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Chapter 1:

INTRODUCTION

Sections in this chapter:

1.1 Scope and aims
1.2 Intended audience
1.3 Definitions
1.4 Structure and content
Chapter 1
1. Introduction

Summary

- The United Kingdom’s approach to preparing for, responding to, and recovering from emergencies is founded on the six activities of Integrated Emergency Management (paragraphs 1.1.2 to 1.1.4).

- This guidance complements Emergency Preparedness, which deals with the pre-emergency phase and describes the requirements of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and supporting regulations (paragraph 1.1.1).

- Emergency Response and Recovery describes the multi-agency framework for responding to and recovering from civil emergencies in the UK (paragraph 1.1.5).

- This guidance is not intended to be prescriptive, and can be adapted in the light of local circumstances, experience and priorities (paragraphs 1.1.3).

- This guidance is targeted at all personnel who may become involved in emergencies, particularly those at a senior level. It aims to develop a shared understanding of multi-agency response and recovery arrangements across responding agencies (paragraphs 1.2.1 and 1.2.2).

- This chapter explains three key terms which underpin this guidance – “response”, “recovery” and “emergency” (paragraphs 1.3.1 to 1.3.8).

- This chapter outlines the scope aims and structure of the guidance (paragraphs 1.4.1 to 1.4.3).
1.1. **Scope and aims**

1.1.1. This guidance document is designed to complement *Emergency Preparedness*, which sets out how the duties under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA) and its supporting Regulations (Regulations) should be implemented. This guidance focuses on guiding principles, practical considerations, operational doctrine and examples of good practice for the emergency response and recovery phases. The CCA, its Regulations, and *Emergency Preparedness* are together referred to as the **CCA regime** throughout this document. Further details on the CCA regime can be found:

- at *Annex A* – which provides a brief overview of the CCA;

- in the *Expectations and Indicators for Good Practice Set for Category 1 and 2 Responders*, – which provides a detailed check-list for Category 1 and 2 Responders; and

- on [www.legislation.gov.uk](http://www.legislation.gov.uk) – where copies of the CCA and the Regulations can be found.

1.1.2. The Civil Contingencies Act assigns a duty to warn and inform the public in the event of an emergency, but otherwise response and recovery activities are not duties under the CCA regime but effective response and recovery are its intended outcomes. The CCA regime should be viewed in the wider context of Integrated Emergency Management (IEM), the concept on which civil protection in the UK is based. IEM is a holistic approach to preventing and managing emergencies that entails six key steps: anticipation; assessment; prevention; preparation; response; and recovery. *Emergency Preparedness* covers the first four of these steps whilst Emergency Response and Recovery covers the remaining two steps: response and recovery.

1.1.3. Under IEM, the preparation for, response to, and recovery from, emergencies focuses on the consequences and wider impacts of events rather than their causes. The underlying aim of IEM is to develop flexible and adaptable arrangements that will enable an effective joint response to and recovery from any emergency. This document establishes a common framework for England and Wales that is flexible enough to be adapted to local circumstances and specific problems. It is not intended to be prescriptive or an operations manual as there is no single approach that will meet the needs of every area, nor is there...
one single set of organisational arrangements that will be appropriate to each and every type of emergency.

1.1.4. IEM and the CCA regime are based on the principle that preparation, response and recovery should be undertaken as an extension of a local responder’s normal day-to-day activities. *Emergency Response and Recovery* is grounded in what local responders do on a day-to-day basis, albeit delivered on a larger scale and to a faster tempo.

1.1.5. The co-operation and information sharing duties in the CCA regime are designed not only to ensure there is a co-ordinated and consistent approach to preparing for emergencies but also to provide a basis for effective integration during emergency response and recovery. Civil protection arrangements need to be integrated both within and between organisations. Not only should civil protection be an integral part of organisational planning, but local responders should work collaboratively as part of a coherent multi-agency effort. This guidance is aimed at a multi-agency audience. It focuses on multi-agency response and recovery arrangements and does not provide specific advice for each sector.

1.1.6. This guidance aims to establish good practice based on lessons identified from responding to and recovering from emergencies, both in the UK and internationally. The objectives of this guidance are to develop further:

- a shared understanding of the multi-agency framework for emergency response and recovery at the local level, and the roles and responsibilities of individual organisations;

- a shared understanding of the role of local, sub-national and national levels in emergency response, and how they will work together; and

- a common frame of reference, especially concepts and language, for those involved in responding to emergencies.

1.2. **Intended audience**

1.2.1. Whilst *Emergency Preparedness* is aimed principally at civil protection professionals, this guidance is likely to be useful to all staff of responder agencies, in particular senior officers or managers who may become involved in emergency response and recovery work. It is
intended to be a stand-alone briefing document that can be used for training purposes in advance of emergencies and for reference purposes during emergencies.

1.2.2. This guidance is primarily aimed at an English and Welsh audience. While this guidance does describe emergency response and recovery arrangements in Scotland and Northern Ireland, it does so for context-setting purposes only. This guidance is relevant to both England and Wales unless otherwise stated.

1.3. Definitions

1.3.1. The following three definitions underpin this guidance document. These terms are used consistently as defined below throughout this document.

Response

1.3.2. Response encompasses the decisions and actions taken to deal with the immediate effects of an emergency. It is the decisions and actions taken in accordance with the strategic, tactical and operational objectives defined by emergency responders. At a high level these will be to protect life, contain and mitigate the impacts of the emergency and create the conditions for a return to normality. In many scenarios it is likely to be relatively short and to last for a matter of hours or days – rapid implementation of arrangements for collaboration, co-ordination and communication are, therefore, vital. Response encompasses the effort to deal not only with the direct effects of the emergency itself (e.g. fighting fires, rescuing individuals) but also the indirect effects (e.g. disruption, media interest).

Recovery

1.3.3. In contrast, recovery may take months or even years to complete, as it seeks to support affected communities in the reconstruction of the physical infrastructure and restoration of emotional, social and physical well-being. The process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency or disaster, continues until the disruption has been rectified, demands on services have been returned to normal levels, and the needs of those affected have been met.

1.3.4. Recovery is defined as the process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency. Although distinct from the response phase, recovery should be an integral part of the response from the very beginning, as actions taken during the response phase can influence the longer-term outcomes for a community.
Emergency

1.3.5. The term emergency underpins this guidance. An emergency is defined in the CCA regime as:

- an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK;
- an event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment of a place in the UK; or
- war, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of the UK.

1.3.6. Additionally, to constitute an emergency, an incident or situation must also pose a considerable test for an organisation’s ability to perform its functions. The common themes of emergencies are: the scale of the impact of the event or situation; the demands it is likely to make of local responders; and the exceptional deployment of resources.

1.3.7. The term emergency is used consistently throughout this guidance to encompass all challenges that require the use of assets beyond the scope of normal operations and require a special deployment. The term “major incident” is commonly used by emergency services personnel to describe events or situations which would constitute an emergency as defined in the CCA regime; this is the threshold of event or situation that will initiate a response under their major incident plans. These terms refer to the same threshold and are essentially interchangeable.

1.3.8. A list of acronyms can be found in annex B. A full list of definitions can be found in the glossary at annex C.

1.4. Structure and content

1.4.1. This guidance outlines local response and recovery arrangements and sets them in context. In particular, it describes:

- the guiding principles that underpin emergency response and recovery - chapter 2;
- how the response and recovery effort is managed and the contribution of individual organisations - chapter 3;
1.4.2. This guidance is not intended to be exhaustive. Throughout, this guidance provides cross references to associated, more detailed guidance. Details on the most up-to-date advice of specific aspects of emergency response and recovery can be found on:

https://www.gov.uk/emergency-response-and-recovery

1.4.3. This guidance is published online so that it can be more frequently updated, to ensure good practice and lessons learnt from actual emergencies and exercises are adequately reflected. For the most recent update of this document, check:

https://www.gov.uk/emergency-response-and-recovery The version number and the date of revision are shown on the footer of each page of this document.
Chapter 2:

PRINCIPLES OF EFFECTIVE RESPONSE AND RECOVERY

Sections in this chapter:

2.1 Guiding principles
2.2 Anticipation
2.3 Preparedness
2.4 Subsidiarity
2.5 Direction
2.6 Information
2.7 Integration
2.8 Co-operation
2.9 Continuity
Chapter 2
2. Principles of effective response and recovery

Summary

- Emergency response and recovery arrangements should be flexible and tailored to reflect circumstances, but will follow a common set of underpinning principles (paragraph 2.1.1 and 2.1.2).

- These principles guide the response and recovery effort at all levels – from local to national (paragraph 2.1.2).

- There are eight guiding principles:

  - **anticipation** – ongoing risk identification and analysis is essential to the anticipation and management of the direct, indirect and interdependent consequences of emergencies (see section 2.2);
    - **preparedness** – all organisations and individuals that might have a role to play in emergency response and recovery should be properly prepared and be clear about their roles and responsibilities (see section 2.3);
    - **subsidiarity** – decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level, with coordination at the highest necessary level; local agencies are the building blocks of the response to and recovery from an emergency of any scale (see section 2.4);
    - **direction** – clarity of purpose comes from a strategic aim and supporting objectives that are agreed, understood and sustained by all involved. This will enable the prioritisation and focus of the response and recovery effort (see section 2.5);
    - **information** – information is critical to emergency response and recovery and the collation, assessment, verification and dissemination of information must be underpinned by appropriate information management systems. These systems need to support single and multi-agency decision making and the external provision of information that will allow members of the public to make informed decisions to ensure their safety (see section 2.6);
o **integration** – effective co-ordination should be exercised between and within organisations and levels (i.e. local, sub-national and national) in order to produce a coherent, integrated effort (see section 2.7);

o **co-operation** – flexibility and effectiveness depends on positive engagement and information sharing between all agencies and at all levels (see section 2.8); and

o **continuity** – emergency response and recovery should be grounded in the existing functions of organisations and familiar ways of working, albeit on a larger scale, to a faster tempo and in more testing circumstances (see section 2.9).
2.1. Guiding principles

2.1.1. What constitutes an appropriate response to and recovery from an emergency will be determined by a range of factors which will include:

- the nature and demands of the emergency, specifically context, geographical extent, duration, complexity and potential impacts;
- local experience and the designated lead agency;
- local circumstances, priorities and experience; and
- whether or not there is sub-national, national or international involvement in the response and recovery effort.

2.1.2. However, there are eight guiding principles that underpin the response to and recovery from every emergency. These principles apply equally to each tier (local, sub-national and national) and are consistent with Central Government Arrangements for Responding to an Emergency: Concept of Operations. In the interests of achieving coherent arrangements for emergency response and recovery, these principles should be applied at the local, sub-national and national levels. A check-list of considerations for responders for each of these principles can be found in part 3 of the Expectations and Indicators for Good Practice Set for Category 1 and 2 Responders.

2.2. Anticipation

2.2.1. Anticipation is crucial in both the pre-emergency and post-emergency phases. Anticipation is commonly used to describe the first phase of the Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) process, which sees organisations actively “horizon-scanning” for risks and potential emergencies. Anticipation is also a principle of effective response and recovery, and, at the strategic level, the risk focus must be forwards, upwards and outwards, with more operational risks being appropriately addressed at lower levels.

2.2.2. All emergencies have disparate direct and indirect impacts that may not be immediately apparent amidst the pressure, uncertainties and demanding circumstances of an emergency. Two factors merit particular consideration in planning: training and exercising.
In emergencies, risk becomes dynamic. New risks emerge, previously recognised risks recede and the balance between risks changes continuously. Active risk assessment and management should be an ongoing process. But this should enable, rather than obstruct, effective operations by providing analysis of, and solutions to, anticipated problems before they arise.

Emergencies create business continuity challenges. Demands on staff time, resources and management attention will be significant and maintaining the response and recovery effort alongside an organisation’s day-to-day functions will pose a major challenge. The risk of senior management discontinuity during prolonged periods of pressure may not be immediately apparent, but can be significant. This can be managed through good organisation; planning and thorough training; and preparation of deputies and second teams at every level.

2.2.3. An important aspect of anticipation is addressing recovery issues at the earliest possible opportunity, ensuring that the response and recovery effort is fully integrated. This will ensure that recovery priorities are factored into the initial response, and will ensure coherence between the two streams of activity. Ideally, the two activities should be taken forward in tandem from the outset, although in some cases constraints on capacity may necessitate a degree of separation, with the recovery effort gathering momentum once the initial risk to life has been addressed.

2.3. Preparedness

2.3.1. All individuals and organisations that might play a part in the response and recovery effort should be appropriately prepared. This requires a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities and how they fit into the wider, multi-agency picture.

2.3.2. A brief overview of the roles and responsibilities of the major agencies involved in emergency response and recovery can be found in chapter 3. Further guidance on the multi-agency framework for managing emergency response and recovery work can be found in chapters 4 and 5.

2.3.3. The Act requires those organisations likely to be at the core of an emergency response to work together to ensure that they are prepared for emergencies, as identified through the national to local processes of risk assessment. Emergency Preparedness explains the
requirements of the legislation and offers good practice advice to local responders. A brief outline of the aims, objectives and provisions of the Act can be found at annex A.

2.4. **Subsidiarity**

2.4.1. The UK’s approach to emergency response and recovery is founded on a bottom-up approach in which operations are managed and decisions are made at the lowest appropriate level. In all cases, local agencies are the building blocks of response and recovery operations. Indeed, the local level deals with most emergencies with little or no input from the sub-national or national levels.

2.4.2. The role of central government and the devolved administrations is to support and supplement the efforts of local responders through the provision of resources and co-ordination. The central and sub-national tiers will only become involved in emergency response and recovery efforts where it is necessary or helpful to do so (chapters 9 and 13).

2.5. **Direction**

2.5.1. When an emergency occurs, those responsible for managing the response and recovery effort will face an array of competing demands and pressures. These will vary according to the event or situation that caused the emergency, the speed of its onset, the geographical area affected, any concurrent or interdependent events, and many other factors. The information available will often be incomplete, inaccurate or ambiguous, and perceptions of the situation may differ within and between organisations. The response and recovery effort may involve many organisations, potentially from across the public, private and voluntary sectors, and each will have its own responsibilities, capabilities and priorities that require co-ordination.

2.5.2. To negotiate these pressures, it is essential to establish a clear and unambiguous strategic aim and objectives, and this will usually be done by the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (see chapter 4). This will help establish a shared set of priorities and thereby focus effort and resources where they are most required. The determination of the aim and objectives and their communication and observance are fundamental to the success of the multi-agency effort.

2.5.3. In sudden impact emergencies (e.g. explosions or transport accidents) local responders will immediately strive to save life, alleviate suffering and contain and mitigate the impacts of
the emergency. But in most cases, the response phase is relatively short, perhaps only a matter of hours. The strategic aim should look beyond the immediate demands of the response and embrace the longer-term priorities of restoring essential services and helping to facilitate the recovery of the affected communities.

2.5.4. Common objectives for responders are:

- saving and protecting human life;
- relieving suffering;
- containing the emergency – limiting its escalation or spread and mitigating its impacts;
- providing the public and businesses with warnings, advice and information;
- protecting the health and safety of responding personnel;
- safeguarding the environment;
- as far as reasonably practicable, protecting property;
- maintaining or restoring critical activities;
- maintaining normal services at an appropriate level;
- promoting and facilitating self-help in affected communities;
- facilitating investigations and inquiries (e.g. by preserving the scene and effective records management);
- facilitating the recovery of the community (including the humanitarian, economic, infrastructure and environmental impacts);
- evaluating the response and recovery effort; and
- identifying and taking action to implement lessons identified.
2.5.5. In slow-onset emergencies (e.g. disruption to the fuel supply or spread of infectious disease) where the emergency services may not necessarily lead the response, the strategic aim may be more difficult to identify and formulate. It is, nevertheless, equally important to establish a clear aim and objectives to bring direction and coherence to the activities of multiple agencies under circumstances of sustained pressure, complexity and potential hazard and volatility. Government may, in certain limited circumstances, assume the role of setting the strategic direction where only it is in a position to deliver the necessary co-ordination.

2.6. Information

2.6.1. Information is critical to emergency response and recovery, yet maintaining the flow of information, within agencies, with partners, and to the wider public, is extremely challenging under emergency conditions. The importance of information to emergency responders and those affected by events must not be underestimated. Effective information management is dependent upon appropriate preparatory measures being in place to build situational awareness and the development of a Common Recognised Information Picture (CRIP) at the local, sub-national and national levels (if appropriate). Such measures will need to support:

- the transmission and collation of potentially high volumes of information from multiple sources;

- the assessment of collated information to ensure its relevance, accuracy, timeliness, accessibility, interpretability and transparency; and

- the translation of available information into appropriate information products, for example, briefing the Strategic Co-ordinating Group or national groups, or release to the media for public information.

2.6.2. Particular challenges that may need to be addressed to realise the collation, assessment, validation and dissemination of information under emergency conditions may include:

- information management procedures may vary between agencies;

- perspectives on the event or situation may differ;
• mistakes and misunderstandings may occur under pressure; and

• communications can become overloaded.

2.6.3. There is a balance to be struck between ensuring that decisions are well informed and acting swiftly and decisively. Establishing systematic information management systems and embedding them within multi-agency emergency management arrangements will enable the right balance to be struck. It is important to note that voluntary and private sector organisations will typically need to be included in the multi-agency response and, as such, they must be integrated into the information management structures and processes that are established, trained, exercised and tested. In particular, the sharing of information in a way that is responsive to the needs of emergency responders, and is compliant with data protection and other legislation, needs to be thoroughly understood and tested. In establishing information management systems and processes responders should bear in mind the following guidance: Data Protection and Sharing – Guidance for Emergency Planners and Responders

2.6.4. Terms and definitions must come from national standards and publications rather than local initiative and invention. Parochial usage may interfere with interoperability and co-operation with local partners and neighbouring areas and hinder co-ordination at the sub-national and national levels. The same applies to concepts of operation, doctrine and structures. A lexicon of terminology for multi-agency, local strategic operations is maintained by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat and published at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-responder-interoperability-lexicon. Document glossaries, whether national, regional or local, must be terminologically ‘faithful’ to this lexicon.

2.6.5. Where likely information requirements have been defined, local responders need to follow the established templates for such information products, whether these are locally determined or supplied from the sub-national or national level. Additionally, the use of such templates, and information management more broadly, should be embedded and evaluated through training and exercising.

2.6.6. Any emergency will result in widespread media interest and public concern. It is, therefore, essential that structures and processes exist to manage the demands of the media and to ensure that messages given out are consistent. It is similarly essential that the public receives appropriate advice, warnings and information to provide reassurance and a basis
for any necessary action. Further information on arrangements for working with the media and providing information to the public can be found in chapter 8.

2.6.7. As described in chapter 3, the private and voluntary sectors and the general public are key participants in the recovery management effort. The flow of authoritative information following the principles set out above underpins the resilience of a community to disruptive challenges; supports business continuity management arrangements; and facilitates 'self-help'.

2.7. Integration

2.7.1. Responding to, and recovering from, emergencies is a multi-agency activity that may involve many organisations. Their involvement, role and relative prominence may change between phases of the emergency. Furthermore, depending on the nature and severity of the event or situation, there may also be involvement from sub-national and national levels. It is crucial that the contributions of respective organisations are integrated.

2.7.2. The range of organisations involved in emergency response and recovery can pose difficulties for the effective management of local operations, and this underlines the importance of putting in place clearly defined structures to ensure that key agencies can:

- combine and act as a coherent multi-agency group;
- consult, agree and decide on key issues; and
- issue instructions, policies and guidance to which emergency response partners will conform.

2.7.3. This will only be achieved if structures and processes are formulated through careful planning, and embedded through operations and regular training and exercising. Chapter 4 describes, in greater detail, the generic multi-agency framework for the management and co-ordination of local operations, while Emergency Preparedness covers the work required in the preparatory phases to enable effective integration.

2.7.4. Emergencies do not respect boundaries. Some emergencies may affect large areas, and some may have national or even international implications (e.g. maritime pollution or atmospheric radiological pollution). It is important that mechanisms are in place to manage
emergencies which straddle Local Resilience Areas and regions, or affect more than one part of the UK (i.e. England, Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland). Chapter 4 describes some of the mechanisms that are in place to deliver this integration in the case of wide-area emergencies.

2.8. Co-operation

2.8.1. Emergency response and recovery is a multi-agency activity. The management of emergencies brings together a wide range of organisations which are not bound by hierarchical relationships. Although one agency may take the lead in relation to an emergency, or a phase or an aspect of that emergency, decision-making processes should always aim to be inclusive and, wherever possible, arrive at consensual decisions.

2.8.2. Mutual trust and understanding are, therefore, the fundamental building blocks of effective multi-agency operations. Organisations must understand each other’s functions, ways of working, priorities and constraints. This will facilitate the open dialogue that is essential for a common aim and objectives to be developed, agreed and worked towards. Furthermore, openness between agencies must be supported and assured by a commitment to the confidentiality of shared information when dealing with third parties or the public at large. Unauthorised disclosure of information or unilateral action will not only prejudice cohesion, but may also undermine operational effectiveness.

2.9. Continuity

2.9.1. Emergency response and recovery arrangements in the United Kingdom are founded on the premise that those organisations undertaking functions on a day-to-day basis are best placed to exercise them in the demanding circumstances of an emergency. The experience, expertise, resources and relationships they have established will be crucial, even though they may be deployed in a different way or supported by neighbouring areas. For this reason, the CCA imposes a duty on those organisations to plan for emergencies in respect of their every day role.

2.9.2. Effective response and recovery will be grounded in tried and tested arrangements built on everyday working practices. Wherever possible, response and recovery arrangements should preserve established structures and ways of doing things that people know well.
2.9.3. By their very nature, emergencies require the special deployment of staff and resources. Wherever roles, responsibilities and organisational arrangements are different in emergency mode, these should be embedded through training and exercising.
Chapter 3:

AGENCIES INVOLVED IN RESPONDING TO AND RECOVERING FROM EMERGENCIES

Sections in this chapter:

3.1 Agencies involved in responding to and recovering from emergencies
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Chapter 3
3. Agencies involved in responding to and recovering from emergencies

Summary

This chapter outlines the roles and responsibilities of the main agencies and sectors that are likely to become engaged in the response to, and recovery from, emergencies at the local level. This chapter describes arrangements in both England and Wales unless otherwise stated. It includes information on:

- **Category 1 responders**
  - police services;
  - fire and rescue authorities;
  - health bodies;
  - Maritime and Coastguard Agency;
  - local authorities; and
  - Environment Agency.

- **Category 2 responders**
  - utilities;
  - telecommunications;
  - transport providers;
  - Highways Agency;
  - Health and Safety Executive
  - category 2 responder health bodies; and

- **The wider resilience community**

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1 For definitions of what is meant by the terms Category 1 and 2 responders, refer to the glossary
3.1. **Agencies involved in responding to and recovering from emergencies**

3.1.1. The CCA describes two categories of responder, with differing duties required of each. (The role of these responders in preparing for emergencies is described in *Emergency Preparedness*, annex A and *The Expectations and Indicators of Good Practice Set for Category 1 and 2 Responders*. Part 3 of the latter provides a check-list of considerations for effective emergency response and recovery). This chapter focuses on their role in responding to, and recovering from, emergencies. The role of the wider resilience community in emergency response and recovery is also summarised.

3.2. **Category 1 responders**

*Police services*

3.2.1. The police will normally co-ordinate the activities of those responding to a land-based sudden impact emergency, at and around the scene. There are however exceptions, for example, a fire and rescue authority would co-ordinate the response at the scene for a major fire.

3.2.2. For the police, as for other responders, the saving and protection of life is the priority. However they must also ensure the scene is preserved, so as to safeguard evidence for subsequent enquiries and, possibly, criminal proceedings. Once life-saving is complete, the area will be preserved as a crime scene until it is confirmed otherwise (unless the emergency results from severe weather or other natural phenomena and no element of human culpability is involved).

3.2.3. The police oversee any criminal investigation. Where a criminal act is suspected, they must undertake the collection of evidence, with due labelling, sealing, storage and recording. They facilitate inquiries carried out by the responsible accident investigation bodies, such as the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) or the Air, Rail or Marine Accident Investigation Branches. If there is the possibility that an emergency has been caused by terrorist action, then that will be taken as the working assumption until demonstrated otherwise.

3.2.4. Where practical, the police, in consultation with other emergency services and specialists, will establish and maintain cordons at appropriate distances. Cordons are established to facilitate the work of the emergency services and other responding agencies in the saving of life, the protection of the public and property, and the care of survivors.
3.2.5. Where terrorist action is suspected to be the cause of an emergency, the police will take additional measures to protect the scene (which will be treated as the scene of a crime) and will assume overall control of the incident. These measures may include establishing cordons to restrict access to, and require evacuation from, the scene, and carrying out searches for secondary devices.

3.2.6. All agencies with staff working within the inner cordon remain responsible for the health and safety of their staff. Each agency should ensure that personnel arriving at the scene have appropriate personal protective equipment and are adequately trained and briefed. Health and safety issues will be addressed collectively at multi-agency meetings on the basis of a risk assessment. If it is a terrorist incident, the police will ensure that health and safety issues are considered and this will be informed by an assessment of the specific risks associated with terrorist incidents.

3.2.7. The police process casualty information and have responsibility for identifying and arranging for the removal of fatalities. In this task, they act on behalf of HM Coroner, who has the legal responsibility for investigating the cause and circumstances of any deaths involved.

3.2.8. Survivors or casualties may not always be located in or immediately around the scene of an incident. It is, therefore, important to consider the need to search the surrounding area. If this is necessary, the police will normally co-ordinate search activities on land. Where the task may be labour intensive and cover a wide area, assistance should be sought from the other emergency services, the Armed Forces or volunteers.

Fire and rescue authorities

3.2.9. The primary role of a fire and rescue authority in an emergency is to extinguish any fire and rescue anyone trapped by fire, wreckage or debris. They will prevent further escalation of an incident by controlling or extinguishing fires, rescuing people, and undertaking other protective measures. They will deal with released chemicals or other contaminants in order to render the incident site safe, or recommend exclusion zones. They will assist other agencies in the removal of large quantities of flood water. They may also assist ambulance services with casualty-handling, and the police with the recovery of bodies.

3.2.10. In some areas, there are agreements between fire and rescue and the police for controlling entry to cordons. Where this is the case, fire and rescue are trained and equipped to
manage gateways into the inner cordon and will liaise with the police to establish who
should be granted access and keep a record of people entering and exiting.

3.2.11. Where required, a fire and rescue authority will undertake mass decontamination of the
general public in circumstances where large numbers of people have been exposed to
chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear substances. This is done on behalf of the NHS,
in consultation with ambulance services.

Ambulance services
3.2.12. As part of the NHS, Ambulance Trusts have the responsibility for responding to and co-
ordinating the on-site NHS response to short notice or sudden impact emergencies. This
includes identifying the receiving hospital(s) to which injured people should be taken, which
depending on the types and numbers of injured, may include numerous hospitals remote
from the immediate area where the incident has occurred. The person with overall
responsibility for this, at the scene of an emergency, is the Ambulance Incident
Commander (AIC). If necessary, the AIC may seek the attendance of a Medical Incident
Advisor (MIA) and/or mobilise specialist medical teams, for instance Medical Emergency
Response Incident Teams (MERITs). Both the MIA and these specialist medical teams
would come from across the local NHS.

3.2.13. Ambulance Trusts, in conjunction with the MIA, medical teams and other emergency
services, endeavour to sustain life through effective prioritisation of emergency treatment at
the scene. This enables the AIC to determine the priority for release of trapped, treatment
and where necessary, decontamination of casualties. This will allow patients to be
transported in order of priority, to receiving hospitals.

3.2.14. Ambulance services may seek support from other organisations, specifically the voluntary
sector (e.g. British Red Cross, St John Ambulance), in managing and transporting
casualties. If these resources are deployed, these organisations would work under the
direction of the Ambulance Trust.

3.2.15. Ambulance Services also have Hazardous Area Response Teams (HARTs). These are
highly trained staff with specialist equipment capable of entering hazardous environments
with the sole purpose of saving life. Each Ambulance Trust has at least one HART and they
are strategically located throughout the country.
3.2.16. Where casualties are many, Ambulance Services may establish a Casualty Clearing Station (CCS) at or near the scene of the incident. The CCS is designed to provide medical care for those injured at the scene. If MERIT has been requested their skills will be utilised here for the benefit of patient care.

Acute Trusts and Foundation Trusts

3.2.17. Hospitals are managed by Acute Trusts and Foundation Trusts in England and by Local Health Boards in Wales. In the event of an emergency resulting in large numbers of casualties, the ambulance service will designate receiving hospital(s) from one of these organisations. Hospitals with major accident and emergency units and specialist treatment centres (i.e. burns units) are usually selected. If an AIC requests the attendance of a MIA or specialist medical teams, it would be Acute Trusts in England and Local Health Boards in Wales that provides this clinical response. This clinical response provides general support and specialist healthcare to casualties at the scene of the emergency.

Primary and community care services

3.2.18. The provision of primary and community care covers a range of health professions, including general practitioners, community nurses, health visitors, mental health services and pharmacists, many of whom would need to be involved, particularly during the recovery phase of an emergency.

3.2.19. In the early stages following an incident, the focus would be on the follow-up to injuries incurred at the incident, i.e. the continuing recovery or patients, physiotherapy, chest clinics, orthopaedic clinics, dressings, drug regimes, and the post-traumatic stress caused by the event. Depending on the nature of the emergency, there may then be a requirement for more long-term health monitoring / surveillance. Appropriate NHS organisations ensure that these primary care services are engaged in NHS emergency preparedness activities.

NHS Clinical Commissioning Groups

3.2.20. The Health and Social Care Act 2012 made significant changes to health organisations involved in emergency preparedness, resilience and response (EPRR). The Act makes consequential amendments to the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA). From April 2013, commissioning responsibilities passed from Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) to Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) and CCGs become Category 2 responders under the CCA. Directors of Public Health (DsPH), previously employed by PCTs, have moved to unitary and upper tier local authorities where they lead a public health function, and play a key role in local public health emergency preparedness, resilience and response, in
conjunction with Public Health England (PHE). Local authorities, incorporating DsPH, remain a Category 1 responder under the CCA. NHS England has established Local Health Resilience Partnerships (LHRPs) in each LRF area which will ensure that local emergency plans for the Health Sector are complete and sufficient and that they are fully joined up with other local partners.

**NHS England**

3.2.21. From April 2013, Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) and the role they played in coordinating the health response across a widespread incident were replaced by NHS England, working through four regional offices. The Health and Social Care Act 2012 made consequential amendments to the CCA such that NHS England became a Category 1 responder under the CCA.

**Public Health England (PHE)**

3.2.22. Public Health England is an Executive Agency created following the Health and Social Care Act 2012. It is a Category 1 responder and carries out all the responsibilities previously attributed to the Health Protection Agency (HPA), including the specific health protection with respect to radiation and chemicals in Scotland and Wales.

3.2.23. PHE identifies and responds to health hazards and emergencies caused by infectious disease, hazardous chemicals, poisons or radiation. It does this by information and surveillance activities to detect and monitor threats; this includes horizon scanning, risk assessment, and modelling. It gives advice to the public on how to stay healthy and avoid health hazards, provides data and information to government to help inform its decision making, and advises people working in healthcare. It also makes sure the nation is ready for future threats to health that could happen naturally, accidentally or deliberately.

3.2.24. PHE combines public health and scientific knowledge, research and emergency planning within one organisation - and works at international, national, regional and local levels. It also supports and advises other organisations that play a part in protecting health.

**Public Health Wales (PHW)**

3.2.25. Public health advice is available in Wales from Public Health Wales. The service will provide management of the public health aspects of emergencies in Wales, working closely with other parts of the NHS and non-NHS agencies as appropriate.
Port health authorities

3.2.26. These are separately constituted local authorities in England that carry out a range of functions at seaports and airports. Their primary duties in an emergency relate to the control of infectious disease, environmental protection, imported food control and hygiene on vessels. In some instances, they are part of a local authority, in others they may be a joint board of local authorities serving a number of ports in a harbour, or a single authority carrying out the function across the districts of a number of local authorities. They work closely with the Public Health England, Food Standards Agency, Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), Welsh Assembly Government, and the National Public Health Service for Wales.

Independent Healthcare Organisations

3.2.27. Independent healthcare organisations are not covered by the CCA regime automatically. However, it is the responsibility of those NHS organisations that commission services from the independent sector to ensure those providers of care are engaged in the process of health resilience planning and any response to emergencies in their local area. In addition, some ambulance services have links with local private ambulance services for the deployment of agreed resources as required in the event of an emergency.

Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)

3.2.28. The MCA is an executive agency of the Department for Transport (DfT). The MCA’s Directorate of Maritime Services includes HM Coastguard (responsible for civil maritime search and rescue) and the Counter Pollution and Response Branch.

3.2.29. The primary responsibility of HM Coastguard is to initiate and co-ordinate civil maritime search and rescue within the UK Search and Rescue Region. This includes mobilising, organising and dispatching resources to assist people in distress at sea, or in danger on the cliffs or shoreline, or in certain inland areas. HM Coastguard may assist other emergency services and local authorities during civil emergencies, such as flooding, at the specific request of the police or local authority. The Counter Pollution and Response Branch is responsible for dealing with pollution at sea, and assists local authorities with shoreline clean-ups.

3.2.30. Co-located with the MCA is the Secretary of State’s Representative (SOSREP). SOSREP is empowered under merchant shipping legislation to intervene on behalf of the Secretary of State for purposes relating to safety or pollution in respect of ships, given certain
Emergency Response and Recovery

conditions. This includes powers to give directions. SOSREP has similar powers regarding pollution from offshore oil and gas installations. See www.legislation.gov.uk for details.

3.2.31. The MCA’s emergency response and recovery roles are further explained in the Search and Rescue Framework for the United Kingdom and the National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution.

Local Authorities (LA)

3.2.32. There are two types of local authority structure in England: single-tier and two-tier. In the two-tier system, a county council and several district councils divide responsibilities for local authority services. County councils are responsible for running children’s services (which includes children’s social services and education) and adult social care. Other functions include strategic planning, regeneration, transport and roads, libraries, refuse disposal and trading standards. District councils are responsible for leisure, environmental health, housing, planning control and refuse collection. In the single-tier system, one authority is responsible for all local authority functions. In Wales, there is a single tier structure of local government with 22 unitary authorities.

3.2.33. Local authorities play a critical role in civil protection. They have a wide range of functions that are likely to be called upon in support of the emergency services during emergency response and recovery and this now includes Public Health functions carried out by the Director of Public Health. Local authorities are one of the main bodies representing the community and their role in emergency response and recovery largely reflects this.

3.2.34. The local authority will play an enabling role in close collaboration with a wide range of bodies which are not routinely involved in emergency response e.g. building proprietors, land owners, etc. In particular, the local authority will work with partners to:

- provide immediate shelter and welfare for survivors not requiring medical support and their families and friends via evacuation, rest, humanitarian and other centres to meet their immediate to short term needs. See chapter 4 (for evacuation) and 7 (for humanitarian centres);

- provide medium to longer-term welfare of survivors (e.g. social services support and financial assistance which may be generated from appeal funds and also provide help-lines which should answer the public’s questions as a one stop shop). Local authorities
have a large part in addressing community needs via drop-in centres and organising anniversaries and memorials as part of the recovery effort;

- provide Investigating and Enforcement Officers under the provision of the Food and Environment Protection Act 1985 as requested by DEFRA;

- facilitate the inspection of dangerous structures to ensure that they are safe for emergency personnel to enter;

- clean up of pollution and facilitate the remediation and reoccupation of sites or areas affected by an emergency;

- liaise with the coroner’s office to provide emergency mortuary capacity in the event that existing mortuary provision is exceeded. For further details on arrangements for dealing with fatalities in emergencies see chapter 7;

- co-ordinate the activities of the various voluntary sector agencies involved, and spontaneous volunteers;

- may provide catering facilities, toilets and rest rooms for use by all agencies in one place, for the welfare of emergency response personnel in the event of a protracted emergency. This will depend on the circumstances and available premises;

- lead the recovery effort, which is likely to carry on for a considerable time and is likely to involve many organisations who are not ordinarily involved in, or used to the speed and scale of the recovery effort. They may also put in place arrangements for supporting communities to become more resilient to the risks they face.

3.2.35. Local authorities should consider and plan for the roles of both officers and elected members in emergency response and recovery. Experience has shown that where their respective roles have not been established prior to an emergency, or where agreed roles are exceeded or disregarded, then the coherence of the local authority’s position is undermined. Local authorities should ensure that they have plans and procedures to inform their elected members of risks and emergencies, ensure the safety of elected members,

\footnote{For details see www.legislation.gov.uk.}
avoid issuing contradictory or unconfirmed information to the media and the public, avoid duplication of effort and prevent unnecessary additional workload for officers responding to the incident.

3.2.36. From April 2013 local authorities have new roles and responsibilities in relation to public health, supported by a Director of Public Health.

**Environment Agency (EA)**

3.2.37. The EA is the leading public body for protecting and improving the environment in England. As an environmental regulator, with a wide range of roles and responsibilities, it responds to many different types of incident affecting the natural environment, human health or property.

3.2.38. The EA’s main priorities, during the response and recovery phases are to:

- prevent or minimise the impact of the incident;
- investigate the cause of the incident and consider enforcement action; and
- seek remediation, clean-up or restoration of the environment.

3.2.39. The role of the Environment Agency at an incident depends on the nature of the event. For example:

- in a flood event, it focuses on operational issues such as issuing flood warnings, predicting the location, timing and magnitude of flooding and operating its flood defence assets to protect communities and critical infrastructure;
- in a pollution incident, it will seek to prevent/control and monitor the input of pollutants to the environment. In emergencies involving air pollution the EA will co-ordinate a multi-agency Air Quality Cell to provide interpreted air quality information;
- in other emergencies (such as animal disease outbreaks), its principal role is usually to regulate and provide advice and support on waste disposal issues;
Natural Resources Wales (NRW)

3.2.40. From 1 April 2013, Natural Resources Wales (NRW), a new body formed by the Welsh Government, took over the functions previously carried out by the Environment Agency (EA) in Wales, alongside those of the Forestry Commission Wales and the Countryside Council for Wales.

3.3. **Category 2 responders**

**Utilities, telecommunications and transport providers**

3.3.1. There is a wide range of private sector bodies that, while not routinely involved in the core of multi-agency emergency response and recovery work, will have an important role in the response to, and recovery from, emergencies affecting their sectors. They include:

- gas and electricity transmitters and distributors;
- fixed and mobile telecommunications providers;
- water and sewerage undertakers; and
- a range of transport companies.

3.3.2. These organisations are crucial players in emergency response and recovery, and will work closely with emergency services and local authorities to deliver timely restoration of essential services to help minimise the wider impact on the community.

3.3.3. There are established sector-specific emergency planning arrangements and response frameworks in place in each of these sectors to build resilience and ensure effective response. For example, emergency management done by water and sewerage undertakers is governed by a Security and Emergency Measures Direction (SEMD) made under Section 208 of the Water Industry Act 1991³.

³ For details see [www.legislation.gov.uk](http://www.legislation.gov.uk)
3.3.4. There are also established multi-agency arrangements for dealing with incidents affecting sites covered by the Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH), Pipelines Safety, and Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations (REPPIR).

