Report of the
Official Account of the Bombings in
London on 7th July 2005
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PREFACE

The 7 July bombings were an act of indiscriminate terror. They killed and maimed the old and the young; Britons and non-Britons; Christians, Muslims, Jews, those of other religions and none. The authors of this account extend their deepest condolences to the bereaved, sympathy to the injured and admiration to them and others involved in the rescue efforts and wider response. Ten months on, Londoners and those who visit London have shown their resilience by calmly continuing with their lives as before.

This narrative summarises what the police, intelligence and security agencies have so far discovered about the bombers and how and why they came to do what they did. This is one of a number of reports into aspects of the attacks. Other reports include the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee report, which will look at the intelligence and security issues relating to the 7 July bombings and the London Assembly review of lessons to be learned from the attacks, which will focus on the experience of ordinary Londoners caught up in the events, with particular attention to issues of communication. Together, these should provide as full a picture as it is possible to do at this stage of the events of 7 July, our preparedness for and response to them, to help learn the lessons for the future.

The account is not yet the full picture. Some material has been withheld to avoid prejudicing current or possible future prosecutions, the ongoing police investigation, to protect intelligence relationships, sources and techniques and to avoid providing information that could help future terrorists. The police investigation remains very much a live one, and further information may emerge.
THE MORNING OF 7 JULY

1. July 2005 in the UK started with a strongly positive feel. On 6 July London won the competition to host the 2012 Olympic Games. A few days earlier the Live 8 concerts had sent an unprecedentedly powerful message to world leaders about poverty in Africa. On 7 July, G8 leaders¹ were meeting in Gleneagles.

2. 7 July began unsettled, with heavy showers in places. The early morning rush in London started as normal. There were some delays that morning on the Underground, including – significantly – on the Northern Line. Then, at about 8.50am there were 3 almost simultaneous explosions – the first in a Circle Line tunnel between Liverpool Street and Aldgate stations, the second on the Circle Line just outside Edgware Road and the third in a Piccadilly Line tunnel between King’s Cross and Russell Square. At 9.47am, there was a fourth explosion on the upper deck of a no 30 bus in Tavistock Square. 56 people, including the bombers, died in the attacks and more than 700 were injured.

3. There is now a fuller – but still incomplete – picture of the bombers’ movements on the day from CCTV and witness accounts. The following summarises what is known:

03.58: A light blue Nissan Micra is caught on CCTV in Hyde Park Road, Leeds, prior to joining the M1 outside Leeds. This car was hired by Shehzad Tanweer and is believed to have been carrying Tanweer, Mohammad Sidique Khan and Hasib Hussain. Hyde Park Road is close to 18 Alexandra Grove – the flat which appears to have been the bomb factory.

04.54: The Micra stops at Woodall Services on the M1 to fill up with petrol. Tanweer goes in to pay. He is wearing a white T-shirt, dark jacket, white tracksuit bottoms and a baseball cap. He buys snacks, quibbles with the cashier over his change, looks directly at the CCTV camera and leaves.

¹The G8 comprises: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, UK and USA. The European Commission is also represented.
05.07: A red Fiat Brava arrives at Luton station car park. Jermaine Lindsay is alone in this car. During the 90 minutes or so before the others arrive, Lindsay gets out and walks around, enters the station, looks up at the departure board, comes out, moves the car a couple of times. There are a handful of other cars in the car park. A few more arrive during this period.

06.49: The Micra arrives at Luton and parks next to the Brava. The 4 men get out of their respective cars, look in the boots of both, and appear to move items between them. They each put on rucksacks which CCTV shows are large and full. The 4 are described as looking as if they were going on a camping holiday.

One car contained explosive devices of a different and smaller kind from those in the rucksacks. It is not clear what they were for, but they may have been for self-defence or diversion in case of interception during the journey given their size; that they were in the car rather than the boot; and that they were left behind. Also left in the Micra were other items consistent with the use of explosives. A 9mm handgun was also found in the Brava. The Micra had a day parking ticket in the window, perhaps to avoid attention, the Brava did not.
07.15: Lindsay, Hussain, Tanweer and Khan enter Luton station and go through the ticket barriers together. It is not known where they bought their tickets or what sort of tickets they possessed, but they must have had some to get on to the platform.

