTURE

1. The Department is to have in place appropriate infrastructure to ensure an effective response to the range of nuclear emergencies for which it is appointed as LGD; to include the appropriate facilities, IT and communications equipment.

Alerting Responders to a Defence Nuclear Incident or Emergency

2. A nuclear emergency alerting High Grade Messaging (HGM) signal is to be used by submarines at sea or in a foreign berth to alert all appropriate authorities in the event of a Defence nuclear incident or emergency. For all other Defence nuclear incidents or emergencies the initial method of alert is to be via a telephone call out system, whether manual or automatic. The Chief of Defence Staff Duty Officer (CDSDO) is the point of contact who will initiate the call out procedures for all central MOD HQ emergency responders.

3. Appropriate facilities from which the Department can manage its response are to be capable of being set-up and in use within appropriate timescales.

Nuclear Emergency Response Information Management System (NERIMS)

4. The Department's Nuclear Emergency Response Information Management System (NERIMS) is the dedicated, resilient information management system used by MOD, other government departments and agencies, as the primary means for transferring information in the event of a Defence nuclear incident or emergency.

5. To enable effective information management, the full functionality of NERIMS is to be utilised by Duty Holders and is to be identified as the information management system in all MOD nuclear emergency response plans. NERIMS is to be populated as soon as possible with emergency information.

Mapping / Geographic Information System (GIS) Capability

6. The MOD is to maintain mapping / GIS capability and to ensure that appropriate use of GIS is part of the planning process within the Department in accordance with Cabinet Office guidance.
CHAPTER 6 - MISCELLANEOUS

Preservation of Records

1. MOD Policy for preservation of records can be found in JSP 441 - Defence Records Management Policy and Procedures. All MOD nuclear emergency plans and protocols are to include arrangements for the preservation of all records, actions and key decisions during the response to a Defence nuclear incident or emergency to provide the necessary audit trail for any subsequent investigations.

2. Records to be preserved as evidence for any follow-up inquiry are to include written media such as flip over charts, faxes, meeting minutes and records, as well as electronic data generated throughout the incident or emergency. NERIMS, as the main communications medium, will retain a database of all events and records logged on to it. All data on the NERIMS server associated with an event will be archived. Duty Holders are to maintain logs during an incident at all sites, which clearly identify which NERIMS stations were in use, the name of the operators, the period of time they were at the machine and the user name that was used (all times are to be in local).

Met Office PACRAM Service

3. The Procedures and Communications in the event of a release of Radioactive Materials (PACRAM) Service provides meteorological advice on the dispersion of radioactive materials that enables resulting contamination in the air and on the ground to be assessed. In the event of a Defence nuclear emergency, this service is to be provided to meet the requirements of the emergency response arrangements and as detailed in the Met Office Service Definition document.

Standard Statement

4. In order to present a coherent and unified approach to foreign visits and access to nuclear information the Western nuclear powers have developed national Standard Statements that set out the basis for foreign visits by Nuclear Powered Warships (NPWs). In effect, the Standard Statement declares that ‘all safety precautions and procedures followed in connection with operations in home ports will be strictly observed in foreign ports.’ The Standard Statement also makes clear that the respective government ‘does not make technical information on the design or operations of its NPWs available’ (The UK Standard Statement is reproduced at Annex A). Provision of the Statement is the sole condition of entry that the UK will meet. The UK policy of strictly adhering to the use of these statements ensures compliance with the UK / US 1958 agreement and also acts to cement the relationship with the US. Any off-site emergency plans, or planning arrangements, are a matter for the host nation. The provision of information to host nations to support the development of off-site response plans is to be in accordance with the provisions of the UK Standard Statement.

Visiting Forces / US and French Nuclear Powered Warships

5. While Visiting Forces are covered by state immunity, SoS has, for the avoidance of doubt, exempted members of HM Forces and other persons working on behalf of SoS in respect of Visiting Forces, and Visiting Forces themselves, from the provisions of both the UK and Gibraltar Ionising Radiations Regulations (IRR) and Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations (REPPIR) in the interests of national security.
Security

6. JSP 440, Supplement 1, prescribes the minimum physical security requirements for the protection of Defence nuclear materials or assets. The aim of the physical security measures is to exercise positive control over unauthorised access to nuclear assets or materials and to preclude damage, sabotage, espionage, theft, diversion or unauthorised detonation.

7. Duty Holders are to ensure that plans for responding to incidents or emergencies involving Defence nuclear materials or assets include, as appropriate, effective arrangements to ensure that positive control can continue to be exercised over the assets or materials involved or affected. Where the incident or emergency occurs outside MOD property, security and/or control arrangements are to be integrated with those of the civilian police.

Terrorist Initiated Nuclear Incidents or Emergencies

8. Response plans are to include arrangements for responding to nuclear incidents or emergencies arising as a result of terrorist and/or malevolent acts. Different command and control structures will be established for these two events, both within MOD and among the civil powers, with the Home Office as LGD.

9. All Duty Holders are to ensure that their operational response plans, and planning assumptions, would be coherent in the event of a terrorist initiated nuclear incident or emergency, and should support the civil authorities in developing similarly coherent multi-agency arrangements.

Neither Confirm nor Deny

10. It is UK policy to neither confirm nor deny (NCND) the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at any particular place or time; information on this subject is generally classified SECRET. Detailed guidance on how this policy is to be managed in the event of an incident or emergency involving UK or US nuclear weapons is detailed at Annex B.

Deconfliction

11. Deconfliction of nuclear transportation tasks is required to avoid over-commitment of MOD response forces and to meet the requirements of civil emergency services. Policy for this is stated in Annex C.

Business Continuity Planning

12. Effective Business Continuity (BC) arrangements are a core management function, and an integral part of the planning and management processes of every part of the MOD and wider crisis management community. The MOD Plan for Continuity of Government \(^1\) includes, as one of six critical business activities, the ability to respond to a Defence nuclear emergency. Accordingly, all MOD nuclear emergency plans are to ensure that critical nuclear emergency response outputs and processes can be carried out following disruption to normal working conditions. JSP 503 Business Continuity Management sets out the MOD’s policy on business continuity management and provides advice on best practice. BC Recovery Planning staffs at Defence nuclear sites, or those having responsibility for Defence nuclear transport operations, are to ensure that their BC-focussed plans are complimentary to their emergency plans. Where there is conflict, nuclear emergency response plans are to take primacy.

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\(^1\) Continuity of Government – MOD Plan dated 8 Aug 05, and Technical Update dated 17 Jul 08.
13. Defence Nuclear Emergency continuity arrangements are to be sufficiently scalable to contribute to the continuity of government and commensurate with the Continuity of Government (COG) Planning Assumptions and Plans.

**Third Tier Arrangement**

14. The UK and US Governments recognise the need to provide a fast, efficient and co-ordinated response to an incident or emergency involving US nuclear weapons or nuclear components in the UK, including its internal waters and territorial sea. The policies and responsibilities of the UK MOD, the US Department of Defence (DoD), UK and US response forces, and other responsible UK and US authorities for dealing with an incident or emergency involving a US nuclear weapon in the UK, is specified in the UK / US Government to Government Third Tier Arrangement\(^2\).