3.3.5. More information on legislative and non legislative arrangements that relate to emergency response and recovery, but are outside of the CCA regime, can be found on: www.legislation.gov.uk; and https://www.gov.uk/emergency-response-and-recovery.

Highways Agency§

3.3.6. The Highways Agency, established in 1994, is an executive agency of the Department for Transport. It is responsible for the operation and stewardship of the English strategic road network on behalf of the Secretary of State for Transport. The Highways Agency road network carries a third of all road traffic in England and two thirds of all heavy freight traffic. The network provides a vital service to commerce, industry and to the lives of individuals and communities.

3.3.7. The Highways Agency’s primary functions are to manage traffic, tackle congestion, provide information to road users and improve safety and journey time reliability, whilst respecting and minimising any potential adverse impact on the environment. These roles are fulfilled by close partnership working with partners and managing agent contractors. It has strong links with other road administrations across Europe and around the world for the mutual exchange of information and expertise. Many of these functions, in particular providing information, improving safety and tackling congestion are relevant to the response to emergencies that have a direct or indirect impact on road travel.

3.3.8. The National Traffic Control Centre (NTCC) based in the West Midlands is a central hub for the collection and dissemination of traffic and travel information across the entire Network. Six Regional Control Centres (RCC) situated throughout England, further assist with collection and dissemination of information, also serving as regional depots for the Traffic Officers and as control centres for the strategic management of localised incidents.

Health and Safety Executive (HSE)

3.3.9. HSE’s mission is to protect people’s health and safety by ensuring that risks in the workplace are properly controlled. HSE regulates health and safety in nuclear installations,

§ The Highways Agency does not operate in Wales. In Wales, its functions are carried out by the Welsh Government.
mines, factories, farms, hospitals, schools, offshore gas and oil installations and other workplaces. It also regulates the safety of the gas grid, railway safety, and many other aspects of the protection of both workers and the public.

3.3.10. HSE’s remit encompasses the workplace health and safety of other responding agencies, including the emergency services. In addition, its chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) experts can provide relevant specialist or technical advice to support planning for, response to, and recovery from emergencies, especially, but not exclusively, those events that involve major hazard industrial sites. HSE has a 24/7 response to emergencies that includes a decision maker who will assess the initial incident and determine HSE’s approach and deployment of resources.

3.4. **The wider resilience community**

**Lead Government Departments (LGDs)**

3.4.1 Although most incidents are handled by Category 1 and 2 responders, with no direct involvement from central government, where there is a need for central government involvement, this is undertaken in accordance with the established concept of Lead Government Department. For both emergency response and recovery there is a pre-designated list of departments that would take the lead if required. The role of each Lead Government Department in emergencies is outlined in [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/list-of-lead-government-departments-responsibilities-for-planning-response-and-recovery-from-emergencies](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/list-of-lead-government-departments-responsibilities-for-planning-response-and-recovery-from-emergencies)

3.4.2 The National Resilience Capabilities Programme is the core framework through which the Government is seeking to build resilience across all parts of the United Kingdom. The aim of this programme is to ensure that a robust infrastructure of response is in place to deal rapidly, effectively and flexibly with the consequences of a wide range of emergencies. The programme is split into 22 active work-streams which fall into three groups: structural (local, multi-area, and national); essential services (food and water; health services; transport; telecoms and postal; energy; financial services) and functional (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) resilience; infectious diseases (human); infectious diseases (animal and plant); mass fatalities; mass casualties; evacuation and shelter; warning and informing the public; humanitarian assistance; flooding; recovery; emergency communications). Each of these work-streams is the responsibility of a designated lead Department. Further details on this programme and the role of each Government...
Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories Agency

3.4.3 Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories Agency (AHVLA) is the government’s executive agency primarily responsible for ensuring that farmed animals in Great Britain are healthy, disease-free and well looked after. AHVLA is responsible for controlling and eradicating notifiable animal diseases, providing advice on disease prevention; implementing and enforcing national and EU legislation on animal welfare, carrying out welfare visits to farms and markets; and the provision of advice on requirements for importing and exporting animals.

3.4.4 Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories Agency is the lead agency for responding to outbreaks and incidents of exotic notifiable animal disease in Great Britain. The Agency works with other delivery partners including local authorities, the Veterinary Laboratories Agency, the Institute of Animal Health, the Public Health England, the Police, and the Environment Agency to contain, control and eradicate outbreaks of disease. AHVLA delivers the policy objectives for the relevant Lead Government Department involved. This is usually the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) in England or the Welsh Government in Wales. In delivering the operational response, government establishes a National Disease Control Centre (NDCC) in London, and one or more Local Disease Control Centres (LDCCs) close to the outbreak or incident. This is to ensure a coordinated and consistent response across Great Britain and is required by European Union (EU) Directive. Control centres may also be established in Cardiff and Edinburgh.

3.4.5 Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories Agency works closely with local resilience teams, Department for Communities and Local Government Resilience and Emergencies Division (DCLG RED) and the other partners responsible for wider consequence management issues resulting from disease outbreaks. Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories Agency will generally provide a liaison officer to be based in Strategic Coordinating Groups (SCGs) and will provide a situation report (Sitreps) and briefing to other delivery partners. In most cases it is expected that key delivery partners will provide appropriate representation in the LDCC. The role of AHVLA and the other delivery agencies is set out in more detail in the DEFRA, Scottish Executive and Welsh Government contingency plans for exotic animal diseases. AHVLA oversees the cleansing and disinfection of premises affected by disease but has a limited role in wider recovery.
activity. The recovery effort for animal health emergencies is coordinated by policy officials from DEFRA or the devolved administration concerned.

3.4.6 Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories Agency does not have an operational delivery role over and above its normal regulatory or enforcement responsibilities in incidents, or emergencies, not involving exotic notifiable animal diseases. However, AHVLA will attend SCGs and provide advice and expert opinion on animal welfare and the management of farmed livestock when required. AHVLA will also provide advice on animal by-product issues and will assist with the tracing of farmed livestock that may have moved from an incident/affected area and which may need to be identified and located. Where appropriate, AHVLA will also provide representation on the local Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) – see chapter 4.

Department of Health (DH)

3.4.7 In addition to its Lead Government Department role, the DH will activate its Incident Response Centre in the event of a complex and significant emergency, including those on a national and international scale, through its Emergency Preparedness, Resilience and Response (EPRR) team. It provides the co-ordination and focal point for the NHS and PHE and supports the Health Ministers and Secretary of State. DH also co-ordinates with the health departments in the devolved administrations where health is a fully devolved function.

Other NHS Organisations and providers of NHS funded services

3.4.8 The NHS has many supporting organisations which assist in providing care to patients; these include NHS Direct (to be replaced by NHS 111), NHS 111, NHS Blood & Transplant, NHS Supply Chain, and Mental Health Trusts. Whilst the CCA at present does not categorise all of these bodies, each NHS organisation must be included in the whole systems approach to planning health resilience and response. This includes the provision of robust business continuity plans. In England, it is for the newly created Local Health Resilience Partnerships (LHRPs) to ensure these NHS organisations are engaged in planning at local and multi-LRF levels.

Public health

3.4.9 In the event of a major public health emergency, Public Health England – working closely with the Directors of Public Health in Local Authorities – provide public health advice, support and leadership to help the NHS manage the emergency. They ensure co-ordination
with multi-LRF resilience mechanisms in preparing for and responding to outbreaks of infectious diseases and other public health emergencies.

3.4.10 Public health advice is available in Wales from Public Health Wales. The service will provide management of the public health aspects of emergencies in Wales, working closely with other parts of the NHS and non-NHS agencies as appropriate.

HM Coroner

3.4.11 The role of the coroner is defined by statute (see www.legislation.gov.uk for details). In an emergency, the coroner will be responsible for establishing the identity of the fatalities and the cause and circumstances of death. Essentially, they will determine who has died and how, when and where the death came about. The coroner will be supported by a deputy and an assistant deputy. Current legislation dictates that a body lying in a coroner’s district (irrespective of where death has occurred) will trigger and determine jurisdiction, provided the deceased has died from violence or sudden death of an unknown cause. If an emergency spans across more than one district, a lead coroner should be established to deal with all fatalities.

3.4.12 Following the recovery of the deceased from the scene (which in most circumstances will be led and co-ordinated by the police and carried out by trained body-recovery teams), it will be for the coroner to decide whether a post mortem is required to establish the cause of death. On the instruction of the coroner, a pathologist carries out the post mortem. If the death does not require an inquest, the death may be registered on receipt of a coroner’s certificate detailing the cause of death; if an inquest is required, the coroner registers the death when the inquest is concluded.

3.4.13 Coroners should have an emergency plan for dealing with multiple deaths for the local authority mortuaries which are within their remit. This should include how dealing with multiple deaths might impact on their normal working arrangements. Additionally, they are instrumental in the development of local and multi-locality emergency plans for extraordinary emergency mortuary arrangements. It is also vital that coroners are familiar with any local emergency mortuary plans developed by Category 1 and 2 responders.

Civil Society including the voluntary sector and faith groups

3.4.14 The voluntary sector can provide an extensive and diverse range of operational and support skills and services to statutory responders. These skills and services include:
• practical support: first aid, support to ambulance services, support to hospital personnel, support to police and fire services; referral to other organisations, search for and rescue of survivors, refreshments and emergency feeding arrangements, transportation and medical services (e.g. diagnosis, administration of drugs);

• psycho-social support: comforting, befriending, listening, help-lines, support lines, support networks, drop-in centres, advice, counselling, spiritual support and group therapy;

• equipment: vehicles (e.g. ambulances, passenger transport, fire and emergency support service caravans), communications (e.g. radios), medical aid equipment (e.g. mobility aids), bedding, clothing and hygiene packs (e.g. washing kits);

• information services: public training (e.g. first aid, flood preparation), communications and documentation; and

• disaster appeal funds and advice.

3.4.15 Statutory responders should be aware of the capabilities and capacity of local voluntary organisations and the means of accessing their services, whether as individual volunteers or as members of local or national volunteer organisations. Statutory responders should develop and implement agreed processes for activating call-out mechanisms, and systems for organising, managing, briefing and debriefing volunteers. The voluntary sector should also be included in post-response review and evaluation activity.

3.4.16 Mutual aid arrangements do exist within and between many of voluntary sector organisations, for activation as required, particularly across boundaries. In the event of a major or international emergency, voluntary sector support may be accessed through the head offices of the relevant voluntary organisations or through the Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum (VSCPF). In extreme circumstances, times of conflict support may be provided by the National Voluntary Aid Society Emergency Committee (NVASEC) - a standing committee that will be convened by the British Red Cross at the request of the Ministry of Defence, Department for Health and the Civil Contingencies Secretariat.

3.4.17 Through local multi-agency liaison arrangements (e.g. the Local Resilience Forum), the statutory services will maintain an overview of the services that are offered across a range of voluntary organisations and will provide an agreed system for co-ordinating the voluntary
sector response, including members of the public who may volunteer their services in response to an incident (convergent or spontaneous volunteers). It is important to avoid double-counting and gaps in service provision by indicating which statutory responder has first call on (or priority need for) any particular voluntary sector contribution.

3.4.18 Agencies using volunteers may become responsible for the health and safety of volunteers. These volunteers should be appropriately equipped, trained, supervised and supported by their own organisations. Statutory responders may also enter into agreements with voluntary organisations in relation to the payment of costs. The voluntary sector can provide important and effective links with local communities and networks.

**Armed Forces**

3.4.19 The Armed Forces’ national structure, organisation, skills, equipment and training can be of benefit to the civil authorities in managing the response to and recovery from emergencies. This support is governed by Military Aid to the Civil Authority (MACA) arrangements. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) Joint Doctrine Publication 02 - *Joint Doctrine Publication 02 - Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience* sets out the detailed rules and procedures governing the employment of the Armed Forces on MACA operations. Reserves, if available, can be deployed alongside regular personnel in most, although not all, scenarios. *JDP02* includes templates for requesting military assistance. The availability and deployment of Defence assets will be determined in accordance with standing criteria which are detailed within *JDP02*.

3.4.20 The Armed Forces maintain no standing forces for MACA tasks. There are, by definition, no permanent or standing MACA responses. Assistance is provided if assets are available and in accordance with the standing criteria as the Armed Forces cannot make a commitment that guarantees assistance to meet specific emergencies. Neither the production of contingency plans, nor Armed Forces’ participation in civil exercises, guarantees the provision of MACA support. It is therefore essential that responding agencies do not base plans upon assumptions of military assistance. In most circumstances the provision of Armed Forces’ support requires approval by a Defence Minister following a request by a government department. The only exception to this is that commanders have the authority to provide urgent assistance to the civil authority under circumstances where it is necessary to save life, alleviate distress or protect property without the need to seek higher authority.

3.4.21 The operational lead for Defence support to the civil authorities is the MOD’s Standing Joint Command (United Kingdom) (SJC(UK)) which is collocated with the Army’s HQ in Andover.
Through the Army’s regional brigades, Defence can provide advice on any support requests and they should be contacted in the first instance. All such headquarters have 24-hour emergency contact telephone numbers. Each regional brigade has at least one Joint Regional Liaison Officer (JRLO) who will assume the tri-Service lead for sub-national and local liaison, and he or she will be the primary initial link with the MoD’s command structure within the UK. Liaison involves the provision of advice and exchange of information. It does not guarantee the provision of support. In exceptional circumstances, requests for assistance may be directed to any service unit, station or establishment.

3.4.22 Under Treasury rules the MOD is required to recover costs for support provided to other government departments. The only exception to this is that where there is a direct threat to life, the MoD may, at its discretion, choose to waive the recovery of costs for assistance provided. In cases where human life is not deemed to be in danger, civil organisations will be required to meet all or some of the costs of the Defence response. When the response moves towards the recovery phase and danger to human life subsides, continued military assistance will be considered as routine and charged for at rates determined by the MoD. Civil authorities should consider the disengagement of military assistance at this point if very high costs are to be avoided.

Search and rescue (SAR)

3.4.23 The MoD has responsibility for providing SAR facilities for military operations, exercises and training within the UK and, by agreement, for civil aeronautical SAR on behalf of the Department for Transport. Where the coverage provided by military SAR assets meets the civil SAR coverage requirements, they will be made available for civil maritime and land-based SAR operations. The MoD establishes and maintains the Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre (ARCC) at RAF Kinloss for the operation and co-ordination of civil and military aeronautical SAR, and requests for aeronautical SAR assistance should be placed directly with ARCC.

Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB)

3.4.24 AAIB, which is part of the Department for Transport (DfT), is responsible for the investigation of civil aircraft accidents and serious incidents within the UK. The AAIB focus their investigation on determining the cause of an air accident or serious incident and then make recommendations intended to prevent a reoccurrence. The AAIB does not apportion blame or liability. For further information see http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk
Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB)

3.4.25 RAIB is the independent railway accident investigation organisation for the UK. It investigates railway accidents and incidents on the UK’s railways (including heritage railways) to improve safety, not to establish blame. For further information see http://www.raib.gov.uk

Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB)

3.4.26 MAIB examines and investigates all types of marine accidents to, or on board, UK ships worldwide, and other ships in UK territorial waters. The objective of the MAIB is to determine the circumstances and causes of the accident in order to preserve life and avoid accidents in the future, not to apportion blame or liability. For further information see http://www.maib.gov.uk

Other private sector organisations

3.4.27 A wider community of industrial or commercial organisations may also play a direct role in the response to emergencies, especially if their organisation is the cause of an emergency (e.g. industrial accident at their premises); is affected by an emergency (e.g. staff need to be evacuated); or can provide resources required to mitigate the effects of an emergency (e.g. food retailers, caterers). Site or service managers may, therefore, become involved in emergency response and recovery work.

3.4.28 In the recovery phase, the private sector will play a significant part, given the size of the resources, specialist expertise and capabilities (e.g. site clearance, decontamination and engineering) at its disposal. It also has a direct commercial interest in ensuring the remediation of sites and the rapid rehabilitation of the communities they operate within.

3.4.29 Insurance is a key enabler in the recovery process and the insurance industry is, therefore, an important player. Insurance staff (e.g. loss adjusters) can deploy to the scene rapidly. The Association of British Insurers (ABI) provides insurance information and advice to members of the public who have suffered loss or damage as a result of an emergency. They have the capability to set up an advice service close to the scene, if required. There is a strong case for building the insurance industry into planning arrangements. This will ensure that the need to give insurance industry personnel appropriate access to the scene is given due consideration. The British Insurance Broker Association (BIBA) provide advice on the nearest unaffected broker.
3.4.30 Communities can play a vital role in planning for, responding to, and recovering from, emergencies. Those individuals and communities who have spent time planning and preparing are often better able to cope, and recover from national and local emergencies. Individuals and communities can provide resources, skills and expertise and will often have a good understanding of their geographical areas and of those people who may need extra support during an emergency, which can be very helpful for responding agencies. Communities can also provide links to pre-existing local networks that response agencies can use for the dissemination of information to the wider local community.

3.4.31 Response agencies, particularly local authorities, should engage with their local community at all stages of planning for emergencies and take advantage of the skills, resources and local knowledge communities may be able to contribute. It is important for response agencies to remember that communities may be defined by numerous factors, and not just by geographical proximity, and this should be taken into account when engaging with community groups. Response agencies should also take account of both pre-existing plans that have been developed by the community, and the enthusiasm of individuals and communities, to get involved in emergency preparedness work when planning for their response to emergencies.

3.4.32 Many local authorities have already recognised the benefits of engaging directly with members of their community by sharing local risk information and supporting communities in developing their own emergency plans, particularly in relation to specific risks such as severe weather. In rural areas this will often involve Parish Councils. In addition to this, self-selecting community groups across the UK have developed their own community resilience initiatives to help them prepare for, and respond to, a wide range of hazards and threats. These self-selecting community groups may seek to draw on guidance, resources and other support from a range of response agencies.

3.4.33 The Civil Contingencies Secretariat leads a programme of work to support the building of community, family and individual resilience, working with government departments, public, private and voluntary sector organisations to:

- increase individual, family and community resilience against all threats and hazards;
- support and enable existing community resilience activity, sharing these successful models in other areas;
• support effective dialogue between the community and the emergency response practitioners supporting them;

• identify and bust barriers to participation;

• raise awareness and understanding of risk and local emergency response capability in order to motivate and sustain self resilience; and

• evaluate the success and articulate the benefits of community resilience.

3.4.34 A series of online resources have been developed to support individuals and communities who wish to take part in emergency preparedness activities. These act as a guide to help prompt thinking, with enable communities to develop their own ways of working. Current resources include:

• **Strategic National Framework on Community Resilience** – sets out the principles of community resilience and outlines what the Government’s contribution will be. It is aimed at anyone who is interested in the strategic overview of community resilience policy.

• **Preparing for Emergencies - Guide for Communities** – an introductory guide for those who are interested in helping their community to prepare for an emergency.

• **Community Emergency Plan Toolkit and Template** – a step by step guide for community leaders and champions on how to prepare their communities for emergencies. It emphasises that this is one way of preparing your community and invites community leaders to consider how they might adapt this to their local area. It includes good practice examples to show communities what can be achieved.

3.4.35 Information for individuals, families, communities and businesses on how they can prepare for emergencies can be found on the [Community Resilience Resources and Tools](#) web pages.

A range of helpful material advice is also available to access and download from the Informed Prepared Together website: [www.informedprepared.eu](http://www.informedprepared.eu).
Civil Nuclear Arrangements

3.4.36 Emergency preparedness in respect of civil nuclear sites was the subject of the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations (REPPIR) 2001, which concentrates on requirements of the emergency phase of any accident at a civil nuclear site. Whilst the REPPIR takes precedence over the Civil Contingencies Act in relation to nuclear emergency preparedness and response, the CCA should be followed in areas not covered by REPPIR.

3.4.37 The Department for Energy and Climate Change chairs the Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group (NEPLG), a forum that brings together a wide range of organisations with interests in off-site planning for an emergency at civil nuclear sites. The Group identifies and finds solutions to common problems, and agrees improvements in planning procedure and organisation to form a framework of advice for emergency planners. NELPG meets twice a year and consists of other sub-groups that meet more frequently and takes into account national and international best practice.

3.4.38 The Group has issued consolidated guidance for planners and practitioners concerned with emergency response at civil nuclear sites; the consolidated guidance now addresses defence sites. However, the guidance does not provide a comprehensive description of civil nuclear response arrangements. For further information on NELPG membership and the consolidated guidance please see:

https://www.gov.uk/preparing-for-and-responding-to-energy-emergencies#civil-nuclear
Chapter 4:

RESPONDING TO EMERGENCIES

Sections in this chapter:

4.1 Management and co-ordination of local operations
4.2 Levels of Command, Control and Co-ordination
4.3 Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC)
4.4 Using and adapting the management framework in specific circumstances
4.5 Response phase funding
4.6 Identifying and learning lessons
Chapter 4

4. Responding to emergencies

Summary

- There is an agreed national framework for managing the local multi-agency response to, and recovery from, emergencies. This chapter describes the single-agency and multi-agency management tiers that comprise the local framework; their roles and responsibilities; the interaction between the tiers; and the interaction between individual agencies within the tiers (paragraphs 4.1.3 to 4.1.6).

- Command, Control and Co-ordination are important concepts in the multi-agency response to emergencies and this chapter distinguishes between single agency command and control structures (often termed Gold, Silver and Bronze) and the multi-agency co-ordination structures that may be convened at Strategic, Tactical and, exceptionally, at Operational levels (section 4.2).

- It is a generic framework and the principles and procedures underpinning it are flexible enough to be used to manage a wide range of emergencies. However, further guidance is given on the considerations that may apply in relation to:
  - localised emergencies (paragraphs 4.4.3 to 4.4.14);
  - wide-area emergencies (paragraphs 4.4.15 to 4.4.23);
  - terrorist incidents (paragraph 4.4.24);
  - animal health outbreaks (paragraphs 4.4.25 to 4.2.27);
  - maritime emergencies (paragraphs 4.4.28 to 4.4.43); and
  - procedures and considerations for the management of evacuations (paragraphs 4.4.44 to 4.4.53).

- The effective management of most emergencies will require access to specialist scientific and technical advice. During the response to an emergency, local responders in England are advised to consider establishing a Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) to provide timely and co-ordinated advice on scientific and technical issues (section 4.3).
• In Wales, public health advice for Strategic Co-ordinating Groups is provided by Health Advisory Teams (HATs). Public Health Wales takes the lead in the establishment of the HAT (section 4.3).

• The Government operates a scheme of emergency financial assistance (Bellwin) to assist local authorities in covering costs that occur as a result of work related to the response phase of emergencies (section 4.5).

• De-briefing should be honest and open, and its results disseminated widely (section 4.6)
4.1. **Management and co-ordination of local operations**

4.1.1. Emergencies involve a large number of agencies that need to co-operate and support each other. Procedures and capabilities need to be well integrated for response and recovery work to be effective.

4.1.2. Under the CCA, Category 1 responders are required to have emergency plans which must include a procedure for determining whether an emergency has occurred. Whilst historically this role has been undertaken by the emergency services, this is something that can be done by any Category 1 responder. The decision on who is best placed to determine whether an emergency has occurred will be dependent on the type of emergency. For example, *Learning lessons from the 2007 floods – an independent review* by Sir Michael Pitt found that upper tier local authorities are best placed to trigger multi agency arrangements in relation to severe weather.

4.1.3. There is a generic national framework for managing emergency response and recovery that is applicable irrespective of the size, nature or cause of an emergency, but remains flexible enough to be adapted to the needs of particular circumstances. Adoption of this nationally agreed management framework will help integrate plans and procedures within and between agencies and across geographical boundaries. It also ensures that all agencies understand their roles and responsibilities in the combined response.

4.1.4. This framework identifies the various tiers of single-agency and multi-agency management in emergency response and recovery, and defines the relationships between them. It provides a common framework within which individual agencies can develop their own response and recovery plans and procedures.

4.1.5. Within this framework, the management of the emergency response and recovery effort is undertaken at one or more of three ascending levels: Operational (the ‘lowest’ tier), Tactical and Strategic. This framework is based around the concepts of command, control and co-ordination. The meaning of these three terms are different and they are as follows:

- **Command** is the exercise of vested authority that is associated with a role or rank within an organisation, to give direction in order to achieve defined objectives.

- **Control** is the application of authority, combined with the capability to manage resources, in order to achieve defined objectives. Some organisations define command...
and control together, but the key element of control is the combination of authority with the means to ensure command intent is communicated and results monitored. While command cannot be exercised by one organisation over another, the authority to exercise control of an organisation’s personnel or assets, for a specified time period to attain defined objectives, can be granted or delegated to another organisation. This granting of control does not imply that the responsibility for those resources has been transferred.

- **Co-ordination** is the integration of multi-agency efforts and available capabilities, which may be interdependent, in order to achieve defined objectives. The co-ordination function will be exercised through control arrangements, and requires that command of individual organisations’ personnel and assets is appropriately exercised in pursuit of the defined objectives.

4.1.6. The emergency services and a number of other responder bodies will usually term their own command and control levels, in ascending order, Bronze, Silver and Gold and their functions and distinctiveness is well documented in single service publications. These levels are defined by their differing functions rather than by specific rank, grade or status.

4.2. **Levels of Command, Control and Co-ordination**

4.2.1. It is important to distinguish between the respective functions of single and multi-agency groups. Single agency groups have the authority to exercise a command function over their own personnel and assets. Multi-agency groups are convened to co-ordinate the involved agencies’ activities and, where appropriate, define strategy and objectives for the multi-agency response as a whole. No single responding agency has command authority over any other agencies’ personnel or assets. Where multi-agency co-ordinating groups are established to define strategy and objectives, it is expected that all involved responder agencies will work in a directed and co-ordinated fashion in pursuit of those objectives.

4.2.2. Although a multi-agency Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) may colloquially be known by some responder bodies as a ‘Gold Group’, it is ambiguous to refer to the SCG simply as ‘Gold.’ Similarly, it is ambiguous to refer to a multi-agency Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG) simply as ‘Silver’; Gold and Silver describe single-agency levels of command, and they should be clearly distinguished from the multi-agency co-ordinating groups that exist at the corresponding level. Further, it is misleading to refer to the SCG Chair as ‘Gold
Emergency Response and Recovery

Commander'; it might be that the Police Gold Commander is also the SCG Chair, but in the role of SCG Chair, s/he is exercising a co-ordination function, not a command function.

4.2.3. In some instances the nature or severity of an emergency may necessitate the involvement of the sub-national tier in England, a devolved administration, or UK central government, as set out in the Central Government arrangements for responding to an emergency: Concept of Operations. These arrangements are summarised in Chapters 9 (Multi-LRF working arrangements), Chapters 10, 11 and 12 (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland respectively) and Chapter 13 (Central Government arrangements). If wide area or multi-SCG, devolved administration or UK tiers are convened, then their role and function is to identify and address issues that require resolution or co-ordination at those levels in pursuit of the agreed objectives. Such ‘higher level’ tiers do not remove the local strategic perspective from the local level, rather they consider only those issues and dimensions where value can be added by a broader or higher level perspective. For this reason, a local strategic perspective and role (i.e. the SCG) can be distinguished from the sub-national or wide area perspective, e.g. the multi-SCG Response Co-ordinating Group (ResCG) where, for example, competing priorities for available mutual aid may need to be determined) and distinguished again from the UK-national perspective (e.g. the National Security Council, Sub Committee on Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies NSC (THRC)) where national (and potentially international) strategic issues may bear on the emergency response.

4.2.4. In rapid onset emergencies within a limited geographical area, the emergency management framework is usually constructed from the bottom up. Escalation of the event (in severity or geographical extent) or greater awareness of the situation may require the implementation of a tactical or even a strategic level. There will also be situations in which all three levels may be activated concurrently, and others (e.g. wide area, slow onset emergencies) when the response may be initiated by central government or by the sub-national tier. Decisions on the activation of management levels should be guided by flexibility, functional requirements and two broad principles. First, the principle of subsidiarity set out in Chapter 2 should be applied (i.e. decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level, with co-ordination at the highest necessary level). Secondly, it is better to activate a SCG on a precautionary basis and then stand it down, than be forced to activate it belatedly under the pressure of events.

4.2.5. In its planning, each agency will need to recognise the three tiers of management and their support requirements, which are described in more detail in the following paragraphs. It is
important to note that not all tiers, single or multi-agency, will necessarily be convened for all emergencies. Additionally, the tiers of management do not predetermine the rank or status of the individuals involved, but act as simple descriptors of their functions.

Operational

4.2.6. Operational is the level at which the management of immediate “hands-on” work is undertaken at the site(s) of the emergency or other affected areas. Individual responder agencies may refer to the Operational level as Bronze.

4.2.7. Personnel first on the scene will take immediate steps to assess the nature and extent of the problem. Operational commanders will concentrate their effort and resources on the specific tasks within their areas of responsibility – for example, the police will concentrate on establishing cordons, maintaining security and managing traffic. They will act on delegated responsibility from their parent organisation until higher levels of management are established.

4.2.8. Individual agencies retain command authority over their own resources and personnel deployed at the scene, but each agency must liaise and co-ordinate with all other agencies involved, ensuring a coherent and integrated effort. Under some circumstances this may require the temporary transfer of one organisation’s personnel or assets under the control of another organisation. In most, but not all, instances, the police will co-ordinate the operational response at an identifiable scene.

4.2.9. These arrangements will usually be adequate to deal with most events or situations, but if events demand greater planning, co-ordination or resources, an additional tier of management may be necessary. A key function of an operational commander will be to consider whether circumstances warrant a tactical level of management and to advise his/her superiors accordingly.

4.2.10. Operational commanders become responsible for implementing the tactical commander’s tactical plan within their geographical area or functional area of responsibility. To discharge this successfully, they need to have a clear understanding of the tactical commander’s intent and plan, their tasks, and any restrictions on their freedom of action, on which they in turn can brief their staff.
4.2.11. The purpose of the tactical level is to ensure that the actions taken by the operational level are co-ordinated, coherent and integrated in order to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency. Individual responder agencies may refer to the Tactical level as Silver.

4.2.12. While a single agency will usually be identified at an early stage to be the lead responder, they do not have the authority to command the personnel or assets of other involved responders.

4.2.13. Where formal co-ordination is required at the Tactical level, then a Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG) may be convened. This will usually comprise the most senior officers of each agency committed within the area of operations, and will undertake tactical co-ordination of the response to the event or situation. Working in co-ordination, the responder agencies’ tactical commanders will:

- determine priorities for allocating available resources;
- plan and co-ordinate how and when tasks will be undertaken;
- obtain additional resources if required;
- assess significant risks and use this to inform tasking of operational commanders; and
- ensure the health and safety of the public and personnel.

4.2.14. Although each of the senior officers at the tactical level will have specific service or agency responsibilities, together they must jointly deliver the overall multi-agency management of the incident and ensure that operational commanders have the means, direction and co-ordination required to deliver successful outcomes. Unless there is an obvious and urgent need for intervention, tactical commanders should not become directly involved in the detailed operational tasks being discharged by the operational level.

4.2.15. In a rapid onset emergency when there is an identifiable scene and the emergency services are in the lead, then tactical co-ordination will usually be carried out from an incident control point (which may be termed a Forward Command Post) located nearby or directly adjacent to the scene. An alternative location should always be identified as a back-up. A Tactical Co-ordinating Group may, as a response progresses or circumstances dictate, be re-
located to a point further removed from the incident site. However, in determining this, the responder bodies should ensure that the TCG is established at the most appropriate location to carry out the function required of it, including the convenient attendance of all appropriate responder representatives. In the event that co-location of tactical commanders is not possible appropriate communications or representation to ensure a co-ordinated response at the tactical level is essential.

4.2.16. The effectiveness of the tactical level as a joint, multi-agency organisation rests on a systematic approach to multi-agency co-ordination. Irrespective of the pressure of operations, the TCG chair must create time for regular, structured briefing, consultation and tasking meetings with his/her counterparts and key liaison officers. Co-location will assist these processes, which should be defined, documented and embedded through training.

4.2.17. When an emergency occurs without a specific scene (e.g. disruption to the fuel supply or an overseas emergency with domestic effects), a Tactical Co-ordinating Group may still be required to deliver effective multi-agency co-ordination.

4.2.18. In those cases where it becomes clear that resources, expertise or co-ordination are required beyond the capacity of the tactical level (e.g. where there is more than one scene or incident), it may be necessary to invoke the strategic level of management to take overall command and set the strategic direction. Once this occurs, tactical commanders will continue to effect multi-agency co-ordination within their area of responsibility, while simultaneously directing tactical operations within the strategic direction and parameters set by the SCG and promulgated through their respective agencies’ Strategic Commanders.

Strategic

4.2.19. The purpose of the Strategic level is to consider the emergency in its wider context; determine longer-term and wider impacts and risks with strategic implications; define and communicate the overarching strategy and objectives for the emergency response; establish the framework, policy and parameters for lower level tiers; and monitor the context, risks, impacts and progress towards defined objectives. Individual responder agencies may refer to the Strategic level as Gold.

4.2.20. Where an event or situation has: an especially significant impact; substantial resource implications; involves a large number of organisations; or lasts for an extended duration, it may be necessary to convene a multi-agency co-ordinating group at the strategic level. The
multi-agency group, which brings together strategic commanders from relevant organisations, is called the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) or Gold Co-ordinating Group (GCG) in London.

4.2.21. Lessons identified from emergencies, including the 2007 floods, show that establishing SCGs at an early stage on a precautionary basis can be extremely helpful in ensuring local responders are ready if a situation suddenly worsens. Precautionary SCGs need not physically convene at the outset but can instead use other appropriate means to share and assess information on the extent of the emergency.

4.2.22. Emergencies can place considerable demands on the resources of responding agencies and can pose significant challenges in terms of business continuity management. Furthermore, they may have long-term implications for communities, economies and the environment. These require the attention of top-level management.

4.2.23. The purpose of the SCG is to take overall responsibility for the multi-agency management of the emergency and to establish the policy and strategic framework within which lower tier command and co-ordinating groups will work. The SCG will:

- determine and promulgate a clear strategic aim and objectives and review them regularly;
- establish a policy framework for the overall management of the event or situation;
- prioritise the requirements of the tactical tier and allocate personnel and resources accordingly;
- formulate and implement media-handling and public communication plans, potentially delegating this to one responding agency; and
- direct planning and operations beyond the immediate response in order to facilitate the recovery process.

4.2.24. The requirement for strategic management may not apply to all responding agencies owing to differing levels of engagement. However, emergencies almost always require multi-agency co-ordination and rarely remain entirely within the ambit of a single agency. It
may, therefore, be appropriate for an agency not involved at strategic level nevertheless to send liaison officers to meetings of the SCG.

4.2.25. As part of the tasking process, SCGs may commission the formation of a series of supporting groups to address particular issues. For example, given the likely demands of the immediate response from the SCG, it is good practice, in most emergencies with significant recovery implications, to establish a Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG).

4.2.26. SCGs must develop a strategy for providing warnings, advice and information to the public and dealing with the media. If a Lead Government Department is engaged in the emergency, then the co-ordination of media lines and information given directly to the public is essential if public confidence is to be maintained. Chapter 8 of this guidance addresses media management and communicating with the public in more detail.

4.2.27. Further strategic issues that may require the formation of specific sub-groups include:

- humanitarian assistance for those affected by the emergency (see also chapter 7);
- facilitating inquiries and investigations;
- visits by VIPs; and
- international and diplomatic dimensions.

4.2.28. The SCG does not have the collective authority to issue commands or executive orders to individual responder agencies. Each organisation represented retains its own command authority, defined responsibilities and will exercise control of its own operations in the normal way.
4.2.29. As a multi-agency group, the SCG has collective responsibility for decision-making and implementation. To achieve this SCG relies on a process of discussion and consensus to reach decisions at strategic level and to ensure that the agreed strategic aim and objectives are implemented at the tactical and operational levels. These discussions, including both decisions taken and not taken or deferred, must be logged for future scrutiny. Effectiveness at strategic level rests upon every member having a clear understanding of the roles, responsibilities and constraints of other participants. The required mutual understanding and trust will be cemented through training and exercising.

4.2.30. SCGs must comprise representatives of appropriate seniority and authority in order to be effective, and representatives should be empowered to make executive decisions in respect of their organisation’s resources. In a long-running emergency, the need for personnel to hand over to colleagues will undoubtedly arise. This underlines the necessity for each organisation to select, train and exercise sufficient senior individuals who are capable of fulfilling this role.

4.2.31. It will normally, but not always, be the role of the police to co-ordinate other organisations and therefore to chair the SCG. The police are particularly likely to field a SCG chair where there is an immediate threat to human life, a possibility that the emergency was a result of criminal activity, or significant public order implications. Under these circumstances the same person may be the Police Strategic Commander and the SCG Chair. These two roles should however be clearly distinguished. In other types of emergency, for instance some health emergencies, an agency other than the police may initiate and lead the SCG.

4.2.32. Furthermore in the transition to the recovery phase, the chair of the Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG) (see chapter 5) will usually pass to another agency if its role and responsibilities leave it better placed to take on the role (e.g. to the local authority). The identification of lead agencies in relation to specified emergencies and transitional arrangements in relation to the recovery phase should be agreed and exercised in the preparation phase (see chapters 5 and 7 of Emergency Preparedness).

4.2.33. The SCG should be based at an appropriate location away from the scene. The place at which the SCG meet is referred to as the Strategic Co-ordination Centre. This will usually, but not always be at the headquarters of the lead service or organisation (e.g. police headquarters). The location of meetings may shift if another agency takes the lead of the RCG in relation to the recovery phase. In the preparation phase, consideration should be given to the arrangements suitable for a range of scenarios and alternative locations should
be identified for business continuity purposes. Part 3 of the *Expectation and Indicators of Good Practice Set for Category 1 and 2 responders*, provides a check-list of considerations for this.

4.2.34. Depending on the nature, extent and severity of the emergency, either the sub-national tier or central government may become involved. The SCG will then become the primary interface with these other levels of response. Detailed descriptions of when the sub-national and national levels may become involved, what their likely contribution will be, how they will be organised, and liaison with the local level can be found in *Chapter 9* and *Chapter 13* respectively. *Chapters 10, 11* and *12* describe arrangements in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland respectively.

### 4.3. Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC)

4.3.1. The effective management of most emergencies will require access to specialist scientific and technical advice, for example regarding the public health or environmental implications of a release of toxic material, or the spread of a disease. During the response to an emergency, local responders in England are advised to consider establishing a Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) to provide timely and co-ordinated advice on scientific and technical issues.

4.3.2. The role of the STAC is to:

- provide a common source of science and technical advice to the SCG chair and members and responder agencies' Strategic Commanders;

- monitor and corral the responding scientific and technical community to deliver on SCGs' high-level objectives and immediate priorities;

- agree any divergence from agreed arrangements for providing scientific and technical input;

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5 In Wales, public health advice for Strategic Co-ordinating Groups is provided by Health Advisory Teams (HATs). Public Health Wales takes the lead in establishment of the HAT and membership of the group is varied and draws upon wider scientific and technical advice as appropriate.
• pool available information and arrive, as far as possible, at a common view on the scientific and technical merits of different courses of action;

• provide a common brief to the technical lead from each agency represented in the cell on the extent of the evidence base available, and how the situation might develop, what this means, and the likely effect of various mitigation strategies;

• identify other agencies / individuals with specialist advice who should be invited to join the cell in order to inform the response;

• liaise with national specialist advisors from agencies represented in the cell and, where warranted, the wider scientific and technical community to ensure the best possible advice is provided;

• liaise between agencies represented in the cell and their national advisors to ensure consistent advice is presented locally and nationally;

• ensure a practical division of effort among the scientific response to avoid duplication and overcome any immediate problems arising; and

• maintain a written record of decisions made and the reasons for those decisions.