07.21: The 4 are caught on CCTV together heading to the platform for the King's Cross Thameslink train. They are casually dressed, apparently relaxed. Tanweer’s posture and the way he pulls the rucksack on to his shoulder as he walks, suggests he finds it heavy. It is estimated that in each rucksack was 2-5 kg of high explosive. Tanweer is now wearing dark tracksuit bottoms. There is no explanation for this change at present.

07.40: The London King’s Cross train leaves Luton station. There are conflicting accounts of their behaviour on the train. Some witnesses report noisy conversations, another believes he saw 2 of them standing silently by a set of train doors. The 4 stood out a bit from usual commuters due to their luggage and casual clothes, but not enough to cause suspicion. This was the beginning of the summer tourist period and Luton Station serves Luton Airport.

08.23: The train arrives at King’s Cross, slightly late due to a delay further up the line. The 4 are captured on CCTV at 08.26am on the concourse close to the Thameslink platform and heading in the direction of the London Underground system. At around 08.30am, 4 men fitting their descriptions are seen hugging. They appear happy, even euphoric. They then split up. Khan must have gone to board a westbound Circle Line train, Tanweer an eastbound Circle Line train and Lindsay a southbound Piccadilly Line train. Hussain also appeared to walk towards the Piccadilly Line entrance.
08.50: CCTV images show the platform at Liverpool Street with the eastbound Circle Line train alongside seconds before it is blown up. Shehzad Tanweer is not visible, but he must have been in the second carriage from the front. The images show commuters rushing to get on the train and a busy platform. Some get on, some just miss it. The train pulls out of the station. Seconds later smoke billows from the tunnel. There is shock and confusion on the platform as people make for the exits.

Forensic evidence suggests that Tanweer was sitting towards the back of the second carriage with the rucksack next to him on the floor. The blast killed 8 people, including Tanweer, with 171 injured.

At Edgware Road, Mohammad Sidique Khan was also in the second carriage from the front, most likely near the standing area by the first set of double doors. He was probably also seated with the bomb next to him on the floor. Shortly before the explosion, Khan was seen fiddling with the top of the rucksack. The explosion killed 7 including Khan, and injured 163 people.

On the Piccadilly Line, Jermaine Lindsay was in the first carriage as it travelled between King’s Cross and Russell Square. It is unlikely that he was seated. The train was crowded, with 127 people in the first carriage alone, which makes it difficult to position those involved. Forensic evidence suggests the explosion occurred on or close to the floor of the standing area between the second and third set of seats. The explosion killed 27 people including Lindsay, and injured over 340.

08.55: Hussain walks out of King’s Cross Underground onto Euston Road. Telephone call records show that he tried unsuccessfully to contact the 3 other bombers on his mobile over the next few minutes. His demeanour over this period appears relaxed and unhurried.

09.00: Hussain goes back into King’s Cross station through Boots and then goes into W H Smith on the station concourse and, it appears, buys a 9v battery. It is possible that a new battery was needed to detonate the device, but this is only speculation at this stage.

09.06: Hussain goes into McDonald’s on Euston Road, leaving about ten minutes later.

09.19: Hussain is seen on Grays Inn Road. Around this time, a man fitting Hussain’s description was seen on the no 91 bus travelling from King’s Cross to Euston Station, looking nervous and pushing past people.

It was almost certainly at Euston that Hussain switched to the no 30 bus travelling eastwards from Marble Arch. The bus was crowded.
following the closures on the underground. Hussain sat on the upper deck, towards the back. Forensic evidence suggests the bomb was next to him in the aisle or between his feet on the floor. A man fitting Hussain’s description was seen on the lower deck earlier, fiddling repeatedly with his rucksack.

09.47: The bomb goes off, killing 14 people, including Hussain, and injuring over 110. It remains unclear why the bomb did not go off at 08.50am alongside the others. It may be that Hussain was intending to go north from King’s Cross but was frustrated by delays on the Northern Line. Another possibility, as he seems to have bought a new battery, is that he was unable to detonate his device with the original battery. But we have no further evidence on this at this stage.