15. The arrangements for dealing with an incident or emergency on land or where the effects have an impact on land are modelled on those in the UK Cabinet Office publication “Emergency Response and Recovery”. Arrangements for the integration of the joint military response are detailed in Implementing Joint Operational Plans (IJOP).

16. The IJOP Part 1 provides policy interpretation of the Third Tier Arrangement in respect of incidents or emergencies involving US nuclear weapons in the UK.

17. The IJOP Part 2 details the concept of operations to be adopted jointly by both nations in the event of an off-base Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) incident or emergency involving Defence Nuclear Material (DNM).

**International Conventions and Notifications**

18. The Convention on Early Notification in the event of a nuclear emergency describes the arrangements established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under which any signatory country that operates nuclear installations is obliged to inform the IAEA immediately of an emergency which could have consequences outside the country’s own borders. The IAEA undertake to forward the notification of a nuclear emergency occurring anywhere in the world to the respective National Warning Points in member States. The Convention requires States to report the emergency time, location, radiation releases and other data essential for assessing the situation.

19. Although the IAEA Convention does not apply to Defence the MOD has agreed to provide information in accordance with the Convention, on a voluntary basis, in the event of a Defence nuclear emergency in the UK. The Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) is the UK Competent Authority for notifying the European Community of a nuclear emergency in the UK. The MOD maintains a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with DECC for the provision of information relating to Defence nuclear emergencies. Provision of information relating to a Defence nuclear emergency will be provided by HQ DNEO.

**The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES)**

20. The INES is a worldwide tool designed by the IAEA as a means of communicating to the public, in a consistent way, the safety significance of nuclear and radiological events.

21. Events are classified on the scale at seven levels: Levels 1–3 are called "incidents" and Levels 4–7 "accidents". The scale is designed so that the severity of an event is about ten times

\(^2\) Third Tier Arrangement dated 9 Oct 97.
greater for each increase in level on the scale. Events without safety significance are called "deviations" and are classified Below Scale / Level 0.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL / DESCRIPTOR</th>
<th>NATURE OF THE EVENTS</th>
<th>EXAMPLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACCIDENTS 7 MAJOR ACCIDENT</td>
<td>• External release of a large fraction of the radioactive material in a large facility (e.g. the core of a power reactor). This would typically involve a mixture of short and long-lived radioactive fission products (in quantities radiologically equivalent to more than tens of thousands of terabecquerels of iodine-131). Such a release would result in the possibility of acute health effects; delayed health effects over a wide area, possibly involving more than one country; long-term environmental consequences.</td>
<td>Chernobyl NPP, USSR (now in Ukraine), 1986; Fukushima Dai-ichi, Japan, 2011 (Provisional)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCIDENT WITH OFF-SITE RISK</td>
<td>• External release of radioactive material (in quantities radiologically equivalent to the order of thousands to tens of thousands of terabecquerels of iodine-131). Such a release would be likely to result in full implementation of countermeasures covered by local emergency plans to limit serious health effects.</td>
<td>Kyshtym Reprocessing Plant, USSR (now in Russia), 1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCIDENTS 6 SERIOUS ACCIDENT</td>
<td>• External release of radioactive material (in quantities radiologically equivalent to the order of hundreds to thousands of terabecquerels of iodine-131). Such a release would be likely to result in partial implementation of countermeasures covered by emergency plans to lessen the likelihood of health effects. • Severe damage to the installation. This may involve severe damage to a large fraction of the core of a power reactor, a major criticality accident or a major fire or explosion releasing large quantities of radioactivity within the installation.</td>
<td>Windscale Pile, UK, 1957; Three Mile Island, NPP, USA, 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCIDENTS 5 ACCIDENT WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT OFF-SITE RISK</td>
<td>• External release of radioactivity resulting in a dose to the critical group of the order of a few millisieverts. With such a release the need for off-site protective actions would be generally unlikely except possibly for local food control. • Significant damage to the installation. Such an accident might include damage leading to major on-site recovery problems such as partial core melt in a power reactor and comparable events at non-reactor installations. • Irradiation of one or more workers resulting in an overexposure where a high probability of early death occurs.</td>
<td>Windscale Reprocessing Plant, UK, 1973; Saint-Laurent NPP, France, 1980; Buenos Aires Critical Assembly, Argentina, 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCIDENTS 4 SERIOUS INCIDENT</td>
<td>• External release of radioactivity resulting in a dose to the critical group of the order of tenths of millisievert. With such a release, off-site protective measures may not be needed. • On-site events resulting in doses to workers sufficient to cause acute health effects and/or an event resulting in a severe spread of contamination for example a few thousand terabecquerels of activity released in a secondary containment where the material can be returned to a satisfactory storage area. • Incidents in which a further failure of safety systems could lead to accident conditions, or a situation in which safety systems would be unable to prevent an accident if certain initiators were to occur.</td>
<td>Vandels NPP, Spain, 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCIDENTS 3 MAJOR INCIDENT</td>
<td>• Incidents with significant failure in safety provisions but with sufficient defence remaining to cope with additional failures. These include events where the actual would be rated at level 1 but which reveal significant additional organisational inadequacies or safety culture deficiencies. • An event resulting in a dose to a worker exceeding a statutory annual dose limit an event which leads to the presence of significant quantities of radioactivity in the installation in areas not expected by design and which require corrective action.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>INCIDENTS 2 INCIDENT</td>
<td>• Anomaly beyond the authorised regime but with significant defence in depth remaining. This may be due to equipment failure, human error or procedural inadequacies and may occur in any area covered by the scale. e.g. plant operation, transport of radioactive material, fuel handling, waste storage. Examples include: breaches of technical specifications or transport regulations, incidents without direct safety consequences that reveal inadequacies in the organisational system or safety culture, minor defects in pipework beyond the expectations of the surveillance programme.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANOMALY 1</td>
<td>• Deviations where operational limits and conditions are not exceeded and which are properly managed in accordance with adequate procedures. Examples include: a single random failure in a redundant protection system discovered during periodic inspections or tests, a planned reactor trip proceeding normally, spurious initiation of protection systems without significant consequences, leakages within the operational limits, minor spreads of contamination within controlled areas without wider implications for safety culture. NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE</td>
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Fig 6.1 – The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale.

22. The Safety Cell in HQ DNEO will classify a Defence nuclear emergency in terms of the INES scale before information is passed to DECC. Once classified, the information will also be disseminated within the MOD response organisation.
Liability and Claims

23. There would, broadly speaking, be an absolute liability on the Department to meet any subsequent personal injury or property damage claims from civilians where it can be demonstrated that their injury or loss was attributable to a Defence nuclear emergency.