4.3.3. Local Resilience Forums (and Strategic Co-ordinating Groups in Scotland) should have plans in place which identify a designated lead and core membership of the STAC; and set out the arrangements for its activation in the event of an emergency.

4.3.4. Whilst the issues covered by the role of the STAC suggest that an appropriate person from the health community would be best placed to lead it, LRFs (SCGs in Scotland) will need to ensure that the person has the right knowledge and skill set to chair complex meetings and commands respect of their peers.

4.3.5. Once the lead has been appointed, they should work with the SCG to select the core membership of the STAC, ensuring that those chosen have the knowledge and skills collectively to provide the level of scientific and technical advice required by the SCG. Although not exhaustive, membership could include:
• emergency service technical advisers;
• site operator technical advisers;
• Public Health England;
• Clinical Commissioning Groups
• NHS Commissioning Board
• Environment Agency;
• Food Standards Agency;
• Health and Safety Executive;
• Local authorities (e.g. Environmental Health Officers);
• Met Office;
• Government Decontamination Service;
• DEFRA (WG in Wales); and
• any other agencies deemed necessary.  

4.3.6. In the event of an emergency, the STAC would be activated by the SCG chair through the cell lead or relevant duty officer. However, a senior public health professional (i.e. Director Public Health England or equivalents in the devolved administrations) may recommend to the SCG chair that a STAC is required.

4.3.7. For more information on STACs see: Provision of Scientific and Technical Advice in the Strategic Coordination Centre – Guidance to Local Responders. For guidance on the

\[\text{In Wales, the Health bodies listed will be different (e.g. NHSB and LHBs – see chapter 3 for more details).}\]
interface between STACs and the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) see chapter 13.

4.4. Using and adapting the management framework in specific circumstances

4.4.1. This section sets out how the response framework can be adapted to both localised and wide-area emergencies. It does not cover every single type of emergency; the framework is designed to be both flexible and scalable and is based on the principle of subsidiarity (see chapter 2) and agencies acting within their own functions. Describing every eventuality is therefore unnecessary. However, following the recommendations of Lady Justice Hallett in her review of the evidence following the London bombings of 7 July 2005, organisations need to ensure that familiarity with, adherence to, and exercising of procedures are inherent in these frameworks. Specific information on terrorist, animal health and maritime incidents is however provided because slightly different arrangements apply and additional agencies are involved. Specific information on considerations to note in relation to evacuation is also outlined for similar reasons.

4.4.2. A general distinction is made between localised and wide-area emergencies. Localised emergencies will typically have a clearly identifiable scene such as the location of a major transport incident, an explosion at an industrial site or a building collapse. Wide-area emergencies can be divided into those comprised of incidents at multiple sites that are spread over a wide area, and emergencies where wide areas are affected to some degree. An example of the former might be a mid air collision with impact and debris sites distributed over a large area, or concurrent, but unconnected, localised incidents taking place over a large area. Examples of the latter would include widespread flooding, a pandemic, sustained power outages or severe weather.

The response to localised emergencies

4.4.3. Within the United Kingdom, there is substantial experience of managing emergencies that occur within the bounds of relatively small geographical areas (e.g. explosions or major fires) and have primarily localised effects. It is important to note however that localised incidents have the potential for widespread disruption if there are knock-on consequences or interdependent impacts, for example arising from the loss or disruption of utilities or other essential services.
4.4.4. To bring order to the response and reduce the potential for confusion, it is important that the emergency services establish control over the immediate area and also build up arrangements for co-ordinating individual agencies’ contributions to the response. Each agency needs to establish its own control arrangements, but continuous liaison between them is essential. Effective response depends on good communication and mutual understanding, which is built up through planning, the development of protocols and joint exercises.

4.4.5. It is generally accepted that the first members of the emergency services to arrive on the scene should make a rapid assessment and report back to their control room. The control room that receives the initial report should, in accordance with established plans, alert the other emergency services and relevant partner agencies.

4.4.6. In accordance with their own procedures, those agencies will then alert personnel or activate appropriate response and recovery plans to the level they judge necessary. Agreed protocols should be in place to alert any commercial or industrial organisations whose premises, services or personnel could be affected, or required as part of the response and recovery effort. Voluntary sector organisations that may be required to support the response and recovery effort should be informed at the earliest opportunity, in accordance with established plans.

4.4.7. For localised incidents, tactical co-ordinators will usually operate from an Incident Control Point or Forward Command Post established in the vicinity of the incident site. Arrangements that are necessary in the immediate vicinity of the scene include the following:

- assessing control measures with regard to reducing risk;

- deciding the functions to be controlled by each agency after taking account of:
  - the circumstances;
  - the professional expertise of the emergency services and other agencies;
  - statutory obligations; and
  - overall priorities;

- the reception and engagement of utility companies’ staff (e.g. gas, electricity and water) on essential safety work, or to effect the restoration of essential services, where appropriate; and
- setting up an inner cordon to secure the immediate scene and provide a measure of protection for personnel working within the area. All those entering the inner cordon should report to a designated cordon access point. This ensures that they can be safely accounted for should there be any escalation of the incident, and affords an opportunity for briefing about the evacuation signal, hazards, control measures and other issues about which they need to be aware. People entering the inner cordon must have an appropriate level of personal protective equipment, while those leaving must register their departure.

4.4.8. If practical, an outer cordon may have to be established around the vicinity of the incident to control access to a much wider area around the site. This will allow the emergency services and other agencies to work unhindered and in privacy. Access through the outer cordon for essential non-emergency service personnel should be by way of a scene access control point. The outer cordon may then be further supplemented by a traffic cordon.

4.4.9. Other issues that should be addressed at this level include:

- establishing internal traffic routes for emergency and other vehicles (including a one-way system where appropriate); and

- deciding on the location of key functions or facilities, for example:
  - casualty clearing station(s) to which the injured can be taken;
  - an ambulance loading point for those who need to be taken to hospital;
  - a collection/assembly point for survivors before they are taken to a Survivor Reception Centre;
  - possible helicopter landing site(s);
  - a rendezvous point or points for all responding personnel, which may be some distance from the scene in the event of a bomb incident or incidents involving hazardous materials;
  - a marshalling area for assembling vehicles and equipment;
  - a Holding and Audit Area for Deceased People and Human Remains (HAADR) that is under cover and protected from public view; and
  - a media liaison point.
4.4.10. The possible need for evacuation (see below) of the public from the immediate vicinity may also have to be considered at a very early stage. Other functions will be carried out outside the immediate scene.

4.4.11. For the majority of localised emergencies, there are significant benefits if a liaison officer represents the interests of the relevant local authority or local authorities at the incident control point, if this is established. Arrangements should also be in place for calling in liaison officers from other organisations that may need to contribute to the response (e.g. the Environment Agency, health organisations and utilities). Liaison officers at the scene should be clearly identifiable. They should be equipped with their own communications so that they can remain in contact with their organisations to obtain any further support rapidly.

4.4.12. Where local authority services might be required at short notice, resources should be assembled nearby so that they are ready for immediate action if called upon by the emergency services. Some functions will by their very nature be discharged outside cordon lines and away from the scene but remain essential components of an integrated response. Similarly, it may be appropriate for emergency services and other organisations to be represented within the local authority’s emergency/crisis management centre, which provides the focus for the management and co-ordination of local authority activities.

4.4.13. Emergency services in particular should be aware that local authorities do not operate most of their services out of normal hours as a matter of routine, so realistic planning assumptions should be determined in discussion between local authorities and other responder agencies as appropriate.

4.4.14. If an incident occurs within the perimeter of an industrial or commercial establishment, public venue, airport or harbour, it is essential that a site incident officer from the affected organisation establishes liaison with responding organisations. Such a representative can ease access to facilities within the establishment and act as a link between the establishment’s senior management and the emergency management structure.

The response to wide-area emergencies

4.4.15. Historically, the United Kingdom has been more fortunate than some other countries, suffering at a lesser frequency and scale from wide-area natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes or major storms and flooding. Nevertheless, it is essential that
plans and arrangements are in place to deal with emergencies that are not limited to a single, local scene.

4.4.16. The framework for managing wide-area emergencies will follow the same generic framework that is applicable to all emergencies, and many of the challenges faced will be similar to emergencies where there is an identifiable scene. However, it is probable that inter-agency strategic management will be required in such circumstances, leading to the activation of SCGs in all or most affected areas.

4.4.17. In the early stages of the response, information management is likely to represent a significant challenge. Responders may be faced with large quantities of potentially relevant information or very little information, information of uncertain provenance and quality or indicators that are ambiguous or otherwise hard to interpret. In this scenario, multi-agency co-ordinating groups at the strategic and tactical levels will have an especially important role in collating, evaluating and monitoring situational and contextual information to build Situation Reports (Sitrep) and a Common Recognised Information Picture (CRIP).

4.4.18. In a densely populated country like the UK, where wide-area emergencies are likely to affect large numbers of people, self-help will be the first response. Wide-area emergencies can overwhelm local resources, disrupt telecommunications and other essential services and cut off access or egress routes. Further blockage of routes may occur as people attempt to leave an affected area.

4.4.19. Business continuity management will also be a particular challenge. Primary office locations and emergency control centres may have been affected or made inaccessible. The likelihood of a protracted response and recovery effort will also place a heavy burden on staff and resources.

4.4.20. Wide-area emergencies may affect large parts of one or more regions, and therefore pose challenges in terms of communication, co-ordination and integration. Where a number of SCGs are established, they will need to work closely together to ensure the response is integrated and co-ordinated. There may be a role for the sub-national tier, or devolved governments, in supporting or co-ordinating the local response, and a Lead Government Department (LGD) may become involved. Further details can be found in Chapters 10, 11, 12 (arrangements in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland respectively) and 13 (the role of LGDs).
4.4.21. Not all emergencies occur suddenly. The emergency management framework set out in this chapter is readily adaptable to slow-onset (or “rising tide”) emergencies such as a disruption to the supply of fuel. However in these circumstances, it becomes more likely that the response will be led from the top-down rather than from the bottom-up, with SCGs being convened at the request of, and working within a strategic framework set by, central government. This is because in certain circumstances central government will be:

- better sighted on an emerging risk (e.g. through intelligence reports, international liaison or access to specialist advice);

- well positioned to maintain an overview of the situation as it develops (e.g. patterns of disruption or infection); and

- able to help ensure a coherent, integrated and robust response (ensuring that pre-emptive action is taken where necessary).

4.4.22. Effective top-down leadership of an emergency presumes robust and timely information flows upward and downward. Sub-national Teams, and the Devolved Administrations, will play a crucial role in ensuring that this happens, activating the crisis management machinery described in Chapter 9 (Sub-national arrangements in England), 10 (Scotland), 11 (Wales) and 12 (Northern Ireland) where necessary. There may be a particular role for these levels in co-ordinating the flow of information from utility providers which are unable, for resource or other reasons, to attend multiple SCGs in a wide-area emergency.

4.4.23. Emergencies overseas can also have similar implications for the UK and its citizens, and may impose challenging demands on local responders, (for example the 2004 Asian tsunami). However, in such cases (e.g. natural disasters or large-scale evacuations) the effects are likely to be distributed geographically across the UK and are therefore unlikely to overwhelm the resources of a large number of responders. In these circumstances central government, working closely with the police and other agencies, will lead the response by liaising with international counterparts to arrange for the identification and repatriation of the dead, injured and survivors, and by communicating with the public. As in the case of the 2004 Asian tsunami, Humanitarian assistance measures may well need to be put in place for returnees, as outlined in Chapter 7.
Terrorist incidents

4.4.24. The management framework for responding to, and recovering from, the consequences of a terrorist incident will be similar to that adopted in relation to non-malicious incidents. In relation to terrorism however, it may be necessary for the police to take executive action in respect of the entire incident. The impact of terrorist events on public confidence, and the possibility of further attacks, will make the provision of warnings, advice and information to the public particularly important.

4.4.25. Separate guidance documents detail the specific response and recovery arrangements in relation to terrorist incidents. Most of these are protectively marked and are distributed to those organisations that require them rather than being made publically available.

Exotic Animal Disease outbreaks

4.4.26. Unlike most other major incidents and emergency responses DEFRA is not only the Lead Government Department (LGD) but, together with its executive agencies, is directly responsible for both the local and national disease control response. In delivering the operational response, government establishes a National Disease Control Centre (NDCC) in London and one or more Local Disease Control Centres (LDCCs) and associated Forward Operations Bases (FOBs) close to the outbreak or incident. Details of the disease control response can be found in DEFRA’s Contingency Plan for Exotic Diseases of Animals.

4.4.27. Operational partners and stakeholders are represented at the LDCC and, by their national representative bodies, in the NDCC. These disease control structures are aligned with the emergency response structures described above in 4.1. For animal disease outbreaks in, or impacting on Wales, Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratory Agency would closely liaise with ECC(W) (see chapter 11).

4.4.28. Local Strategic Co-ordinating Groups (SCGs) may be established to manage the wider impacts of an outbreak on the local area (e.g. health, social, economic, environmental and public information). The Chair of the SCG and Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratory Agency Regional Operations Director (ROD) will work closely together; this will usually involve AHVLA providing briefing for members of the SCGs. This briefing would normally be provided remotely via situation reporting and additional briefing notes, as required.

7 The Welsh Government is the LGD for outbreaks in Wales.
Where required, however, it may involve the provision of liaison officer to attend the SCG. For large scale outbreaks, multi-LRF arrangements may be activated (see chapter 9 for details).

Maritime emergencies

4.4.29. Cruise liners can now carry more than 5,000 passengers and crew, and oil tankers can carry in excess of 200,000 tons of oil. Container ships carry a multitude of goods, including hazardous materials, in as many as 15,000 containers. Consequently, the potential scale of a major maritime emergency will pose significant challenges for responder organisations, both at sea and on shore. A collision between two such vessels will dramatically increase the consequences and require a much larger response.

4.4.30. It should be noted that the land based consequences of a maritime incident may well affect more than one Local Resilience Forum (LRF) or police force area, including devolved administrations. Where the geography makes this likely (e.g. where rivers and estuaries divide LRF/multi-area LRFs/Police force areas or national boundaries such as Wales/England), standing arrangements must address the issue of co-ordination between SCGs. In addition, major maritime emergencies often have an international dimension, and may require liaison with neighbouring states.

4.4.31. The objectives of the combined response and the tiered management framework also apply to maritime incidents. However, the nature of a maritime incident raises specific management and co-ordination issues that do not arise on land. Strategic decisions for maritime incidents are taken in separate response cells, and some tactical decisions may need to be taken on shore at a strategic centre, rather than at the incident scene.

4.4.32. There is a potential for up to five strategic decision making cells to be established for specific aspects of the incident (see figure 4.1). The Maritime & Coastguard Agency (MCA) lead the ‘at sea’ response from a Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre (MRCC), Salvage Control Unit (SCU), and Marine Response Centre (MRC). The Secretary of State’s Representative (SOSREP) has overall responsibility for salvage and will determine if a SCU is required. Where there are significant ‘on shore’ consequences, a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) and/or a Shoreline Response Centre (SRC) may be required, with the lead being provided by the police or the local authority.

4.4.33. It is essential that clear arrangements are in place to provide liaison between those strategic cells and for effective co-ordination of the at sea and the on land response. Local
plans should address this requirement, and arrangements should provide for liaison officers in each strategic cell to represent the interests of the other cells. Inter-agency liaison needs to recognise the shore-based consequences at an early stage and make appropriate arrangements. Consideration should be given to combining some of these cells (e.g. SCG and the SRC), and local plans should indicate how and when this might be done. The arrangements can be in generic major incident plans, or specific maritime major incident plans. Where rivers and estuaries divide multi-area LRF/LRF/Police force areas, specific maritime plans should be agreed, as any incident can affect all those areas.

4.4.34. Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centres (MRCC) are responsible for alerting, tasking and co-ordinating the search & rescue (SAR) response. The Search Mission Co-ordinator (SMC) will use various SAR facilities including RNLI Lifeboats, military and civilian SAR helicopters, Coastguard Rescue Teams, and/or shipping in the area. They may also appoint an On-Scene Co-ordinator and/or an Aircraft Co-ordinator (AirCO) to assist in implementing the SAR plan at the scene of the incident.

4.4.35. The Secretary of State’s Representative (SOSREP) is responsible for any action related to the vessel, or vessels that is necessary to protect the environment. To assist the SOSREP a Salvage Control Unit (SCU) will usually be established. SOSREP has the authority to oversee, control and, if necessary, to intervene and exercise “ultimate command and control” of vessels. SOSREP can give direction to a vessel’s master or owners, to salvors, pilots and harbours. The Royal Navy and the local police force can be used to enforce any direction. Arrangements should be in place for close liaison between the SCG and SOSREP. SOSREP may set up a similar Operations Control Unit in cases involving the offshore oil and gas industry.

4.4.36. When a maritime emergency results in pollution that is significant enough to require a national level of intervention, the at sea response will be co-ordinated from a Marine Response Centre (MRC) that will be established by the MCA’s Counter Pollution Branch.

4.4.37. The Marine Response Centre and/or the Salvage Control Unit may be located at the nearest MRCC or in a harbour, depending on the circumstances of the incident. Prior to their establishment, the Counter Pollution Branch and/or SOSREP may operate from the Marine Emergencies Information Room (MEIR) at MCA’s headquarters in Southampton.

4.4.38. Arrangements must be made to deal with survivors, injured and the deceased on shore. Unless the number of people affected is low, a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) should
be established. People affected by emergencies can arrive on the shore at various locations, so arrangements must be flexible enough to cope with many people at several locations. Vessels may also be carrying significant numbers of foreign nationals, so liaison with the Foreign & Commonwealth Office and with the UK Border Agency should be established in such circumstances.

4.4.39. Where pollution affects the shoreline, an inter-agency Shoreline Response Centre (SRC) will usually be established, after consultation with the MCA, by the local authority most affected. Coastal local authorities maintain pollution plans and in two tier areas, it is the County Council that will normally host the SRC. Maritime Major Emergency Plans and Coastal Pollution Plans may need to operate side by side, so care should be taken to ensure that they are compatible.

4.4.40. Non-polluting wreckage and cargo may also come ashore and will require effective action from responders on land. This could be dealt with by a SRC or a SCG if one has been established. If not, there should be discussion on the most appropriate method to co-ordinate the response. In some cases, the owners or their insurers may appoint a contractor to carry out salvage and clean up operations. This should reduce the need for a SRC or SCG, but effective liaison between Responder Organisations and the contractor must still be established. Contractors will usually provide a single point of contact for liaison. SOSREP remains responsible for the vessel.

4.4.41. In general, wreckage and cargo coming ashore should be treated no differently to that arising from a land based major incident (e.g. train or air crash). Evidence should be preserved and efforts made to protect property until the owners or insurers have an opportunity to recover it. The Receiver of Wreck (RoW) has powers in such situations and can require people to immediately hand over cargo found on the shore. The RoW can also give instruction to leave wreckage and cargo in situ for an officially appointed salvor to recover. The police, and other officials, can be authorised to give those instructions on the RoW’s behalf. Early liaison with the RoW, together with effective public statements, can reduce the risk of theft in such situations.

4.4.42. In accordance with the National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution from Shipping and Offshore Installations, an Environment Group is usually established quite quickly for maritime emergencies. This will provide environmental and public health advice to all response cells. Where a maritime incident poses a significant threat to public health on land (e.g. chemical fumes blowing in to a coastal town), the SCG may also feel the need to
establish a Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC). To avoid duplication or conflicting advice, the STAC should either be integrated with the Environment Group, or close liaison should be established between the two.

4.4.43. There is no statutory duty for fire and rescue authorities to respond to offshore incidents. However the MCA has arrangements with strategically located coastal services enabling them to exercise their power to take action at sea in response to incidents such as fires, chemical hazards and collisions involving vessels. These are called Maritime Incident Response Groups (MIRG).

4.4.44. Local planning and response for maritime emergencies should be consistent with the National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution from Shipping and Offshore Installations and the Search and Rescue Framework for the United Kingdom. These documents may be found on the MCA’s website http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/mcga07-home.htm

**Figure 4.1 Maritime Emergencies**

**Rescue and Support**

- **At Sea Response**
  - Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre (MRCC)
  - Salvage Control Unit and Secretary of States Representatives
- **On Land Response**
  - Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC)
  - Contractors single point of contact* (if appointed)
  - Shoreline Response Centre*

- **Intervention and direction**
  - Environment Group
  - Intervention and direction
  - Pollution and salvage

- **Pollution and salvage**
  - Environment Group
  - Contractors single point of contact* (if appointed)
  - Shoreline Response Centre*

- **Advice**
  - Environment Group
  - Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC)
  - Contractors single point of contact* (if appointed)
  - Shoreline Response Centre*

- **Strategic Co-ordinating Group**
  - Tactical Co-ordinating Group
  - Tactical Co-ordinating Group
* Note – for large incidents, the SRC will co-ordinate clean up via Forward Control Centres (FCC), which in turn will manage Beach Supervisors at each site. If a single contractor is appointed, they may manage Beach Supervisors directly.

**Evacuation**

4.4.45. In some circumstances it may be necessary to advise the public on whether they should evacuate a given area or remain and shelter indoors. Such circumstances include risks to life or health from:

- acts of terrorism;
- release or threatened release of radioactive materials or other hazardous substances;
- spread of fire;
- risk of explosion;
- damage caused by severe weather;
- risk from serious flooding;
- risk of environmental contamination; and
- transport failures.

4.4.46. It is normally the police who recommend whether or not to evacuate and define the area to be evacuated. Their recommendation will take account of advice from other agencies.

4.4.47. The police can only recommend evacuation and have no power (except within the inner cordon in response to a terrorist incident) to require responsible adults to leave their homes.

4.4.48. In any decision to evacuate or not, the over-riding priority must be the safety of the public and emergency responders, and it is necessary to assess whether bringing people outdoors may put them at greater risk. Buildings can provide significant protection against most risks and the public may be safer seeking shelter in the nearest suitable building.
Similarly, in the case of chemical, biological or radiological release, taking shelter would normally be the preferred option, at least initially. In the case of flooding, it may be safer to advise people to seek refuge in the upper storeys of a building rather than run the risk of being overcome by the flood waters.

4.4.49. Multi-agency co-operation is a guiding principle for evacuation planning, and Local Resilience Forums should develop a generic evacuation plan and consider how best to structure their evacuation planning activities, for example, by establishing a sub-group to focus specifically on evacuation and shelter issues.

4.4.50. In 2006 the Cabinet Office published *Evacuation and Shelter Guidance*. This guidance should be used by emergency planners to develop scalable and flexible plans that enable a co-ordinated multi-agency response in a crisis. The guidance is designed to inform on the roles and responsibilities relating to evacuation and shelter and give more information on the key issues relating to evacuation and shelter, including those that have proved problematic in past exercises or real-world events.

4.4.51. As detailed in the Evacuation and Shelter guidance plans should to take into account:

- transporting people and traffic management;
- shelter and rest centre accommodation;
- supporting people sheltering in situ;
- assisting groups with specific needs;
- developing multi-agency crime prevention strategy;
- pets and livestock;
- business continuity;
- protecting items of cultural interest and high value;
- special considerations for flooding, chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear/hazardous materials and pandemic flu;
• return and recovery; and

• communications.

4.4.52. In the event of larger scale evacuation, local emergency responders may need to call on aid from outside their area, which can be prepared for by developing mutual aid arrangements. In December 2008, the Cabinet Office and the Local Government Association published *Mutual Aid: A short guide for local authorities*. The guide concentrates on the issue of human resource mutual aid and provides practical advice on many of the issues that, to date, have often been viewed as barriers to successful arrangements. It also provides a model agreement for authorities to draw upon in the development of their own collaborative arrangements.

4.4.53. There are also difficulties in evacuating people who are frail or vulnerable. Those responsible for the care of vulnerable people in an emergency should develop a local action plan to identify people who are vulnerable in a crisis (see the Cabinet Office guidance *Identifying People Who are Vulnerable in a Crisis: Guidance for Emergency Planners and Responders*) for more details.

4.4.54. The Department for Culture, Media and Sport has published *Humanitarian Assistance in Emergencies: Non-statutory guidance on establishing Humanitarian Assistance Centres*. This guidance is designed to give advice about how to structure the humanitarian response to an emergency with major consequences.

Logistic Operations for Emergency Supplies

4.4.55. Logistic operations refer to the co-ordination of the acquisition, distribution and replenishment of supplies essential for the response and recovery to an emergency. Recent experience has demonstrated that emergencies, especially when sustained and affecting a wide-area, can pose serious logistical challenges to local responders.

4.4.56. In 2009 Cabinet Office published guidance for emergency planners on *Logistic Operations for Emergency Supplies* with the objective of establishing a common understanding of the options available to emergency planners for the co-ordination, prioritisation and acquisition of emergency supplies. This guidance presents the expected roles at the LRF, multi-LRF and central government levels and sets out options and considerations for (a) prioritising
requirements for emergency supplies, and (b) choosing the appropriate method of supply acquisition.

4.5. **Response phase funding**

4.5.1. The Government operates a scheme of emergency financial assistance (*Bellwin*) to assist local authorities in covering costs that incur as a result of work related to the response phase of emergencies.

4.5.2. A *Bellwin* scheme may be activated in any case where an emergency involving destruction of, or danger to, life or property occurs, and, as a result, one or more local authorities incur expenditure on, or in connection with, the taking of immediate action to safeguard life or property, or to prevent suffering or severe inconvenience, in their area or among inhabitants.

4.5.3. *Bellwin* is applicable only in the response phase of an incident, since the grant is limited by Section 155 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 to contributing to immediate costs incurred on or in connection with safeguarding life or property or preventing inconvenience following an incident. It is important to be aware that precautionary actions and longer term clearing up action are ruled out by the terms of the statute.

4.5.4. General guidance notes are issued from time to time, which set out the conditions applying and more general information about the *Bellwin* scheme. This includes qualifying emergencies, who can claim, grant rates and thresholds and how to notify an incident or make a claim.

4.5.5. There are different schemes in operation in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. See the glossary for more details.

4.6. **Identifying and learning lessons**

4.6.1. In order to facilitate operational debriefing and to provide evidence for inquiries (whether judicial, public, technical, inquest or of some other form), it is essential to keep records.

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8 See [www.legislation.gov.uk](http://www.legislation.gov.uk)
Single-agency and inter-agency debriefing processes should aim to capture information while memories are fresh.

4.6.2. A comprehensive record should be kept of all events, decisions, reasoning behind key decisions and actions taken. Each organisation should maintain its own records. It is important that a nominated information manager be responsible for overseeing the keeping and storage of the records and files created during the response, and also for assuring the retention of those that existed before the emergency occurred. All document destruction under routine housekeeping arrangements should be suspended. All electronic records should be copied directly to non-volatile media.

4.6.3. Good record-keeping serves a further purpose, whether or not there is a formal inquiry. It allows lessons to be identified and made more widely available for the benefit of those who might be involved in future emergencies. Additionally, chief officers and chief executives will wish to ensure that there is appropriate follow-up to any lessons that emerge from the debriefing process. Appropriate follow-up will depend on the circumstances but might include revision of plans, procedures and training, strengthening of liaison with other agencies, and the devising of targeted exercises to test alternative approaches.

4.6.4. Debriefing should be honest and open, and its results disseminated widely. This is particularly important when it comes to disseminating lessons identified, which should be considered at local, sub-national, devolved administration or central government level as appropriate.
Chapter 5:

RECOVERING FROM EMERGENCIES

Sections in this chapter:

5.1 Recovery overview
5.2 Roles and responsibilities
5.3 Recovery structures and organisations
5.4 Management and co-ordination of the recovery phase
5.5 Funding for recovery
5.6 Debriefing and identifying lessons to be learned
Chapter 5
5. Recovering from emergencies

Summary

- Recovery is a complex and long running process that will involve many more agencies and participants than the response phase (paragraph 5.1.2).

- Recovery is defined as the process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency, but it is more than simply the replacement of what has been destroyed and the rehabilitation of those affected (paragraph 5.1.3).

- Local communities may also look upon an emergency as an opportunity to regenerate an area. Regeneration is about transformation and revitalisation (paragraph 5.1.4).

- The chapter sets out:
  - key principles of planning for and undertaking recovery (paragraph 5.1.9);
  - the scope of recovery capability and activity (paragraph 5.1.8 and 5.1.14);
  - a framework for recovery (paragraphs 5.1.12 to 5.1.13);
  - roles and responsibilities for various agencies and groups engaged in planning for and recovering from emergencies (section 5.2);
  - suggested structures for those involved in managing recovery (section 5.3);
  - processes for managing and co-ordinating the recovery phase (section 5.4);
  - the transition between the response and recovery phase (paragraphs 5.4.6 and 5.4.18 to 5.4.20);
  - the role and operation of the Recovery Co-ordinating Group (paragraphs 5.3.1 to 5.3.4 and section 5.4);
  - guidance on recovery funding (section 5.5);
- guidance on recovery reporting (box 1); and

- the evaluation and debrief process (section 5.6).
5.1. Recovery overview

5.1.1. Roles and responsibilities in the response phase of emergencies are well known, understood and rehearsed. However, experience has shown that the recovery phase and the structures, processes and relationships that underpin it are harder to get right.

5.1.2. Recovery is a complex and long running process that will involve many more agencies and participants than the response phase. It will certainly be more costly in terms of resources, and it will undoubtedly be subject to close scrutiny from the community, the media and politicians alike. It is therefore essential for the process to be based on well thought out and tested structures and procedures for it to work in an efficient and orderly manner.

5.1.3. Recovery is defined as the process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency, but it is more than simply the replacement of what has been destroyed and the rehabilitation of those affected. It is a complex social and developmental process rather than just a remedial process. There are four interlinked categories of impact that individuals and communities will need to recover from: Humanitarian (inc. Health); Economic; Infrastructure; and Environmental. The manner in which recovery processes are undertaken is critical to their success. Recovery is best achieved when the affected community is able to exercise a high degree of self-determination.

5.1.4. Local communities may also look upon an emergency as an opportunity to regenerate an area. This regeneration phase may overlap with the recovery phase, with regeneration being defined as follows:

- Regeneration is about transformation and revitalisation - both visual and psychological. This transformation can be physical, social and economic, achieved through building new homes or commercial buildings, raising aspirations, improving skills and improving the environment whilst introducing new people and dynamism to an area.

5.1.5. The recovery phase should begin at the earliest opportunity following the onset of an emergency, running in tandem with the response to the emergency. It continues until the disruption has been rectified, demands on services have returned to normal levels, and the needs of those affected (directly and indirectly) have been met. While the response phase to an emergency can be relatively short, the recovery phase may endure for months, years or even decades.
Recovery guidance

5.1.6. In response to the need for information on preparing for and undertaking recovery following emergencies, the Cabinet Office published the National Recovery Guidance which provides a single point of reference for local responders dealing with the recovery phase of an emergency. It comprises:

- **Topic Sheets** on a wide range of recovery issues, which are intended to be used as guidance during the planning phase, and as a quick reference note, as required, during an emergency.

- **A Recovery Plan Guidance Template**, which can be tailored to local circumstances and used as a basis for recovery planning (and during the recovery phase of an incident if no plan is in place).

- **Over 100 Case Studies** from incidents and exercises, going back to the Aberfan disaster of 1966, and the 7/7 bomb attacks, so that lessons previously identified can be shared.

5.1.7. The following text summarises the key principles of planning for and undertaking recovery; more detailed information can be found in the National Recovery Guidance.

Purpose of recovery

5.1.8. The purpose of providing recovery support is to assist the affected community towards management of its own recovery. It is recognised that where a community experiences a significant emergency, there is a need to supplement the personal, family and community structures which have been disrupted. Recovery should be done ‘with’ the community not ‘to’ the community.

Recovery principles

5.1.9. The principles of recovering from emergencies are:

- Recovery is an enabling and supportive process, which allows individuals, families and communities to attain a proper level of functioning through the provision of information, specialist services and resources.
• Effective recovery requires the establishment of planning and management arrangements, which are accepted and understood by recovery agencies, the community and armed forces (if deployed).

• Recovery management arrangements are most effective when they recognise the complex, dynamic and protracted nature of recovery processes and the changing needs of affected individuals, families and groups within the community over time.

• The management of recovery is best approached from a community development perspective. It is most effective when conducted at the local level with the active participation of the affected community and a strong reliance on local capacities and expertise. Recovery is not just a matter for the statutory agencies - the private sector, the voluntary sector and the wider community will play a crucial role.

• Recovery management is most effective when agencies involved in human welfare have a major role in all levels of decision-making which may influence the well being and recovery of the affected community.

• Recovery is best achieved where the recovery process begins from the moment the emergency begins. It is recommended that the Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG) is set up on the first day of the emergency and run in parallel with the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG).

• Recovery planning and management arrangements are most effective where they are supported by training programmes and multi-agency exercises which ensure that the agencies and groups involved in the recovery process are properly prepared for their role.

• Recovery is most effective where recovery management arrangements provide a comprehensive and integrated framework for managing all potential emergencies and where assistance measures are provided in a timely, fair and equitable manner and are sufficiently flexible to respond to a diversity of community needs.
Impacts of emergencies – the recovery phase

5.1.10. Emergencies affect communities in a wide variety of ways. To understand what recovery comprises one first needs to map out who is affected and how the emergency has affected them.

5.1.11. The impact of emergencies goes well beyond those directly affected by an emergency (e.g. through injury, loss of property, evacuation). Emergencies affect, for example, onlookers, family and friends of fatalities or survivors, response and recovery workers, and the wider community, as well as the economy and businesses, physical infrastructure, and the environment.

5.1.12. To understand how emergencies affect individuals and their communities – and thus prioritise and scope the recovery effort – it is important to understand how emergencies impact upon the environment people live and work in.

5.1.13. Below is a framework for understanding these impacts and the steps that may need to be taken to mitigate them. There are four interlinked categories of impact that individuals and communities will need to recover from. The nature of the impacts – and whether and at what level action needs to be taken – will depend in large part on the nature, scale and severity of the emergency itself.

**Figure 5.1 Framework for understanding the impact of emergencies**
Some examples of the types of issues faced may include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Humanitarian (inc. Health)</th>
<th>Physical impacts (inc. Individuals’ health, housing, and financial needs)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Psychological impacts</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Deaths</td>
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<td>Community displacement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Economic and business recovery</td>
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<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Disruption to daily life (e.g. educational establishments, welfare services, transport system)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Disruption to utilities / essential services</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Damage to residential properties and security of empty properties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>Pollution and decontamination</td>
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<td>Waste</td>
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<td>Natural resources and habitats</td>
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5.1.14. Although the scope for recovery activities is very broad, by planning in advance, recovery capability can be built around four key themes: humanitarian, economic, environmental and infrastructure.

5.1.15. The National Recovery Guidance includes topic sheets on each of these four themes, plus on generic recovery issues (see Table 5.1). This guidance is regularly updated and can be found at [https://www.gov.uk/national-recovery-guidance](https://www.gov.uk/national-recovery-guidance). Each topic sheet also has links to case studies from numerous incidents and exercises, highlighting how these issues were addressed and what lessons were identified from this process.

5.1.16. The guidance included in this chapter is based upon the good practice from many case studies, including those in the National Recovery Guidance. It is not intended to be prescriptive about local recovery arrangements.
### Table 5.1: National Recovery Guidance Topic Sheets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generic Issues</th>
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<tr>
<td>Recovery structures and processes</td>
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<td>Social media</td>
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<td>Training and exercising</td>
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<td>Data protection and sharing</td>
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<td>Mutual Aid</td>
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<td>Military Aid</td>
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<td>Working with the media</td>
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<td>The Role of Elected Members</td>
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<td>VIP visits and involvement</td>
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<td>Impacts on local authority performance targets</td>
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<td>Inquiries</td>
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<td>Investigations and prosecutions</td>
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<td>Coroner’s Inquests</td>
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<td>Inquiries into deaths in Scotland</td>
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<td>Recovery evaluation and lessons identified processes</td>
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<td>Impact assessments</td>
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<td>Reporting</td>
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<td>Voluntary sector</td>
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<tr>
<th>Humanitarian aspects</th>
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<td>Needs of people - health</td>
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<td>Displaced People</td>
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<td>Foreign nationals</td>
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<td>Community engagement</td>
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<td>Commemoration</td>
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<td>Community cohesion</td>
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<td>Needs of people - non-health</td>
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<td>Financial support for individuals</td>
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<td>Investigation and prosecutions</td>
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<td>UK residents affected by overseas emergencies</td>
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<td>Non-resident UK nationals returning from overseas emergencies</td>
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<td>Mass fatalities</td>
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<th>Environmental Issues</th>
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<td>Environmental pollution and decontamination</td>
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<td>Recovery from a CBRN Incident</td>
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<td>Economic Issues</td>
<td>Dealing with waste</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Animal health and welfare</td>
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<td>Economic and business recovery</td>
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<td>Financial impact on local authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infrastructure Issues</td>
<td>Access to and security of sites</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Utilities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Repairs to domestic properties</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Historic environment</td>
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<td>Site clearance</td>
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<td>Dealing with insurance issues</td>
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<td>Damaged school buildings</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Transport</td>
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5.1.17. An impact assessment should be started early and regularly updated. It is likely to develop over time from a pretty rough and ready assessment, probably covering the more immediate needs of people, to a more refined assessment of longer-term humanitarian needs and economic development. It is probably be started off by the SCG who pass it to the RCG fairly quickly once it is established. More information on carrying out an impact assessment can be found in the [National Recovery Guidance](#).

5.1.18. Elected local authority members and parish councillors can play a critical role in the impact assessment process: identifying problems and vulnerabilities in their community that may require priority attention and feeding them back to the relevant recovery group. They also have an important role in disseminating credible information and advice back to the community, assisting to maintain community cohesion and providing public reassurance. Further information on the role of Elected Members in the recovery process can be found in the [National Recovery Guidance](#).

5.1.19. It is vital that following the impact assessment process (which will be an iterative process occurring throughout the recovery phase), any resulting actions are accurately captured and progress monitored. A suggested template for a Recovery Action Plan is shown in the [Recovery Plan Guidance Template](#).
5.2. Roles and responsibilities

**Emergencies within one local authority’s boundaries**

5.2.1. The local authority is the agency responsible for planning for the recovery of the community following any major emergency, supported by other local partners via the Local Resilience Forums (LRF). In most cases, it will be sensible for top tier local authorities to lead but all local authorities and Category 1 responders should input. If there is more than one top tier local authority in the LRF, they should work together to co-ordinate recovery planning.

5.2.2. Following an emergency, the local authority will usually co-ordinate the multi-agency recovery process, including by chairing and providing the secretariat for the RCG, with support from the full range of multi-agency partners as necessary. *Recovery Plan Guidance Template* provides details of those other multi-agency partners who should be involved in recovery and outlines their roles and responsibilities.