The sites of the bomb attacks
THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH

4. In the hours and days immediately after the attacks, a massive police and intelligence effort was launched to identify those responsible and prevent any further attacks. By 13 July, the police had strong evidence that Khan, Tanweer, Hussain and Lindsay were the bombers and that they had died in the attacks. This section looks at the police and intelligence effort and the Government response until the identification of the 4. It does not look at the emergency response. But the authors of this report wish to express their gratitude and admiration to the police, those working on the underground, buses and trains, medical staff, firefighters, disaster recovery teams, volunteers and ordinary people, including the many survivors, who showed extraordinary courage and resilience in horrific circumstances.

08.50 onwards Initial confusion over the nature of the incidents with reports of power surges, explosions and suspicious packages at various locations. Local police officers quickly deployed to potential scenes and police Gold Command, already in place for the G8 summit, takes over operational command function leading on security and response to the incidents.

09.29 Metropolitan Police press office confirm, “This has been declared as a major incident. Too early to state what has happened at this stage”.

09.30 The Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR)\(^2\), the Government’s national crisis management facility, is activated in response to the explosions (it was already in place to co-ordinate any response to events in Gleneagles). COBR attended by officials from all the appropriate central Government departments together with the Metropolitan Police Service. Functions round the clock until 15 July. Seems increasingly likely that this is a terrorist incident.

10.00 Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, chairs a meeting of COBR.

10.55 Home Secretary statement outside Downing Street makes clear that the blasts have caused “terrible casualties” and confirms that public transport has been suspended.

11.00 Metropolitan Police Commissioner in a briefing confirms “The situation has been very confused but is now coming under control”.

12.00 The Prime Minister in a statement from Gleneagles says “It is reasonably clear there have been a series of terrorist attacks in London”. G8 leaders add their condemnation.

\(^2\)COBR is the national crisis centre from which the central Government response to all types of major crisis is co-ordinated. Once activated, relevant departments and agencies will immediately send representatives to COBR. COBR will remain open until the emergency has passed.
The Home Secretary makes a statement to Parliament. He confirms there have been 4 explosions and where they were located on the London transport network. He says, “As yet we do not know who or which organisation are responsible for those criminal and appalling acts”. Opposition spokesmen and MPs of all parties join him in condemning the attacks, conveying their sympathy to those injured, condolences to those bereaved and expressing support for the country’s emergency services.

Claims of responsibility are posted on the internet. The first within hours, posted by “The Secret Organisation Group of Al Qaida in Europe”, includes warnings to other governments with troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Investigations have found no evidence to verify this or any subsequent internet claim of responsibility.

The Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, condemns the “cowardly attack” and confirms that “I have no doubt whatsoever that this is a terrorist attack”.

The Prime Minister who had returned to London from the G8 meeting and had gone straight into a meeting of COBR, makes a public statement where he promises the “most intense police and Security Service action to make sure we bring those responsible to justice”.

UN Security Council unanimously adopts a resolution condemning “without reservation” the attacks.

Amongst the many thousands of calls to the emergency Casualty Bureau, record of a call to the police emergency hotline from Hasib Hussain’s family, reporting him missing.

Police exhibits officer telephones into the investigators to say that along with many other personal items, cash and membership cards in the name of “Sidique Khan” and “Mr S Tanweer” had been found at Aldgate. Investigation begins into the identity of these and other names including through financial records.

The Queen, on learning the news on 7 July issues an immediate statement expressing the nation’s sense of deep shock. Subsequently, The Queen and other members of the Royal Family move quickly to meet many of those affected by the bombings and the personnel who responded to them at hospitals, police stations and other coordination centres. During a visit to the Royal London Hospital, and after meeting victims of the attacks, The Queen speaks of the nation’s “sympathy to those who have been caught up in these events and above all to the relatives and friends of those who have lost their lives” and admiration for members of the emergency
services and Transport for London. “Those who perpetrate these brutal acts against innocent people should know that they will not change our way of life”.

8 July As the investigation continues at the sites, the priority is preservation of life and dealing with those injured. The second objective is to obtain evidence.

At 23.59, Khan identified as the account holder for a credit card found at a second scene, Edgware Road.

9 July Police searching for clues at the bomb sites find items linked to Tanweer and further items linked to Khan. Significantly, items traceable to Khan have now been found at 2 of the scenes – Aldgate and Edgware Road. In reviewing records, it is also found that Khan has previously been picked up on the periphery of another investigation. Tanweer’s link to this investigation was identified later. The nature of these links is covered by the Intelligence and Security Committee’s report.