24. In the event of a UK nuclear weapon or Defence nuclear reactor emergency resulting in the release of radiation, or an emergency involving a US nuclear weapon within the UK and its territorial waters (Third Tier Arrangement), the Head of Common Law Claims and Policy would be responsible for:

   a. On site claims work as needed from the time of the initial alert.
   b. Membership of MOD HQ DNEO to handle all claims issues and to provide advice and assistance when required.
   c. Provision of registration forms for those in the area at the time of the incident.

25. Further details are contained in the Head of Common Law Claims and Policy, Claims Manual which may be obtained from the MOD Senior Claims Officer.

Post Emergency Investigations

26. There are likely to be a number of different investigations and inquiries following a Defence nuclear emergency. These may range from a Ships Investigation or a Service Board of Inquiry, an Air Crash Investigation Board, a full Public Inquiry, and possibly a civil police criminal investigation depending on the circumstances of the emergency. MOD centre / HQ DNEO will take the lead in seeking advice from the Lord Chancellors Department (or Devolved Administration equivalent) on the precedence of such inquiries at the appropriate time, although a civil police investigation will take precedence over any other type of inquiry. If the emergency has resulted in fatalities a Coroner’s Inquest (in England or Wales) will be undertaken to find out the facts surrounding the deaths. In Scotland this task will be undertaken by the Procurator Fiscal. MOD personnel are to co-operate fully with investigating officers from within and outside the Department. Further information on post emergency investigations can be found in JSP 832 Guide to Service Inquiries.

Ministerial Notification and Reporting of Defence Nuclear Incidents

27. The arrangements for the Ministerial notification and reporting of Defence nuclear incidents were implemented in response to a finding from the Defence Nuclear Safety Study 2001, and to conclude an exchange between MOD and the Health and Safety Executive (Nuclear Installations Inspectorate) now known as the Office for Nuclear Regulation.

28. The Defence Ministerial Reporting criteria (Appendix 1) categorises occurrences at Defence nuclear sites, Defence related licensed sites, Defence nuclear transport operations and/or deployed nuclear powered submarines or weapons – depending on their nuclear/radiological safety significance.

29. The arrangements, which mirror civil practice, ensure that Defence Ministers are informed in a timely manner to respond effectively to Parliamentary and media enquiries in relation to nuclear/radiological safety related issues involving the Defence nuclear programmes.

30. The reporting arrangements are aligned with the more general arrangements for the reporting of routine issues related to the Defence nuclear programmes and are the responsibility of DE&S Pol Sec and NAVCOM Pol Sec.
31. Emergencies or incidents that require nuclear emergency plans to be invoked, as detailed at Annex A to Chapter 1, are to be reported in accordance with JSP 471 Chapter 5, paragraph 2.
CHAPTER 6 ANNEX A - Statement by the United Kingdom Government on Operation of Nuclear Powered Warships in Foreign Ports

1. The UK Government certifies that the reactor safety aspects of design, crew training and operating procedures of the nuclear propulsion plant of UK NPWs are reviewed by the UK Defence Nuclear Safety Committee (DNSC) and other appropriate UK authorities, and are as defined in officially approved manuals. The UK Government also certifies that all safety precautions and procedures followed in connection with operations in UK ports will be strictly observed in foreign ports.

2. In connection with the operation of UK NPWs in foreign ports:

   a. No effluent or other waste will be discharged from the ship which would cause an ascertifiable hazard through an increase in the general background radioactivity of the environment; waste disposal standards are consistent with the recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection.

   b. During the period of the visit, the personnel of the NPW will be responsible for the radiological control onboard the ship and for environmental monitoring of the vicinity. The host Government may, of course, take such surveys as it desires, in the vicinity of the vessel, to assure itself that it is not creating a radioactive contamination hazard.

   c. The appropriate authorities of the host Government will be notified immediately in the event of an accident involving the reactor of the NPW during a port visit.

   d. The UK Government assumes the responsibility to salvage or otherwise make safe any NPWs that might be incapacitated in a foreign port.

   e. The UK Government does not make technical information on the design or operation of its NPWs available to a host Government in connection with port entry. The UK Government cannot, therefore, permit the boarding of its NPW for the purpose of obtaining technical information concerning their propulsion plants or operating instructions.

   f. The Royal Navy will inform the appropriate host Government authorities as early as practicable, but normally at least 24 hours in advance, as to the estimated time of arrival and, pursuant to prior consultation with the host Government, the intended location of mooring or anchoring of its NPWs.

   g. The United Kingdom will, of course, welcome the customary protocol visits to its NPWs by representatives of the host government.

3. Claims arising out of a nuclear emergency involving a visiting NPW will be dealt with through diplomatic channels in accordance with customary procedures for the settlement of international claims under generally accepted principles of law and equity.
CHAPTER 6 ANNEX B - Guidance on the Operational Application of the 'Neither Confirm nor Deny' Policy in the Context of an Incident or Emergency Involving a Nuclear Weapon

General Policy

1. It is UK policy to neither confirm nor deny (NCND) the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at any particular place or time; information on this subject is generally classified SECRET. This policy is also upheld by the US and by NATO. The primary rationale for the policy is that it contributes towards effective security of nuclear weapons, but to be effective it must be consistently applied, even on occasions where the presence or absence of nuclear weapons may be thought to be obvious. CBRN Policy is the lead division for NCND policy matters, and should be consulted wherever possible in circumstances where questions on these issues arise (including requests for information under the Freedom of Information Act).

2. The NCND policy does not apply to Special Nuclear Material (SNM).

Possible Exceptions In Case Of Emergency

3. The following guidance applies to all situations involving UK nuclear weapons (including operations at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), nuclear weapons convoys, and operations at HMNB Clyde), whether arising from an accident or malicious intervention by a third party.

4. In certain circumstances, it will be necessary to set aside the NCND policy and confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons to allow MOD to meet its health and safety responsibilities and duty-of-care to the public and emergency service responders, namely:

   a. Where there is a potential or confirmed radiological or explosive risk to the public or emergency services.

   b. Where there is no radiological or explosive risk but where life and limb is imperilled, and where the emergency services request details of any hazard that may be present at the scene.

   c. Where there is no radiological or explosive risk but where emergency action is needed to stabilise the situation i.e. fire fighting and where the emergency services request details of any hazards that may be present at the scene.

5. In these circumstances, the commander on the scene (convoy commander, MOD Bronze commander or MCA, as appropriate) and the Senior Operations Officer (SOO) in the Special Safety Cell have the authority to set NCND aside, for the duration of the incident, confirming the presence or absence of nuclear weapons, and thus declassifying the information in question. Once information has been disclosed to the civilian emergency services, even if it has not been directly or officially disclosed to the media, the assumption must be that the information is in the public domain.

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1 The fact that nuclear weapons are routinely present in certain places – AWE Burghfield, RNAD Coulport and on board SSBNs – has been officially confirmed. It has also been officially confirmed that SSBNs in refit at Devonport, which will have offloaded their missiles before going into refit, are not carrying nuclear weapons.