**Emergencies crossing local authority boundaries in England**

5.2.3. When carrying out their recovery planning, local authorities, along with their LRF partners, need to agree how they would co-ordinate the recovery from emergencies that cross local authority boundaries. The agreed arrangements need to be detailed in the relevant local plans to avoid any confusion during an incident.

5.2.4. Where the emergency crosses a local authority boundary but remains within one LRF area, the affected authorities will need to decide whether to establish one RCG at the LRF level, or whether to operate separate RCGs in each local authority area. To ensure there is consistency of approach, no duplication of effort, and to reduce the burden on agencies that cover more than one local authority area, the recommended approach would be to have one RCG to cover all affected communities within the LRF area. In this instance, it would be sensible for the affected local authorities to designate a lead local authority that would provide the RCG Chair and Secretariat. Other local authorities could then provide deputy chairs as necessary.

5.2.5. Where the emergency crosses LRF boundaries, consideration should be given to the potential assistance that a Multi-LRF RCG (see *chapter 9*) could provide in ensuring consistency of approach, reducing duplication of effort, minimising the burden on responders, and facilitating the sharing of information, support and mutual aid.
5.2.6. The Multi-LRF RCG should observe the principle of subsidiarity in which it is recognised that decisions shall be taken at the lowest appropriate level. The Multi-LRF RCG does not interfere in local command and control arrangements, but provides a mechanism for ensuring that local responders can be as fully informed as possible in the decisions they have to take.

**Lead Government Department**

5.2.7. In an event requiring national level recovery structures to be activated, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (Cabinet Office) will confirm the Lead Government Department (LGD), based on the type of emergency and informed by the list of Lead Government Department responsibilities published on the Cabinet Office UK Resilience website (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/list-of-lead-government-departments-responsibilities-for-planning-response-and-recovery-from-emergencies). Where required, the relevant LGD will consider activating the National Recovery Group (further information can be found in Central Government Arrangements for Responding to an Emergency: Concept of Operations).

5.2.8. The Department for Communities and Local Government’s Resilience and Emergencies Division (DCLG RED) provides the initial conduit for communication between local responders and the nominated Lead Government Department. Using a single Government point of contact (whether a RED or LGD liaison officer) as the main point of contact reduces the risk of duplicated requests from different central government departments who may be supporting the LGD, thereby minimising the burden on local responders.

**Other government involvement**

5.2.9. Other government involvement in the recovery phase will depend upon the nature of the emergency. The topic sheets in the National Recovery Guidance outline the role of government departments and agencies in dealing with specific recovery issues.

**Devolved administrations**

5.2.10. Where emergencies cross constitutional boundaries within the UK, it is clearly still vital that recovery efforts are co-ordinated. However, it should be recognised that different legislation and funding streams, as well as different structures, may be in place in the devolved administrations. Areas that border devolved administrations should, in the planning phase, agree how recovery would be co-ordinated in the event of cross-government border incidents and record this in the local plan.
5.3. **Recovery structures and organisations**

5.3.1 The local authority will usually lead the recovery process and chair the RCG; however they will need strong support from a wide range of multi-agency local and Category 1 and 2 responders. A suggested structure for managing the recovery and co-ordinating these responders is shown in figure 5.2. These structures are for guidance only. It is a matter for the organisations concerned to decide what structure best suits them for their particular situation. It may not be necessary to establish all the sub-groups shown depending on the nature of the emergency.

5.3.2 Detailed terms of reference (ToR) for these groups, including guidance on membership and issues that may arise, is provided in the *Recovery Plan Guidance Template*. The Chair and Secretariat shown are suggestions; it is a matter for the local authority, in consultation with others, to decide who should most appropriately perform these roles.

5.3.3 In the initial stages of the emergency, it is advisable to ‘start big and then scale down’. An early assessment should be made of the responding organisations’ capacity and resources, and mutual aid agreements should be activated as required. In the event that co-ordination is required at the multi-LRF level, contact should be made with the DCLG RED to discuss how this may best be delivered. In Wales, contact should be made via the Welsh Government and consideration should be given to establishing a Civil Contingencies Group or Wales Civil Contingencies Committee.

5.3.4 In light of the cross-cutting nature of recovery, the range of participants during the recovery phase often goes beyond the usual responding bodies and may include organisations such as Tourist Boards, Chambers of Commerce, Natural England, or English Heritage (and devolved equivalents in devolved areas), as well as community groups and faith leaders, and possibly individual businesses. Similarly, other wider representatives from Category 1 and 2 organisations, such as social services and elected members from local authorities, should be involved.

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9 The recovery structures and organisations described in this section are different in Wales. The equivalent arrangements in Wales are summarised in chapter 11.
5.4. **Management and co-ordination of the recovery phase**

**Activation of the Recovery Co-ordinating Group**

5.4.1. Activation of the Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG) is initiated by the local authority, usually following a request by / agreement with the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG). An important part of the work of the RCG during the response phase of an emergency is to develop a recovery strategy (see paragraph 5.4.4) and inform the SCG of this strategy to ensure decisions made by the SCG do not compromise medium to long term recovery. The RCG reports into the SCG until the SCG stands down.

5.4.2. Membership of the RCG will be decided by the local authority based on the type of emergency, but likely membership is illustrated in the RCG terms of reference in the *Recovery Plan Guidance Template*.

5.4.3. A suggested agenda for the first meeting of the RCG is included in the *Recovery Plan Guidance Template*.
Strategy of the Recovery Co-ordinating Group

5.4.4. At the start of the recovery process, a clear recovery strategy should be developed and agreed by the RCG. The recovery strategy could cover some, or all, of the following key objectives:

- An impact assessment (covering impacts on residents, businesses, infrastructure, environment, etc) if not passed down from the SCG, is carried out as soon as possible and is regularly updated.

- Determine at an early stage if there is an opportunity for longer term regeneration and economic development as part of the recovery process.

- Determine at an early stage if there is an opportunity to enhance the resilience of the area (physical and social.)

- A concise, balanced, affordable recovery action plan is developed that can be quickly implemented, involves all agencies, and fits the needs of the emergency.

- The local voluntary sector organisations and the community are fully involved in the recovery process.

- All agencies work closely with the community and those directly affected, including on monitoring and protection of public health.

- Utilities (e.g. gas, water and sewerage) and transport networks are brought back into use as soon as practicable.

- A pro-active and integrated framework of support to businesses is established.

- All affected areas are restored to an agreed standard so that they are ‘suitable for use’ for their defined future purposes.

- Environmental protection and recovery issues are co-ordinated. (The communication requirements will be different from the response phase with more emphasis on two-way communication and engagement, rather than the control/command and information provision associated with the response phase).
Information and media management of the recovery process is co-ordinated.

Effective protocols for political involvement and liaison (parish, district / county / unitary and parliamentary) are established.

5.4.5. As part of the recovery strategy, it is recommended that various targets / milestones for the recovery are established and agreed. The community should be involved in establishing these targets. These targets provide a means of measuring progress with the recovery process, and may assist in deciding when specific recovery activities can be scaled down. Targets / milestones could include:

- demands on public services returned to normal levels (including health);
- utilities are again fully functional;
- transport infrastructure is running normally;
- local businesses are trading normally; and
- tourism, where applicable, in the area has been re-established.

The targets (particularly involving businesses and tourism for example) have to be balanced against external market drivers and changes in the wider economy which may mean that it is not possible for the area to fully recover to its pre-incident levels.

Handover from response phase to recovery phase

5.4.6. In order to ensure that all agencies are aware of the implications and arrangements for handover from the response to recovery phase, it is suggested a formal meeting is held within a few days of the start of the emergency. Membership at this meeting should, as a minimum, include the SCG Chair and the affected local authorities, and should consider:

- The criteria to be used to assess when the handover can take place from the SCG (usually chaired by the police) to the RCG (usually chaired by the local authority). Suggested criteria are shown in the Recovery Plan Guidance Template.

- The process for the handover: it is recommended that a formal handover process is followed and a suggested handover certificate is shown in the Recovery Plan Guidance.
Template. As part of the handover process, consideration needs to be given to how information collated as part of the response phase is effectively, efficiently, and securely handed over to those responsible for managing the recovery phase and should ideally include an up-to-date impact assessment.

- Communications to other responding agencies and the community about the handover.

Location and operation of the Recovery Co-ordinating Group
5.4.7. In the early part of the recovery phase (both when the RCG is running in parallel with the SCG, and after the lead is handed over from the SCG chair to the RCG chair), there is much merit in agencies being (and remaining) co-located, if possible, to establish communication links and ensure ready interaction between agencies can be maintained.

5.4.8. Once individuals return to their desks, the demand to return to the ‘day job’ and catch up may become irresistible and the recovery process may falter. If the Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC) is not available, then alternative (probably local authority) premises should be found.

5.4.9. That said, some agencies necessary to the recovery process may not have been involved in the response phase and will need to be integrated into the process.

5.4.10. The lead recovery officer from the local authority needs to manage this progression carefully and instil the importance of agencies being closely allied, especially in the early stages of recovery.

5.4.11. The frequency of RCG meetings will be determined by the group on a case-by-case basis. In the early stages, the group may meet two or three times a day, but this is likely to reduce over time, maybe to once or twice a week.

5.4.12. The need for accurate record keeping is of paramount importance. The responses to issues will be on public view; there will be a requirement to prepare reports; and there is also the potential for subsequent inquiries or litigation. There need to be clear audit trails with comprehensive records of timings, notifications, decisions, actions and expenditure. It would therefore be beneficial to use the same information management system used in the response phase for the recovery phase.
Recovery reporting

5.4.13. A reporting framework for recovery has been introduced to ensure that there is a common understanding between government departments, devolved administrations, and local responders, about what will be expected in terms of reporting during the recovery phase.

5.4.14. The recovery reporting framework will enable local authorities to undertake a degree of planning to ensure they have the resources at their disposal to collate the information required, during and after an incident. It will also ensure that central government has a recognised system by which it can collect recovery information from localities. This will help to inform decisions as to what central government support may be required. The recovery reporting framework is only intended to be activated in the event of a wide area emergency requiring central government co-ordination of the recovery phase.

5.4.15. The recovery reporting framework sets out the likely data requirements from local responders and provides guidance as to what the information is likely to be used for.

5.4.16. Local responders may find the recovery reporting framework helpful in training and exercising for larger scale emergencies. Flexibility about what data needs to be reported is important. The type of information required will depend on the particular nature of the incident and the operational needs of those responsible for recovery, particularly at the local level.

5.4.17. In order to ensure that these arrangements are as consistent and as straightforward for local responders to use as possible, they all operate according to a set of recovery reporting principles (see Box 1, below). These principles have been commonly agreed with all relevant government departments and give guidance as to how the reporting framework will be activated, and the processes in place to alert localities to its activation. It includes the procedure by which the information will be requested, and the process by which it will be collected, by central government.

Stand Down of the Recovery Co-ordinating Group

5.4.18. The Chair of the RCG, in discussion with the RCG members, will decide when it is appropriate to stand-down the Group. The needs of the community will be key to this decision and should inform the decision.

5.4.19. The length of time that the RCG is required to continue meeting will vary according to the nature and scale of the emergency. Some emergencies may have long term issues to
consider, such as health monitoring. The RCG will be closed once there is no longer the need for regular multi-agency co-ordination and the remaining issues can be dealt with by individual agencies as a part of their normal business. Depending on the recovery issues being addressed, it may be possible for some of the RCG sub-groups to close prior to the main RCG standing down.

5.4.20. The decision to stand-down the RCG will be communicated to all affected agencies by the RCG Chair / Secretariat.

**Box 1: Cross-government principles on recovery reporting**

- The recovery reporting framework allows local responders to be aware of the potential requirements for reporting recovery and, in the event of an emergency, will provide a strategy to co-ordinate central government requests for recovery information.

- The information requirements in the framework should be sufficiently generic to be useable in any type of emergency recovery situation be it flooding, pandemic flu or a terrorist attack, for example. That said, the framework will have the flexibility to allow for additional information needs depending on the situation being dealt with.

- The framework should only be activated when there is central government recovery co-ordination and a lead government department role is initiated. Government will judge whether co-ordination is needed on a case by case basis.

- Government departments will ask for information using the recovery reporting framework and using the principles set out. Only in exceptional circumstances should government departments ask for additional information not covered in the reporting framework.

- There should be a sound rationale for the inclusion of information in the framework and clear provenance of the data. Data requests should be kept at a minimum whilst still allowing departments and Ministers sufficient information from affected areas to allow them to determine the scale of the recovery situation and make decisions about the type of support that may need to be offered.

- Information in the framework will also be used to monitor progress being made during the recovery process.
- The framework will be integrated as far as possible with the collection of information for the Emergency Response SitReps to make the reporting requirements as seamless as possible for the Lead Government Department for Recovery/Welsh Government and local responders. The SitRep template is available on the Cabinet Office UK resilience website.

- Most recovery work in Wales will fall to the Welsh Government and there may not always be a requirement to report to CCS or to other government departments if the emergency falls within devolved competence or is not of a sufficient scale to require UK Government involvement.

- Information included in the framework should include, as far as possible, information requests that would be needed in determining any additional funding from individual departments recovery funding schemes. However, it will not necessarily follow that activation of the recovery framework goes hand in hand with additional funding for local authorities.

- It is not possible to prescribe timescales for the duration of collection of this information but exit strategies should link to the completion of recovery objectives as set out in recovery plans. Timescales should, as far as possible, be consistent with those required by the funding streams so as to reduce the burden on local authorities collecting this information. All of the information required may not be available during the early stages of the recovery phase. There may be an incremental increase in the amount of information it is possible to gather.

- The information required will be collected as a function of the Recovery Co-ordinating Group. The information should be provided and disseminated as follows:

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| Local responders | Recovery Co-ordinating Group | Lead Government Department | Civil Contingencies Secretariat | Relevant Departmental officials and ministers |
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Version 5: October 2013
5.5. **Funding for recovery**

5.5.1. The flooding incidents of summer 2007 were both widespread and exceptional in nature. In response, Government put together, for the first time, a financial package to assist affected local authorities with the costs of recovery, in addition to the support provided in the response phase through the existing Bellwin scheme in England (see chapter 4) and for which DCLG leads. The Bellwin scheme does not apply in the recovery phase as it is for immediate response costs, providing emergency financial assistance for affected local authorities. This section only covers Central Government Recovery funding arrangements.

5.5.2. In the event of an exceptional emergency, individual departments (DCLG, DfE Defra and DfT), will consider providing financial support for various aspects of the recovery effort.

5.5.3. To ensure that these arrangements are as consistent and as straightforward for local authorities to use as possible, they all operate according to a set of commonly agreed principles (see Box 2).

**Box 2: Cross-government principles on recovery funding**

- The appointment of a Lead Government Department (LGD) for recovery will not necessarily trigger the activation of recovery funding arrangements and vice versa.

- Costs of funding recovery in a particular sector will fall to the department responsible for that sector (e.g. DfT for transport issues), irrespective of which department is designated the LGD for recovery in that instance.

- Departments will not pay out for recovery costs that are insurable – with the exception of damage to roads (see below for more detail).

- The activation of any funding arrangements will be at Ministerial discretion. Activation will not be automatic, and activation by one department of its arrangements will not automatically trigger activation by other departments of their arrangements – this will depend on the impact of an emergency on a particular sector.

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10 The funding arrangements described in this section do not apply in Wales.
• Any funding provided by a department will depend on the impact of a particular emergency on the relevant sector, and the total resource which that department is able to make available at the time. This will need to be balanced against the requirements of existing programmes and other priorities which might be making demands on finite resources.

• There will be no automatic entitlement to financial assistance even if arrangements are activated. Local authorities will have to demonstrate need against criteria laid down by the department running a particular scheme.

• Government will not normally pay out against costs relating to areas where there is already a government spending programme in place, or where existing programme spend can be re-prioritised. Local authorities will need to confirm that they are unable to claim funding for damage repairs from any other source.

**Likely circumstances for activation of recovery funding arrangements**

5.5.4. As recognised in the Pitt Review, local authorities should make arrangements to bear the costs of recovery in all but the most exceptional circumstances. It is up to councils to assess their own risk and put in place the right mix of insurance, self insurance, and reserves, to provide both security and value for money for their communities.

5.5.5. However, Government may consider stepping in to provide support in exceptional circumstances. For the purposes of this guidance, this should be taken to mean major emergencies with the sort of impacts currently described as Significant (Level 4) or Catastrophic (Level 5) as set out in the Local Risk Assessment Guidance (see table 5.2 for examples).

5.5.6. Local authorities should be aware that the impacts set out in table 5.2 are purely indicative. The meeting of one or more of these indicators would not on its own trigger the provision of central government financial assistance for recovery and, as set out in the cross-government principles, activation of its funding arrangements by one department would not automatically trigger activation by other departments.
European Union Solidarity Fund

5.5.7. The European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF) was established in 2002 to provide financial assistance in the aftermath of major disasters to meet part of public expenditure costs in dealing with disasters.

5.5.8. The fund is intended to contribute towards the costs of damages incurred where no other funding is available, including emergency relief and reconstruction operations. As such, it can be used to support the costs of emergency services, cleaning up and putting infrastructure back into working order. Regulations governing the grant, state that the EUSF can only be spent on the following types of work:

- Immediate restoration to working order of infrastructure and plant in the fields of energy, water and waste water, telecommunications, transport, health and education (although in most circumstances the actual costs relating to energy, water, waste water and telecommunications are borne by the private utilities companies).

- Providing temporary accommodation and funding rescue services to meet the immediate needs of the population concerned.

- Immediate securing of preventive infrastructures and measures of immediate protection of the cultural heritage.

- Immediate cleaning up of disaster-stricken areas, including natural zones.

5.5.9. In order to qualify for assistance in the case of a major disaster, the total cost of damages incurred by a EU Member State must exceed a certain amount. That is, the cost of all damage must exceed 3.2 billion Euros or 0.6% of the affected country’s Gross National Income - whichever is the lower.

5.5.10. The assistance from the EUSF is apportioned progressively as follows:

- the portion of the damage exceeding the threshold gives rise to aid amounting to 6% of the total direct damage; and

- for the total direct damage under the threshold, the rate is 2.5%.
5.5.11. Therefore, even if the threshold is met, the total aid provided would still be only a small proportion of the total costs of damage - typically between 2.5% and 5% of the total damage suffered.

5.5.12. Further details on the EUSF can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/thefunds/solidarity/index_en.cfm
Table 5.2: Example of circumstances under which central recovery funding may be activated (from *Emergency Preparedness* Annex 4D: Likelihood and Impact Scoring Scales)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level/Descriptor</th>
<th>Categories of Impact</th>
<th>Description of Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Significant number of people in affected area impacted with multiple fatalities, multiple serious or extensive injuries, significant hospitalisation and activation of MAJAX procedures across a number of hospitals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Significant damage that requires support for local responders with external resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - Significant</td>
<td></td>
<td>100 to 500 people in danger and displaced for longer than 1 week. Local responders require external resources to deliver personal support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Significant impact on and possible breakdown of delivery of some local community services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Significant impact on local economy with medium-term loss of production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Significant extra clean-up and recovery costs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Significant impact on environment with medium- to long-term effects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Very large numbers of people in affected area(s) impacted with significant numbers of fatalities, large number of people requiring hospitalisation with serious injuries with longer-term effects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - Catastrophic</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Extensive damage to properties and built environment in affected area requiring major demolition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>General and widespread displacement of more than 500 people for prolonged duration and extensive personal support required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Serious damage to infrastructure causing significant disruption to, or loss of, key services for prolonged period. Community unable to function without significant support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Serious impact on local and regional economy with some long-term, potentially permanent, loss of production with some structural change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Extensive clean-up and recovery costs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Serious long-term impact on environment and/or permanent damage.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.6. **Debriefing and identifying lessons to be learned**

5.6.1 It is important to ensure that a continuous evaluation of the recovery phase takes place, and that any issues identified are captured and actioned as necessary. The formal debrief process (which may be repeated on a number of occasions at key milestones during a prolonged recovery phase) should identify issues from all partners involved in the recovery process. Consideration should also be given to obtaining views from the affected community (residents and businesses).

*Recovery debriefs*

5.6.2 After an emergency, it is very important that thorough debriefs are carried out to capture issues identified, recommendations to be implemented, and planning assumptions to be reviewed. However, the processes required in order to share the issues identified are not always clear. Many responders look to the agencies affected by an emergency to provide them with information so they too can be prepared for a similar event.

5.6.3 The recovery phase of an emergency has additional complications in that the time line is longer, and it potentially involves more stakeholders than the response phase. Typically, it has peaks of activity, such as around the time of an anniversary, as well as routine ongoing work to address the physical and psychological effects of the emergency.

5.6.4 For most emergencies, it is appropriate to carry out a number of debriefs at different stages in the recovery, when certain “recovery milestones” are achieved or a certain period of time has elapsed. It may be a number of months since the emergency until the first recovery debrief can take place, but there should be a continual process for debriefs throughout the recovery phase.

5.6.5 In widespread emergencies involving multiple-LRFs or the national tier, debriefing at local level may feed into a national level document. In these cases, the process and format may be steered at a multi-LRF level or the national tier in order to produce a consistent and comprehensive debrief.

5.6.6 As debriefing moves from response to recovery, it is increasingly important that the community (including businesses) is involved at all stages. Elected Members can play a key role in this, chairing public (and business) debrief meetings. They can also be useful for door-knocking rounds, bringing back issues that the community has identified, and providing a trusted point of contact for those with concerns.
5.6.7 The contents of debrief documents may be used as evidence in public inquiries - further details of which can be found in the *Inquiries* topic sheet within the *National Recovery Guidance*.

5.6.8 There is currently no specific guidance on how to carry out recovery debriefs, but learning from those carried out following recent incidents shows that the following key points may be useful:

- Where a RCG is established to lead the recovery from an emergency, it would be sensible to hold a debrief session before the disbandment of the group (or any of its sub-groups). It is suggested that internal debriefs within an organisation are held first, with these thoughts then being brought together in a multi-agency debrief.

- A strategy for obtaining views from the community (residents, businesses, etc) should be developed and agreed with Elected Members and the RCG. Such a strategy might include the use of:
  - questionnaires;
  - focus groups;
  - websites; and
  - existing networks (e.g. business networks, parish councils, community groups, etc).

- Obtaining views from the community is likely to require an extended debriefing programme (in terms of the time needed to issue questionnaires, collate responses, gather focus groups, etc), but the debrief still needs to be carried out in a timely fashion so issues are still fresh in people’s minds. The use of an independent company or facilitator (possibly an Emergency Planning Officer from a different area) to take forward the public debrief programme should be considered to (1) demonstrate impartiality – particularly if the emergency has been contentious, and (2) because of the personnel resource such an exercise is likely to require:

- There is likely to be considerable pressure to release the recovery debrief report into the public domain, particularly if the community has been consulted. It is therefore recommended that a pro-active approach is taken to this issue, with an early statement being made about the consultation mechanisms, the fact that the
report will be published (with details of how, e.g. on a website, etc), and with an indicative publication date being provided.

- Documents produced during the debrief process should be held for a suggested five years, but then reviewed in light of possible inquiry or investigation timelines prior to disposal. Everyone should maintain their own documents in case of an inquiry.

Identifying and learning lessons

5.6.9 The collation of lessons identified from the recovery phase of emergencies and exercises should be the same as those used for the response phase.

- National lessons identified can be fed via DCLG RED, (or devolved equivalents), or the LGD to the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in the Cabinet Office for collation and coordination of any subsequent actions by the relevant government departments.

- Local lessons identified can be collated for consideration and action by Local Resilience Forums.

5.6.10 Where lessons identified would be of interest to other LRFs or responders in other geographic areas, these can be flagged to the DCLG RED / Welsh Government who will arrange for them to be disseminated via their networks. Consideration should also be given to producing case studies (with links to the full debrief report) for inclusion in the National Recovery Guidance. Details of how to submit case studies, along with the case study template, can be found with the Guidance on the UK Resilience website11.

11 http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/national-recovery-guidance
Chapter 6:

RESILIENT TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Sections in this chapter:

6.1 Generic principles for enhancing communications resilience
6.2 Telecommunications Sub-Groups
6.3 Government initiatives for enhancing resilience
6.4 National arrangements for promoting the availability of telecommunications infrastructure
Chapter 6
6. Resilient telecommunications

Summary

- Good communications are at the heart of an effective response to, and recovery from, an emergency. Experience from recent emergencies in the UK and overseas has shown that responders should plan for disruption to their communications.

- The Community Risk Register provides an insight into the types of local situations that might cause disruption, which include natural events such as adverse weather, or circumstances that have occurred through human intervention such as an electrical power failure or a terrorist incident.

- The National Risk Register (NRR) identifies a number of situations that could potentially disrupt telecommunications. From an assessment of the consequences of the disruption, guidance is produced annually in the form of planning assumptions, which provide a framework against which the resilience of responder communications should be tested.

- This chapter provides an overview of:
  - Generic principles for enhancing communications resilience;
  - How these should be applied locally through Telecommunications Sub-Groups;
  - Government initiatives for enhancing resilience; and
  - National arrangements for promoting the availability of telecommunications infrastructures.
6.1. Generic principles for enhancing communications resilience

6.1.1. Telecommunications are a fundamental enabler underpinning the effective response to any emergency. While the technical aspects, such as types of devices being used, are often at the forefront of our considerations, they must be considered alongside softer issues such as the way we organise ourselves to respond. There is no silver bullet that will provide resilience; rather, it is achieved through a thorough and careful analysis of communications requirements. That process can be guided by five principles:

1. **Look beyond the technical solutions at processes and organisational arrangements**
   The way in which responders organise themselves, the processes used in communicating (such as agreed protocols that make conference calls work smoothly) and the technical arrangements that enable communications to be achieved over distance and on the move, should command equal attention and recognition that none of these three components should be considered in isolation.

2. **Identify and review the critical communication activities that underpin your response arrangements**
   We increasingly work in an environment constrained by resources, so it is vitally important that focus should first be given to critical activities that are essential to the effectiveness of response arrangements. Organisations processes, and technologies change arrangements, need to be reviewed as appropriate.

3. **Ensure diversity of your technical solutions**
   When we use different telecommunications systems it is often not apparent that they are dependent on the same underlying infrastructure – a failure there can affect many different platforms. Public mobile (cellular) networks are dependent, to varying degrees, on core and access networks (that deliver land-line telephone services) - failure or degradation here can affect mobile services. While core telecommunications networks can survive for many days without grid distributed electricity, organisational systems may not and mobile systems are unlikely to be operational for more than an hour. It is important to review local arrangements underpinning critical communications to reduce as far as possible such common means of failure.
4. **Adopt layered fall-back arrangements**

No means of communicating is going to be available all the time, for example faults occur and systems become congested. Such problems can be mitigated by adopting a layered approach to critical communications so that if preferred means becomes unavailable, processes are in place to seamlessly fall-back to other arrangements.

5. **Plan for appropriate interoperability**

During a response to an emergency, responders will be working alongside colleagues and other organisations, and it is vitally important that appropriate information can be shared. For sharing to be effective, both the soft issues, (the organisational and processes), and the hard, (telecommunications equipment and systems), must be appropriately interoperable.

6.2. **Telecommunications Sub-Groups**

6.2.1. The focus for local resilience enhancing activity is through Telecommunications Sub-Groups (TSGs) that have been established in each Local Resilience Forum. TSGs bring together a wide representation of statutory responders and partner organisations who inject both contingency planning and information technology skills into the Groups’ activities. Contact details for TSGs can be found at: [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/local-resilience-forums-telecommunications-sub-groups](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/local-resilience-forums-telecommunications-sub-groups)

6.2.2. Groups have developed local plans that provide a focus for all communications arrangements that support a response to an emergency. Plans should go beyond a communications directory and provide a source of reference for all responder organisations, enabling interoperability arrangements to be clearly understood. The plan should also contain contact details for key local telecommunications service providers to enable liaison with industry. At their inception, TSGs were given advice on how to draw up a plan to enhance the resilience of local responders’ communications and that of their partners. The guidance suggested that the plan should contain:

- an assessment to identify key local responders and resilience partners, their communication requirements and their arrangements for telecommunications;
a ‘gap analysis’ to identify shortfalls in the resilience of the current arrangements for telecommunications when viewed against the requirement for communication and the local risks to telecommunications;

steps to be taken to enhance the resilience of telecommunications and a timetable for undertaking any remedial actions;

arrangements for liaising with neighbouring LRF areas; and

exercise programme for resilient telecommunications.

6.2.3. While TSGs have operated chiefly as planning forums, they also have a valuable role to play in support of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group, providing a technical and advisory resource and promoting the timely application of the local telecommunications plan. The TSG will hold contact details for the telecommunications service providers and be able to liaise with industry as required.

6.3. Government initiatives for enhancing resilience

6.3.1. Telecommunications technologies are now largely commoditised. This is recognised in the Government’s 2007 strategy for enhancing the resilience responder’s communications. Four broad capabilities established centrally remain relevant:

1. **High Integrity Telecommunications System (HITS)** provides a highly resilient telecommunications link between Strategic Coordination Centres (SCCs), central government crisis management centres and the devolved administrations, as these fixed locations are augmented by a fully deployable capability.

The wider responder community (Category 1 and 2 responders as defined in the Act) can avail themselves of the following resilience enhancing capabilities:

2. **National Resilience Extranet** is a secure collaborative platform for sharing information. Being browser-based it can be used over any broadband internet connection or government network (e.g. gsi, gcsx, gsx and pnn) with connectivity provided by a number of means, including: HITS; commercial satellite; 3G and fixed-line.
3. Mobile Telecommunications Privileged Access Scheme (MTPAS) helps circumvent congestion on mobile networks by the use of a special SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) card.

4. Airwave, the resilient, secure, digital mobile radio system provides national coverage from any sealed road. Used primarily by Ambulance and Fire and Rescue Services, and the Police, it is shared with other responders with whom they need to communicate in responding to emergencies.

6.4. National arrangements for promoting the availability of telecommunications infrastructure

6.4.1. The availability of electronic communications infrastructure, including the internet, is promoted by the Electronic Communications – Resilience and Response Group (EC-RRG), an industry group hosted by BIS (Department for Business Innovation and Skills). This is achieved through ownership and maintenance of the National Emergency Plan for the Telecommunications Sector. The Group leads in developing and maintaining co-operation between the telecommunication industry and government, and provides an industry emergency response capability through the National Emergency Alert for Telecommunications (NEAT).

More detail on enhancing the resilience of telecommunications is available on the Cabinet Office website https://www.gov.uk/resilient-communications.
Chapter 7:

MEETING THE NEEDS OF THOSE AFFECTED BY AN EMERGENCY

Sections in this chapter:

7.1 What is humanitarian assistance?
7.2 Meeting the immediate needs of the injured
7.3 Meeting the immediate needs of survivors without serious injuries
7.4 Meeting the immediate needs of family and friends
7.5 Meeting the needs of friends and family of the deceased
7.6 Meeting the longer term needs of the injured survivors, family and friends
7.8 Meeting the needs of specific groups
7.9 Meeting the needs of rescuers and response workers
Chapter 7
7. Meeting the needs of those affected by an emergency

Summary

- Humanitarian assistance is about ensuring that those involved and affected by emergencies are properly cared for (paragraph 7.1.1).

- This chapter identifies the key groups of people affected by emergencies, and outlines how their needs can be met. The key groups covered are:
  - the injured (section 7.2);
  - uninjured survivors, and those without serious injuries (section 7.3);
  - families and friends, (section 7.4);
  - family and friends of the deceased (section 7.5);
  - specific groups such as children, the elderly and faith groups (section 7.7); and
  - rescue and response workers (section 7.8)

- It also gives specific guidance about meeting the long-term needs of the injured, survivors family and friends (section 7.6).

- This chapter is primarily oriented towards emergencies occurring in the United Kingdom. However, in dealing with emergencies overseas involving UK citizens, agencies should draw on this guidance selectively and pragmatically.

- The Department for Culture, Media, and Sport has produced strategic guidance to inform planners and responders of the issues they should be taking into account prior to, during and after an emergency https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/humanitarian-assistance-in-emergencies

- The Department of Health has produced guidance for NHS organisations on psychosocial and mental health care for people following emergencies
7.1. What is Humanitarian assistance

7.1.1. Humanitarian assistance is about ensuring that those involved and affected by a major incident are properly cared for. The exact focus and nature of provision will depend on the type of emergency, the impact it has had on the community, and the needs of those affected. Humanitarian assistance provision is likely to include:

- basic shelter;
- information about what has happened;
- medical assistance/treatment;
- financial and legal support;
- psychosocial support;
- advice and direction on how to get further help and assistance;
- communication facilities to allow people to contact and meet each other;
- providing a link to ongoing police investigation where relevant; and
- providing a point of contact for longer term support and advice.

7.1.2. Emergencies can cause death and physical injury; they can also have an impact on the psychological, social and economic welfare of individuals affected, as well as their families, friends and wider communities. This chapter identifies the key groups of people affected by emergencies and outlines ways of meeting their needs.

7.1.3. When considering how to meet the needs of those affected it is important to recognise:

- The range of assistance required. In addition to medical assistance and material welfare, many of those affected by an emergency will have psychosocial needs.
The range of agencies involved. The care and assistance given to meet the needs of those affected lies at the heart of emergency response and recovery work. This brings together a wider range of agencies including:

- the National Health Service, which provides assistance to those suffering from injury or trauma;
- police services, who are responsible for establishing the identity of the injured and fatalities, providing information to family and friends and conducting criminal investigations;
- local authorities, who co-ordinate welfare support and social care;
- commercial organisations (e.g. transport companies), who, in consultation with the responding authorities, may provide humanitarian assistance to those affected by emergencies occurring in their sectors;
- voluntary organisations, which have particular expertise in dealing with health, and practical care needs; and
- embassy staff where an emergency affects foreign nationals or takes place overseas.


The period of time that assistance may be needed. Humanitarian assistance will be required in the immediate aftermath of the incident, but in many cases this need will extend into the medium and longer term. It is important to look beyond the immediate response effort, and consider the longer-term recovery and rehabilitation issues for individuals, families and communities.

7.1.4. All these factors make the effective provision of humanitarian assistance a challenging but essential task. It is important that agencies work together to ensure that the needs of those affected are dealt with by the most appropriate agency; that there is no duplication of effort; and that individuals and their families and friends are dealt with in a sensitive and joined-up way. In the preparation phase, this should be embedded through multi-agency planning and regular training and exercising.

7.1.5. The Strategic Co-ordinating Group (see chapter 4) should also take steps to ensure that humanitarian assistance is co-ordinated and effective in the response phase. This might take the form of establishing a working group to advise on this issue if required.
7.1.6. More information on humanitarian issues can be found in the National Recovery Guidance at: https://www.gov.uk/national-recovery-guidance-humanitarian-aspects

7.2. Meeting the immediate needs of the injured

7.2.1. The care and treatment of the injured is a high priority response objective with the preservation of life being the primary aim. Injured survivors may be taken to a casualty clearing station, which will usually be sited in a building or temporary shelter close to the ambulance loading point. Medical and paramedical personnel will carry out triage and any appropriate stabilisation measures before ensuring that casualties are evacuated in accordance with priorities for hospital treatment.

7.2.2. The Ambulance Incident Commander, who has overall responsibility for the work of ambulance services at the scene of an emergency, is responsible for ensuring/assessing:

- the establishment of medical communications on site;
- the transport of medical teams;
- whether a Medical Incident Commander (MIC) – who is responsible for the management of medical resources at the scene – should be appointed;
- in consultation with the MIC, conveyance of casualties to appropriate receiving hospitals;
- transport of casualties to distant specialist hospitals by helicopter where appropriate;
- the provision of ambulance resources necessary for the ongoing treatment of casualties; and
- the distribution and replenishment of medical and first-aid supplies.
7.3. Meeting the immediate needs of survivors without serious injuries

7.3.1. Those who have survived an emergency with no apparent physical injuries (or with only minor injuries) may nonetheless be traumatised and be suffering from shock, anxiety or grief. They will, therefore, need to be treated with care and sensitivity.

7.3.2. Survivors without serious injuries are often anxious for information about the incident; any family, friends or colleagues who may have been affected by the emergency; the location of other survivors; and what will happen to them next and when. Their initial needs are likely to include:

- shelter and warmth;
- information on and assistance with contacting family and friends – keeping survivors well informed with accurate information can help reduce anxiety and the disruption to their lives;
- support in their distress;
- food and drink;
- first aid to treat injuries and meet medicinal and mobility needs; and
- changing, washing and toilet facilities, and perhaps spare clothing.

7.3.3. In addition to these immediate needs, their subsequent needs could include:

- transport home;
- finding temporary accommodation; and
- financial advice and assistance.

7.3.4. It is important not to overlook psychological care needs, both in the immediate and longer term. Even if psychological affects are not immediately apparent, they can be hidden or can develop a considerable time later. Experience has shown that the quality of care and support received by survivors in the immediate aftermath of an incident is crucial in
managing the longer-term psychological effects. It should be borne in mind that survivors may also be bereaved in an incident.

Further information is available at

7.3.5. Survivors will often be able to provide crucial information about what happened and may be important witnesses at any subsequent trial or inquiry. There must be a balance between the requirement to gather evidence from survivors and the reluctance of some to remain at the scene of their distress. For example, prioritising information might help, so that only names and addresses are taken from those anxious to leave, with further details being obtained later at follow up.

7.3.6. Local authorities are responsible for co-ordinating the provision of care and welfare support by both the statutory and voluntary sector in emergencies. This will include caring for survivors without serious injuries. To meet the needs of survivors, the local authority can, in the immediate aftermath of an incident, establish survivor reception centres (SuRC\textsuperscript{12}) or rest centres. These facilities may in some cases be co-located and the precise implementation of each will vary by local area and the nature of the emergency itself.

Providing short-term shelter and first aid

7.3.7. A survivor reception centre can be used to provide a secure area for survivors not requiring acute hospital treatment. This centre can be used to provide short-term shelter and first aid if required. Information on who might require this support will need to be gathered; police documentation teams will usually fulfil this role. Survivor reception centres are often established and initially run by the emergency services, who are usually the first on the scene. They will maintain this facility until the local authority becomes engaged in the response and takes the lead in the provision of this facility.

7.3.8. Survivor reception centres are likely to be activated for only a limited period of time. When the survivor reception centres cease operation, survivors may need to be moved into rest centre facilities or other accommodation (e.g. bed and breakfasts or local hotels) as determined by local planning arrangements. The longer-term welfare requirements

\textsuperscript{12} Survivor Reception Centre is abbreviated as SuRC to distinguish it from a Shoreline Response Centre (SRC)
of survivors may be met through humanitarian assistance centres and/or via other mechanisms such as local authority social care outreach teams.

Providing longer term shelter

7.3.9. Rest centres (a building designated or taken over by the local authority) can be used to provide temporary accommodation for evacuees and homeless survivors. In other areas, arrangements may instead be made with local bed and breakfasts and hotels to provide accommodation for survivors.