Inevitably in an investigation of this scale, many avenues are pursued, to eliminate those not involved from the inquiry. One initial strand concerned 3 British citizens from West Yorkshire who arrived at Toronto Airport, Canada, on a flight from Manchester, which left around mid-day on 7 July. The group arrived back in the UK on 9 July and were released without charge on 10 July.

The press reported later that a known extremist figure and possible mastermind left the UK shortly before the bombings. There is no evidence that this individual was involved.

There was also interest in another individual who was linked to 18 Alexandra Grove (see paragraph 58).

10 July Despite the attacks, in London thousands of people, including a great number of veterans, turn out and gather in the Mall for Commemoration Day, marking 60 years since the end of World War II.

Driving licence and other identifying documents in the name of Hussain found at Tavistock Square. Link made between these and the missing person report.

Police enquiries reveal that Hussain had travelled to London with Khan and Tanweer.
11 July    The Prime Minister updates Parliament on the investigation. He says “7 July will always be remembered as a day of terrible sadness for our country and for London. Yet it is true that, just four days later, London’s buses, trains and as much of its underground as possible are back on normal schedules; its businesses, shops and schools are open; its millions of people are coming to work with a steely determination that is genuinely remarkable”.

Further information provides a possible link between Hussain and 18 Alexandra Grove.

12 July    In the early morning, the police search premises in the West Yorkshire area, including the homes of Khan, Tanweer and Hussain and 18 Alexandra Grove.

Report received that 4 people by two vehicles were seen putting on rucksacks at Luton Station car park. One of the vehicles was now missing but one remained in the car park.

By lunchtime, police working on the theory that there is a King’s Cross link to the 3 train bombs, all being broadly equidistant from there at the time of the explosions, identify a CCTV image of 4 men with rucksacks at King’s Cross. They recognise Tanweer first from a DVLA photograph.

The police identify CCTV images of the same 4 at Luton Station.

The Micra is found at Luton and examined. 9 controlled explosions were carried out on material found in it. The Brava, which had been towed away because it did not have a parking ticket is later traced to Lindsay. There had been a report on the Police National Computer that the Brava may have been used in an aggravated burglary (see paragraph 69) and Lindsay was named as the registered keeper for the car.

There was at the time of the attacks, reports of a “5th bomber”. It was thought, because of witness statements and CCTV, that there was a “5th man” with the group travelling down from Luton. Inquiries showed the individual was a regular commuter and he was eliminated from the inquiry. Also in the period immediately following the attacks, one man was arrested in connection with the investigation but he was released without charge. In subsequent weeks, a further man who had claimed to be the “5th bomber” was also arrested and later charged with wasting police time. There is no intelligence to indicate that there was a fifth or further bombers.
13 July Jermaine Lindsay’s wife informs police that he is missing. Police search Lindsay’s home in Aylesbury.

European Union Ministers assemble for an Emergency Justice and Home Affairs Council and agree a plan of action for EU anti-terrorist co-operation.

14 July Property belonging to Khan found at a third scene, Tavistock Square. Police publicly confirm the identity of Tanweer and Hussain.

15 July Property belonging to Lindsay found at Russell Square.

16 July The police publicly confirm the names of Khan and Lindsay.

21 July Ministers begin to consider the emerging lessons learned at a Cabinet level meeting, chaired by the Home Secretary. These lessons fell mainly into the following categories:

- Clarifying the “Central Government’s Arrangements for Responding to an Emergency”.
- Closure and re-opening of the transport system along with reducing the vulnerability to it.
- A review of the capacity of the Casualty Bureau and its ability to handle the huge volume of calls.
- Support to victims and families of the deceased.
- The resilience of the telecommunications network and in particular, the capacity of the mobile telephone network.
- Enhancing the role and effectiveness of media co-ordination in Government.

A full and more comprehensive lessons identified exercise was completed in March 2006 and the key findings are being integrated into longer term government programmes.