3 It is acceptable in certain situations, especially where there is a justified desire to dispel false suspicions of the presence of nuclear weapons, to couple NCND with other existing official statements, such as the SDR statement that Trident is the UK’s only nuclear weapon system and the obvious fact that Trident can only be carried on a submarine, to enable the hearer to draw their own conclusions. On the same basis, it is also acceptable to state whether a certain site has facilities for storing nuclear weapons. CBRN Policy should be consulted for forms of words that can be used in particular circumstances.

4 Though in such circumstances the assumption is that the information may spread unofficially from members of the emergency services, the responsibility for public information will rest with the civil police. No information should be directly disclosed to the media by the MOD commander on the scene or by the MOD press office without the agreement of the civil police.
6. In the event that there is, or is likely to be, widespread public alarm (even where there is no radiological hazard requiring public information procedures to be activated), responsibility for addressing that public alarm will lie with the civil police. In setting the NCND policy aside, the SOO and MOD commander on the scene must first have spoken to agree the extent of the incident. NCND will only be set aside with regards to the vehicle(s) directly involved in the incident. NCND will remain in place for the remainder of the convoy/load carriers (if any). The SOO will send hazard information to the Civil Emergency Services and accordingly the details of the incident will be in the public domain.

7. In the circumstances set out in paragraph 5 and 6, it must clearly be stated by MOD representatives that NCND is HM Government’s policy and departing from it in the emergency situation prevailing at the time does not invalidate its continuing application in future.

8. Before responding to any requests for information from the public or the media concerning the presence or absence of nuclear weapons where the circumstances set out in paragraphs 4 or 6 do not apply, the matter is to be referred to MOD HQ (CBRN Pol during office hours, or via the Resident Clerk out of hours; in the event that this is not possible, the Strategic Weapons Project Team (SWPT) Special Safety Cell (SSC) for nuclear weapon convoys).
CHAPTER 6 ANNEX C - Deconfliction of Transport of Defence Nuclear Materials

1. The policy for deconfliction applies to Defence Nuclear Material (DNM) movements (i.e. Nuclear Weapons, Category I and II Special Nuclear Material (SNM), specific instances and quantities of other radioactive materials and Reactor Fuel). Constituted, but unloaded, nuclear weapons convoys are included within this policy. Planning of movements to achieve this policy is delegated to Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S) SW PT.

2. There is to be only one road or rail movement in or one air movement over the same or adjacent Constabulary areas at any one time. Provided this condition is met:
   a. A single nuclear weapon road convoy and a single SNM road convoy may be carried out concurrently.
   b. A single rail movement and a single road convoy may be carried out concurrently.
   c. A single rail movement or a single road convoy may be carried out concurrently with a single air movement in UK airspace.

Exercises

3. There are to be no DNM movements during Level 3 exercises.

4. DNM movements during all other nuclear emergency exercises are to be determined on a case by case basis and in consultation with DBR – DefSy – NucSyEP AH.
CHAPTER 7 - EXERCISES AND ASSESSMENT

Exercises

1. The testing of emergency response arrangements is an important element of the overall assessment of the adequacy of the Department’s arrangements. Duty Holders are responsible for scheduling exercises of their arrangements in accordance with statutory and DNSR requirements. For convenience, broad definitions of different types of exercises (based on those developed within the civil nuclear programme) are at Annex A.

2. MOD nuclear emergency PR and Media arrangements are to be tested, as appropriate, during Defence nuclear emergency response exercises, normally as part of exercises of the off-site response (Level 2 exercises).

3. Key elements of the MOD HQ DNEO executive and LGD plans are to be exercised each year in conjunction with an exercise of the off-site response (a Level 3 exercise). The exercise will be selected by DBR-DefSy in conjunction with other Government Departments and stakeholders and will be de-conflicted with the national exercise programme.

Assessment

4. Statutory regulation of Duty Holders’ arrangements is by ONR, in conjunction with the non-statutory Regulator, DNSR, where applicable. Copies of both regulatory assessments and any self-assessments carried by Duty Holders are to be provided to DBR-DefSy.

5. Those aspects of Central Government co-ordination arrangements will be reviewed by DBR-DefSy in conjunction with the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat.

6. For national level exercises, DBR-DefSy is to co-ordinate the completion of an All Agency Report (AAR). All participants are to be invited to make a contribution to the report. The draft report is to be circulated to participants for comment and approval prior to it being published on the GOV.UK website. Before they provide input, contributors are to be made aware that the report will become a public document.
CHAPTER 7 ANNEX A - Nuclear Emergency Response – Exercise Definitions

Level 1

1. A test of the operator’s emergency response arrangements. This may be a MOD only exercise or may include participation by off-site responders (e.g. the emergency services) where these form an integral element of the on-site arrangements. The overall objective is to test the response at the tactical and / or operational levels.

Level 2

2. A test of the off-site emergency response arrangements. The overall objective is to test the response at the local strategic level. This may include, or be linked to, the testing of the operators plan or may be conducted separately (the operator’s response being simulated).

3. All Level 2 exercises are to include, as a minimum, a test of the interface with the MOD HQ and LGD plans. DBR will provide support to test the upward interface from GOLD level as required.

Note

4. Level 1 or 2 exercises, as defined above, may be combined. For example, Level 1 and 2 combined exercises would test both the on-site and off-site response arrangements in a single exercise.

Level 3

5. Key elements of the MOD HQ and cross government arrangements for responding to an emergency involving Defence nuclear assets, as well as the on-site and off-site response arrangements (i.e. Level 1 and 2 exercise), will be tested during a Level 3 exercise. HQ DNEO will be closed up.

6. A full test of the cross government arrangements will only take place as part of a National Tier 1 exercise with full Cabinet Office involvement. A National Tier 1 exercise will not necessarily be combined with a Level 1 and 2 exercise.
CHAPTER 8 - MEDIA and COMMUNICATIONS

MOD Public Relations and Media Management

1. Communication with the media, Parliament or directly with the public is a vital part of the MOD’s strategy for responding to a Defence nuclear emergency.

2. The public relations and media management requirements set out here are separate from, and additional to, the specific requirements on Duty Holders to provide timely notification of an off-site nuclear emergency including, where appropriate, public safety advice.

3. The MOD, as the LGD in the event of a Defence nuclear emergency, must have a clear PR and media strategy to ensure the effective and efficient management of the departmental and Central Government public relations and media issues.

4. MOD HQ DNEO is responsible for ensuring that information for the public, parliament and the media is accurate, consistent, informative and issued promptly. The need for public safety and reassurance takes precedence over security requirements, although there would be no automatic relaxation of security requirements. Responsibility for the overall effectiveness of MOD’s media and communications response lies with Directorate Media and Communications (DMC).

Preparation of Information

5. In so far as is practicable, information for the public is to be prepared in advance. Press statements are to be prepared covering the immediate phase of the response. These statements are to allow for the inclusion of specific details relating to the location of the emergency and casualties. Background material is to be prepared covering topics which are likely to be required to be briefed in depth to the media. For example details about the operation, the nuclear asset, radiation and radioactive materials and medical aspects. Consideration should be given as to how this will be published i.e. the printed press or on the internet. Photographs or short film clips may be required. Where practical during the planning process, pre-prepared information is to be agreed with relevant civilian agencies such as the police and local authorities. Appropriate information is to be included in the Implementing Joint Operational Plans (IJOPs) for US nuclear assets.