Roles and responsibilities for providing shelter

7.3.10. The responsibility for organising, staffing and providing logistical support for survivor reception centres, rest centres or appropriate alternatives sits with local authorities. However, the local authority relies upon the contributions of other services to provide effective assistance to uninjured survivors. In particular:

- the police may need to ensure the security of these facilities, controlling access in order to prevent uninvited media representatives or onlookers disturbing those inside;

- local healthcare providers may be required to give assistance in treating those requiring non-acute medical care and dealing with the effects of trauma; and

- the voluntary sector can augment the local authority’s capabilities and capacity to provide practical care and support.

7.3.11. The longer-term housing needs of those made homeless by an emergency, or those who need to be evacuated for long periods of time, are the statutory responsibility of local authorities.

Role of commercial organisations

7.3.12. A number of commercial organisations (e.g. transport companies) offer family assistance services in the event of an emergency occurring in their sector. For example:

- The UK passenger train operators provide care and support to those involved in rail-related emergencies and their family and friends. In conjunction with its members, the Association of Train Operating Companies has developed a Code of Practice, *Joint Industry Provision of Humanitarian Assistance Following a Major Passenger Rail*
Incident, which sets out the framework through which such care and support is provided.

- Upon notification of an incident, UK airlines and helicopter operators will activate emergency response plans. This will include the assembly of humanitarian assistance teams.

7.3.13. It is important that any arrangements for call centres opened by transport operators and other commercial organisations to provide information following an emergency are closely linked into police casualty bureau procedures. This will help minimise the potential for duplication of effort and, more importantly, inconsistencies in the messages given out. It is also important that any responding commercial organisations are integrated into any operational facilities provided to ensure an integrated approach. At the same time, potential sensitivities around the investigations into the origin and cause of transport incidents should be borne in mind.

7.4. Meeting the immediate needs of family and friends

7.4.1. Experience has shown that in the immediate aftermath of an incident many people will travel to the scene or to meeting points, such as travel terminals, if they believe their family or friends may have been involved in an emergency.

7.4.2. Friends and relatives who may be feeling intense anxiety, shock or grief, need a sympathetic and understanding approach. Appropriate and effective liaison and control must be in place to ensure that information is accurate, consistent and non-contradictory. The information provided to those seeking information about individuals who might be affected should also be as full as possible, without compromising the privacy of the individual. Given feelings of intense anxiety, shock or grief, arrangements should be in place to ensure uninvited media attention is prevented.

7.4.3. Friends and family reception centres (FFRCs) can be used to help reunite family and friends with survivors. Such centres need to provide the capacity to register, interview and provide shelter for family and friends. These centres may be near the scene, in the area of the community affected or at arrival and departure points.

7.4.4. Family and friends reception centres will usually be staffed by police, local authority staff and suitably trained staff from voluntary organisations. In setting up such facilities,
representatives of faith communities should be consulted whenever appropriate. Interpreters may also be required.

7.5. **Meeting the needs of friends and family of the deceased**

7.5.1. It is essential that the handling of issues surrounding fatalities is both efficient and sensitive. What is important is that the response, as far as it is possible, seeks to satisfy the needs of the families, providing timely and accurate information and appropriate support whilst still meeting the legal requirements for investigating the incident and the cause of death.

7.5.2. Challenges faced by responding agencies are likely to be diverse and complex. A whole range of activity is likely to be undertaken from recovering the deceased from the incident site to identifying them, and in turn releasing them to families for funerals. A joined-up multi-agency response should be developed and tested through the development of plans\(^{13}\); these plans should consider the care and support of those working with multiple death situations.

**Police Family Liaison Officers**

7.5.3. Following an emergency that involves loss of life, police family liaison officers (FLOs) have a crucial role to play in investigating those believed to be missing. They also assist in the identification process by collecting ante mortem data from families and others. They will be working to a family liaison strategy for the emergency set by the police senior identification manager (SIM). This individual will have overall responsibility for the identification of the deceased on behalf of HM Coroner.

7.5.4. FLOs have an important role to play in providing a single point of contact, particularly in the aftermath of the emergency, keeping families informed of developments in respect of the identification and any investigation that may take place. The FLO will normally work directly to a police family liaison co-ordinator (FLC); who, in addition to giving support and direction to individual FLOs will also provide a liaison point for other agencies that may be able to assist with the families needs.

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\(^{13}\) Lord Justice Clarke's public inquiry on identification of victims following major transport accidents (2001), highlighted that joint training and exercising would assist in delivering an appropriate and sensitive service to families of the deceased.
Police Casualty Bureau

7.5.5. Following a mass casualty incident, large numbers of the general public will be seeking information about friends and relatives who may have been affected by the incident(s). Therefore, hospitals should have, as part of their major incident plans, a mechanism to manage a significant number of people making contact either in person or via telephone and internet access, seeking information about patients that may have been admitted. The first priority of healthcare staff must be to ensure that any relatives who have arrived at the hospital are reunited with patients who have been admitted. However, it is vital that when this occurs this information is passed to the police casualty bureau.

7.5.6. The purpose of a police casualty bureau is to provide an initial point of contact for the assessing and receiving of information relating to persons who have been, or are believed to have been, involved in an emergency. For the purposes of the bureau, a casualty may be defined as any person who is directly involved in, or affected by, the incident. This will include survivors, evacuees and the deceased.

7.5.7. A police casualty bureau has three fundamental tasks:

- to obtain relevant information regarding persons involved or potentially involved;
- to assess and process that information; and
- to provide accurate information to relatives and friends, the investigating and identification officers and HM Coroner.

7.5.8. When a casualty bureau is required, its early establishment is essential. Without such a facility, calls from concerned friends and relatives may swamp control centres. This has the potential to severely inhibit the management of the response to the emergency, to increase the anxiety of those seeking reassurances about relatives, and increase their search for information.
7.5.9. Once the bureau is activated and able to receive calls, the media will publicise a dedicated telephone number. The bureau telephone numbers must also be passed as soon as possible to telephone network controllers, control rooms for the other emergency services and the local authority (or authorities), receiving hospital switchboards, and embassies (if appropriate). These measures will reduce delays and confusion caused by embassies and relatives ringing round for information.

7.5.10. As part of the information flow to the casualty bureau, police officers trained to document casualties will be deployed to receiving hospitals and ensure that all known casualty information from the hospital is passed to the central casualty bureau. This includes the notification of patients who are declared dead as a result of the incident. However, further links need to be in place between the police and other healthcare providers, which cover the triage processes (principally at the scene(s)) or those patients who are referred for non-urgent treatment within local primary care services (e.g. local GPs), who may slip through the documentation or recording processes that in-patients will undergo.

7.5.11. In incidents where a large volume of calls from the public may be reasonably anticipated, the police service may request support from the British Red Cross through activation of its multi-agency telephone support line service – most commonly used to supplement the casualty bureau.

7.5.12. In order to fulfil its role, the casualty bureau will:

- receive enquiries from the general public and file missing person (MISPER) reports;
- record details (including their whereabouts) of survivors, evacuees, the injured and deceased through reports from police documentation teams, receiving hospitals, Survivor Reception Centres, rest centres, Family and Friends Reception Centres, etc.;
- formulate a comprehensive list of missing persons;
- collate data to support identification of persons involved;
- liaise with the ante mortem team; and
- inform enquirers (by the most appropriate means) of the condition and location of these persons.
7.6. Meeting the longer-term needs of the injured, survivors, family and friends

7.6.1. Emergencies can have a significant and long-lasting physical, emotional and psychological impact on the welfare of individuals, families and friends and wider communities affected by emergencies.

7.6.2. Humanitarian assistance centres (HACs) may be established to provide comprehensive longer-term humanitarian assistance, in particular during the remainder of the response and any subsequent investigations. The scale and nature of the emergency will influence the longer-term requirement for a humanitarian assistance centre and the organisations required to be present. Having considered the potential scale of an incident, the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (see chapter 4) will make a decision on the opening and location of a HAC, in consultation with local authorities. The HAC may take over the site of the initial rest and reception centre, adding new services to these centres. In some circumstances, a virtual rather than physical HAC would be more appropriate and may include a dedicated website or helpline. However, it should be borne in mind that not everyone will have access to the internet for such virtual support and this should be a consideration as part of the decision-making process.

Humanitarian Assistance Centres

7.6.3. A humanitarian assistance centre’s fundamental purpose is to act as a one-stop-shop for survivors, families and all those impacted by the incident, through which they can access support, care and advice. Humanitarian assistance centres will:

- act as a focal point for information and assistance to bereaved individuals and families or friends of those missing or killed; survivors; and all those directly affected by and involved in the emergency;

14 Survivors and bereaved people from major UK and overseas disasters founded the charity Disaster Action (DA) in 1991. Members have personal experience of surviving and/or being bereaved in 25 disasters, including terrorist attacks, transport and natural disasters. These range from the Zeebrugge ferry sinking (1987) to the South East Asian Tsunami (2004), the Dunblane shootings, the London bombings (2005), further terrorist attacks and transportation disasters overseas. The organisation consists of an informal national network. The purpose of DA is to represent the interests of those on the receiving end of disaster. Further information is available on their website at www.disasteraction.org.uk
enable individuals, friends and families to benefit from co-ordinated and appropriate information and assistance;

- enable the gathering of mass forensic samples in a timely manner, which enhances the ability to identify loved ones quickly;

- offer access to a range of facilities that will allow individuals, families and survivors to make informed choices according to their needs; and

- provide a coherent multi-agency approach to humanitarian assistance in emergencies that will minimise duplication.

7.6.4. In some areas and in some emergencies, not all of the above will be provided via the HAC and may instead be provided via other means. In addition it is not necessary for all of these services to be delivered via a physical centre; in some cases delivery by virtual means will be more appropriate.

7.6.5. If it is decided that a physical humanitarian assistance centre is needed, local authorities will lead in identifying and establishing these centres, in consultation with police colleagues and the voluntary sector. The responsibility for identifying and securing the use of suitable premises rests with the local authority. The local authority will co-ordinate the provision of practical care and support to the community in the event of an emergency. It will also be responsible for meeting the costs of securing the use of premises in the planning phase, and for providing the centre itself in the event of an emergency.

7.6.6. It is important to adopt a multi-agency approach to the provision of humanitarian assistance centres. During the planning phase local authorities may enter into agreements with voluntary agencies, establishing clear expectations in relation to the responsibility for the payment of costs. The Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) have produced Humanitarian Assistance in Emergencies: non statutory guidance on establishing Humanitarian Assistance Centres which gives more detailed guidance on planning for and operating a HAC.
7.6.7. The HAC will exist for a limited period only. To ensure longer term needs are met, individuals requiring further assistance will need to be identified and signposted to appropriate services. Useful information on sources of assistance can be found on https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/humanitarian-assistance-in-emergencies

7.6.8. Experience has demonstrated the effectiveness of two particular mechanisms for enabling the community itself to participate in the longer-term recovery and rehabilitation process, and these are detailed below.

Memorial services or acts of remembrance

7.6.9. A memorial service provides an opportunity for those affected to share their grief with others (and as a public recognition of the incident and its human consequences). However, it often has an important national as well as local role and is likely to receive extensive media coverage. For these reasons it is important to consider the organisation and structure of such events very carefully, covering such aspects as timing, invitations, representation and conduct. The bereaved should be consulted on the content and arrangements for such services and acts of remembrance.

7.6.10. Further information and advice on commemoration can be found on the Cabinet Office website https://www.gov.uk/national-recovery-guidance-humanitarian-aspects#commemoration

Disaster appeals

7.6.11. Whenever an emergency occurs, people often wish to contribute in some way. Even before any appeal has been launched, unsolicited donations are likely to be received by, for example, the local authority. Dealing with donations and accompanying letters can be a time-consuming task and it may be preferable to launch an appeal fund. Agencies should make it clear at the earliest opportunity what type of assistance (e.g. financial) they are seeking – dealing with unwanted, inappropriate or unneeded donations can be time consuming and costly.

7.6.12. Establishing an appeal fund can be a complex and sensitive task. Appeal fund management involves co-ordinating the handling of donations, weighing the arguments for and against charitable status, appointing independent trustees, deciding how to distribute funds fairly and eventually distributing funds to the appropriate beneficiaries. All of these activities are fraught with potential pitfalls; they require extensive research, planning and monitoring in order to maximise the response of the public. Advice is available from a
number of sources, including Disaster Action which has published lessons and guidance on
the management and distribution of disaster funds.


The British Red Cross has also produced non statutory guidance on their Disaster
Appeal Scheme (United Kingdom). http://www.redcross.org.uk/What-we-do/Emergency-
response/Support-in-UK-emergencies/For-category-one-responders/Disaster-Appeal-
Scheme

7.7. Meeting the needs of specific groups

7.7.1. The care and support needs of a range of groups require special consideration. This
section focuses on four groups which can make challenging demands on responding
agencies. These are: children and young people; faith, religious or cultural groups;
elderly people and people with disabilities. For more information on identifying vulnerable
groups see: Identifying people who are vulnerable in a crisis.

Children and young people

7.7.2. Catering for the needs of children and young people raises particular issues. The
emotional effects on children and young people are not always immediately obvious to
parents or school staff. At times, they find it difficult to confide their distress to adults, often
because they know it will upset them. In some children, the distress can last for months
and may affect academic performance. Families, carers and professionals who deal with
children and young people need to be aware of the range of symptoms that they may show
after a major trauma. They should note any changes in behaviour and alert others.

7.7.3. There are a number of key issues to consider:

- The relaying of accurate information to children and young people as well as adults is
  vital.

- The families of children and young people caught up in a tragedy need full and accurate
  information as quickly as possible.

- Formal debriefing meetings for children, young people and adults can be an important
  part of the rehabilitation process. Further information on the special arrangements
needed when children and young people are caught up in traumatic events is contained in the booklet *Wise Before the Event – Coping with Crises in Schools*.

7.7.4. Local authorities have professional educational psychologists available to provide the necessary support and assistance to children, and young people, who have been involved in an emergency. Their expertise should be sought at an early stage of the response to any emergency where children and young people are involved or affected.

7.7.5. Working with children and young people brings its own particular challenges – arrangements must include the welfare needs of support workers. It is important that staff and volunteers who have a specified role in dealing with children and young people in the event of an emergency are appropriately trained and have been subject to appropriate checks.

**Faith, religious, cultural and minority ethnic communities**

7.7.6. Any emergency occurring in the UK is likely to involve members of different faith, religious, cultural and ethnic minority communities. Emergency services, local authorities and other responding agencies should bear their needs in mind. In communities where this can be reasonably anticipated, suitable arrangements should be built into plans. In cases such as transport incidents, it is more difficult to predict who will be affected, but planning should at least identify which organisations can provide help and maintain advice on how to engage them.

7.7.7. Some people may have language difficulties: help from translators and interpreters may therefore be needed. Any interpreters used should be aware of the principles of responding to and recovering from emergencies (and will need appropriate support afterwards). Particular faith, religious, cultural and minority ethnic requirements may relate to medical treatment, gender issues, hygiene, diet, clothing, accommodation and places for prayer. Depending on the faith, religion, culture and ethnicity of the deceased or bereaved, there may also be concern about how the deceased are managed, and the timing of funeral arrangements. Practical assistance with foreign languages is available in the simple to use British Red Cross Multilingual Phrasebooks, one for medical emergencies and the other for major incidents.

7.7.8. Various sections of faith communities have well-established emergency arrangements. It is therefore important to integrate their requirements into general contingency planning as far as possible. Further advice on the particular needs of faith communities is available in *The
Elderly people and people with disabilities

7.7.9. Although not the same, many of the needs of these groups will be similar. Disabilities are wide ranging and may include: physical or sensory impairment (e.g. hearing or sight); learning difficulties; and mental health problems.

7.7.10. Local authorities will be aware of residential and nursing homes where elderly people or people with disabilities reside or visit for day care. In the event of an emergency, families and neighbours may also bring to the attention of responding agencies elderly and disabled people who are not in receipt of local authority attention.

7.7.11. It is important to make provision to meet any special needs and to provide additional sensitivity, care or support that may be required. These needs may relate to:

- information;
- communication and understanding;
- mobility;
- medication; and
- reassurance.

7.8. Meeting the needs of rescuers and response workers

7.8.1. Emergencies place enormous demands on all involved in the response and recovery effort. Pressure of work may sometimes be sustained over long periods. Agencies need to ensure they look after the physical and psychosocial welfare of staff and volunteers – managers should be trained in what to look out for in both the short and longer term.

7.8.2. Health and safety at work legislation requires employers and others to ensure "so far as reasonably practicable" a safe place of work and working practices. The legislation is therefore flexible – what is reasonably practicable in the challenging circumstances of an emergency will clearly be different to what is reasonably practicable on a day-to-day basis.
Responding agencies should apply their training, knowledge and skills in assessing the circumstances they face and should take appropriate precautions. In most cases, this will be to apply their established systems of work and use their usual equipment, including personal protective equipment. Some circumstances may require more detailed assessment (e.g. before the emergency services can safely enter a badly contaminated or unstable building).

7.8.3. Similarly, legislation on working time is not a bar to the emergency services or others responding to an emergency effectively. Given the way in which working time is calculated (e.g. the 48-hour limit is calculated by averaging time worked over 17 weeks), relatively long periods of long hours can be accommodated. There are also a number of exceptions which will apply depending on the circumstances. However, given the challenging nature of emergency response work, responding agencies should ensure that shifts are of a reasonable length and rotas are in place to ensure the continuing health, safety and effectiveness of personnel.

7.8.4. Other physical requirements include:

- refreshments at any response scene, especially to provide warmth or prevent dehydration;

- facilities for taking meals away from “the front line”;

- washing and changing facilities;

- medical and first-aid facilities; and

- telephone and transport provision so people can keep their families informed and get home as quickly as possible.

7.8.5. With regard to psychosocial care, management should consider the need for:

- appropriate and effective briefing to ensure staff and volunteers know what is happening and what their contribution will be;

- honest information about what to expect where unpleasant or stressful tasks are involved;

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• quiet space to prepare, unwind or think;

• someone to discuss experiences with, both at the time and afterwards;

• providing access to information on sources of help or support;

• information about what constitutes a normal reaction;

• similar support and information for family or partners; and

• debriefing at the end of a day’s activity and the close of operations.

7.8.6. For many, it will be enough to talk through issues with their colleagues or peers, perhaps guided by a suitably trained or experienced person. Some, however, will require skilled professional care and support. All services should provide access to this support in a way that ensures confidentiality and overcomes any cultural resistance.

7.8.7. In areas of activity that are particularly harrowing, it is important to advise personnel (be they professional or voluntary workers) of the nature of the work involved. Training and selection arrangements should aim to ensure that suitable staff are chosen; appropriate training is given and support is available.

7.8.8. The welfare of personnel remains the responsibility of individual agencies. However, in some circumstances, the local authority may provide premises for a joint emergency service welfare facility. Voluntary organisations may be asked to augment the efforts of occupational health personnel if required.
Chapter 8:

WORKING WITH THE MEDIA

Sections in this chapter:

8.1 Introduction
8.2 Role of the News Co-ordination Centre (NCC)
8.3 Warning and informing the public
8.4 The challenges of working with the media
8.5 Co-ordinating media liaison
8.6 Working with the media
8.7 Controlling media access at the scene
8.8 Specific issues for consideration
8.9 Sustainability
8.10 Media debrief
Chapter 8
8. Working with the Media

Summary

• This chapter concerns co-operation with the media at the scene of an emergency.

• It includes information on:
  
  • the role of the News Co-ordination Centre (section 8.2);
  • warning and informing the public (section 8.3);
  • the challenges of working with the media (section 8.4);
  • co-ordinating media liaison (section 8.5);
  • working effectively with the media in emergencies (section 8.6);
  • media arrangements at the scene of an emergency (section 8.7);
  • specific issues for consideration, including the release of casualty figures, interviews with survivors, remote access and VIP visits (section 8.8);
  • media debriefs (section 8.10).

• Media interest can create pressure 24 hours a day. Careful planning of staggered handovers between shifts is essential (section 8.9).

• Case studies from recent emergencies are included in section 8.10.
8.1. Introduction

8.1.1. Good public communication is vital to the successful handling of any emergency and should be incorporated in all contingency planning. When an emergency occurs, the key communications objective will be to deliver accurate, clear and timely information and advice to the public so they feel confident, safe and well informed.

8.1.2. The news media (radio and TV broadcasting and print) remain the primary means of communication with the public in these circumstances. Digital and social media are also being used widely to provide a further source of information and advice for the public. However, it is important to be aware that information can be generated by official or unofficial sources and this will need to be fully considered when developing a media handling strategy.

8.2. Role of the News Co-ordination Centre (NCC)

8.2.1. In the event of an emergency, the News Co-ordination Centre may be established by the Cabinet Office Communications Group. The NCC is there to support the Lead Government Department (LGD) in their communications management of the overall incident.

8.2.2. The nature of the NCC’s support will depend on the circumstances, but it could take the form of securing extra staff to work in the LGD or in an operations centre; helping to compile and distribute briefing material; designing and establishing websites; forward planning; collation of requests for ministerial interviews; and preparing media assessments. Additionally, the NCC could provide a central press office to co-ordinate the overall government message. The Department of Communities and Local Government, Resilience and Emergencies Division can play a role in assisting local responders – see chapter 9 Multi-LRF working arrangements.

8.3. Warning and informing the public

8.3.1. The Civil Contingencies Act includes two specific duties for Category 1 responders in relation to communicating with the public. First, there is a duty to inform the public about the risks of emergencies affecting a local area and how responders are prepared to deal with them should they occur. This is based on the belief that the more information the public have before an emergency, the more likely they are to take appropriate action if the
emergency occurs. Secondly, there is a duty to maintain arrangements to warn the public and provide appropriate advice and information if an emergency is likely to occur or has occurred. Chapter 7 of *Emergency Preparedness* (Communicating with the public) describes the requirements of the legislation and offers advice and case studies on public communications issues.

8.3.2. Under other existing legislation such as the COMAH Regulations (Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999) and REPPIR (Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001)\(^{15}\), there is a duty to provide information to the public. Under COMAH, an operator must provide information to members of the public liable to be affected by a major accident at the operator’s establishment. In preparing this information, the operator must consult the local authority in which they are situated and reach agreement for the local authority to disseminate the information to the public. Similarly, under REPPIR, an operator or carrier must ensure that members of the public in an area likely to be affected by a radiation emergency as a result of their operations are supplied with appropriate information. The operator or carrier must consult the local authority or local authorities for the areas concerned and reach agreement with them to disseminate the information.

- The key to effective communication with the public is getting the message right for the right audience, balancing the need to rapidly disseminate information with the methods available at the time of the emergency. How information and advice are delivered can greatly affect how they are received. Responders should take into account different response behaviours, for example, members of the public may be shocked and bewildered or exhibit inappropriate behaviours, and tailor their messages appropriately\(^{16}\).
- The public may not understand that responders use the media as one of the main channels to get information out to the public. Responders should consider how they present information so that the media is seen to be conveying official advice; otherwise it may appear to be generated by the media representatives themselves.

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**Co-ordination of information flow among stakeholders**

\(^{15}\) See [www.legislation.gov.uk](http://www.legislation.gov.uk) for details.

\(^{16}\) Note: in extreme circumstances what may normally be considered to be extreme or even inappropriate behaviours may be a ‘normal’ reaction to abnormal circumstances
8.3.3. A key issue during any emergency is to try and ensure consistency in the information provided by the different agencies involved. In the confusion that often follows an incident, it can be a difficult and lengthy process to establish clear, concise and accurate facts and figures about what has happened. However, the media will have an insatiable appetite for these details and will continue to seek information wherever and from whoever they can.

8.3.4. It will cause unnecessary pain and alarm if the information provided by different agencies is inconsistent, and great care should be taken to avoid this. Inconsistency will also lead to a loss of confidence in the responding agencies handling the incident.

8.3.5. Establishing cross-agency co-ordination of information at an early stage in an incident is a key step in seeking to avoid unnecessary confusion and inconsistency. This may include production and distribution of a core media brief for distribution among key stakeholders, central co-ordination of interviews, or even a centralised press office. It could also mean provision of additional press officers by one agency to support the efforts of another agency that may be coming under particular pressure.

Websites
8.3.6. Searching for information via the Internet is now common place. Research showed that in 2011 at least 77% of UK households had internet access. Websites are one of the useful ways to get out detailed information to a wide audience. It should be regarded as a continuous medium, like 24-hour TV or radio, and will need to be regularly updated, particularly during an emergency. Websites are often used to supplement other sources of information and to provide context and confirmation. The information should be available when people need to access it and it serves as an audit log to show that information was provided at certain times. It is recognised that the public will seek information and advice from a number of sources. It is important to have consistent messages and accurate signposting to appropriate information.

8.3.7. Organisations should ensure that their website address is always issued as part of the public and media information. Emergencies can place huge demands on websites. Part of the planning for a crisis or emergency should also include ensuring that your website has the capacity in place (or can quickly get the capacity in place) to deal with the huge number of hits a crisis or emergency might generate. This may include, for example, having a cut down text only version quickly available to ensure that a website can cope with large demand.
8.3.8. The UK Resilience section on the GOV.UK website and other departmental sites, can be a central source of information for the press and broadcasters inside and outside the United Kingdom.

8.3.9. The Preparing for Emergencies page on the GOV.UK website has information for the general public on what to do to prepare for emergencies. In the event of emergencies, the lead government department sites also carry ministerial statements, background details, and instructions on actions to take.

8.3.10. When required the web team within the Cabinet Office can monitor news sources and feeds for breaking news and additional information, and liaises with other government departments’ web teams to co-ordinate messages and share information.

Social Media

8.3.11. Recent years have seen an exponential growth in the use of social media. For example, Twitter grew overall by 800% in 2010. Whilst social media are a powerful tool, they should not be used in isolation and need to be incorporated into wider communication strategies.

8.3.12. The use of social media in an emergency can help to reach a broad range of people and organisations as it permits instant transmission of messages directly to followers. It also contributes to the public's situational awareness as an emergency unfolds, and can help responders gain a more accurate picture. Through social media responders are able to counter erroneous information and manage speculation and rumours. However, it is important to recognise that social media cannot be used in isolation in an emergency; and that it should not be seen as simply an alerting tool. Responders need to build up a core of followers before an emergency and ensure there is a level of trust with the followers before social media can be used effectively during an emergency.

8.3.13. In 2011, CCS commissioned the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) to undertake research to establish how the broad spectrum of social media could be used in emergency management. The research outcome included practical guidance for responders to consider – “Smart tips for Category 1 responders using social media in emergency management”.

Information from the Public – Citizen Journalists or “User Generated Content”

8.3.14. It is recognised that the public are not a passive audience and that they play a vital role in providing two way communications. In all recent emergencies, the media have received a
huge volume of video, photographs and information from the public – often taken at the scene of the emergency. Media organisations give guidance on the terms and conditions associated with the acceptance of this material as well as warning individuals not to put themselves at risk. Organisations looking for this type of information from the public should ensure that they issue similar advice and guidance.

Establishing an emergency call centre

8.3.15. Where an emergency call centre/local contact centre (or British Red Cross multi-agency support line) is established, the media have an important role to play in raising awareness of its existence and the information it can provide. The telephone number should be given to the media urgently to enable them to publicise it.

8.3.16. The role of the emergency call centre/local contact centre (or British Red Cross multi-agency support line) should be clearly distinguished from that of the Casualty Bureau.

Internal Communications

8.3.17. It is important to remember an organisation’s own internal communications. Keeping staff informed and up-to-date is an important part of an organisation’s overall response. It can also be useful to circulate messages received from the community as they can offer insight into reaction and support on the ground.

8.4. The challenges of working with the media

8.4.1. There have been considerable changes in the news media in recent years. The advent of multiple channels provided through cable, satellite and online, and the availability of newspaper websites to carry video has resulted in a reduction in the different requirements of the various arms of the media.

8.4.2. Studies undertaken have indicated that upwards of 200 media representatives can be expected to turn up at the site of an emergency within an hour of it happening and this can swell to 1,000 or more from all over the world within 24 hours. An incident such as the Buncefield explosion, for example, can attract worldwide media interest within hours.

8.4.3. Advances in technology mean that live interviews, pictures and reports can now be sent direct from the scene of an incident, via a mobile phone, as the event is unfolding. They may come from members of the public making direct contact with media channels even before journalists have arrived. These developments mean there will be a constant
requirement from the media for accurate, timely and up-to-date information. Where it is not provided, rumour and misinformation may flourish.

8.4.4. However, ensuring there are basic arrangements in place for media at the site of an incident – space for parking satellite trucks, for example, and a recognised media area – will make operations at the site easier for all concerned.

8.5. **Co-ordinating media liaison**

8.5.1. At the strategic tier of co-ordination, a media cell should be established which will act as the press office for the incident. It may vary in size from one press officer to larger units staffed by media professionals from a range of responder organisations (e.g. emergency services, local authorities, the Environment Agency and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency). This cell is known as the media communications cell.

8.5.2. The media communications cell should report to the SCG, enabling the press officers to advise on and assist with media issues. This includes feeding back incoming intelligence from the media (which can be an important source of information) while preserving the SCG chair’s privacy and allowing crucial decision making to be conducted without the pressure of immediate media scrutiny. Consequently, media organisations should not normally be granted access to the media communications cell.

8.5.3. As the emergency develops, there will be a requirement for a more comprehensive media response structure. This should be headed by a media communication specialist, ideally with previous crisis experience. It is essential that this person has sufficient seniority and personal authority to take decisions and command respect. Public and media communications should be a fully integral part of the strategic decision-making arrangements for handling the emergency.

**Role of the media communication specialist**

8.5.4. The media communication specialist (and his/her team) should oversee all aspects of the media response. Typically, this would include:

- activities at the media liaison point;
- arrangements for the media to visit any scene, including transport arrangements where events have occurred in a remote location;
- Management of a media centre when/if this is established;
- Monitoring of likely media activities related to the emergency but at locations remote from the primary scene;
- Ensuring an accurate and rapidly updated web presence which should co-ordinate with partner organisations where necessary;
- Monitoring of media coverage;
- Support for those who choose to be interviewed and protection of the privacy of those who do not wish to be interviewed;
- Participation in/management of any discussions with the media about not broadcasting certain details for the time being, or indeed to broadcast specific details (e.g. during hijack situations or kidnap negotiations for which there are existing protocols);
- Liaison with central government communications arrangements (e.g. News Co-ordination Centre); and
- Provision of communications policy advice to the Strategic Co-ordinating Group handling the emergency;
- Ensuring arrangements are in place to agree lines to take and press statements, etc, with partners.

8.5.5. In addition, the organisation will need to consider issues such as staffing rotas and shift arrangements (if required), handover arrangements and logistics for their team – for example, accommodation, catering and IT.

NOMINATING A MEDIA LIASON OFFICER (MLO)

8.5.6. The swift attendance at the scene of an experienced media liaison officer (MLO) (likely to be from the police) should ease pressure from the media. It is vital that this person quickly establishes a procedure for working with media requests and for regularly briefing them on developments. Rumour and conjecture will flourish in a vacuum, and it is far better that the...
MLO gains the trust and confidence of the media by providing regular updates on events, even if there is little new to say.

8.5.7. Demonstrating awareness of the need to meet copy deadlines or broadcast ‘live’ reports will assist the MLO in establishing credibility with the media at the scene. This is important as he/she may need to seek the media’s co-operation in, for example, organising pooled access to the incident site for filming or broadcasting urgent appeals for blood donors or details of evacuation arrangements.

Regular briefings from senior personnel involved in the operation

8.5.8. Arrangements should also be made for the media to receive regular briefings from and interviews with senior police officers, fire and ambulance officers and representatives of other key agencies involved, such as transport companies and local authorities. This can best be facilitated in a controlled environment (ideally in a building) where a raised dais and microphone facilities are available. This will ensure more control over the proceedings and a less stressful environment.

8.5.9. All organisations should give careful thought ahead of any emergency to who should act as their official spokespeople and undertake media interviews. In some cases it will be appropriate for this to be a council leader or local authority representative. Sometimes, it may be more appropriate for it to be a member of the emergency services, or a representative from organisations such as health or the Environment Agency. These people will need suitable training. People filling other public facing roles in the responder community should have a basic level of information so that they can handle enquiries confidently.

8.5.10. While facts may be scarce initially, the media will welcome an honest appraisal of what is ‘known’ at the time and an account of what is being done, for example, to free trapped people. This should be backed up with a commitment to provide new information as soon as it is available. There should be no speculation on causal factors or half promises that raise expectations. Limitations on the release of information, where this is necessary to avoid prejudicing a possible criminal prosecution, should also be explained.
8.5.11. Press releases and briefings should be released in electronic form as soon as possible, for distributing to the media, local responders’ press offices, and for posting on responders’ websites and the National Resilience Extranet (NRE). Ensuring that all websites carrying related information are regularly updated should be regarded as a priority.

8.6. Working with the media

BBC Connecting in a crisis

8.6.1. All organisations should be familiar with the media representatives and outlets in their own areas, and should aim to develop good working relationships with them. In the past BBC local radio stations have operated in a range of crisis situations and the service is recognised as an emergency broadcaster for the UK through the BBC’s Connecting in a Crisis initiative, and emergency planners are encouraged to work more closely with BBC editors in the preparation of strategies for communicating essential information. Planning before a crisis is key and the importance of a good pre-existing relationship between those in the media and those involved in emergency planning and response crisis cannot be overestimated.

Editors contact details can be found via the BBC’s website – http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-15250977

8.7. Controlling media access at the scene

8.7.1. Controlling general access to the incident site itself is a matter for the police, and it is likely that cordons will be put in place as soon as is practicable. Restricting access is intended to allow rescue services to carry out their work unhindered and to preserve evidence at what may be the scene of a crime. Decisions on the extent of the cordon need to be taken quickly and include, where possible, consideration of the media’s desire to be able to film and report what is happening at the site. It is important to avoid creating an area for the media further from the scene than the general public; otherwise the media will simply move to a more accessible location.

8.7.2. Helicopters, ‘cherry pickers’, and/or hoist-mounted remote cameras may well be quickly deployed by the media seeking overview of the site. Depending on the type of incident, broadcasters many consider using a helicopter to get a better vantage point at the scene of an incident. Decisions on control of airspace and overflight and whether an air exclusion zone is required or necessary and communicating that decision should, therefore, be an
early consideration. Depending on the situation, this may be an area where, by arranging a "pooled" (see below) shot, aerial coverage can continue; however working with the media on what is, and what is not achievable is desirable.

Pooling arrangements

8.7.3. Access to the incident site for the purpose of filming, television and stills pictures and reporting what has happened may have to be limited either because of the physical limitations (number and nature of casualties) and/or security considerations at the scene or because of the numbers of media representatives wanting access. One way to resolve this is by seeking media co-operation in nominating and agreeing members for a 'pool'. A 'pool' might, for example, comprise one TV crew, one news agency, such as the Press Association, a photographer and a radio reporter. Their pooled coverage is then made available simultaneously to all the other media organisations. Additional thought may need to be given to meeting the particular needs of foreign media organisations (including providing them with accreditation where necessary).

Establishing a media or rendezvous liaison point

8.7.4. A Media Liaison Point or rendezvous point is a designated point close to an emergency scene, usually (but not always) outside the outer cordon erected by the police around an incident site. This serves as the rendezvous point for media representatives, where their bona fides can be checked and from where they may be able to gain controlled access to the site itself for the purposes of filming, photography and news reporting.

Emergency media centres

8.7.5. The media/communication sub-groups of Local Resilience Forums have worked with the media to establish what arrangements are required to ensure the effective delivery of information to the public in an emergency. This includes recommendations for the basic requirements for an emergency media centre. Considerable additional work has also been done through the media/communication sub group of LRFs and through local media groups, to identify suitable locations and address issues such as the staff required to run such an operation 24 hours a day. Experienced press officers – from all the organisations involved – and also support staff will be required.

8.7.6. There are several benefits to establishing an appropriate media centre for the duration of the emergency. These include a central focus for locating the media; for accrediting potentially large numbers, including media coming from overseas; and for organising regular briefings and providing facilities for press conferences and interviews. It will
also provide a central point for assessing media coverage, co-ordinating information flows from all the organisations involved and, if necessary, establishing a central press office. In the event of a widespread or multi-site emergency, a single media centre may serve as a focus for several media liaison points at different locations.

8.7.7. In very large scale or long running incidents, a decision will also need to be taken quickly about the requirement for establishing an emergency media centre. Where possible, the media should be consulted on this (if the site does not work for them, they will not use it.) The requirement will obviously depend on issues such as the potential longevity, scale and seriousness of the incident or possibly multiple incidents. Issues such as the need for accreditation of large numbers of foreign media, the ready availability of suitable locations – including power, parking and IT facilities – and the opportunities for media access to the site(s) themselves will need to be considered.

8.7.8. In many cases, a Forward Briefing Point with good views over the incident site and regular briefings may well be sufficient for the media’s needs.

Decontamination procedures
8.7.9. If there is a need to decontaminate casualties at the scene, the media will require clear and urgent briefing on the procedures – including the need for privacy involved. (Apart from anything else, media employers have a duty of care to their own staff.)

8.8. Specific issues for consideration

Release of casualty figures
8.8.1. Great care should be taken to ensure that no information about individual casualties, or premature or uncorroborated estimates of the numbers of casualties, is released until details have been confirmed. Names should never be released until the Coroner and next of kin have been informed. In general, this information will be confirmed only by the emergency services involved – usually the police but this may depend on the particular circumstances. It may be necessary to establish a Casualty Bureau (see also Chapter 7) for the purposes of co-ordinating and sifting this information. In briefing the media about this and providing contact details and so on, it should be made clear that the bureau’s role is to receive information to assist in identifying those involved rather than the provision of general information.
Remote handling

8.8.2. Experience has shown that, in some emergencies, media attention focuses on communities and individuals living many miles from the scene, but who are seen as having a direct link to the emergency – perhaps because the casualties came from there. Action will be required to ensure that media facilities and requirements in this area are also covered by the PR manager’s central co-ordination arrangements.

Visits by VIPs

8.8.3. Visits by VIPs can lift the morale of those affected as well as those who are involved with the response. A government or devolved administration Minister may make an early visit to the scene or areas affected, not only to mark public concern but also to be able to report to Parliament on the response. A government Minister visiting the scene may also be accompanied by local MPs. This would be arranged through the Minister’s Private Office. It is possible that the scale of the emergency may, in addition, prompt visits by a member of the Royal Family and/or the Prime Minister. Local VIP visitors may include the Lord Lieutenant and/or High Sheriff, religious leaders, local MPs, mayors, local authority leaders and other elected representatives. If foreign nationals have been involved, their country’s Ambassador, High Commissioner or other dignitaries may also want to visit key locations.

8.8.4. Visits to the scene of an emergency need to take account of the local situation and the immediate effects on the local community. It may be inappropriate for VIP visitors to go to the scene of the emergency while rescue operations are still going on, particularly if casualties are still trapped. VIP visits should not interrupt rescue and life-saving work and the emergency services should be involved in determining the timings of visits.

8.8.5. VIP visits will inevitably cause some disruption and visitors will want this to be kept to a minimum. The additional need for security may also cause a problem. However, there are also dividends to be gained from such visits as they may boost the morale of all those involved, including the injured and the emergency services, and give an opportunity to place on record public gratitude for what has been done.