5. It will be formally concluded as part of the legal process how the victims died, but the key evidence indicating that these were co-ordinated suicide attacks by these 4 men is:

- DNA has identified the four at the four separate bombsites. The impact on their bodies suggests that they were close to the bombs.
- 3 of the men (Khan, Tanweer and Hussain) have so far been forensically linked to the suspected bomb factory at 18 Alexandra Grove.
- The car in which 3 of the men travelled from Leeds to Luton contained explosive devices and other material consistent with bomb-making.
• The 4 were identified together by CCTV at various points before the bombings, carrying large and heavy rucksacks, consistent with bombs of the size and nature used in the attack.
• Witness accounts suggest 2 of the men were fiddling in their rucksacks shortly before the explosions.
• There is no evidence at the bomb sites of remote detonation, nor of any material at the bomb factory which would suggest that they intended to construct remote detonators. The fact that Hussain seems to have bought a battery that morning may provide further indication that they were using self-detonating devices.
• There is a video statement by Khan, shown on the al Jazeera television network on 1 September, and, separately, a last Will and Testament indicating his intention to martyr himself through a terrorist attack.
WHY DID THEY DO IT?

6. The key factors in turning Khan, Tanweer, Hussain and Lindsay into bombers are only partly clear at this stage.

Who were they?

7. The backgrounds of the 4 men appear largely unexceptional. Little distinguishes their formative experiences from those of many others of the same generation, ethnic origin and social background, with the partial exception of Lindsay, who will be considered separately at the end of this chapter.

8. Khan was the oldest of the group. Born in Leeds on 20 October 1974, he was 30 at the time of the bombings. He appears to have been the group’s ringleader. Tanweer was born on 15 December 1982, Hussain on 16 September 1986, 22 and 18 respectively when they died. All three were second generation British citizens whose parents were of Pakistani origin. Their respective parents had come to West Yorkshire from Pakistan many years before, found work, settled and taken British citizenship. Khan was the youngest of 6 children, Tanweer the second of 4 and the eldest son, Hussain the youngest of 4.

9. All 3 grew up in Beeston and the neighbouring district of Holbeck on the outskirts of Leeds. Tanweer and Hussain were still living there with their parents when they died. Khan moved a short distance away after his marriage in 2001, first to Batley then to Dewsbury, although he was still much involved in the area as a teaching assistant and youth worker. The area is largely residential, close-knit and densely populated with back-to-back terraced housing, much of which is in poor condition. The population is ethnically mixed with quite a high transitory element. There are a number of mosques, a large, modern community centre, an Islamic bookshop (now closed) and a large park where the young play football and cricket. The area is deprived. Average income is low (over 10,000 of the 16,300 residents have living standards that are amongst the worst 3% nationally) but there is little to distinguish it from many poorer areas of Britain’s other big cities and Khan, Tanweer and Hussain were not poor by the standards of the area; with Tanweer’s father in particular being a prominent local businessman.

10. All 3 were educated locally. Khan is remembered as quiet, studious and never in trouble. He was apparently a vulnerable boy and sometimes bullied at school. After school, he worked locally for the Benefits Agency and then for the Department of Trade and Industry as an administrative assistant. He left to study at Leeds Metropolitan University in September 1996 and achieved a 2.2 in business studies. It was here that he met his future wife, a British Muslim of Indian origin. They were married on 22 October 2001 and had a daughter in May 2004. The marriage was not arranged and both families are said initially to have disapproved. Khan’s parents had moved away to Nottingham, but he and some siblings remained in the Leeds area. It was at University that Khan appears to have developed a vocation for helping disadvantaged young people, and took on part-time youth and community work while finishing his degree.
11. In 2001, Khan joined the staff of a local primary school, where he was employed as a learning mentor, working with special needs children and those with language or behavioural difficulties. The school was ethnically mixed and had a high pupil turnover. The job came to an end in November 2004, following problems over extended sick leave (see next section). During this time he continued to be active as a youth worker in Beeston.

12. Tanweer did well academically at school and was a gifted sportsman, excelling at cricket and athletics. He played for a local cricket team. He went on to study sports science at Leeds Metropolitan University in 2001 and obtained an HND after 2 years. He left University in 2003 before completing the follow-on BSc course. He worked part-time in his father’s fish and chip shop until November 2004, after which he did not have paid employment and was supported by his family. His father was looking to set him up in business at this time.

13. Hussain was not a high achiever academically, keen on sport but not outstanding. He left school in 2003 with a few GCSEs at C grade and below. He went on to College to study for an Advanced Business Programme. Although his attendance record was patchy, he stayed to the end of the course in June 2005.