Responsibilities for Disseminating Information

6. The Central Government response to a Defence nuclear emergency will be managed from the MOD Directorate of Media and Communications (DMC). DMC will work through and with the NCC, helping them to co-ordinate the national Government media and communications response by working with OGDs and agencies and devolved administrations as required and maintain close links with Local Strategic (GOLD), supporting and supplementing their efforts as necessary.

7. The MCA’s Public Relations (PR) personnel are to prepare information for the MCA to use at the Media Briefing Centre, in conjunction with civilian agencies. PR staff, DMC and HQ DNEO are to ensure that they keep each other fully informed of all the information disseminated, together with details of the reaction of the media at any briefings and the content of printed articles and broadcasts. In order to ensure consistency it is the MOD’s aim to disseminate information from as few sources as possible.
Content of Information

8. The MCA’s PR staff and the HQ DNEO / DMC are to ensure that the information disseminated at local strategic, London or elsewhere is consistent, both in content and timing.

9. If there is any doubt whether the information to be supplied concerns policy issues, PR staff should clear statements with HQ DNEO.

10. HQ DNEO and the DMC will address issues of a longer term nature, the need for and precedence of formal inquiries and matters of Defence policy.

Central Government Co-ordination of Media and Public Information

11. In the event of a Defence nuclear emergency, it is likely that the Cabinet Office News Co-ordination Centre¹ (NCC) will be activated to support the UK Central Government response.

12. Any emergency on a scale requiring a co-ordinated UK Central Government response will need national direction of public information from the outset. Central Government will be responsible for the national communications strategy for responding to the crisis, the development of which will be co-ordinated with the lead responder locally (normally the police).

Local Strategic Co-ordination of Media and Public Information

13. Strategic Media Advisory Cell (SMAC). To ensure consistent communication is delivered by all agencies involved in the response to a Defence nuclear emergency a Strategic Media Advisory Cell (SMAC) will be set up at the SCC. The SMAC will be established to ensure that the legal duty to warn, inform and advise the public in an emergency is carried out and there is adequate provision of timely, accurate, consistent information in support of the SCG aim and objectives.

14. Media Briefing Centre (MBC). A Media Briefing Centre (MBC) will be set up, usually close to the SCC, to provide a single focus for the provision of information and facilitate liaison with the press and broadcasters. It will be the designated location for news conferences, media interviews and briefings and will give journalists access to responding organisations’ spokespeople.

15. Forward Media Briefing Point. An appropriate location for a Forward Media Briefing Point may be identified if the situation allows. Ideally this location should provide safe and easy access from public areas and be close to the incident scene. If possible it will include a media vantage point for photographs and filming at the scene.

MOD Emergency Website

16. In the event of a Defence nuclear emergency, the MOD will launch the emergency website pages on MOD’s home page on GOV.UK. The website will be managed and operated by the DMC web team, with HQ DNEO Secretariat assisting with the provision of Defence information. It is essential that the dissemination of information is co-ordinated for content, accuracy and security. For this reason, Defence-related information about the emergency will only be posted on the GOV.UK website. If local authorities, emergency services or OGDs wish to utilise their own websites to disseminate information, any Defence sourced information that is offered to these agencies for inclusion on their web pages will first be cleared by HQ DNEO.

¹ The News Co-ordination Centre (NCC) is a cross governmental emergency press office, set up in the event of a national crisis with implications for more than one department.
SQEP MOD Personnel

17. All MOD DNEO personnel who are designated in emergency plans to present information to the media are to be Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel (SQEP). If there is any doubt as to what constitutes SQEP in this sense then advice is to be sought from MOD DMC. MOD PR personnel are to advise the MCA on the selection of suitable personnel to provide briefings to the media.
CHAPTER 9 - OPERATIONS IN THE UK: DEFENCE CONTRIBUTION TO RESILIENCE

Standing Joint Commander (UK)

1. Whilst the strategic lead for the Defence contribution to Resilience in the UK comes from the Directorate of Counter Terrorism and Resilience (DCT & R), the operational-level lead is the Commander in Chief Land Forces (CINCLF), who is appointed by Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to be the Standing Joint Commander (United Kingdom) (SJC(UK)). SJC(UK)'s primary responsibility is to force-generate any MOD contribution to the planning and execution of joint and Other Government Department (OGD) led civil contingency operations within the SJC(UK) Joint Operations Area (JOA). Military support to a Defence nuclear emergency may involve both military support to a Defence Operation and deployments under Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) arrangements.

Military Aid to the Defence Nuclear Emergency Organisation

2. Activation of the DNEO and its response is a pre-planned military operation led at the local level by the MCA under CDS’s authority. SJC(UK) is to provide oversight of assets detailed in support of individual Nuclear Emergency Response (NER) plans, where arranged in bilateral agreements between NER Plan Duty Holders and Single Service, TLB or Defence Agency. If additional Military Force Elements (FE) are required by the MCA for contingent work to augment FE already assigned, this is Defence supporting Defence and MACA procedures (see below) do not apply. Requests for military support under these arrangements will be made on behalf of the MCA to the JRLO / RF Bde Commander or the RF Military Liaison Officer (MLO).

3. SJC(UK) has been directed to support the DNEO through planning and contingent force generation of FE in addition to those already allocated to nuclear emergency plans. In order to achieve that, all plans are to be submitted to SJC(UK) who will check that forces allocated are viable, available and suitable.

Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA)

4. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 02, Operations in the UK - the Defence Contribution to Resilience, defines the policy for operations in the UK in support of civil authorities. Following a Defence nuclear emergency, in addition to the Military support required by the MCA to deal with its tasks, the civil authorities may also require Military aid under MACA arrangements. In that scenario MACA may fall under the following categories:

a. Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) Category A. Emergency assistance to the civil authorities in time of emergency such as natural disasters or major emergencies. This may be called upon by civil authorities if they assess civil resources are locally inadequate and / or such resources are not available within a suitable timeline.

b. Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP). Provision of military assistance to the Civil Power in the maintenance of law, order and public safety, using specialist capabilities or equipment, in situations beyond the capability of the Civil Power.

c. Military Aid to Other Government Departments (MAGD). Provision of Defence support on urgent work of national importance or in maintaining supplies and services essential to the life, health and safety of the community.

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1 The SJC(UK) JOA is defined as the UK land area and its territorial seas, including Northern Ireland but excluding the Isle of Man and Channel Islands.
2 http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/MicroSite/DCDC/OurPublications/JDWP/JointDoctrinePublicationjdp02OperationsInTheUkTheDefenceContributionToResilience.htm
3 With the exception of Military Aid to the Civil Power operations in Northern Ireland.
5. Military support under MACA arrangements must always be at the specific request of the civil authorities and, with the exception of MACC, requires the authorisation of Defence Ministers. Requests for military support under these arrangements should initially be made to the JRLO or the RF MLO. Once scoped and assessed viable, the civil authorities should forward a formal request through their chain of command to their LGD in accordance with normal MACA procedures.