8.8.6. The emergency services are experienced at handling VIP visits in normal circumstances and many of the usual considerations will apply to visits to the scene of the emergency. However, it may be necessary to restrict media coverage of such visits, in which case pooling arrangements may be made.
8.8.7. Visiting Ministers and other VIPs will require comprehensive briefing before visiting the site and will require briefing before any meetings with the media. While the lead Government Department or DCLG’s RED Office or the press officer dealing may help to collate this, individual organisations should consider what information they will need to supply in advance that will help to contextualise the situation.

8.8.8. VIPs will also wish to meet those survivors who are well enough to see them. It will be for the hospitals to decide, on the basis of medical advice and respect for the wishes of individual patients and their relatives, whether it is appropriate for VIPs and/or the media to visit casualties. If the media cannot have access to wards, VIPs can still be interviewed afterwards, at the hospital entrance, about how patients and medical staff are coping. Such VIP visits are best managed by the PR team of the ‘host’ venue (the hospital, for example,) in close consultation with the police. Further information on VIP visits can be found in the National Recovery Guidance.

8.8.9. The same applies for reception centres, a Press Officer should, if possible, be a member of the team here. Some of those present will be happy to speak to the media and a press officer will have a key role in facilitating this as well as giving media advice to those involved.

Interviews with survivors, their families, the bereaved and those waiting for news of the missing.

8.8.10. The media will be keen to obtain interviews with survivors and their families. However, many may feel too shocked and distressed to give interviews in the immediate aftermath of an incident. Therefore the first consideration should always be the well-being of the individual.

8.8.11. Strenuous efforts should also be made to shield survivors and their families from aggressive pursuit by less responsible members of the media. At its worst, this activity may include harassment, invasion of privacy, intrusion into grief and shock, unwanted involvement of relatives and friends, and interviewing or photographing children.

17 Note: such visits should not be seen as PR exercises and Ministers and other VIPs should be dissuaded from seeing them as such. The public as well as bereaved, those waiting for news of the missing, survivors and responders will wish to know that dignitaries, MPs and others care about what has happened, but this must be tempered by good sense.
8.9. Sustainability

8.9.1. Emergencies place enormous demands on all involved in the response and recovery effort. Media interest, particularly if it is international, can create pressure 24 hours a day, and careful planning of staggered handovers between shifts is essential. Senior staff within responding agencies will wish to take the sustainability of their level of engagement with the media into account and seek mutual aid accordingly. The pooling of resources in a joint media centre may be helpful in this respect. This relates not only to operational personnel but also to those providing administrative and specialist skills, e.g. in website technology.

8.9.2. In the much longer term, experience has also shown that media interest will be rekindled on the anniversary of events, and provision will need to be made to consider how to work with the media in such cases.

8.10. Media debrief

8.10.1. Where there has been a considerable amount of media attention, there will be inevitable strains between media and local responders’ interests. Arranging for senior media representatives to meet with senior members of the emergency services and other organisations involved in the incident, some weeks later, can assist both sides in looking at how information was provided and identifying ways in which arrangements can be improved in the future.

8.10.2. Box 1 provides some case-studies on working with the media, which identify some important lessons. More details on the media case studies and examples of good practice can be found in National Recovery Guidance at: https://www.gov.uk/national-recovery-guidance#national-recovery-guidance-case-studies

Box 1 Working with the media case-studies
(Further examples of best practice case studies are available on the NRE at: https://www.resilience-extranet.gse.gov.uk/best_practice_case_studies)

- Citizen Journalism – the move to a ‘transparent society’ - With the advances in digital media, members of the public taking pictures at incidents brings major issues for responders. ‘Citizen journalism’, or ‘active audience’ as the media call it, means we now live in a transparent society.
During the 7/7 bombings in London, the BBC alone received over 20,000 photo images emailed to them by the public who caught the incident on their mobile phone cameras.

At the Grayrigg train crash in Cumbria in February 2007, the BBC broadcast still pictures from inside one of the wrecked carriages before the main emergency services arrived – they had been forwarded by mobile phone from a BBC employee who had been on the train.

Citizen journalism also raises health and safety issues too. At Buncefield, the media complained that young children were coming to them offering pictures on their mobile phones; if the media refused them, the children would run back closer to the blaze to get ‘better’ pictures, putting themselves at risk. The issue has been discussed by the RMEFs, and most media now put advice and guidance for would-be ‘citizen journalists’ on their websites. For responders, bona fide journalists should be carrying a Press Card recognised by the UK Press Card Authority – rules governing its use can be found at [http://www.ukpresscardauthority.co.uk](http://www.ukpresscardauthority.co.uk)

- **Swine Flu – ‘speaking with one voice’** - The importance of well organised LRF media or ‘Communicating with the Public’ sub-groups was demonstrated during the early stages of the Swine Flu pandemic. At the outset of Swine Flu, the chairs of the four LRF media sub groups in the West Midlands region (West Midlands Conurbation, Warwickshire, Staffordshire and West Mercia) and heads of communication from region-wide government agencies, met with key health communicators in the region.

Their first task was to ensure that all the LRF media sub-group email contact lists were up to date and functioning for the distribution of briefings. Where LRF media sub-groups did not exist, assistance was provided to set them up. The LRF media sub-groups ensured that throughout the pandemic, all press officers for all Category 1 & 2 responders in the region, received information from central government and regional daily briefings from the Strategic Health Authority. This ensured everyone “spoke with one voice”.

In Birmingham, an emergency RMEF was called when the city was one of the first hot spots in the UK to go from the containment policy to treatment. Under the Chatham House Rule, the new procedures were explained in a non-pressurised environment to all of the region’s broadcast media. This set the tone for positive reports, both locally and nationally, that promoted the ‘stay at home’ message to the public.
• **Carlisle floods – the importance of the web** - The 2005 floods in Carlisle raised a number of issues for the media and responders. The debrief for this incident which was led by the RMEF highlighted loss of power and failed business continuity plans which resulted in problems with collating and distributing information to the public and the media. The debrief highlighted how because of the widespread use of the internet the use of one dedicated website would have been advantageous. Cumbria LRF took this recommendation forward and now like many other LRFs throughout England and Wales, host one stop websites that the public can be directed to during local emergencies.

• **Summer floods 2007 – multi-agency working** - The floods in the Gloucestershire, Tewkesbury and Worcestershire areas during the summer of 2007 demonstrated the importance of multi-agency working, and developing strong links with the local media. From the outset, press officers from the key responding organisations, set up one single press office staffed by police and local authority press officers, at West Mercia Police headquarters (the SCC for this emergency) This ensured a fast flow of information to the media, and made it easier for the media to contact the right responder quickly.

When distribution of drinking water became an issue, the Severn Trent (a water company) website crashed due to the high volume of enquiries. To overcome this, the BBC hosted information that Severn Trent needed to get out to customers on their more robust websites. Worcester News, the local daily paper also hosted information on its newly developed website. At the height of the floods, the volume of traffic of the Worcester News website increased from 2,000, to 16,000 a day. This example shows how websites of established regional daily newspapers can be as important in localised incidents, as those of the major broadcast companies in the event of an emergency.
Chapter 9:

MULTI-LRF WORKING ARRANGEMENTS

Sections in this chapter:

9.1 DCLG Resilience and Emergencies Division (RED)
9.2 Multi-SCG Response Co-ordinating Groups (ResCG)
9.3 Recovery arrangements
9.4 Multi-RCG Recovery Co-ordinating Groups (RecCG)
9.5 Emergency Powers
Chapter 9

9. Multi-LRF working arrangements

Summary

- DCLG’s Resilience and Emergencies Division is responsible for providing the Government liaison function on resilience issues below the national level (formerly provided through Government Offices in the Regions), working with local resilience forums (LRFs) to build resilience (emergency preparedness) and to support the response to an emergency. (section 9.1).

- Where the response to an emergency would benefit from wider area co-ordination, a Multi-SCG Response Co-ordinating Group (ResCG) will be convened. The need for these groups can either be decided by DCLG on its own initiative or at the request of responders or by the Lead Government Department in consultation with the Cabinet Office. (section 9.2).

- During the response phase, the Lead Government Department for Response, Cabinet Office and other relevant departments will, with input from DCLG RED, agree what support is likely to be required by local responders to recover from the emergency (section 9.3 and 9.4).

- If CCA emergency powers are to be enacted, there may be a requirement for a body to oversee activity in a geographic area in support of any nominated co-ordinator. The name and composition of any such body will be agreed at the time. They will co-ordinate activities under emergency regulations (section 9.6).

- The arrangements outlined in this chapter are in line with those that will be described in the revised Central Government Arrangements for Responding to an Emergency: Concept of Operations.
9.1. **DCLG Resilience and Emergencies Division (RED)**

9.1.1. DCLG’s Resilience and Emergencies Division is responsible for providing the Government liaison function on resilience issues below the national level (formerly provided through Government Offices in the Regions). The Division works with local organisations to build resilience, to support local resilience forums (LRFs) working together and, as appropriate, support the response to any emergency. This includes through assisting the exchange of information between responders in affected Strategic Co-ordinating Groups (SCGs) and with UK central government. The Division acts as a single team with Resilience Advisors based in London, Leeds, Birmingham and Bristol providing a Government first point of contact for all LRFs in England.

**The Role of the Resilience and Emergencies Division in an Emergency**

9.1.2. In the event of an emergency, DCLG will immediately take steps to ensure that they can provide support to the local emergency response, where necessary and as appropriate. This could involve any, or all, of the actions below, depending upon the nature of the incident:

- establishing whether Strategic Co-ordinating Groups have been set up, or are on standby, then maintaining immediate lines of communication with them, including identifying whether there are likely to be issues arising or capability gaps emerging which may require central government support or input;

- deploying a Government Liaison Officer (GLO) once an SCG has been established, unless alternative arrangements have been agreed. In some cases such as a terrorist or nuclear emergency the Lead Department may deploy the GLO and DCLG will support as a Consequence Management Liaison Officer as part of a multi-disciplinary Government Liaison Team;

- ensuring a Strategic Local Recognised Information Picture (or other incident specific, nationally agreed, reporting template) is developed and maintained for each SCG, in order to support local response efforts and to contribute to the national appreciation of the situation;

- where appropriate, developing and maintaining a multi-SCG Strategic Recognised Information Picture (or other incident specific, nationally agreed, reporting template)
where an incident affects a number of LRF / SCG areas, or has the potential to do so, to add value to the local and/or national response;

- establishing and maintaining immediate lines of communication with the Lead Government Department and the Cabinet Office. As part of this process, agreeing the level and frequency of ongoing reporting requirements, including providing the local or Multi-SCG Strategic Recognised Information Picture (to be agreed on a case by case basis with the Lead Government Department and the Cabinet Office in situations where COBR is activated) to feed into the national picture co-ordinated by COBR or the Lead Government Department as appropriate;

- activating Operations Centre (OpC), if required, in order to provide a focal point for the collection and collation of information on the situation, a point of contact for local responders, and to engage as necessary other bodies to provide the local or multi-SCG picture to local responders and government as necessary;

- working with partners to identify priorities and providing advice to COBR and Lead Government Departments to support national discussions on the deployment of scarce resources across the affected area;

- facilitating mutual aid arrangements between LRFs;

- assisting local responders deliver a co-ordinated and coherent public message, through sharing Government’s lines to take;

- being ready, on request, to provide information to local MPs in affected constituencies;

- whilst the SCG is still standing, providing incident situation reports and advice to brief the Lead Government Department organising Ministerial or VIP visits, in consultation with local partners; and

- enabling the transition from response to recovery by ensuring an effective handover from DCLG RED GLOs to Lead Government Department officials taking up responsibility for supporting local responders and any Recovery Co-ordinating Group(s).

9.1.3. **Using the DCLG RED as the main point of contact reduces the risk of duplicated requests from different central government departments, thereby minimising the burden on local**
responders. Where required by the scale or duration of the emergency, the DCLG RED will draw on staff and expertise from across DCLG and other Government departments.


9.2.1. Whilst most emergencies are dealt with by local responders at a local level through Strategic Co-ordinating Groups, a Multi-SCG Response Co-ordinating Group (ResCG) may be convened where the local response has been or may be overwhelmed and wider support is required, or where an emergency affects a number of neighbouring Strategic Co-ordinating Groups and would benefit from co-ordination (e.g. to obtain a consistent, structured approach) or enhanced support. In situations where there are a number of concurrent incidents ongoing across England, COBR will be used to draw together the national picture.

9.2.2. In such circumstances, or in the event of a potential emergency or escalating incident, DCLG may, on its own initiative or at the request of local responders or the Lead Government Department in consultation with the Cabinet Office, convene a ResCG in order to bring together appropriate representatives from local Strategic Co-ordinating Groups (e.g. the Chair or Chief of Staff) where activated, or relevant organisations if not (e.g. if the incident primarily affects local authorities, then it may be appropriate for only LAs to be represented at the ResCG). Where relevant, the membership may be augmented, including by representatives from central government departments and agencies with a regional presence (such as MoD and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency) and other agencies such as voluntary organisations, utilities and transport operators.

9.2.3. The precise role of the ResCG may vary depending on the nature of the emergency. However, the role is likely to cover:

- developing a shared understanding of the evolving situation, including horizon scanning to provide early warning of emerging major challenges;

- assessing the emergency’s actual and/or potential impact;

- reviewing the steps being taken to manage the situation, and any assistance that may be needed/offered, including through facilitating mutual aid arrangements between SCG responders if required;
• ensuring an effective flow of communication between and across local and national levels, including reports to the national level on the response effort, to ensure a complementary approach;

• co-ordinating a coherent and consistent public message; and

• identifying any issues which cannot be resolved at local level and need to be raised at national level, including advising on priorities and guiding the deployment of scarce resources across the area.

9.2.4. Such gatherings are most likely via a tele/videoconference, though there may be occasions when a face-to-face meeting is more appropriate. The ResCG would normally be chaired by DCLG unless otherwise agreed and DCLG staff would take the lead in confirming the form the meeting will take and attendance. They would also:

• draw up the agenda;

• circulate papers and other relevant information to committee members as necessary;

• provide the formal record of discussions and decisions.

• the exact organisational and logistical arrangements for the ResCG will depend on the scale and nature of the incident.

9.2.5. ResCGs will observe the principle of subsidiarity – in which it is recognised that decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level. The ResCG will not interfere in local command and control arrangements but will provide a mechanism for ensuring that local responders can be as fully informed as possible in the decisions they have to take. Where arrangements already exist for the co-ordination of mutual aid (e.g. the Police National Information Co-ordination Centre (PNICC)) is the mechanism for police resources), the ResCG will complement such arrangements and take a multi-agency overview.

9.3. Recovery Arrangements

9.3.1. During the response phase, the Lead Government Department (LGD) for Response, Cabinet Office and other relevant Departments will, with input from DCLG RED, agree what support is likely to be required by local responders during the recovery phase. This will
dictate what support structures, if any, are put in place. These could include a continued presence (either physically or virtually) from a Government Liaison Officer(s) in the local Recovery Co-ordinating Group(s) (RCGs) performing similar functions to DCLG RED in response (as outlined in paragraph 9.1.2). In addition, consideration will be given to the establishment of a Ministerial cross-departmental Recovery Group (supported by an equivalent at officials level).

9.3.2. If it is agreed that ongoing national support is required, then activities during the recovery phase will be co-ordinated by the relevant Lead Government Department for Recovery as identified in Departments Responsibilities for Planning, Response and Recovery from Emergencies, and will include co-ordinating cross-departmental action (via Ministerial / Officials groups as necessary) as well as providing any support to local responders (e.g. through provision of a GLO to liaise with the Recovery Co-ordinating Group).

9.3.3. In performing this role, the LGD for Recovery may call on other government departments for support, both for specialist technical or policy advice as well as local knowledge of the area, key contacts and to augment their resources. During the transition from Response to Recovery, the LGD for Recovery will also have the assistance of the DCLG RED team to ensure a smooth handover of information, contacts and ongoing actions.

9.4. Multi-RCG Recovery Co-ordinating Groups (RecCG)

9.4.1. As in the response phase, a Multi-RCG Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RecCG) may be convened where recovery action is required across a number of neighbouring Recovery Co-ordinating Groups (RCGs) and co-ordination or enhanced support, would be beneficial.

9.4.2. In such circumstances, the LGD for Recovery may, on its own initiative or at the request of local responders, convene a RecCG in order to bring together appropriate representatives from local Recovery Co-ordinating Groups (e.g. the Chair or Chief of Staff) where activated, or relevant organisations if not (e.g. if the incident primarily affects local authorities, then it may be appropriate for only LAs to be represented at the RecCG). As in the response phase, the membership may be augmented by representatives from other organisations (such as the voluntary sector) as appropriate.

9.4.3. The precise role of the RecCG may vary depending on the nature of the emergency. However, the role is likely to cover:
• developing a shared understanding of the situation, including horizon scanning to provide early warning of emerging major challenges;
• assessing the impact of the emergency on the community (humanitarian), economy, infrastructure, environment;
• reviewing the steps being taken to manage the situation, and any assistance that may be needed/offered, including through facilitating mutual aid arrangements between SCG responders if required;
• ensuring an effective flow of communication between and across local and national levels, including reports to the national level on the response effort, to ensure a complementary approach;
• co-ordinating a coherent and consistent public message; and
• identifying any issues which cannot be resolved at local level and need to be raised at national level, including advising on priorities and guiding the deployment of scarce resources across the area.

9.4.4. Such gatherings are most likely via a tele/videoconference, though there may be occasions when a face to face meeting is more appropriate. The RecCG would normally be chaired by LGD for Recovery unless otherwise agreed. LGD for Recovery staff would normally take the lead in confirming the form the meeting will take and attendance. They would also:

• draw up the agenda;
• circulate papers and other relevant information to committee members as necessary;
• provide the formal record of discussions and decisions.

9.4.5. RecCGs will observe the principle of subsidiarity – in which it is recognised that decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level. The RecCG will not interfere in local command and control arrangements but will provide a mechanism for ensuring that local responders can be as fully informed as possible in the decisions they have to take.
9.5. Emergency Powers

9.5.1. In the event of the use of Emergency Powers, there may be a requirement for a body to oversee activity in a geographic area in support of nominated co-ordinator. In the past, this body has been known as a Regional Civil Contingencies Committee (RCCC). However, due to the renaming of the national Civil Contingencies Committee and the more flexible geographic approach being taken below national level, the name and composition of any such body will be agreed at the time. This will, however, build on the existing tried and tested structures of Strategic and Recovery Co-ordinating Groups and Multi-SCG/RCG groups as described earlier.
Chapter 10:

ARRANGEMENTS IN SCOTLAND

Sections in this chapter:

10.1 Emergency response arrangements in Scotland
10.2 Scottish emergency co-ordination arrangements
10.3 Media arrangements
10.4 Recovery arrangements
Chapter 10
10. Arrangements in Scotland

Summary

- At the political level, Scottish Ministers are responsible for managing the consequences of any emergency that impacts on Scotland, irrespective of its cause. Scottish emergency response arrangements are based on the same principles as those that apply elsewhere in the United Kingdom (paragraph 10.1.1).

- The Scottish Emergency Co-ordination Arrangements set out the structure for an integrated response to an emergency in Scotland. The arrangements provide for Scottish Ministers to act as a focus for communications with the UK government (paragraph 10.2.1).

- A Strategic Co-ordinating Group may be established in each police force/fire board area to determine the strategy for the response and the appropriate management structures to co-ordinate the local inter-agency response (paragraphs 10.2.3 to 10.2.7). With the creation of national police and fire and rescue services in April 2013, emergency response structures are under review.

- In the event of an emergency impacting on Scotland or its people, Scottish Ministers will open the Scottish Government Resilience Room (SGoRR), which will gather and disseminate information, co-ordinate activity and provide appropriate guidance/support the Scottish response to emergencies. It will provide a national picture of the impact of the emergency which, in turn, can be used to advise and inform decisions on the strategic management of the situation for Scottish and UK government (paragraphs 10.2.8 to 10.2.13).

- This chapter also addresses:
  - media arrangements (section 10.3);
  - recovery arrangements (section 10.4).

(Note: please note that new guidance for the care and treatment of those affected by emergencies is being prepared by the Scottish government – information should be sought on this from the appropriate contacts)
10.1. **Emergency response arrangements in Scotland**

10.1.1. Responsibility for civil protection is largely a devolved matter in Scotland. The balance of activity and interaction between Scottish Ministers and the UK Government in relation to emergencies affecting Scotland will depend on the nature of the incident and the devolution settlement.

10.1.2. The principles of emergency response in Scotland are set out in ‘Preparing Scotland: Scottish Guidance on Resilience’. They are broadly the same as for the rest of the United Kingdom. Details can be found at: http://www.readyscotland.org/ready-government/preparing-scotland/

10.1.3. The expectation is that in the event of an emergency impacting on Scotland or its people, local, Scottish and if necessary UK response arrangements will integrate in order to provide the best possible response. With that in mind, lead UK Government Departments will liaise and if necessary coordinate with the Scottish Government Resilience Room (SGoRR), which in order to ensure that coordination of the response.

10.2. **Scottish emergency co-ordination arrangements**

Arrangements for coordinating the response to an emergency in Scotland are set out in Preparing Scotland. In summary:

- Responder organisations will come together under the auspices of their local strategic coordinating group in order to coordinate their actions. Agencies not subject to devolved competence but with a role to play in the response, such as the Maritime and Coastguard Agency will be expected to participate in SCG decision making.
- The Scottish Government Resilience Room will be established to inform Scottish Ministers’ decision making, ensure cross government coordination of the response and support responders as necessary.
- In the event that UK level arrangements are initiated:
  - SGoRR will work with the Cabinet Office Briefing Room, the Scotland Office and other relevant departments in Whitehall to ensure effective integration of local, Scottish and UK arrangements.
  - Lead UK departments will liaise and coordinate with their opposite numbers in Scottish Government Directorates and vice versa.
10.2.1. Under the provisions of the Civil Contingencies Act, if emergency regulations are made that apply to Scotland, the UK government must appoint a Scottish Emergency Co-ordinator. There will be a list jointly compiled by the Scottish and UK government of designates for this role for particular emergencies. The terms of appointment, conditions of service and functions of the Co-ordinator will be set out in the letter of appointment, though details of the general role may be included in the emergency regulations themselves.

10.3. Media arrangements

10.3.1. Arrangements for engaging with the media in the event of an emergency impacting in Scotland are set out in ‘Warning and Informing Scotland: Communicating with the Public’. This guidance aims to ensure effective coordination of communications activity at local, Scottish and UK levels. The guidance can be found at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2012/02/4073

10.4. Recovery Arrangements

10.4.1. Recovery arrangements in Scotland follow the same principles as in the rest of the UK. Details of Scottish recovery arrangements are set out in interim guidance ‘Recovering from Emergencies in Scotland’ which is available at: http://scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2010/12/02150415/0
Chapter 11:

ARRANGEMENTS IN WALES

Sections in this chapter:

11.1 Introduction
11.2 Civil Contingencies Group (CCG)/Wales Civil Contingencies Committee (WCCC)
11.3 Liaison with central government
11.4 Emergency Co-ordination Centre (Wales) (ECC(W))
11.5 Reporting and communication structure
11.6 Warning and informing
11.7 Scientific and technical advice
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11. Arrangements in Wales

Summary

- The Welsh Government plays an important role in emergencies in or affecting Wales (paragraph 11.1.1).

- The Pan-Wales Response Plan sets out the arrangements for the pan-Wales level integration of the Welsh response to an emergency in or affecting Wales.

- The Wales Civil Contingencies Committee (WCCC) is constituted and functions in a similar way to its counterparts in England. The Welsh Government provides support for the Wales Civil Contingencies Committee (section 11.2).

- The Emergency Co-ordination Centre (Wales) (ECC(W)) is a facility established by the Welsh Government to gather and disseminate information in Wales on developing emergencies. It supports the WCCC and Welsh Ministers in providing briefing and advice on emergencies (section 11.4).

- The Welsh Government Communications Division will act as a link between the local media and community relations lead, and, the United Kingdom government’s News Co-ordination Centre and UK Government Department media teams where appropriate (section 11.3, section 11.5 and section 11.6).

- Response arrangements at the local level in Wales are the same as those in England but take into account devolved functions (section 11.7).

- If emergency regulations are made covering Wales, the UK government must appoint a Wales Emergency Co-ordinator (paragraph 11.2.12).

- This section also covers recovery arrangements in Wales (section 11.9)
11.1. Introduction

11.1.1. Responsibility for civil protection is largely a non-devolved matter in Wales, remaining primarily the responsibility of UK government departments. However, the Welsh Government has functional responsibility for a number of important policy areas (e.g. health, fire and rescue, the environment, animal health) and plays an important co-ordinating role. The balance of activity and interaction between the Welsh Government and the UK Government in relation to emergencies affecting Wales will depend on the nature of the incident.

11.2. Civil Contingencies Group (CCG)/Wales Civil Contingencies Committee (WCCC)

11.2.1. The CCG is established where an emergency has occurred or is likely to occur with a Level 1 impact (See 11.2.11 below). The CCG will generally be convened for rising tide incidents such as pandemic flu or potential severe weather following a period where the development of the threat has been closely monitored.

11.2.2. The CCG will be chaired by a senior Welsh Government official and be comprised largely of representatives from Welsh Government Departments. The membership will be augmented by representatives from key organisations appropriate to the emergency. In the main, the CCG will provide strategic leadership to the response to emergencies falling fully within devolved competence.

11.2.3. Where the emergency remains at Level 1, the CCG will continue to co-ordinate the response at the pan-Wales level and link into both the local and national levels as appropriate. The Group will also be responsible for de-escalating the response at the pan-Wales level following consultation with the UK Government and any SCGs in Wales which may have been established.

11.2.4. Where the CCG decides that the pan-Wales response should be escalated to Level 2 the group will be re-constituted as the WCCC. The WCCC will be convened immediately at Level 2 for sudden impact emergencies requiring urgent pan-Wales co-ordination or support.
11.2.5. The WCCC is an advisory body comprising senior Departmental representatives of the Welsh Government and senior experts from Category 1 and 2 responders and others who can best assess and advise on a particular emergency affecting Wales.

Role of the WCCC

11.2.6. The role of the WCCC will be to:

- to maintain a strategic picture of the evolving situation within Wales, with a particular (but not exclusive) focus on consequence management;
- to support the Home Office Government Liaison Team at the SCG in the response to terrorist incidents; primarily on consequence management issues;
- to assess and advise on any issues which cannot be resolved at a local level and which may need to be raised at a UK level;
- to advise on the deployment of scarce resources across Wales by identifying pan-Wales priorities; and
- to advise on the use of existing legislation and, in some cases, to consider the use of additional powers through the UK Government.

WCCC Membership

11.2.7. The membership of the WCCC will be determined by the pre-designated Lead Official for the particular emergency who will chair the Committee. As well as senior representatives from Welsh Government Departments, responder agencies and others the WCCC may include those members of the Wales Resilience Forum who are relevant to the crisis.

11.2.8. Good communication during a crisis is vital and the Welsh Government Director of Communications will be a member of the WCCC. In emergencies where the lead is at the UK level, this may involve a senior official from the Government Department concerned.

11.2.9. The Welsh Government will issue all requests to individuals invited to join the Committee.
Support for the WCCC

11.2.10. Where events justify the setting up of a WCCC, the Welsh Government will take the lead in:

- arranging and facilitating meetings;
- establishing video/teleconferencing links when appropriate;
- drawing up agendas;
- circulating papers and information to committee members as necessary; and
- providing the formal record of committees' discussions and decisions.

Levels of response for the CCG/WCCC

11.2.11. It is anticipated that the CCG/WCCC will meet at three levels:

**Level one** – Level One CCG meetings would be convened in the phase prior to an emergency, where prior warning is available. The meeting would be held to review the situation and update local stakeholders, with a view to escalating to Level Two if the situation warranted.

**Level two** – Level Two WCCC meetings would be convened in the event of an emergency occurring in, or affecting, Wales where Strategic Co-ordinating Group(s) have been established. The Emergency Co-ordination Centre (Wales) will be activated.

**Level three** – Level Three meetings will only be called once an emergency arises which requires the making of emergency regulations under Part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act (see chapter 14).

Wales Emergency Co-ordinator

11.2.12. Under the provisions of the CCA, if emergency regulations are introduced covering Wales, the UK government must appoint a Wales Emergency Co-ordinator who will be the Welsh Government Director or Director General responsible for chairing its Civil Contingencies Group. The terms of appointment, conditions of service and functions of the WEC will be set out in the letter of appointment, though some aspects may be included in the emergency regulations themselves. Further details on the use of emergency powers and the role of the WEC can be found in chapter 14.
Wales Utilities Group

11.2.13. Utility companies have their own arrangements in place to respond. Most of these arrangements are a statutory requirement on the utility companies concerned. Although for many incidents affecting utilities, the situation is best dealt with by the utility companies and a multi-agency approach is not required, there are some instances where a multi-agency approach will be required. Likewise, some emergencies not immediately linked to the utilities may require input or expertise from the utility companies. In order to help facilitate the engagement of utility companies in multi-agency activity, a Wales Utilities Group has been established. This group of utility companies works with category 1 responders in Wales and responds to emergencies in the following way:

- utility companies notify category 1 responders of minor incidents which may have a wider impact;
- category 1 responders notify utility companies of emergencies requiring their response;
- forces notify utility companies of the activation of a Strategic Co-ordinating Group requiring their attendance;
- utility companies provide advice and participate at the strategic, tactical and operational levels; and
- where required and appropriate utility companies activate Strategic or Tactical Co-ordinating groups in response to an emergency.


11.3. Liaison with central government

11.3.1. In many smaller-scale, non-terrorist events, particularly where UK Government Ministers show an interest, Government Departments will approach the Welsh Government for information. The Welsh Government will, therefore, request situation reports from local responders on behalf of its own Ministers and/or UK Government Ministers. Using the Welsh Government as the main point of contact will reduce the risk of duplicated requests from different Government Departments. Local responders can also use the Welsh Government as a first port of call for requests for advice or assistance from central...
government. The structure which establishes this process is set out in the Pan-Wales Response Plan. The Welsh Government will also maintain close links with the Wales Office.

11.3.2. In carrying out this role in relation to some non-terrorist incidents, it will be the Welsh Government that fulfils the Government Liaison role with the SCGs where they are established. Where the Government Liaison Officer is provided by the Home Office in relation to a terrorist incident the Welsh Government Liaison Officer would work alongside and take responsibility for consequent management and recovery issues.

11.3.3. When the UK Government crisis management mechanisms are brought into play following an emergency in or affecting Wales, the Welsh Government’s Emergency Co-ordination Centre (Wales) will be activated and will provide situation reports, copied to the UK Lead Government Department, Wales Office and any other Government Department with an interest. The Welsh Government will usually be represented at COBR by the First Minister for Wales who will normally attend by video-link or teleconference link.

11.4. Emergency Co-ordination Centre (Wales) [ECC(W)]

Levels 1 and 2

11.4.1. Under Level 1 the ECC(W) will remain on stand-by and arrangements will be put in place to activate the Centre should the emergency escalate.

11.4.2. For Level 2 emergencies the Welsh Government will activate the ECC(W) which can be linked with all SCGs and, where required, the central government crisis management machinery facilitated by Cabinet Office (COBR). The role of the ECC(W) will be to:

- co-ordinate the gathering and dissemination of information across Wales;
- ensure an effective flow of communication between local, pan-Wales and UK levels, including the co-ordination of reports to the UK level on the response and recovery effort;
- brief the Lead Official and WCCC;
- ensure that the UK input to the response is co-ordinated with the local and pan-Wales efforts;
- provide media and community relations support through the Welsh Government Communications Division;
- assist, where required by the SCGs, in the consequence management of the emergency and recovery planning;
• facilitate mutual aid arrangements within Wales and where necessary, between Wales and the border areas of England;
• raise to a UK level any issues that cannot be resolved at a local or Wales level.

11.4.3. The ECC(W)’s role is primarily one of information gathering and keeping Welsh Ministers and the UK Government informed of the implications of emergencies in Wales. At the same time, it keeps SCGs and individual agencies informed about developments at the UK level which will affect them. It will also offer assistance, where possible, to SCGs, particularly in respect of consequence management and recovery issues.

11.4.4. A record will be maintained of all actions taken by the ECC(W) and all decisions made. A SCG Action Log will be maintained to record and monitor action against issues raised by the SCGs which require advice from Government.

11.4.5. Depending upon the nature of the emergency, the ECC(W) can be established to focus the Welsh Government’s own response to emergencies by largely engaging the relevant policy Departments that will lead its response.

11.4.6. On other occasions, the ECC(W) can be used as a means of co-ordinating a multi-agency response by including external partners whose presence in the centre facilitates links with external agencies and draws experience and expertise into the assessment of information being gathered. On these occasions, the Welsh Government will use the centre to facilitate its own response and deal with consequence management issues relevant to its functions whilst also co-ordinating a wider multi-agency response.

11.4.7. The decision on whether to activate the ECC(W) will depend upon the nature and extent of any emergency in or affecting Wales.

11.4.8. Where required, the ECC(W) will report for Wales as a whole to the central government crisis management machinery facilitated by Cabinet Office, though other agencies will maintain specific reporting lines, and will provide briefing and advice to Welsh Ministers. The ECC(W) will also act as a mechanism for disseminating information from the central government crisis management machinery to the SCGs.

11.4.9. SCGs and the ECC(W) will advise each other of any significant de-escalation of their respective arrangements.
11.4.10. Where required, the ECC(W) can develop business cases for requests to the Civil Contingencies Committee for the use of Emergency Powers in Wales and so raise the emergency to Level 3.

11.4.11. Under Level 3 the ECC(W) will support the Wales Emergencies Co-ordinator (WEC) in the discharge of his/her functions.

11.4.12. The ECC(W) will not interfere in local command and control arrangements but will provide a mechanism for ensuring that local responders can be as fully informed as possible in the decisions they have to take. Where arrangements already exist for the co-ordination of mutual aid the ECC(W) will, where necessary, aim to complement such arrangements and add value by taking a multi-agency overview at a pan-Wales level. The ECC(W) will also inform the deployment of pan-Wales or UK resources.

11.4.13. Communication from the Welsh Government to responder agencies will be co-ordinated at the local level through the SCCs. All information will be channelled through the ECC(W) and the SCCs except where a Welsh Government Department has a specific reason to communicate directly with the responder agency concerned. In the case of the latter, the communication will be sent in parallel through the established route between the ECC(W) and the SCC to ensure that the SCC has a record of all communication traffic with responders in their areas and can inform the SCG accordingly.

11.4.14. If, for any reason, the Welsh Government’s ECC(W) facility at Cathays Park should not be available there would be a requirement to relocate to alternative premises. This has been identified as the Welsh Government offices in Merthyr Tydfil. The Welsh Government has internal arrangements in place to ensure that a similar ECC(W) facility could be set up at this venue, at very short notice. Conversely, if the infrastructure was not available across the Welsh Government estate there is an agreed back-up option to use Cardiff Central Police Station. A plan has also been developed to enable operation from this location.

11.5. Reporting and communication structure

11.5.1. Once implemented, the Pan-Wales Response Plan creates a structure whereby information from across Wales can be assessed and analysed by the ECC(W). This structure may not be appropriate for all emergencies and will be activated only where it adds value to the response. It will provide a pan-Wales picture of the impact of the emergency which, in turn, can be used to inform decisions on the strategic management of the situation in Wales and
be reported from Wales to the UK Government. In the same way, the plan will allow the cascading of information from central Government to agencies on the ground in Wales. The plan details co-ordination arrangements rather than a pan-Wales command structure. Agencies will endeavour to maintain parallel reporting lines to the ECC(W) under this structure.

11.5.2. Major emergencies may occur in a single LRF area where the relevant SCG will manage the response through its multi-agency response plan. In such instances, situation reports to the ECC(W) will be provided by the SCC. A Welsh Government Liaison Officer (WGLO) will represent the Welsh Government at the SCG. The principle directive of the WGLO is to act as a discrete link between the SCG and ECC(W); keeping the ECC(W) and Welsh Government informed of developments without imposing on, or interfering with, the local response effort. The WGLO will attend any consequence management sub-group or Recovery Co-ordinating Group which may be established by the SCG to identify areas and actions where the ECC(W) may be able to provide assistance. The WGLO will be supported by a team of Welsh Government officials where required.

11.5.3. In wide-area disruption emergencies (i.e. pandemic flu, fuel dispute etc.) where there is no clear emergency services lead, there is a greater requirement for broad information gathering from the SCG. Once established, the SCCs will commence gathering information at the local level from within their respective Local Resilience Forum areas detailing the impact of the emergency locally on emergency services, local authority services, utilities and other sectors as appropriate. The information will be collated on the situation report template and relayed, routinely or exceptionally, by the National Resilience Extranet, e-mail, fax, or by other means to the ECC(W). The reports are an extremely useful tool for government in assessing the impact of the incident. Timely completion will be very important. The frequency and timing of reports will be contingent on events.
11.5.4. Agencies which are not devolved will report as normal to their respective UK Department (e.g. Police reporting directly to ACPO and Home Office, military to Ministry of Defence etc.) However, they may also copy any reports about the developing situation in Wales from their agency’s perspective to the ECC(W) where appropriate. Each organisation will need to consider the extent to which it is appropriate to share information with the ECC(W) for security purposes, but will wish to ensure that sufficient information is supplied to allow a pan-Wales picture to be determined.

11.5.5. Under Level 3, where emergency powers are made, the reporting lines may change if required under the emergency regulations or in the letter of appointment of the WEC.

11.6. **Warning and Informing**

11.6.1. Management of the media at an emergency site remains the responsibility of the Lead Responder in conjunction with their joint agency partners. Welsh Government Communications will present the all-Wales picture, providing public information and co-ordinating the Welsh Government response.

11.6.2. A media protocol exists which provides for effective communication in the event of a major incident or wide-area disruptive challenge in Wales. The decision to activate the media protocol will be based on the circumstances and response required, and will be agreed between the Welsh Government and SCG media teams.

11.6.3. The Welsh Government’s Communications Division will liaise with the media and provide advice and public information.

**De-briefing**

11.6.4. Where the Pan-Wales Response Plan is implemented under Levels 2 or 3, the Welsh Government will co-ordinate de-briefing following an emergency by establishing a working group comprised of joint-agency representatives. If possible, this will be done within 28 days of standing down but it will, of course, depend upon the nature and extent of the emergency and time-scales may vary.

11.6.5. This de-brief will address the effectiveness of the plan as it was implemented and not the full operational response to the incident itself.
11.6.6. The findings of the working group and any resultant amendment to the plan, will be reported to the Wales Resilience Forum and subsequently to all Local Resilience Forums in Wales.

11.7. Scientific and Technical Advice

11.7.1. The primary source of scientific and technical advice for SCGs is provided by the agencies from which it is comprised. In some instances, SCGs may wish to formalise the provision of such advice to inform the management of the response by establishing Scientific and Technical Advice Cells (STACs).

11.7.2. Where the requirement for scientific and technical advice is wider than the expertise available at the SCG level, the Welsh Government may be asked to identify other sources of scientific advice from across Wales or further afield to support the local response. If necessary, the Welsh Government will seek support from the UK Government via Cabinet Office which will liaise with the Government Office for Science in identifying appropriate expertise.