Regional Forces (RF) Support to Resilience Operations

6. During a Resilience challenge in the UK, the Army’s RF Bde Commander and the JRLO will deploy to the most appropriate C2 hub (this is likely to be Police GOLD) in order to attend the SCG, provide advice, and where appropriate, support to the civil authorities. If the incident requires a regional response and the JRLO / Bde Commander are at a regional hub, a suitable RF MLO will deploy to Police GOLD and attend the SCG. During a Defence nuclear emergency, the Regional Bde Commander will also assume the role of Supporting Commander to the MCA who is the Supported Commander.

7. The Bde Commander or his representative (JRLO or other MLO) will be the primary conduit to obtain both MACA for the civil authorities and additional military support to the Defence Operation as requested by the MCA.
CHAPTER 10 - ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DIRECTORATE OF BUSINESS RESILIENCE (DBR)

1. Some of the responsibilities of the Directorate of Business Resilience (DBR) have been mentioned in previous chapters in specific contexts. This chapter provides a comprehensive summary of the role and responsibilities of DBR.

Policy and Plans

2. DBR - Defence Security (DefSy) will:
   a. Sponsor and maintain the central high level MOD policy for nuclear emergency response, ie this JSP.
   b. Sponsor and maintain the necessary plans and infrastructure to enable the MOD HQ response to a Defence nuclear emergency and the co-ordination of the Central Government response, including interface with the Cabinet Office, Civil Contingencies Secretariat and COBR. This will include maintenance of the Headquarters Defence Nuclear Emergency Organisation (HQ DNEO) automated call-out alerting system and procedures.
   c. Sponsor and maintain the Government-to-Government arrangements for the response to a US nuclear weapon emergency in the UK as detailed in the Third Tier Arrangement (TTA) and for policy interpretation of this in Implementing Joint Operating Plan (Part 1) (IJOP(Pt1)).
   d. Sponsor and maintain the public Local Authority and Emergency Service Information (LAESI) document which describes the contingency arrangements for the transport of Defence nuclear materials.

Exercises and Training

3. DBR-DefSy will:
   a. Contribute to the planning and exercising of the HQ DNEO and / or LGD elements of the off-site arrangements. For national level UK / US exercises DBR-DefSy will, where appropriate, co-chair the Exercise Steering Committee.
   b. Where appropriate, make submissions to Defence ministers for political approval. Lead, with DMC, on the arrangements for real-time media handling. Ministerial submissions will include draft letters of notification to local Members of Parliament and Constituency Members of the Scottish Parliament where required. Real time news briefs and lines-to-take are also to be provided.

Services in Support of MOD DNEO

4. DBR-DefSy will ensure the provision of common services for MOD DNEO as follows:
   a. Funding of the Meteorological Office services (including PACRAM).
   b. Sponsorship of AWE services for response to weapon and materials emergencies (including hazard prediction).
   c. Senior User and System Manager for the Department’s Nuclear Emergency Response Information Management System (NERIMS).
Other MOD Operations

5. DBR-DefSy will represent nuclear emergency response aspects in the planning for and support of other similar MOD Operations. DBR-DefSy is to be notified of any proposal to divert nuclear emergency response elements or equipment to support such operations in order that compensatory arrangements can be made, and Ministers can be informed, if necessary.

Liaison with Other Government Departments and National Bodies

6. DBR-DefSy will be the primary point of contact with OGDs, Government Agencies and national bodies on Defence nuclear emergency response policy matters. In particular it will:

   a. Represent MOD in its LGD role in liaison with Cabinet Office and others.

   b. Represent the Department on the Nuclear Emergency Planning Board (NEPB); the Nuclear Emergency Planning Delivery Committee (NEPDC) and its working groups; and the Scottish Nuclear Resilience Group (SNRG).

   c. Co-ordinate the departmental responses to proposed legislation, regulation and guidance on, or related to, nuclear emergency response.

   d. Lead for MOD in any discussions with national bodies (e.g. Association of Chief Police Officers, Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs, Fire Officers Association, National Health Service, Local Authority Associations, The Emergency Planning Society).

Liaison with Overseas and UK Dependency Governments

7. DBR-DefSy will be the primary point of contact on nuclear emergency response policy matters with foreign Governments and UK Overseas Territories, consulting with other MOD departments and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as appropriate. In particular it will:

   a. Foster contacts on weapon emergency response with the US Department of Defence through the Defence Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), US European Command (USEUCOM), Office of the Secretary of Defence (OSD) and the US Department of Energy (DOE), under the 1958 agreement; this will include arrangements for the mutual observation of exercises.

   b. Foster contacts with France through the joint Franco-British Nuclear Staff Talks; this will include arrangements for the mutual observation of exercises.

   c. Take the lead on the political aspects of reactor emergency response with UK Overseas Territories.

   d. Take the lead in all aspects of reactor emergency response with overseas Governments (within the scope of the Standard Statement under which UK NPW visits are made).
APPENDIX 1 - DEFENCE MINISTERIAL REPORTING CRITERIA

ARRANGEMENTS FOR MINISTERIAL REPORTING OF DEFENCE NUCLEAR / RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENTS


Scope

1. The Defence Ministerial Reporting Criteria (Annex A) categorises occurrences at Defence nuclear sites, Defence related licensed sites, Defence nuclear transport operations and/or deployed nuclear powered submarines or weapons which do not meet the criteria for Defence Nuclear Emergencies and the activation of emergency response plans (Chapter 1, Annex A), but which may have a nuclear/radiological safety significance and need to be reported to Defence Ministers and senior officials.

Notification

2. DE&S Policy Secretariat (DE&S Pol Sec) and NAVCOM Policy Secretariat (NAVCOM Pol Sec) are to lead on the reporting to Defence Ministers for nuclear/radiological related incidents which meet the Ministerial reporting criteria.

3. Notification of a nuclear/radiological incident is to come from the MOD Duty Holder¹ or, for non-MOD Duty Holders² their MOD customer, or from the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DNSR) by a Fast Stream Report e-mail, which is to be pre-empted by a telephone call to DE&S Pol Sec or NAVCOM Pol Sec, normally within 24 hours of the event occurring (contact details are held separately by DE&S Pol Sec and NAVCOM Pol Sec). The Duty Holder is to inform the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), Environment Agency (EA) or the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) site inspector as appropriate. DE&S Pol Sec or NAVCOM Pol Sec should be notified of any incidents that have been reported to external regulators as soon as possible. DNSR is to give the Regulator’s view on whether the incident is reportable to Defence Ministers. DE&S Pol Sec or NAVCOM Pol Sec are to alert the Directorate of Media and Communications (DMC) where there is a possibility of media interest, and provide lines-to-take, consulting as necessary with the policy/operational lead.

4. The notification timing requirement may be extended for submarines on patrol with restricted communications, but is to be achieved as soon as practicable. Notification of a nuclear/radiological incident onboard a submarine at sea, outside territorial waters, in a foreign berth, in an overseas territory or at a UK berth in fleet time is to be sent from the submarine by signal to FLEET COMMANDER (Duty Submarine Controller).

5. On receipt of notification of the nuclear/radiological incident, DE&S Pol Sec or NAVCOM Pol Sec are to consult with the relevant policy and/or operational lead to confirm:
   a. that the incident meets the reporting criteria;
   b. the Ministerial reporting arrangements.

6. In the case of an incident outside normal office hours DE&S Pol Sec or NAVCOM Pol Sec are to assess whether it is necessary to contact the MOD Main Building Resident Clerk, who may

¹ DE&S SM SWPT; DE&S SM CSSE; DE&S SM NPPT (Fuel Transport); NRP Authorisee; HMNB Clyde; HMNB Devonport; Vulcan NRTE
² AWE; Babcock Marine Division Devonport and Rosyth; BAE Systems Submarine Solutions, Barrow; Rolls Royce Marine Power Operations Ltd, Derby.
inform the relevant Minister, and is to contact the DMC Duty Press Officer if the incident is media sensitive or likely to attract public attention.

7. These arrangements do not apply in the event of a nuclear emergency or incident being declared which meets the definitions in Chapter 1, Annex A of JSP 471, and which requires nuclear emergency response plans to be invoked. In such circumstances, the Headquarters, Defence Nuclear Emergency Organisation is to notify Ministers.

**External Notification**

8. Devolved Administrations, Other Government Departments (OGDs), foreign governments and overseas territories may need to be notified of nuclear/radiological related incidents depending on the nature and location of the incident. DBR-DefSy-NucSyEP AH is to be consulted, and if required will co-ordinate the relevant external notifications.

**Approval**

9. DE&S Pol Sec and NAVCOM Pol Sec are to clear their respective Ministerial submissions through DNSR and the relevant policy and/or operational leads. DBR-DefSy-NucEP AH is to be included as a copy addressee, together with the MOD Duty Holder, and the Nuclear Propulsion Project Team (NPPT) or the Strategic Weapon Project Team (SWPT) as appropriate. DNSR is to liaise with the Office for Nuclear Regulation where the incident has occurred at a Defence related licensed site.
Defence Ministerial Reporting Criteria and High Level Guidance

Criteria are in bold text.
Guidance is in italics.

1. **Dangerous occurrences reportable under the Nuclear Installations (Dangerous Occurrences) Regulation 1965.** (Note: It is most likely that such occurrences would fall within the REPPiR definition of a radiation emergency and require implementation of emergency plans).

   a. Any event on a Defence nuclear operators site\(^1\) that involves the emission of ionising radiations or the release of radioactive or toxic substances that has caused or is likely to cause the death of, or serious injury to the health of, persons\(^2\) outside the site or on the site at the time of occurrence.

   b. Any event in the course of carriage of Defence nuclear material that:

      i. has caused or is likely to cause the death of, or serious injury to the health of, any person by reason of the radioactive properties of such nuclear matter.

      ii. involves the breaking open of any outside container in which such nuclear material is being carried.

   c. Any explosion or outbreak of fire on a Defence nuclear operators site or in the vicinity of a vehicle carrying Defence nuclear material that is affecting, or is likely to affect, the safe working or safe condition of the nuclear plant / facility or of the nuclear material. It would be appropriate to report any explosion or major fire affecting sufficient safety related plant such that the affected system is unable to perform its safety function.

   d. Any uncontrolled criticality excursion.

2. **Confirmed exposures to radiation of individuals which exceed, or which are expected to exceed, the dose limits specified in Schedule 4 to the Ionising Radiations Regulations 1999.**

   a. Dose limits specified in schedule 4 to IRR99 are clear and objective. No guidance required.

3. **Examination, maintenance, inspection, test or operation of any part of the plant revealing that safe operation or condition of the plant may be significantly affected.**

   a. Notification is required if discovery of a fault requires serious consideration of withdrawal or amendment of the Authority to Operate a Naval reactor plant.

   b. Notification is required if discovery of a fault requires serious consideration of the need to make safe a nuclear device or component and review of conformance of the device\(^3\) or component with the safety case.

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\(^1\) Site means: a licensed site; an authorised site; a site under the control of Secretary of State for Defence; a submarine which may, or may not, form part of an aforementioned site or any movement of Defence nuclear materials.

\(^2\) Medical confidentiality must be respected in all notifications.

\(^3\) Nuclear device is taken to mean all those devices whose design intent is to be able to produce an uncontrolled nuclear reaction.
c. Notification is required if discovery of a fault on a Naval reactor plant or nuclear device or component that although in a safe condition at the time of discovery (e.g. shut down) nevertheless could have serious implications for the continued safety of other Naval reactor plant or nuclear devices or components.


a. Quantitative limits set under RSA93 are clear and objective. No further guidance required.

5. Abnormal occurrences leading to a confirmed release to atmosphere or spillage of a radioactive substance which exceeds, or is expected to exceed, the limits set out in Column 4 of Schedule 8 of the Ionising Radiations Regulations 1999, except where the release is in a manner specified in an Authorisation/Agreement under the Radioactive Substances Act 1993.

a. Quantities and concentrations specified in column 4 of schedule 8 to IRR99 are clear and objective.

b. This criteria covers liquids, gases, aerosols and dusts. The term ‘atmosphere’ covers the internal environment of buildings / submarines / vehicles as well as the external atmosphere.

c. Reporting is not required where the spillage is in an enclosure or other such localised facility, so designed, maintained and used as to effectively prevent the release going beyond that facility. This exception would apply, for instance to glove boxes and purpose designed enclosures and benches in laboratories, in circumstances where the spillage would not be considered an ‘abnormal occurrence’. However, this exception would not cover releases affecting whole rooms or buildings where people work and could receive a significant exposure to radiation as a result of the spillage.

6. Abnormal occurrences leading to a release or suspected release or spread of radioactivity, on or off site, which requires special action or special investigation by the Operator.

a. Any unplanned event that significantly increases radiation dose rates or surface or airborne contamination, for which an investigation report will subsequently be required. Any formal investigation into any such suspected occurrence outside the site boundary.

7. Any ‘nuclear or radiological safety event’ which does not meet the criteria at 1 to 6, but which the operator believes might attract media or public attention and for which a press release or response statement is to be issued.

a. Any unplanned event involving the Naval reactor plant, Defence nuclear materials, nuclear weapons or radioactive wastes generated as a result the Defence weapon or propulsion programmes.
b. Reporting is not required under this process if the only media-related action is the preparation of defensive lines for press officers. DE&S Pol Sec and NAVCOM Pol Sec may, however, choose to make Ministers offices aware of the event.

If the incident is such that the relevant nuclear accident response plan has to be invoked, the notification and reporting procedures in those plans are to be followed.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Authorised Site. A defined site within which nuclear activities are controlled by an Authorisee in compliance with the Authorisation Conditions and Further Authorisation Conditions.