11.7.3. Where scientific and technical advice is required by more than one SCG in Wales, a single Wales STAC working under the direction of the SCG or SCGs, may be established to provide appropriate advice to a number of SCGs. The SCGs supported by the Wales STAC would agree the strategic objectives and advice requirements. The Wales STAC would then respond to questions raised by the SCGs and where required, to the individual sub-groups established under the SCGs. During the recovery phase the Recovery Co-ordinating Group may activate a STAC to seek advice, whether or not it has already been established during the response by the SCG.

11.7.4. If the Welsh Government needs additional scientific and technical advice it may also ask COBR to activate and co-ordinate the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) in order that UK scientific and technical advice is available to the Welsh Government and SCGs.

11.8. Local response

Strategic Co-ordinating Group

11.8.1. Local response is the building block of resilience, and the operational response to most emergencies will be managed at the local level. Structures are in place to respond to
emergencies that are within the capacity of the resources in that area (North Wales, South Wales, Dyfed Powys and Gwent). The objectives and arrangements for response at the local level in Wales match those in England. Such a response is the responsibility of the SCG operating at the local level. There will, however, be communication and reporting arrangements with the Wales Resilience Forum as well as with the UK Government, where required.

11.9. Recovery

11.9.1. As part of the response to a civil emergency at the local level, Strategic Co-ordinating Groups will establish Recovery Co-ordinating Groups to manage recovery and to take responsibility for rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community affected.

11.9.2. In any emergency requiring the setting up of Strategic Co-ordinating Groups and Recovery Co-ordinating Groups, it is more than likely that the ECC(W) will be activated.

11.9.3. One of the main functions of the ECC(W) is to offer assistance, where possible, to SCGs; particularly in respect of consequence management and recovery issues. The ECC(W) will include a cell dedicated to Consequence Management and Recovery issues and will be the main link between the ECC(W) and the SCG on these issues.

11.9.4. The Chair of the Welsh Government’s senior level Civil Contingencies Group will ensure the initiation of a process that leads to the formation of a WG Recovery Co-ordinating Group, chaired by a suitable official.

11.9.5. The lead official will convene a meeting at the earliest opportunity and will decide upon the membership drawn from Welsh Government Departments as appropriate and also external organisations, where required. (e.g. Welsh Local Government Association).

11.9.6. Where required, and with the approval of the Permanent Secretary, the WG Recovery Co-ordinating Group will consider establishing a Recovery Team to co-ordinate and support its work by drawing together a team of officials with the appropriate skills and expertise on an internal secondment basis as appropriate.

11.9.7. Once the SCG moves formally to the recovery phase, the operation of the ECC(W) will be scaled down and eventually ceased. The lead department will continue to co-ordinate the
response of the Welsh Government and will convene meetings of the Recovery Co-ordinating Group as necessary.

11.9.8. Where the RCG still meets at the local level, representation for the Welsh Government will be from the lead Department.

**Figure 11.1 Emergency response arrangements in Wales**

![Diagram of emergency response arrangements in Wales]
Chapter 12:

ARRANGEMENTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Sections in this chapter:

12.1 Emergency response and recovery arrangements in Northern Ireland
12.2 Local arrangements
12.3 Northern Ireland strategic arrangements
12.4 Information and the media
12.5 Recovery
Chapter 12
12. Arrangements in Northern Ireland

Summary

- The Northern Ireland Executive plays an important role in emergencies in or affecting Northern Ireland (paragraph 12.1.1).

- Northern Ireland emergency response and recovery arrangements are based on the same principles that apply elsewhere in the United Kingdom (paragraph 12.1.2).

- Northern Ireland has its own unique administrative arrangements. Details such as the identities of organisations which deliver emergency responses and the arrangements for inter-agency co-ordination differ from arrangements elsewhere in the UK (section 12.3).

- Emergency response and recovery is carried out at local levels by the emergency services, district councils and other public service organisations such as the local office or agency of a government department (section 12.2).

- At the Northern Ireland level, the strategic response is provided by the emergency services, the Northern Ireland departments and the Northern Ireland Office (paragraph 12.3.1).

- Arrangements are in place to trigger the Northern Ireland Central Crisis Management Arrangements (NICCMA) in response to actual or anticipated emergencies, and to scale up the level of co-ordination if the situation demands it (paragraphs 12.3.9 to 12.3.10).

- Strategic co-ordination at the Northern Ireland level is delivered by the NICCMA and supporting machinery (paragraph 12.3.6).

- The central crisis management machinery is supported by the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, which will establish the Northern Ireland Central Operations Room, if required (paragraph 12.3.6).

In the most challenging emergencies, especially where they affect the whole of the UK, the NICCMA would link to the UK arrangements.

- This chapter also covers recovery arrangements and arrangements for information provision and working with the media (section 12.4 and section 12.5).
12.1. Emergency response and recovery arrangements in Northern Ireland

12.1.1. Responsibility for civil protection is largely a devolved matter in Northern Ireland. The balance of activity and interaction between the Northern Ireland Executive and the UK government in relation to emergencies affecting Northern Ireland will depend on the nature of the incident.

12.1.2. The principles of emergency response and recovery in Northern Ireland are the same as for the rest of the UK (see chapter 2). For example, the emergency services and the health service operate to UK-wide standards and protocols. What varies most in Northern Ireland is the name and type of organisation that delivers the emergency response, and the inter-agency co-ordination arrangements. Details of arrangements in Northern Ireland are available in the Civil Contingencies Policy Branch (CCPB) documents The Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies Framework and A Guide to Emergency Planning Arrangements in Northern Ireland.

12.2. Local arrangements

12.2.1. The response to emergencies in a particular area is normally managed by the emergency services, who use standard command and control procedures. For emergencies happening on land, the police would normally have responsibility for inter-agency co-ordination at local level, and would involve the other emergency services, other responding organisations and the district council, as appropriate. Where the nature of the emergency is such that the emergency services do not lead the response, leadership of the multi-agency response and recovery effort will fall to the relevant district council. Where another emergency responder organisation, e.g. the Public Health Agency, would more appropriately lead the multi-agency response, this would be determined by agreement.

12.2.2. The district councils may also undertake inter-agency co-ordination in circumstances where the emergency services or another lead agency have been co-ordinating the immediate response to an emergency but where there remains a need for co-ordination of recovery activities after the immediate response has been stood down.
12.2.3. Responses and co-ordination at local level would normally be at operational and tactical level. If an emergency was sufficiently serious or widespread to require strategic-level response and co-ordination, this would bring into play arrangements across Northern Ireland.

12.3. Northern Ireland strategic arrangements

Overview

12.3.1. The strategic response to emergencies that cannot be managed effectively at local level is provided by Northern Ireland departments. The Northern Ireland departments will respond in accordance with the lead department arrangements, which mirror those governing Whitehall departments. Where strategic co-ordination is required across a number of departments, the Northern Ireland Central Crisis Management Arrangements (NICCMA) will be invoked.

12.3.2. The principles of strategic co-ordination of emergency response in Northern Ireland are the same as those elsewhere in the UK. However, the structures used for strategic co-ordination reflect the organisation of public services in Northern Ireland.

12.3.3. The Northern Ireland Executive is responsible for the strategic co-ordination and management of the response to non-terrorist civil emergencies in Northern Ireland. This is achieved through individual Ministers / departments for significant emergencies or through the NICCMA for serious and catastrophic emergencies. Strategic co-ordination for terrorist events (or incidents where there is reason to believe that terrorism is involved) is the responsibility of the Northern Ireland Office (NIO), which would activate its Northern Ireland Office Briefing Room arrangements (NIOBR). However, many of the responses required to the consequences of a terrorist event fall within devolved responsibilities and the NI Executive would activate its crisis management arrangements as required to deal with those consequences. Arrangements exist for close liaison to be maintained between the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), the NICCMA and the NIOBR when they are operating. The following text refers specifically to the NICCMA.

12.3.4. When an emergency has occurred or is likely to occur which meets the criteria for the activation of the NICCMA, the lead department can request that the strategic co-ordination groups, namely the Crisis Management Group and / or the Civil Contingencies Group, Northern Ireland (CCG(NI)) be convened to facilitate co-ordination of the response. This is normally done at Ministerial level with the lead Minister approaching the First Minister /
deputy First Minister directly or at official level through an approach to the Office of the First Minister and deputy First Minister (OFMDFM). Where there is no clear lead department or where it is clear from the circumstances that strategic management will be required, the First Minister and deputy First Minister may activate the arrangements

12.3.5. The functions of these groups and how they would conduct business are detailed below.

Crisis Management Group

12.3.6. The Crisis Management Group (CMG) is the Minister led strategic co-ordination group and, as such, is responsible for setting the overarching strategy for the Northern Ireland Administration’s response to the emergency. The CMG, with the authority of the Northern Ireland Executive to which it reports, has the power to direct the response and commit resources across the Northern Ireland Civil Service. It will normally be chaired by the First Minister and deputy First Minister acting jointly, or where appropriate another Minister nominated jointly by the First Minister and deputy First Minister. Depending on the circumstances, Ministers may also delegate the chairmanship to senior officials. Otherwise, membership comprises the appropriate NI Executive Ministers and departmental senior officials. Expert advisers and representatives of other organisations, including the PSNI and district councils may also attend.

Civil Contingencies Group, Northern Ireland

12.3.7. The Civil Contingencies Group, (Northern Ireland) (CCG(NI)) works in support of CMG to co-ordinate the response across the NI departments and other organisations such as the emergency services and district councils in line with the strategic direction set by CMG. CCG(NI) will normally be chaired by a senior official from OFMDFM and membership would be made up of representatives at senior level from the NI departments, NIO, the emergency services, district councils and other key organisations. In situations where cross-cutting strategic co-ordination is required but the emergency is not of a nature to require the direct engagement of Ministers and senior officials, CCG(NI) may meet as the primary co-ordination / crisis management group.

Supporting machinery

12.3.8. The OFMDFM provides the secretariat to the CMG and CCG(NI). In addition, the CMG and CCG(NI) are supported by a range of machinery which varies in nature according to the emergency. The Central Operations Room (COR) controls the flow of information into and out of CMG and CCG(NI). It commissions and collates situation reports, communicates with other strategic co-ordination arrangements such as Police Strategic Commander,
The Executive Information Service (EIS) co-ordinates the delivery of strategic public information and media response and has representation on CMG and CCG(NI). A Scientific and Technical Advisory Group (STAG) is convened in response to emergencies involving hazards or threats that require specialist analysis and advice. It would be made up of professional and technical experts relevant to the particular emergency and gives professional advice to CMG and CCG(NI).

12.4. Information and the media

12.4.1. The Northern Ireland Executive has its own Executive Information Service (EIS), which undertakes liaison with the media and issue public information for those aspects of the emergency which fall to the Northern Ireland Executive. The EIS works closely with the NIO Press Office, the PSNI Press Office and the UK Government News Co-ordination Centre, as required to ensure consistency and completeness of information flow.

12.5. Recovery

12.5.1. Recovery arrangements in Northern Ireland follow the same principles as in the rest of the UK. Where local co-ordination applies to the response to an emergency, recovery planning would be taken account of as part of this. District councils have a particular role to play in facilitating the co-ordination of the multi-agency recovery arrangements, but many other organisations are involved in the delivery of the recovery functions.

12.5.2. For emergencies where the NICCMA is implemented any required recovery planning and implementation activities would be accommodated within the arrangements.
Figure 12.1: Lines of communication in Northern Ireland

National Security Council, Sub Committee on Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies (NSC (THRC)) COBR

Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG)

Crisis Management Group (CMG)

Northern Ireland Office Briefing Room (NIOBR)

Civil Contingencies Group (NI) CCG (NI)

NI Departments and Agencies

Emergency Services

Local
Chapter 13:

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS

Sections in this chapter:

13.1 Role of UK central government in emergencies
13.2 The Lead Government Department principle and its operation
13.3 Role of the devolved administrations
13.4 The Government’s central crisis management machinery
13.5 Public information
Chapter 13

13. Central Government Arrangements

Summary

- In some instances, the scale or complexity of an emergency is such that some degree of central government support or co-ordination becomes necessary. Central government will not duplicate the role of local responders who remain the basic building block of the response to an emergency (section 13.1).

- A designated Lead Government Department (LGD) or, where appropriate, a devolved administration, will be made responsible for the overall management of the central government response (section 13.2). In the most serious cases, the central government response will be co-ordinated through the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) (paragraphs 13.3.3 to 13.3.4).

- The balance of activity between UK central government and the devolved administrations will depend on the nature of the emergency and the terms of the devolution settlements (section 13.3).

- The arrangements outlined in this chapter are in line with those that will be described in the revised Central Government Arrangements for Responding to an Emergency: Concept of Operations.
13.1. **Role of UK central government in emergencies**

13.1.1. Most emergencies in the United Kingdom are handled at the local level by the emergency services and other responders with no direct involvement of UK central government departments. However, in some instances, the scale or complexity of an emergency is such that some degree of UK central government support or co-ordination becomes necessary. In others, the central government response may be convened before local SCGs are activated, for example, where events are driven by international developments. The level of central government involvement will vary and could range from advice and support from the LGD to the 24/7 activation of the central government crisis management machinery. Figure 13.1 shows the likely form of central government engagement based on the impact and geographical spread of an emergency.

13.1.2. The guiding principles set out in *Chapter 2* of this guidance document apply equally to central government. These principles support a clearly identifiable set of objectives for the UK central government response to all emergencies, including multiple incidents where a number of incidents occur close together in the same area or in different parts of the country. The strategic objectives for the UK central government response are therefore to:

- protect human life and, as far as possible, property, and alleviate suffering;
- support the continuity of everyday activity and the restoration of disrupted services at the earliest opportunity; and
- uphold the rule of law and the democratic process.

13.1.3. In practice, not all of these objectives may be achievable at the outset of an emergency. Ministers will provide early strategic direction on the appropriate balance to strike in light of circumstances at the time.

13.1.4. UK central government will support and complement the role of local responders by:

- providing strategic directions based on:
  - a Common Recognised Information Picture (CRIP);
• intelligence assessments and Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) threat levels in relation to terrorist threats where relevant;

• advice from the local Strategic Co-ordinating Groups or other key stakeholders invited to attend Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms;

• advice on the wider impact and longer-term recovery; and

• scientific advice provided by, or on behalf of, the LGD;

• deciding on the adequacy of existing legislation and the use of emergency powers at UK or sub-UK basis;

• authorising military assistance (see chapter 3);

• mobilising and/or releasing national assets and resources to support response and recovery efforts as appropriate;

• determining national protective security and other counter-measures;

• determining the public information strategy and co-ordinating public advice, in consultation with Strategic Co-ordinating Groups (where appropriate), the devolved administrations (where appropriate) and other key stakeholders;

• managing the international/diplomatic aspects of the incident;

• determining the likely development of the emergency and providing early strategic direction of preparations for the recovery phase to ensure coherent management without conflicting with immediate response, including the role of the sub-national tier;

• sharing information with the devolved administrations on the evolving situation;

• advising on the relative priority to be attached to multi-site or multiple incidents and the allocation of national resources, consulting the devolved administrations where appropriate; and

• brokering mutual aid, where necessary.
Figure 13.1 Likely engagement of Central Government for emergencies occurring in England

Escalation of the Central Response

LGD = Lead Government Department; DCLG RED = Department for Communities and Local Government Resilience and Emergencies Division; Govt = Government; COBR = Cabinet Office Briefing Room. The role of the devolved administrations is not shown in this diagram because it varies according to the scope and severity of the emergency. Their role is described in 13.3. The precise way in which a response would be implemented will depend on the scale and nature of the emergency (e.g. there are different arrangements for the response to outbreaks of exotic animal disease see chapter 3 for details).
13.2. The Lead Government Department principle and its operation

13.2.1. Where the scale or complexity of an emergency is such that some degree of government co-ordination or support becomes necessary, a designated LGD will be made responsible for the overall management of the government response. In the most serious circumstances, this could involve the activation of COBR to facilitate rapid co-ordination and collective decision-making. The LGD’s responsibilities include: ensuring that appropriate plans exist to manage those emergencies on which they lead; that adequate resources are available; and leading on public and parliamentary handling.

13.2.2. A pre-designated list of LGDs is maintained covering leadership of planning, response and recovery phases to a wide range of emergencies. The list can be found at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/response/ukgovernment/responsibilities.aspx. Where responsibility for the response and recovery phases differs, the LGD for the response phase will work closely with the designated LGD for the recovery phase to ensure a smooth transition. When an emergency occurs that does not permit straightforward LGD categorisation, the Cabinet Office will ensure that a lead department is identified in consultation with the Prime Minister’s office and relevant departments.

13.3. Role of the devolved administrations

13.3.1. The devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland will, within their area of competence (area of responsibility as defined in the respective devolution settlements), play a full role in response to an emergency requiring government involvement. Their role will depend on two things: whether the incident affects Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland; and whether the response to the emergency includes activity within the competence of the administration. This is true even for terrorism-related emergencies where responsibility for consequence management may fall within devolved competence (e.g. responsibility for health, investigation and prosecution of crime is devolved to Scotland).

13.3.2. The devolved administrations will mirror many of the tasks of the UK-level crisis mechanisms when the issue falls within devolved competence, as well as fulfilling the same tasks as the English sub-national tier. In every case, the precise balance of activity will depend on where responsibilities lie between a devolved administration and the UK government in relation to the particular emergency. In areas of reserved responsibility, the
UK Lead Government Department will lead the response in the devolved areas, working closely with the relevant devolved administration.

13.4. **The Government’s central crisis management machinery**

**Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR)**

13.4.1. Where the nature of the emergency is such that it affects the business of a number of government departments, a collective response will be required, led by the LGD. Collective decision-making within central government is delivered through the Cabinet committee system and decision-making during emergencies follows the same pattern. Due to the unpredictable nature of emergencies, the Government maintains dedicated crisis management facilities (COBR) and supporting arrangements which are only activated in the event of a major national emergency. The Prime Minister, Home Secretary or another senior Minister will normally chair key meetings involving Ministers and officials from relevant departments, as appropriate. Key external stakeholders (e.g. the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) may be invited to attend depending on the nature of the emergency. Meetings will cover all the strategic aspects of the response and recovery effort. Officials in COBR will identify options and propose advice on the issues on which Ministers will need to focus.

13.4.2. Within COBR, a senior decision making body (the Strategy Group in terrorist incidents and the National Security Council, Sub Committee on Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies NSC (THRC) for all other emergencies) oversees the Government’s response. This decision making group will meet at a ministerial level but can also meet at an official level. The senior decision making body is supported, as necessary, by a number of separate cells and supporting blocks of activities. This will always include a situation cell which is responsible for ensuring that there is a single, immediate, authoritative overview of the current situation. Where necessary, the senior decision making body may also be supported by intelligence; communication and/or operational cells; an Impact Management Group or a Recovery Group. If there is an intelligence cell this would be staffed by the intelligence agencies, Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) and others as necessary. If there is an Impact Management Group this will focus on wider impact management issues; it may be convened on an ad-hoc basis to address particular issues or on a standing basis.
13.4.3. **Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE)**

Lead Government Departments are responsible for ensuring they have effective arrangements to access scientific and technical advice in a timely fashion in an emergency.

13.4.4. During a COBR activation, the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) is responsible for coordinating and peer reviewing, as far as possible, scientific and technical advice to inform decision-making. The primary aim for SAGE is to support Ministers in making evidence based decisions by coordinating relevant scientific and technical advice on key policy questions. At the local level Scientific and Technical Advisory Cells (STACs) provide advice to local Strategic Coordinating Groups (SCGs) and/or Recovery Coordinating Groups (RCGs) which respond to the local consequences and manage local recovery efforts.

13.4.5. Like COBR as a whole, SAGE is designed to be both flexible and scalable. It is likely that its precise role will evolve as the emergency develops and vary by the nature of the incident (e.g. its role may evolve with the transition from response to recovery). To achieve its aim SAGE can:

- analyse, review or model existing data;
- assess, review and/or validate existing research; and/or
- where previous research is limited or non-existent, commission new research.¹⁹

13.4.6. It is likely that SAGE advice will be required on:

- the scientific and technical concepts and processes that are key to understanding the evolving situation and potential impacts;

¹⁹ To ensure quality advice that can be provided in a timely fashion, the aim should be to avoid this situation by formulating scientific and technical advice during the planning phase. The commissioning of new research will need to be considered and authorised by the relevant department which will take into account the provision of funds.
how the emergency might develop and the potential implications of this (i.e. what factors will affect how the situation develops? What are the potential scenarios? How likely are these scenarios? What are their impacts?);

possible ways to improve, monitoring, forecasting and assessment in the short to medium term;

potential scientific and/or technical solutions that can remove or mitigate the risks and/or manage the impacts, and the pros and cons of these. Advice on potential solutions should outline any logistical issues or limitations (e.g. timing, the expertise and resources required) and the associated costs of these proposed solutions;

the scientific and/or technical pros and cons of policy options identified by others;

the degree of consensus (e.g. all, the majority, most, some or few experts agree);

differences in opinion (i.e. are there differences in scientific / technical opinion and what are the sources of disagreements?); and

the degree and cause of uncertainty (e.g. confidence levels, margins of error and the reasons for not being more certain).

13.4.7. SAGE would usually be chaired by the Government’s Chief Scientific Advisor (GCSA) or a departmental CSA, as appropriate.

13.4.8. SAGE can only be activated by COBR in support of collective cross-government responses to and/or recoveries from level 2 or 3 emergencies. Whether SAGE is needed should be considered when COBR is first activated and reviewed throughout the emergency. It is possible that scientific and technical advice will be required in some but not all phases of response and recovery.

13.4.9. Further information on the, activation, governance and membership of SAGE will be available in the Enhance SAGE Guidance which will be published towards the end of 2012.

13.4.10. Liaison between central government and the local response

Where a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) has been established and COBR has been activated, a Government Liaison Officer (GLO) will normally be despatched immediately at
the onset of an emergency. For non-terrorist emergencies, this role will normally be performed by the Department for Communities and Local Government Resilience and Emergencies Division. In terrorist emergencies, the GLO will be normally be a senior Home Office official supported by a multidisciplinary team (the Government Liaison Team). (In the devolved administrations, officials from the relevant devolved administration would also be part of the team, or even lead it.) The GLO will be the main liaison channel between COBR and the scene.

13.4.11. For emergencies without a police lead, or where there is a need to communicate more widely with other police forces, ACPO can channel requests between central government and police forces. ACPO Scotland performs a similar role in Scotland. A senior ACPO representative in COBR will advise central government on the wider implications of response options and will represent the service’s views on wider policing issues. The organisation can also issue national guidance to forces on specific issues. The Police National Information Co-ordination Centre can be activated to support the ACPO representative in COBR.

13.4.12. Where COBR is not activated but there is a need for Central Government engagement, the Department for Communities and Local Government Resilience and Emergencies Division in England will liaise with the SCG to facilitate two-way exchange of information and provide advice to local responders.

13.5. Public information

13.5.1. Any emergency on a scale requiring a co-ordinated UK central government response will need national co-ordination of public information from the outset. UK central government will be responsible for the national communications strategy for responding to the emergency, the development of which will be co-ordinated with the lead local responder. In such circumstance, the News Co-ordination Centre (NCC) will be activated by the Cabinet Office to co-ordinate the communications effort. This will include the preparation of a top lines brief which will be widely distributed to those involved in the response. In the most demanding circumstances, a government Media Centre will be established.
This diagram represents how operations would usually operate. The precise way in which a response would be implemented will depend on the scale and nature of the emergency (e.g. there are different arrangements for the response to outbreaks of exotic animal disease see chapter 3 for details). In addition to the formal lines of accountability and information flow on occasions informal relationships will exist whereby national bodies provide support to local bodies, when this is required. The role of the devolved administrations is not shown in this diagram because it varies according to the scope and severity of the emergency. Their role is described in 13.3.
Chapter 14:

EMERGENCY POWERS

Sections in this chapter:

14.1 What are emergency powers?
14.2 Consideration of emergency powers
14.3 How emergency powers are invoked
Chapter 14
14. Emergency powers

Summary

- Part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 contains the Government’s generic emergency powers legislation.

- Emergency powers are a last-resort option for responding to the most serious of emergencies where existing legislative provision is insufficient (section 14.1).

- They are a mechanism for making temporary legislation in order to prevent, control or mitigate an aspect or effect of the emergency (section 14.1).

- Emergency regulations must be necessary to resolve the emergency and proportionate to the effect or aspect of the emergency they are aimed at (section 14.2).

- What emergency regulations will contain, will depend on the specific requirement arising out of the potential or actual circumstances of the emergency (paragraphs 14.2.3 to 14.2.4).

- There must be no expectation that the Government will agree to use emergency powers; planning and response arrangements must assume that they will not be used.
14.1. **What are emergency powers?**

14.1.1. There are provisions for specific reserve or emergency powers contained within certain primary legislation, such as the Energy Act 1976 which allows the regulation or prohibition of the production, supply, acquisition or use of fuel during an emergency affecting fuel supplies. (The National Emergency Plan for Fuel produced by the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) contains more information about these powers.) Under Part 2 of the CCA, there are wider powers which the Government can draw on to make special temporary legislation (emergency regulations) as a last resort in the most serious of emergencies where existing legislation is insufficient to respond in the most effective way. Emergency regulations may make provision of any kind that could be made by an Act of Parliament or by exercise of the Royal Prerogative, so long as such action is needed urgently and is both necessary and proportionate in the circumstances.

14.1.2. The regulations may extend to the whole of the UK or to any one or more area\(^{21}\) of England and/or one or more of the devolved administrations. In England, Nominated Co-ordinators will be appointed to facilitate the co-ordination of activities under the emergency regulations. In devolved administrations, they will be known as Emergency Co-ordinators.

14.1.3. Emergency powers ensure the Government can respond quickly in emergency situations where new powers or amendments to existing powers are needed and there is not time to legislate in the usual way in advance of acting. They ensure the Government can act legally and accountably in situations where temporary new legal provision is required without the time for Parliament to provide it beforehand.

14.1.4. Emergency powers legislation is not a panacea for difficulties faced in responding to or recovering from emergencies. It is a legislative mechanism for making temporary changes to the law within clearly defined limits. Planning and response arrangements must assume that they will not be used.

\(^{21}\) i.e. the geographical regions known as East Midlands, Eastern, London, North East, North West, South East, South West, West Midlands and Yorkshire and Humberside (as defined by the Regional Development Agencies Act 1998)
14.2. Consideration of emergency powers

14.2.1. The decision to use emergency powers, or not, and the content of emergency regulations, are matters for central government and will be handled by the relevant Lead Government Department (LGD) in collaboration with other government departments. It is subject to collective agreement. In considering the options, the government will have to satisfy itself that conditions within the Act are met.

14.2.2. Foremost, the government has to be satisfied that the conditions which define an emergency are met. The Act states that emergency powers can only be used if an event or situation threatens:

- serious damage to human welfare in the UK, a devolved territory or region;
- serious damage to the environment of the UK, a devolved territory or region; or
- the security of the UK, from war or terrorism.

14.2.3. An emergency within the definition given above must have occurred, be occurring or about to occur in order to permit consideration of the use of emergency powers. This is, however, only the starting point in the process. For an event or situation to be judged to fall within the definition of emergency does not mean that emergency powers should or could be used. Additional safeguards have been built into the process to ensure that emergency powers can only be considered as an option if:

- it is necessary to make provision urgently in order to prevent, control or mitigate an aspect or effect of the emergency when existing powers are insufficient and it is not possible to bring forward a Bill in the usual way and there is a need to make the provision by other means; and
- emergency regulations must be proportionate to the aspect or effect of the emergency they are directed at.

14.2.4. It is not possible to state in advance the exact threshold at which emergency powers may legitimately be considered as this will depend on the unique circumstances prevailing at the time.
14.2.5. Emergency powers are a matter for the UK Government but arrangements are in place to ensure effective consultation and co-ordination with the devolved administrations. These are set out, in detail, in separate concordats with the Welsh and Scottish administrations.

14.3. **How emergency powers are invoked**

14.3.1. Emergency regulations are made by Her Majesty by Order in Council on the advice of her ministers. If, for whatever reason, this is not possible without serious delay, a senior minister of the Crown may make the regulations by order. The regulations must then be laid before Parliament as soon as it is reasonably practicable. Parliament must approve them (with or without amendment) within seven days of laying or they fall. They may stay in force for up to 30 days beginning on the day the order comes into force, but can be renewed for a further 30 days at any point during, or after, this period if it is necessary and proportionate to do so.

14.3.2. The length of time it takes to bring emergency regulations into effect will vary depending on the number and complexity of the proposed regulations, the issues they raise that need to be resolved, the practicalities of legal drafting and making an Order in Council. It is difficult to estimate how long this may take in a given emergency – some emergencies may require only a few very straightforward regulations, others may require many more and raise complex legal issues around liability, protection of human rights and devolution that must be resolved before they are made. In either case, it should be assumed that it will take a minimum of six hours to bring the regulations into effect, or, more likely, a number of days. This must be borne in mind when considering whether it is appropriate to request the use of the powers – if the effects of an incident are expected to be felt in a matter of minutes or to be over in just a few hours, it is extremely unlikely that emergency regulations could be put in place quickly enough to be of any use. In these situations existing ‘normal’ powers, or the Royal Prerogative, can provide legal cover for any action taken. The Government will publicly announce when the regulations will come into effect and disseminate their content using the mass media, alongside issuing guidance to relevant organisations.
Scope of emergency regulations

14.3.3. The content of emergency regulations depends on the circumstances of the emergency. The conditions set out above set clear limits on what can be done in any given situation. All those powers listed in Section 22 of the CCA\textsuperscript{22} will not be collectively available in any specific emergency; the powers actually used must be tailored to the emergency if they are to meet the robust legal tests and safeguards set out in the CCA.

14.3.4. Any decision to make regulations, and the content of the regulations, will be entirely dependent on the unique circumstances of a particular emergency.

Requesting the use of emergency powers

14.3.5. A requirement for emergency powers could be identified by government or a responder. If a responder organisation considers that it is necessary to request the use of emergency powers in order to facilitate a better response to an emergency, the matter should be raised via the Department for Communities and Local Government Resilience and Emergencies Division, devolved administration equivalents or directly with central government via the Lead Government Department or sponsoring department.

14.3.6. The organisation making the request may first wish to seek advice from its legal advisers to confirm that there is a genuine gap in the legislation preventing or inhibiting the desired response. It should also consult with other relevant organisations in the local, and other affected, areas before seeking advice, with a particular focus on Category 1 and 2 responders.

14.3.7. The organisation will wish to consider:

- what action needs to be taken and why?
- when does this action need to be taken?
- why can’t this be achieved under existing powers?
- what specific temporary new powers are requested?

\textsuperscript{22} See \url{www.legislation.gov.uk}
what are the implications of not being granted the powers? and

which organisations have been consulted, and what are their views?

14.3.8. The Government will assess requests based on its overall response strategy and the safeguards set out in the Act. It should be borne in mind that emergency powers are a last-resort option for dealing with the effects of the most serious emergencies. The presumption is against their use. Even if it is agreed that a temporary change to the law is necessary, other options, including introducing an emergency Bill to Parliament, will also need to be considered by the Lead Government Department. There must be no expectation that the government will agree to use emergency powers and planning and response arrangements should assume that they will not be used.

Regional Nominated Co-ordinator/Emergency Coordinator

14.3.9. If emergency regulations are introduced under the provisions of the Civil Contingencies Act, it is a condition of the Act that the Government appoints a Regional Nominated Co-ordinator (RNC) for each region in England to which the emergency regulations relate, and an Emergency Coordinator (EC), for each of the relevant devolved administrations. The RNC(s)/EC(s) primary role will be to facilitate the co-ordination of activities under the emergency regulations. The RNCs/ECs are amongst a number of persons who could be given special powers of direction over organisations, their staff, and the wider population as well as the ability to requisition property and equipment, but the expectation is that their role would normally be largely confined to one of facilitation.

14.3.10. In the event of the use of Emergency Powers, there may be a requirement for a body to oversee activity in a geographic area in support of any nominated co-ordinator. In the past, this body has been known as a Regional Civil Contingencies Committee (RCCC). However, due to the renaming of the national Civil Contingencies Committee and the more flexible geographic approach being taken at below national level on a multi-LRF basis, the name and composition of any such body will need be agreed at the time. Unless otherwise specified in emergency regulations, the body or its equivalent will not have any formal responsibilities; it will in most cases be the RNCs'/ECs' primary source of advice on the evolving situation in the area and how the emergency powers might be used to manage the situation.
Annex A:

OVERVIEW OF THE CIVIL CONTINGENCIES ACT 2004
Annex A
Overview of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004, and accompanying non-legislative measures, delivers a single framework for civil protection in the United Kingdom capable of meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century. The Act is separated into two substantive parts: local arrangements for civil protection (Part 1) and emergency powers (Part 2).

Part 1: Local arrangements for civil protection

Part 1 of the Act and the supporting Regulations, and the statutory guidance Emergency Preparedness, establish a clear set of roles and responsibilities for those involved in emergency preparation and response at the local level. This helps to deliver greater consistency of civil protection activity at the local level; facilitate more systematic co-operation between responders; and lay the foundation for robust performance management.

The Act divides local responders into two categories, imposing a different set of duties on each. Category 1 responders are those organisations at the core of emergency response (e.g. emergency services, local authorities, NHS bodies). Category 1 responders are subject to the full set of civil protection duties. They are required to:

- assess the risk of emergencies occurring and use this to inform emergency planning and business continuity planning;
- put in place emergency plans;
- put in place business continuity plans;
- put in place arrangements to make information available to the public about civil protection matters and maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public in the event of an emergency;
- share information with other local responders to enhance co-ordination;
- co-operate with other local responders to enhance co-ordination and efficiency; and
- provide advice and assistance to businesses and voluntary organisations about business continuity management (local authorities only).
Category 2 responders (e.g. Health and Safety Executive, transport and utility companies) are “co-operating bodies”, which are less likely to be involved in the heart of planning work but will be heavily involved in incidents that affect their sector. Category 2 responders have a lesser set of duties – co-operating and sharing relevant information with other Category 1 and 2 responders.

Regulations under the Act require Category 1 and 2 responders in England and Wales to come together to form Local Resilience Forums (LRF), which are currently based on police force areas outside London. In London, on 1 April 2011, legislative changes resulted in Category 1 status being assigned to the Greater London Authority (GLA). It also deregulated the six multi-borough LRFs; established a pan-London LRF, currently chaired by the Mayor or his deputy, and established statutory Borough Resilience Forums.

These forums are the principal mechanisms for multi-agency co-operation between local responders and help to facilitate better co-ordination and communication, and to foster a sense of partnership.

**Part 2: Emergency powers**

Part 2 of the Act updated the Emergency Powers Act 1920 to reflect the developments in the intervening years and the risks we face in the twenty-first century. It allows for the making of temporary special legislation (emergency regulations) to help deal with the most serious of emergencies. The use of emergency powers is a last resort option and planning arrangements at the local level should not assume that emergency powers will be made available. Their use is subject to a robust set of safeguards – they can only be deployed in exceptional circumstances.

Copies of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA) can be found on: [http://www.legislation.gov.uk/all?title=civil%20contingencies%20act](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/all?title=civil%20contingencies%20act)
Annex B:

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
### Annex B

#### Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation or acronym</th>
<th>Term</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAIB</td>
<td>Air Accidents Investigation Branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABI</td>
<td>Association of British Insurers</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>Access Control Point</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACPO</td>
<td>Association of Chief Police Officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACPOS</td>
<td>Association of Chief Police Officers (Scotland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGLT</td>
<td>Assembly Government Liaison Team (Welsh Government) term defunct see Welsh Government Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHVLA</td>
<td>Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>Ambulance Incident Commander</td>
</tr>
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<td>Aircraft Co-ordinator</td>
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<td>ALP</td>
<td>Ambulance Loading Point</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARCC</td>
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<td>ASAR</td>
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<td>ATOC</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAU</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCM</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCP</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBA</td>
<td>British Insurance Broker Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIS</td>
<td>(Department) for Business, Innovation and Skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CasB</td>
<td>Casualty Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CasCS</td>
<td>Casualty Clearing Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cat 1</td>
<td>Category 1 Responder</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cat 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBA</td>
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<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear</td>
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<td>CCG</td>
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<td>CCPB</td>
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<td>CCRF</td>
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<td>CCS</td>
<td>(Cabinet Office) Civil Contingencies Secretariat</td>
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<td>CEPU</td>
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<td>Chief Fire Officers Association</td>
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<td>Crisis Management Group (Northern Ireland)</td>
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<td>CO</td>
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<td>CT</td>
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<td>CTSA</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism Security Advisor</td>
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<td>DA</td>
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<td>DCLG RED</td>
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<td>DRA</td>
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<td>ECC(W)</td>
<td>Emergency Co-ordination Centre (Wales)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC-RRG</td>
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<td>Emergency Financial Assistance Scheme (in Wales)</td>
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<td>EMort</td>
<td>Emergency Mortuary</td>
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<td>EPRR</td>
<td>Emergency Preparedness, Resilience and Response (DH)</td>
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<td>ES</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUSF</td>
<td>European Union Solidarity Fund</td>
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<td>Exclusion Zone</td>
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<td>Forward Briefing Point (for the media)</td>
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<td>FCP</td>
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<td>Family Liaison Co-ordinator</td>
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<td>FLO</td>
<td>Family Liaison Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRRC</td>
<td>Friends and Relatives Reception Centre</td>
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<td>FRA</td>
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<td>FSA</td>
<td>Food Standards Agency</td>
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<td>Government Decontamination Service</td>
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<td>Holding and Audit Area for Deceased People and Human Remains</td>
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<td>HART</td>
<td>Hazardous Area Response Team (Ambulance Service)</td>
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<td>Health Emergency Operating Centre</td>
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<td>HITS</td>
<td>High Integrity Telecommunications System</td>
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<td>HLS</td>
<td>Helicopter Landing Site</td>
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<td>Her Majesty’s Coastguard</td>
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<td>Health Protection Agency (now Public Health England)</td>
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<td>Health and Safety Executive</td>
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<td>Interim Bronze Interoperability Solution</td>
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<td>Integrated Emergency Management</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>Incident Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>Impact Management Group</td>
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<td>Joint Regional Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>JTAC</td>
<td>Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre</td>
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<td>LAs</td>
<td>Local Authorities</td>
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<td>LGD</td>
<td>Lead Government Department</td>
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<td>Local Health Resilience Partnership</td>
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<td>London Local Authority Co-ordination Centre</td>
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<td>Local Risk Assessment Guidance</td>
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<td>LRF</td>
<td>Local Resilience Forum</td>
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<td>MACA</td>
<td>Military Aid to the Civil Authorities</td>
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<td>MACC</td>
<td>Military Aid to the Civil Community</td>
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<td>MACP</td>
<td>Military Aid to the Civil Power</td>
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<td>MAGD</td>
<td>Military Aid to Government Departments</td>
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<td>MAHP</td>
<td>Major Accident Hazard Pipeline</td>
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<td>MAIB</td>
<td>Marine Accident Investigation Branch</td>
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<td>MCA</td>
<td>Maritime and Coastguard Agency</td>
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<td>MEF</td>
<td>Media Emergency Forum</td>
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<td>MEIR</td>
<td>Marine Emergencies Information Room (of the MCA)</td>
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<td>Medical Emergency Response Incident Team</td>
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<td>Medical Incident Commander</td>
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<td>MIRG</td>
<td>Maritime Incident Response Group</td>
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<td>Media Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>MLP</td>
<td>Media Liaison Point</td>
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<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>Misper</td>
<td>Missing person</td>
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<td>Northern Ireland</td>
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<td>Northern Ireland Central Crisis Management Arrangements</td>
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<td>NIO</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Office</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIOBR</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Office Briefing Room</td>
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<td>Northern Ireland Technical Advisory Group</td>
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<td>National Policing Improvement Agency</td>
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<td>National Resilience Extranet</td>
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<td>National Recovery Guidance</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSC (THRC)</td>
<td>National Security Council, Sub Committee on Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies (formerly Civil Contingencies Committee).</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC (THRC)(O)</td>
<td>National Security Council, Sub Committee on Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies (Officials).</td>
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<td>NTCC</td>
<td>National Traffic Control Centre (of the Highways Agency)</td>
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<td>NVASEC</td>
<td>National Voluntary Aid Society Emergency Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>NVSCPFP</td>
<td>National Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum</td>
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<td>NEPLG</td>
<td>Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group</td>
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<td>OFMDFM</td>
<td>Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (Northern Ireland)</td>
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<td>Public Health England</td>
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<td>Public Information Point</td>
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<td>PMR</td>
<td>Private Mobile Radio</td>
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<td>PNICC</td>
<td>Police National Information Co-ordination Centre</td>
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<td>PPE</td>
<td>Personal Protective Equipment</td>
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<td>PSNI</td>
<td>Police Service of Northern Ireland</td>
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<td>PSR</td>
<td>Pipeline Safety Regulations</td>
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<td>PSTN</td>
<td>Public Switched Telephone Network</td>
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<td>RABS</td>
<td>Resilience Advisory Board for Scotland</td>
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<td>RAIB</td>
<td>Rail Accident Investigation Branch</td>
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<td>RAYNET</td>
<td>Radio Amateurs’ Emergency Network</td>
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<td>Rest Centre</td>
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<td>Recovery Co-ordinating Group</td>
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<td>Response Co-ordinating Group</td>
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<td>REPPIR</td>
<td>Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001</td>
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<td>RNC</td>
<td>Regional Nominated Co-ordinator</td>
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<td>RNLI</td>
<td>Royal National Lifeboat Institute</td>
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<td>RoW</td>
<td>Receiver of Wreck</td>
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<td>RVP</td>
<td>Rendezvous Point</td>
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<td>RWC</td>
<td>Responders’ Welfare Centre</td>
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<td>SACP</td>
<td>Scene Access Control Point</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<td>Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies</td>
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<td>Search and Rescue</td>
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<td>Strategic Co-ordinating Group</td>
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<td>SCU</td>
<td>Salvage Control Unit</td>
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<td>SEMD</td>
<td>Security and Emergency Measures Direction</td>
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<td>Senior Investigating Officer</td>
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<td>Central Situation Cell</td>
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<td>Site Incident Officer</td>
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<td>SITREP</td>
<td>Situation Report</td>
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<td>SJC(UK)</td>
<td>Standing Joint Command (United Kingdom) (MOD)</td>
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<td>Search and Rescue Mission Co-ordinator</td>
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<td>Strategic Local Recognised Information Picture</td>
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<td>Secretary of State’s Representative</td>
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<td>Shoreline Response Centre</td>
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<td>Science and Technical Advice Cell</td>
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<td>SuRC</td>
<td>Survivor Reception Centre</td>
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<td>TAG</td>
<td>(Northern Ireland) Technical Advisory Group</td>
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<td>Tactical Co-ordinating Group</td>
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<td>Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum</td>
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<td>Welsh Government</td>
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<td>Wales Civil Contingencies Committee</td>
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<td>WMEF</td>
<td>Wales Media Emergency Forum</td>
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Annex C:

GLOSSARY
Annex C
Glossary

Summary

- Without a common understanding of what specific terms and phrases mean, multi-agency working will always carry the risk of potentially serious misunderstandings, the consequences of which can be extremely severe.

- A lexicon is a collection of terms from a specific area of work or knowledge that are defined and associated with additional user-relevant information. This lexicon establishes common, agreed definitions for terms used in the multi-agency business of civil protection.

- Future versions of the lexicon will build on and encompass a wider range of terminologies used across the range of Integrated Emergency Management activities. You should check periodically for updates to the lexicon, which is published on the UK Resilience website: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-responder-interoperability-lexicon

- Users of the lexicon are encouraged to cross-reference definitions in their own organisation’s documents and adopt the definitions given in the lexicon.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Term</th>
<th>Abbreviation or acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Geography or jurisdiction to which the term is restricted</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aeronautical rescue coordination centre</td>
<td>ARCC</td>
<td>Royal Air Force facility at Kinloss responsible for the coordination of all airborne assets deployed in a rescue operation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft Co-ordinator</td>
<td>AirCO</td>
<td>Person who supervises the involvement of multiple aircraft in search and rescue operations</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Alternativ(e) Emergency Control Centre</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Local authority guidance term for) Emergency Control Centre (ECC) provided by a partner organization of a local authority in the event of an ECC being unavailable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ambulance Incident Commander</td>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>Officer of the ambulance service with overall responsibility for the work of that service at the scene of an emergency</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ante-Mortem Data</td>
<td></td>
<td>Information obtained from family, friends, etc. about a person who is believed to be among the deceased</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ante-Mortem Team</td>
<td></td>
<td>Officers responsible for liaising with the next of kin on all matters relating to the identification of the deceased</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticipation</td>
<td></td>
<td>The first phase of the Integrated Emergency Management process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly Government Liaison Team</td>
<td>AGLT</td>
<td>A Government Liaison Team from the Welsh Government</td>
<td>Wales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance Centre</td>
<td></td>
<td>Any facility (whether physical or virtual) set up during response to and recovery from an emergency to provide a range of assistance to different categories of people affected by the emergency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back-up</td>
<td></td>
<td>Military or emergency services contingent providing additional support in an operation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bellwin Scheme</td>
<td></td>
<td>Discretionary scheme for providing Central Government financial assistance in exceptional circumstances to affected local authorities (e.g. councils, police authorities) in the event of an emergency. Note: does not apply to Northern Ireland. In Wales the equivalent scheme is the Emergency Financial Assistance Scheme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Red Cross</td>
<td>BRC</td>
<td>An organisation that helps people in crisis. It is part of a global voluntary network that responds to conflicts, natural disasters and individual emergencies and then helps people to recover and move on with their lives.</td>
<td>England, Wales and Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Transport Police</td>
<td>BTP</td>
<td>The police force providing a policing service to rail operators, their staff and passengers throughout England, Wales and Scotland.</td>
<td>England, Wales and Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Bronze</td>
<td></td>
<td>The tier of command and control within a single agency (below gold level and silver level) at which the management of 'hands-on' work is undertaken at the incident site(s) or associated areas. <strong>Note:</strong> Bronze level is also known as the operational level.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business continuity</td>
<td>BC</td>
<td>Strategic and tactical capability of an organisation to plan for and respond to incidents and business disruptions in order to continue business operations at an acceptable predefined level.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Continuity Management</td>
<td>BCM</td>
<td>Holistic management process that identifies potential threats to an organisation and the impacts to business operations that those threats, if realised, might cause, and which provides a framework for building organisational resilience with the capability for an effective response.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Continuity Plan</td>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>Documented collection of procedures and information developed, compiled and maintained in readiness for use in an incident to enable an organisation to continue to deliver its critical functions at an acceptable predefined level.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Office</td>
<td></td>
<td>Department of the United Kingdom Government responsible for supporting the Prime Minister and Cabinet.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms</td>
<td>COBR</td>
<td>UK Government's dedicated crisis management facilities, which are activated in the event of an emergency requiring support and co-ordination at the national strategic level.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat</td>
<td>CCS</td>
<td>Cabinet Office secretariat which provides the central focus for the cross-departmental and cross-agency commitment, co-ordination and cooperation that will enable the United Kingdom to deal effectively with disruptive challenges.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualty Bureau</td>
<td>CasB</td>
<td>Initial point of contact and information, maintained by the police, for all data relating to casualties. <strong>Note:</strong> (1) May be termed Police Casualty Bureau, (2) Plural is Bureaus or Bureaux.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualty Clearing Station</td>
<td>CasCS</td>
<td>Entity set up at the scene of an emergency by the ambulance service in liaison with the Medical Incident Commander to assess, triage and treat casualties and direct their evacuation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category 1 responder</td>
<td>Cat 1</td>
<td>A person or body listed in Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Contingencies Act. These bodies are likely to be at the core of the response to most emergencies. As such, they are subject to the full range of civil protection duties in the Act.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category 2 responder</td>
<td>Cat 2</td>
<td>A person or body listed in Part 3 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Contingencies Act. These are co-operating responders who are less likely to be involved in the heart of multi-agency planning work, but will be heavily involved in preparing for incidents affecting their sectors. The Act requires them to co-operate and share information with other Category 1 and 2 responders.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological and/or Nuclear</td>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>A term used to describe Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear materials. CBRN is often associated with terrorism – see CBRNE.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Contingencies Act (2004)</td>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>Act of 2004 which established a single framework for Civil Protection in the United Kingdom. Part 1 of the Act establishes a clear set of roles and responsibilities for Local Responders; Part 2 of the Act establishes emergency powers. <em>Note: in the UK civil protection context the CCA may often be referred to as 'The Act'</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Contingencies Committee</td>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>See National Security Council (Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Contingencies Group (Northern Ireland)</td>
<td>CCG(NI)</td>
<td>A pan-Northern Ireland multi-agency forum for the development, discussion and agreement of civil protection policy for the Northern Ireland public services. In addition to its policy role, the CCG(NI) supports strategic co-ordination of emergencies, and during the response to an emergency would support the Crisis Management Group (CMG), supplementing existing lead department arrangements. In circumstances where the CMG is not convened but where cross-cutting strategic management is required the CCG(NI) would fulfill this role.</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Contingencies Policy Branch</td>
<td>CCPB</td>
<td>(In Northern Ireland) Central government organisation responsible for a wide range of policies and activities aimed at promoting the development of civil contingencies arrangements within Northern Ireland public sector to ensure an effective response can be made to assist the public during and in the aftermath of a civil emergency</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinical Commissioning Group</td>
<td>CCG</td>
<td>Replaces the functions previously carried out by Primary Care Trusts. Provides services for all patients seeking healthcare.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Recognised Information Picture</td>
<td>CRIP</td>
<td>A single, authoritative strategic overview of an emergency or crisis that is developed according to a standard template and is intended for briefing and decision-support purposes. <em>Note: within COBR the CRIP is typically collated and maintained by the Central Situation Cell</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>circulated where relevant to responders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community resilience</td>
<td></td>
<td>Communities and individuals harnessing local resources and expertise to help themselves in an emergency, in a way that complements the response of the emergency services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequence management</td>
<td></td>
<td>Measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the impacts of an emergency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency</td>
<td></td>
<td>Possible future emergency or risk which must be prepared for. See also civil contingencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency Plan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Plan prepared by a particular authority specifying the response to a potential INCIDENT within its area of jurisdiction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency planning</td>
<td></td>
<td>See civil contingency planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td></td>
<td>The application of authority, combined with the capability to manage resources, in order to achieve defined objectives.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control centre</td>
<td></td>
<td>Operations centre from which the management and co-ordination of the response by each emergency service to an emergency are carried out.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of major accident hazards regulations 1999, Northern Ireland 2000</td>
<td>COMAH</td>
<td>Regulations applying to the chemical industry and to some storage sites where threshold quantities of dangerous substances, as identified in the Regulations, are kept or used.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control room</td>
<td></td>
<td>See control centre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ordination</td>
<td></td>
<td>The integration of multi-agency efforts and available capabilities, which may be interdependent, in order to achieve defined objectives.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordon</td>
<td></td>
<td>Naturally delineated or improvised perimeter indicating an area of restricted access</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter Pollution and Response Branch</td>
<td>CPRB</td>
<td>Body within the Maritime and Coastguard Agency responsible for dealing with pollution at sea, and assisting local authorities with the shoreline clean-up</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. General definition: an inherently abnormal, unstable and complex situation that represents a threat to the strategic objectives, reputation or existence of an organisation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Specific definition - emergency of magnitude and/or severity requiring the activation of central government response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis management</td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Personal - acute emotional reaction to a powerful stimulus or demand</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. General definition - strategically-directed activities to prevent, respond to, mitigate the effects of and recover from a crisis.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. In Central Government Arrangements for Responding to Emergencies: Concept of Operations crisis management is the implementation of measures that attempt to prevent or avert an imminent emergency, along with work that puts in place protective or other measures to mitigate the effects of an emergency, prevent further damage or disruption and secure the scene</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Management Group</td>
<td>CMG</td>
<td>In Northern Ireland - Minister led strategic co-ordination group responsible for setting the overarching strategy for the administration’s response to an emergency</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department for Communities and Local Government</td>
<td>DCLG</td>
<td>Central government department in England that sets policy on local government, housing, urban regeneration, planning and fire and rescue.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Department for Energy and Climate Change | DECC                   | The Lead Government Department in the event of an emergency at a civil nuclear site in England or Wales. It is also the Lead Government Department for co-ordinating the response to an overseas nuclear emergency.  

Note: DECC chairs the Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group (NEPLG) and takes the lead in the preparation of NEPLG Consolidated Guidance. |                                                            |
| Disaster                             |                         | Emergency (usually but not exclusively of natural causes) causing, or threatening to cause, widespread and serious disruption to community life through death, injury, and/or damage to property and/or the environment |                                                            |
| Emergency                            |                         | An event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK, the environment of a place in the UK, or the security of the UK or of a place in the UK.  

Note: to constitute an emergency this event or situation must require the implementation of special arrangements by one or more Category 1 responder. |                                                            |
<p>| Emergency Control Centre             | ECC                     | Generic term for a centre for controlling and co-ordinating the response of an organisation to an incident or an emergency |                                                            |
| Emergency Co-ordination Centre (Wales)| ECC(W)                 | Welsh Assembly Government centre co-ordinating a multi-agency response to an emergency and acting as a link between the local level and the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms | Wales                                                     |
| Emergency management                 |                         | See Integrated Emergency Management                                                                                               |                                                            |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Definition</th>
<th>Geography or jurisdiction to which the term is restricted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emergency plan(ning)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aspect of <em>Integrated Emergency Management</em> concerned with developing and maintaining procedures to prevent <em>emergencies</em> and to mitigate the impact when they occur</td>
<td>Exclusion zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency powers</td>
<td></td>
<td>Last-resort option for responding to the most serious of <em>emergencies</em> where existing powers are insufficient, and additional powers are enacted under part 2 of the <em>Civil Contingencies Act</em> (2004) and elsewhere</td>
<td>Family and Friends Reception Centre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Emergency preparedness       |                         | 1. The extent to which *emergency planning* enables the effective and efficient prevention, reduction, control and mitigation of, and *response to emergencies*  
<p>|                              |                         | 2. Title of a publication setting out civil protection responsibilities under the civil contingencies act 2004 in the areas of anticipation, assessment and prevention of, and preparation for, emergencies | Forward Control Point                                   |
| Emergency regulations        |                         | Temporary legislation used as a last resort in the most serious of emergencies where existing legislation is insufficient to respond in the most effective way | Evacuation       |
| Emergency services           |                         | Generic term for police, fire and rescue, and health agencies; may also include HM Coastguard and other responders.                                                                                     | Family Liaison Officer                                  |
| Environment Group            | EG                      | Body providing environmental and public health advice to responders in the event of a maritime pollution <em>emergency</em>                                                                                   | Evacuee                                                   |
| Evacuation                   |                         | Removal, from a place of actual or potential danger to a place of relative safety, of people and (where appropriate) other living creatures                                                      | Exclusion zone                                            |
| Evacuee                      |                         | Person removed from a place of actual or potential danger to a place of relative safety                                                                                                                | Evacuation       |
| Exclusion zone               | ExclZ                   | Area, usually within the inner cordon, to which access is normally denied to all personnel, including emergency services. See also <em>cordon</em>                                                          | Evacuation       |
| Extranet                     |                         | See <em>National Resilience Extranet</em>                                                                                                                                                                          | Exclusion zone                                            |
| Family and Friends Reception Centre | FFRC                 | Assistance centre established by the police to cater for the family and friends of people affected by an <em>emergency</em>                                                                                     | Evacuee                                                   |
| Family Liaison Officer       | FLO                     | Police officer designated to facilitate an investigation into people believed to be missing and to assist identification by collecting <em>ante-mortem data</em>                                                      | Evacuee                                                   |
| Forward Briefing Point       | FBP                     | Site with good views over the area affected by an <em>incident</em>, at which media briefings are conducted                                                                                                  | Evacuee                                                   |
| Forward Command Post         | FCP                     | Any service's <em>command and control</em> facility nearest the scene of the <em>incident</em>, responsible for immediate direction, deployment and security. This might be either an <em>Operational / Bronze</em> or <em>Tactical / Silver</em> facility depending on the circumstances of the <em>incident</em>. | Forward Control Point                                    |
| Forward Control Point        | FCP                     | See <em>Forward Command Post</em>                                                                                                                                                                                 | Evacuee                                                   |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</table>
| Gold                                                   |                         | The strategic level of command and control (above Silver level and Bronze level) at which policy, strategy and the overall response framework are established and managed for individual responder agencies.  

*Note:* the Strategic Co-ordinating Group, the multi-agency strategic co-ordinating body, may colloquially be referred to as the Gold Group, but not simply as Gold. |                                                                                  |
| Gold group                                             |                         | See Strategic Co-ordinating Group                                                                                                                                                                      |                                                              |
| Government Liaison Officer                            | GLO                     | The lead member of the Government Liaison Team— in a non-terrorist emergency, an official from the Government Office; in a terrorist emergency a Home Office official                                           |                                                              |
| Government Liaison Team                                | GLT                     | Central government, multidisciplinary team, led by the Government Liaison Officer, dispatched to the site of an emergency to facilitate communication and cooperation between the government and local responders |                                                              |
| Government Telephone Preference Scheme                 | GTPS                    | Scheme under which registered telephone numbers would still be able to make calls when all other users have been barred from the public network in extremis during an emergency |                                                              |
| Hazard                                                 |                         | Accidental or naturally occurring (i.e., non-malicious) event or situation with the potential to cause death or physical or psychological harm, damage or losses to property, and/or disruption to the environment and/or to economic, social and political structures |                                                              |
| Helpline                                               |                         | Telephone (and often email) system by which people affected by an emergency can obtain help or services or provide information                                                                          |                                                              |
| High Integrity Telecommunications System                | HITS                    | A hybrid satellite /terrestrial -based communications system that is designed to provide a resilient communications backbone between crisis management centres across the UK.  

*Note:* HITS is designed to remain available in the event of loss of all or part of the Public Switched Telephone Network. The HITS network is comprised of fixed site installations and a number of transportable satellite terminals capable of being deployed to pre-identified fallback locations. |                                                              |
<p>| Holding and Audit Area for Deceased People and Human Remains | HAADR                  | Area close to the scene where the deceased can be temporarily held until transfer to the emergency mortuary or mortuary                                                                               |                                                              |
| Humanitarian assistance                                |                         | Multi-agency response to ensure that those involved and affected by a major incident are properly cared for, by the provision of shelter, information, advice, emotional, financial and legal support, and the like |                                                              |</p>
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance Centre</td>
<td>HAC</td>
<td>Assistance centre established during the first 72 hours of an emergency to cater for the medium and longer term needs of people affected by an emergency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact</td>
<td></td>
<td>The scale of the consequences of a hazard, threat or emergency expressed in terms of a reduction in human welfare, damage to the environment and loss of security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Incident                     |                         | Event or situation that requires a response from the emergency services or other responders  
*Note:* emergency (or major incident) refers to a specific type of incident requiring special deployment by one or more category 1 responder |                                                          |
| Incident commander           |                         | The nominated emergency services officer with overall responsibility for tactics and resource management at the tactical level.  
*Note:* usually specific to each service. At multi-agency incidents, there may be an incident commander for each service, and to avoid confusion it would be beneficial if the commanders referred to themselves as the silver commander for their service |                                                          |
| Incident Control Point       | ICP                     | The point from which the silver (tactical) commander of an emergency service can control that service’s response to an incident.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |                                                          |
| Inner cordon                 |                         | Cordon established to secure the immediate scene and provide a measure of protection for personnel working within the area                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |                                                          |
| Integrated Emergency Management | IEM             | Multi-agency approach to emergency management entailing six key activities – anticipation, assessment, prevention, preparation, response and recovery                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |                                                          |
| Inter-agency                 |                         | Involving the participation of more than one agency  
*Note:* frequently used interchangeably with joint-Agency and Multi-Agency |                                                          |
| Joint-agency                 |                         | Involving the participation of two agencies  
*Note:* frequently used interchangeably with inter-agency and multi-agency |                                                          |
<p>| Lead Government Department Department | LGD         | Department of the United Kingdom government or devolved administration designated as responsible for overall management of the government response to an emergency or disaster. There are LGDs identified for both the response and recovery phases of emergencies.                                                                                                                                                                           |                                                          |</p>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood</td>
<td></td>
<td>Chance of something happening, whether defined, measured or estimated objectively or subjectively, or in terms of general descriptors (such as rare, unlikely, almost certain), frequencies or mathematical probabilities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td></td>
<td>(by contrast with national or regional) relating to a limited area or immediate vicinity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Resilience Area</td>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Area within which category 1 and 2 responders cooperate through the mechanism of a Local Resilience Forum.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Resilience Forum</td>
<td>LRF</td>
<td>Process for bringing together all the category 1 and 2 responders within a police force area for the purpose of facilitating co-operation in fulfilment of their duties under the Civil Contingencies Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local responder</td>
<td></td>
<td>Organisation which responds to emergencies at the local level, including both category 1 and category 2 responders and other organisations not covered by the Civil Contingencies Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Accident</td>
<td></td>
<td>Accident of a sufficiently large scale to constitute an emergency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major incident</td>
<td></td>
<td>Event or situation requiring a response under one or more of the emergency services’ major incident plans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Response Centre</td>
<td>MRC</td>
<td>Maritime and Coastguard Agency co-ordination centre for oil pollution incidents at sea that require a national response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Maritime and Coastguard Agency | MCA | Executive agency of the department for transport, comprising Her Majesty’s Coastguard and the former Marine Safety Agency  
*Note alternative of MCA acronym (Military/MOD Co-ordinating Authority)* | |
| Maritime Incident Response Group | MIRG | Specialist fire and rescue authority teams strategically located around the country, for response to emergencies at sea | |
| Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre | MRCC | Her Majesty’s Coastguard regional centre overseeing and co-ordinating the search and rescue operations within a region | |
| Marshalling area  | MCI                        | Generic term for an area to which resources and personnel not immediately required at the scene or being held for further use can be directed to stand by | |
| Mass casualty incident | MCI | An incident (or series of incidents) causing casualties on a scale that is beyond the normal resources of the emergency services  
*Note: the term mass casualty denotes a major incident potentially involving hundreds of casualties, or more.* | |
<p>| Media            |                            | Press and electronic news reporting agencies | |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
<td>Media Emergency Forum</td>
<td>MEF</td>
<td>Ad hoc group of senior media editors, government representatives, local authority emergency planners, emergency services, police and the private sector set up to consider the provision of information to the public, and other media issues, in the context of civil emergencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Liaison Officer</td>
<td>MLO</td>
<td>Representative who has responsibility for liaising with the media on behalf of his/her organisation. Note alternative of MLO acronym (Military Liaison Officer)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Liaison Point</td>
<td>MLP</td>
<td>Area adjacent to the scene, staffed by Media Liaison Officers, for the reception and accreditation of media personnel and for briefing on reporting, filming and photographing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Emergency Response Incident Team</td>
<td>MERIT</td>
<td>Team of appropriately trained and equipped medical and/or nursing staff provided by a local acute trust or foundation trust hospital to attend the scene of an emergency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Incident Commander</td>
<td>MIC</td>
<td>Lead medical officer responsible for clinical management at the scene of an emergency.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Aid to the Civil Authorities</td>
<td>MACA</td>
<td>Any category of assistance provided by the Ministry of Defence to the civil authorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISPER</td>
<td></td>
<td>Abbreviation for missing person</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Telecommunications Privileged Access Scheme</td>
<td>MTPAS</td>
<td>Scheme that provides call preference for key emergency management organisations if public network access is restricted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortuary</td>
<td></td>
<td>Building or area in which the bodies of deceased persons are held for identification and post mortem examination and which may provide capability for holding bodies prior to release</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-agency</td>
<td></td>
<td>Involving the participation of several agencies. Note: frequently used interchangeably with inter-agency or joint-agency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual aid</td>
<td></td>
<td>An agreement between Category 1 and 2 responders and other organisations not covered by the Act, within the same sector or across sectors and across boundaries, to provide assistance with additional resource during an emergency.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Resilience Extranet</td>
<td>NRE</td>
<td>Secure web based infrastructure to enable multi-agency information sharing and which has a specific information function during emergency response and recovery. Note: the NRE can store protectively marked documents up to and including RESTRICTED.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Voluntary aid Society Emergency Committee</td>
<td>NVASEC</td>
<td>UK-wide forum, responsible to the secretary of state, for addressing Voluntary Sector matters in relation to national integrated contingency planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>News Co-ordination Centre</td>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>A Cabinet Office unit working with the Lead Government Department to provide co-ordinating media and public communications support during an emergency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHS 24</td>
<td></td>
<td>Scottish equivalent of NHS direct.</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHS direct</td>
<td></td>
<td>National health service 24-hour helpline providing advice and information relating to health in England and Wales (as NHS Direct Wales)</td>
<td>England and Wales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHS 111</td>
<td></td>
<td>National health service 24-hour helpline providing advice and information relating to urgent healthcare needs in England</td>
<td>England (currently rolling out across the country)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland Central Crisis Management Arrangements</td>
<td>NICCMA</td>
<td>Central facility to support the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in providing strategic direction following a serious terrorist incident in Northern Ireland.</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland Office Briefing Room</td>
<td>NIOBR</td>
<td>Central facility to support the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in providing strategic direction following a serious terrorist incident in Northern Ireland.</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland Technical Advisory Group</td>
<td>NITAG</td>
<td>Group convened to provide scientific and technical advice in response to emergencies</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-scene Co-ordinator</td>
<td></td>
<td>Person who supervises search and rescue operations in the immediate vicinity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onset</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beginning of the impact of an emergency or disaster</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational</td>
<td></td>
<td>General definition - relating to an emergency service’s actions undertaken in response to an incident</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Specific definition - the level (below tactical level) at which the management of ‘hands-on’ work is undertaken at the incident site(s) or associated areas, equating for single agencies to Bronze level.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Notes:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1) the terms Bronze and operational are frequently used interchangeably</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 operational and tactical are inverted in military usage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer cordon</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cordon established around the vicinity of an incident, and encompassing the inner cordon, to control access to a wider area around the scene, to allow the emergency services and other agencies to work unhindered and in privacy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase</td>
<td></td>
<td>In emergency management, one of three distinct processes undertaken by an organisation in relation to a potential or actual emergency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Police Casualty Bureau</td>
<td>See Casualty Bureau</td>
<td>See Casualty Bureau</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-emergency phase</td>
<td>See Recovery phase</td>
<td>See Recovery phase</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-emergency (pre-incident) phase</td>
<td>See preparedness phase</td>
<td>See preparedness phase</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparedness phase</td>
<td></td>
<td>On-going phase focussed on preparedness for emergencies and disasters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary and community care services</td>
<td></td>
<td>Medical and other health services, provided by health professions and local authority social services departments, particularly during the response phase of an emergency, but also in the longer term recovery phase if on-going monitoring and treatment are required</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td></td>
<td>All non-governmental, for-profit organisations, regarded as a group, involved in any aspects of the response to an emergency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health England</td>
<td>PHE</td>
<td>PHE is an Executive Agency of DH and was established following the Health and Social Care Act 2012 to protect and improve the nation’s health and wellbeing and work to reduce inequalities. It provides national leadership and expert services to support and respond to health protection emergencies, working alongside local government, the NHS and other key partners.</td>
<td>England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector</td>
<td></td>
<td>All governmental organisations, regarded as a group, involved in any aspects of the response to an emergency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiation emergency</td>
<td></td>
<td>Event likely to result in a member of the public receiving an effective dose of 5 MSv during the year immediately following</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001</td>
<td>REPPiR</td>
<td>Framework of emergency preparedness measures to ensure that members of the public are properly prepared for a possible radiation emergency, and properly informed if one occurs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiological</td>
<td></td>
<td>Relating to or caused by radiation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid onset emergency</td>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency which develops quickly, and usually with immediate effects, thereby limiting the time available to consider response options (in contrast to rising tide emergency)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiver of Wreck</td>
<td>RoW</td>
<td>Official of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency responsible for processing wreckage and cargo coming ashore as a result of a maritime emergency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Receiving hospital                   |                         | One of the designated receiving hospitals identified by the NHS Commissioning Board and selected by the ambulance service to receive casualties during an emergency.  
Note: may also be termed Designated Receiving hospital |                                                                                                                         |                                                          |
| Reception centre                     |                         | See Survivor Reception Centre                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                          |
| Recovery                             |                         | The process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency.  
Note: a fuller definition is as follows: Process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency or disaster, continuing until the disruption has been rectified, demands on services have been returned to normal levels, and the needs of those affected have been met |                                                          |                                                          |
<p>| Recovery Co-ordinating Group         | RCG                     | Strategic decision making body for the recovery phase once handover has taken place from the police |                                                                                                                         |                                                          |
| Recovery phase                       |                         | Phase focussed on recovery, commencing at the earliest opportunity following the onset of an emergency, and running in tandem with the response phase |                                                                                                                         |                                                          |
| Regional Civil Contingencies Committee | RCCC                   | Multi-agency group convened in the most serious circumstances, including representatives of the emergency services, local authorities, Central Government and others as applicable, to co-ordinate multiple Strategic Co-ordinating Groups within an English Region to improve the co-ordination of the response to an emergency particularly, but not exclusively, with respect to consequence management and the recovery phase |                                                          |                                                          |
| Regional Nominated Co-ordinator      | RNC                     | Central government appointee responsible for facilitating the regional co-ordination of activities under the emergency powers in line with the governmental response strategy and objectives.                                                                                                                            |                                                          |                                                          |
| Remediation                          |                         | Restoration of a built or natural environment that has been destroyed, damaged, or rendered hazardous as the result of an emergency or disaster. Linked to recovery.                                                                                                                                |                                                          |                                                          |
| Rendezvous point                     | RvP                     | Point to which all resources arriving at the outer cordon are directed for logging, briefing, equipment issue and deployment |                                                                                                                         |                                                          |</p>
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Definition</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rendezvous Point Officer</td>
<td></td>
<td>Police officer responsible for supervision of the rendezvous point</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rescue</td>
<td></td>
<td>Removal, from a place of danger to a place of relative safety, of persons threatened or directly affected by an incident, emergency, or disaster</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserved responsibility</td>
<td></td>
<td>Responsibility retained by the United Kingdom government, as distinct from those assumed by the devolved administrations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resilience</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ability of the community, services, area or infrastructure to detect, prevent, and, if necessary to withstand, handle and recover from disruptive challenges</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response Co-ordinating Group</td>
<td>ResCG</td>
<td>A Multi-SCG Co-ordinating Group which may be convened where the local response has been, or may be, overwhelmed and wider support is required, or where an emergency affects a number of neighbouring Strategic Co-ordinating Groups and would benefit from co-ordination (e.g. to obtain a consistent, structured approach) or enhanced support.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responder</td>
<td></td>
<td>Organisation required to plan and prepare a response to an emergency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>See Category 1 responder; Category 2 responder</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response phase</td>
<td></td>
<td>Phase in which decision making and actions are focused on response to an actual emergency or disaster</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest Centre</td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Building, including overnight facilities, designated by the local authority for the temporary accommodation of evacuees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk</td>
<td></td>
<td>Measure of the significance of a potential emergency in terms of its assessed likelihood and impact</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk assessment</td>
<td></td>
<td>A structured and auditable process of identifying potentially significant events, assessing their likelihood and impacts, and then combining these to provide an overall assessment of risk, as a basis for further decisions and action.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety Advisory Group</td>
<td>SAG</td>
<td>Multi-agency group set up to provide advice on safety matters for a specific event, or events, such as a major sporting event or a concert held in a stadium.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvage Control Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td>Body established by the Secretary of State's Representative in marine salvage incidents in order to provide support for any action related to vessel(s) that is necessary to save life and protect the environment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scene</td>
<td></td>
<td>Point or area of the immediate impact of an incident or disaster</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Term</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>emergency</td>
<td></td>
<td>Group of scientific and technical experts that is established to provide a common source of advice to inform decisions made during the central government response to an emergency.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scene Access Control Point</td>
<td>SACP</td>
<td>Controlled point through which essential personnel may gain access through the inner cordon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science and Technical Advice Cell</td>
<td>STAC</td>
<td>Group of technical experts from those agencies involved in an emergency response that may provide scientific and technical advice to the Strategic Co-ordinating Group chair or single service gold commander</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies</td>
<td>SAGE</td>
<td>Group of scientific and technical experts that is established to provide a common source of advice to inform decisions made during the central government response to an emergency.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search and Rescue</td>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>Use of specialised personnel and equipment to locate persons in distress or in danger and remove them from a place of actual or potential danger to a place of relative safety</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search and Rescue Mission Co-ordinator</td>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>Maritime and Coastguard Agency officer assigned to co-ordinate the response to an actual or apparent maritime incident</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of State’s Representative</td>
<td>SOSREP</td>
<td>On behalf of the secretary of state for the department of Transport SOSREP is tasked to oversee, control and if necessary intervene and exercise ultimate command and control, acting in the overriding interest of the United Kingdom in salvage operations within UK waters involving vessels or fixed platforms where there is significant risk of pollution.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Identification Manager</td>
<td>SIM</td>
<td>Police officer appointed by the senior police officer to manage and co-ordinate all aspects concerning the identification of the deceased in support of HM Coroner or (in Scotland) the procurator fiscal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoreline Response Centre</td>
<td>SRC</td>
<td>A single co-ordination centre established by the local authority most affected by a marine pollution incident and supported by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver</td>
<td></td>
<td>The tactical tier of command and control within a single agency (below Gold level and above Bronze level) at which the response to an emergency is managed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. (general) location or specified area  2. (specific) point or area of the immediate impact of an incident or emergency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation Report</td>
<td>SitRep</td>
<td>Report produced by an officer or body, outlining the current state and potential development of an incident and the response to it</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific (emergency) plan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Plan by one or more category 1 responder(s) that relates to a particular risk not adequately addressed by a generic emergency plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statutory</td>
<td></td>
<td>Prescribed in legislation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statutory agency (or body or authority)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Agency, service or organisation whose establishment, constitution and functions are laid down in legislation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statutory guidance</td>
<td></td>
<td>Advice provided by or to an authority under statutory powers concerning the implementation of or compliance with a specific law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td></td>
<td>The level (above tactical level and operational level) at which policy, strategy and the overall response framework are established and managed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic command(er)</td>
<td></td>
<td>See strategic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Co-ordinating Group</td>
<td>SCG</td>
<td><strong>Multi-agency</strong> body responsible for co-ordinating the joint response to an emergency at the local strategic level. Note: the SCG may also be known as the Gold Group.</td>
<td>England and Wales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Co-ordinating Group</td>
<td>SCG</td>
<td>In Scotland Strategic Co-ordinating Groups are the principal local forum for multi-agency cooperation in civil protection. The groups have a role in both preparation and response to emergencies. Note: SCGs in Scotland effectively combine the role in England of Local Resilience Fora in preparing for emergencies and of Strategic Co-ordinating Groups in responding to emergencies</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic level</td>
<td></td>
<td>See strategic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidiarity</td>
<td></td>
<td>The principle by which decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level, with co-ordination at the highest necessary level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudden impact emergency</td>
<td></td>
<td>See under emergency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support groups</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mutual assistance grouping of people affected by an emergency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survivor</td>
<td></td>
<td>Any person, whether injured or not, who is not killed in an incident or emergency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survivor Reception Centre</td>
<td>SuRC</td>
<td><strong>Assistance centre</strong> in which survivors not requiring acute hospital treatment can be taken for short-term shelter and first aid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td></td>
<td>Level (below strategic level and above operational level) at which the response to an emergency is managed. Notes: 1) The terms tactical and Silver are frequently used interchangeably for single agency operations 2 Tactical and operational are inverted in military usage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical command</td>
<td></td>
<td>See tactical</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical co-ordinating group</td>
<td>TCG</td>
<td>A multi-agency group of tactical commanders that meets to determine, co-ordinate and deliver the tactical response to an emergency. Note: the TCG may also be known as the Silver Group.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical level</td>
<td></td>
<td>See tactical</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Advisory Group</td>
<td></td>
<td>See Northern Ireland Technical Advisory Group</td>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td></td>
<td>Intent and capacity to cause loss of life or create adverse consequences to human welfare (including property and the supply of essential services and commodities), the environment or security.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic cordon</td>
<td></td>
<td>Supplementary cordon around the outer cordon to control internal traffic access for emergency and other vehicles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triage</td>
<td></td>
<td>Assessment of casualties and allocation of priorities by the medical or ambulance staff at a casualty clearing station and/or a receiving hospital</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td></td>
<td>Companies providing essential services, often categorised as water, energy and telecommunications, although this can sometimes include other infrastructure sectors such as transport.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td></td>
<td>(of an agency or activity) non-governmental and not-for-profit, or charitable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Sector</td>
<td></td>
<td>All organisations, regarded as a group, involved in any aspects of the response to an emergency. Also known as third sector.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum</td>
<td>VSCPF</td>
<td>Body hosted and facilitated by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat and the British Red Cross, with the aim of identifying and maximising the contribution to United Kingdom civil protection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales Media Emergency Forum</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ad hoc group of senior media editors, government representatives, local authority emergency planners, emergency services, police and the private sector in Wales set up to consider the provision of information to the public, and other media issues, in the context of civil emergencies</td>
<td>Wales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales Resilience Forum</td>
<td>Multi-agency</td>
<td>Multi-agency group providing the mechanism for national multi-agency cooperation and strategic advice on civil protection and emergency planning</td>
<td>Wales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warning and informing the public</td>
<td></td>
<td>Arrangements to make the public aware of risks and for responders to warn, inform and advise the public when an emergency is likely to occur or has occurred, and to provide them with information and advice subsequently.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welsh Government Civil Contingencies Group</td>
<td></td>
<td>A Group dedicated to supporting <strong>multi-agency co-operation</strong> in Wales and engaging with the UK Government on all issues relating to <strong>civil protection</strong> and <strong>emergency preparedness</strong>.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welsh Government's Emergency Branch</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Assembly Government’s Emergencies Branch fosters links with emergency planners in order to coordinate <strong>civil protection</strong> planning in Wales. It also maintains links with UK Government Departments and other <strong>devolved administrations</strong> to share best practice and undertake joint-working.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>