Authorisee. An individual authorised by the Chairman Defence Nuclear Environment and Safety Board (DNESB) to operate in compliance with the Authorisation Conditions and Further Authorisation Conditions.

Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms. The physical location, usually in Westminster, from which the central response is activated, monitored and coordinated.

Common Recognised Information Picture. As part of its role in an emergency the Cabinet Office Situation Cell at COBR develops and maintains a CRIP, which will be summarised on display boards in COBR, briefed at the outset of key meetings and shared as far as possible with responders at the regional and local level.

Directorate of Counter Terrorism and Resilience. For a Defence nuclear emergency, responsible for seeking ministerial approval for MACA requests from the RF Brigade Commander / JRLO.


Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator. The MOD regulator of nuclear and radiological safety for the Defence nuclear programmes (comprising the NNPP and NWP).

Duty Holder. A person who has direct responsibility for, and control of, activities that influence, directly or indirectly, the safety of the Defence Nuclear Programmes.

Joint Regional Liaison Officer. An officer appointed to each Army Regional Brigade who is responsible for leading tri-Service liaison with local authorities, emergency services and other agencies involved in emergency planning.

Lead Government Department. The Cabinet Office nominated Government department which has responsibility for the planning, response and recovery to an identified emergency situation.

Licensed Site. A site in respect of which a Nuclear Site Licence has been granted by HSE under the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (as amended), whether or not that Licence remains in force.

Licensee. The body corporate that has been granted a Nuclear Site Licence under the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (as amended), which permits it to carry out a defined scope of activities on a delineated site.

Media Emergency Forum. An ad hoc group of senior media editors, Government representatives, local authority emergency planners, emergency services, police and private industry set up to consider media issues arising from civil emergencies. It develops best practice in getting the right information to the right people in an emergency.

Nuclear Emergency Response Information Management System. Dedicated information management system used in the event of a Defence nuclear emergency.

Special Nuclear Material. Nuclear materials held by the MOD and defined by 4 classified categories. It includes new and used fuel for RN submarine reactors, in storage and transit, but not complete reactor and weapon assemblies.
ABBREVIATIONS

AAR  All Agency Report
AWE  Atomic Weapons Establishment
Bde  Brigade
BC  Business Continuity
CBRN  Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CCT  Current Commitments Team
Cdr  Commander
CDs  Chief of Defence Staff
CDSDO  Chief of Defence Staff Duty Officer
CinC(LF)  Commander in Chief (Land Forces)
COBR  Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms
COG  Continuity of Government / Current Operations Group
CRIP  Common Recognised Information Picture
CSA  Chief Scientific Advisor
D CT & R  Directorate of Counter Terrorism and Resilience
D Ops  Director of Operations
DA  Devolved Administration
DBR  Directorate of Business Resilience
DCDS(OPS)  Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Operations)
DCLG  Department for Communities and Local Government
DCMC  Defence Crisis Management Centre
DCMO  Defence Crisis Management Organisation
DE&S  Defence Equipment and Support
DECC  Department of Energy and Climate Change
DEFRA  Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
DefSy  Defence Security
DH  Department of Health
DMC  Director Media Communications
DNEO  Defence Nuclear Emergency Organisation
DNM  Defence Nuclear Material
DNSC  Defence Nuclear Safety Committee
DNSR  Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator
DoD  Department of Defence (US)
DOE  Department of Energy (US)
DTRA  Defence Threat Reduction Agency
DSTL  Defence Science and Technology Laboratory
DSTL ESD  DSTL – Environmental Sciences Division
EA  Environment Agency
FE  Force Elements
FSA  Food Standards Agency
GIS  Geographic Information System
GLO  Government Liaison Officer
GLT  Government Liaison Team
HGM  High Grade Messaging
HMNB  Her Majesty's Naval Base
HQ  Headquarters
HS & EP  Health, safety and environmental protection
HSWA  Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974
HSE ONR  Health and Safety Executive – Office for Nuclear Regulation
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency
IJOP  Implementing Joint Operational Plan
IMG  Impact Management Group
INES  International Nuclear Event Scale
IRR  Ionising Radiations Regulations
JDP  Joint Doctrine Publication  
JOA  Joint Operations Area  
JRLO  Joint Regional Liaison Officer  
JSP  Joint Service Publication  
LAESI  Local Authority and Emergency Services Information  
LGD  Lead Government Department  
LRF  Local Resilience Forum  
MACA  Military Aid to the Civil Authority  
MACC  Military Aid to the Civil Community  
MACP  Military Aid to the Civil Power  
MAGD  Military Aid to other Government Departments  
MBC  Media Briefing Centre  
MCA  Military Co-ordinating Authority  
MDP  Ministry of Defence Police  
Min(AF)  Minister of State for the Armed Forces  
MLO  Military Liaison Officer  
MOD  Ministry of Defence  
MOU  Memorandum of Understanding  
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation  
NAVCOM  Navy Command  
NCC  News Co-ordination Centre  
NCND  Neither Confirm Nor Deny  
NEPDC  Nuclear Emergency Planning Delivery Committee  
NER  Nuclear Emergency Response  
NERIMS  Nuclear Emergency Response Information Management System  
NIA  Nuclear Installations Act 1965 & 1969  
NNPP  Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programme  
NPW  Nuclear Powered Warship  
NRTE  Naval Reactor Test Establishment  
NTE  Nuclear Transport Emergency  
NTI  Nuclear Transport Incident  
NWP  Nuclear Weapon Programme  
NSC(THRC)  National Security Council (Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies)  
OGD  Other Government Department  
OPCOM  Operational Command  
OSD  Office of the Secretary of Defence  
OSNE  Off-Site Nuclear Emergency  
PACRAM  Procedures and Communications in the event of a release of Radioactive Materials  
PHE CRCE  PHE – Centre for Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards  
PR  Public Relations  
PUS  Permanent Under Secretary  
RED  Resilience and Emergencies Division (DCLG)  
REPPIR  Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations  
RF  Regional Forces  
RG  Recovery Group  
RIMNET  Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network  
RN  Royal Navy  
RRF  Regional Resilience Forum  
RSA  Reactor Safety Alert  
SAAM  Special Assignment Airlift Mission  
SAGE  Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies  
SCC  Strategic Co-ordinating Centre  
SCG  Strategic Co-ordinating Group  
SCS  Senior Civil Servant  
SEPA  Scottish Environment Protection Agency
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SGORR</td>
<td>Scottish Government Resilience Room</td>
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<tr>
<td>SJC(UK)</td>
<td>Strategic Joint Command (United Kingdom)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMAC</td>
<td>Strategic Media Advisory Cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNEG</td>
<td>Scottish Nuclear Resilience Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNI</td>
<td>Site Nuclear Incident</td>
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<td>SNM</td>
<td>Special Nuclear Material</td>
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<tr>
<td>SofS</td>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOO</td>
<td>Senior Operations Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPG</td>
<td>Strategic Planning Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SQEP</td>
<td>Suitably Qualified and Experienced Person</td>
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