**Early signs of extremism?**

14. We do not know how Khan developed his extreme views or precisely when. By the time he began his job as a learning mentor in 2001, it was clear that he was serious about religion. He prayed regularly at work and attended the mosque on Fridays. He told others that he had not had a blameless youth and had got into fights. Associates suggest some alcohol and drug taking in the 1990s. But after one incident in a nightclub, he said that he turned to religion and it changed his life. He was not aggressive, extreme or politicised in the way he spoke about religion to colleagues. He had spoken out against the 9/11 attacks at school.

15. With hindsight, some of his colleagues believe there was a subtle change in his character around 12 months after starting at the school. He is said to have become less talkative and more introverted. On a couple of occasions, he showed uncharacteristic intolerance out of line with his normally easy going manner. But his behaviour was not unusual enough to cause concern.

16. Throughout it was clear that Khan, known widely as “Sid”, had a real talent and vocation for working with young people. He was highly regarded by teachers and parents, and had a real empathy with difficult children. Children saw him as a role model. He was highly successful in calming situations and getting excluded children back into school. He gave an interview to the Times Educational Supplement in 2002 in which he spoke passionately about his work. He took part in a school trip to the Houses of Parliament in 2004.
17. More problematic was his increasingly poor attendance record. This culminated in a period of sick leave from 20 September to 19 November 2004. The school administration had reason to believe that the absences were not genuine and dismissed him. At the same time, he had in any case, written to say he would not be returning to work.

18. Tanweer is said to have taken religion seriously from an early age but showed no signs of extremism. Throughout his teenage years, he appeared to have a balanced life. At school, he was remembered as calm, friendly, mature and modest, and was popular with his peers. The nickname his father gave him as a young child, “Kaka” meaning “little one” was used by his friends. He owned a red Mercedes, which his father had bought for him. He took care with his appearance, with fashionable hairstyles and designer clothing. He is said to have become more religiously observant from around the age of 16/17. Then from mid-2002 religion appeared to become the major focus of his life. He left his University course early, it is said both because there was no longer a local authority grant available but also because he was losing interest. Thereafter, he appeared to devote the majority of his time to religious study and observance including at a religious school in Dewsbury. But those around him observed no sign at any stage that strict religious observance had turned to extremism. He had received one caution for disorderly conduct in April 2004 but had otherwise not been in trouble with the police.

19. Hussain is remembered as quiet at school, with few friends. His most distinguishing feature was his large physique. He apparently became involved in a brief period of racial tension at the school but not as a ringleader or prominent troublemaker. He was abusive to a teacher on one occasion but this was said to be out of character.

20. Hussain undertook a Hajj visit to Saudi Arabia with his family early in 2002. After this, he began wearing traditional clothing and a prayer cap and would wear white on Fridays. Some time after this it was noticed that he had written ‘Al Qaida No Limits’ on his RE schoolbook. He was open about his support for Al Qaida in school and said he regarded the 9/11 bombers as martyrs. He told his teacher on one occasion that he wanted to become a cleric when he left school. It is reported that he would regularly sit up until the early hours reading religious texts and praying. In 2003, he began working out regularly, watching his diet, and lost 5 stone. He was cautioned for shoplifting in Leeds town centre with another (older) youth in 2004, but had not otherwise been in trouble with the police.

Social Life of the Young in Beeston

21. A common factor for all 3 – Khan, Tanweer and Hussain – was the social life around the mosques, youth clubs, gyms and Islamic bookshop in Beeston.
22. There were a number of clubs and gyms all within a few hundred yards of each other in Beeston. A room below one of the mosques was used as a youth club and gym until 2001. Khan gave talks here, and worked out. The main youth club operated from a number of premises before being renamed and absorbed into the main community centre. Khan was on the management committee of the youth club until 2003 but was not formally employed there after it moved under the main community centre umbrella. The club was focussed on children from 13-19 years of age, who had fallen behind or been excluded from school. But it also functioned as a general social meeting place for the young of the area. The club and community centre had a gym, computers and classes, lectures and discussion groups for general use.

23. The local bookshop sold Islamic books, tapes and DVDs and was also used for IT lessons, lectures and discussion groups on Islam. There are 3 mosques in the immediate area. The group attended all of them at different times and were not particularly associated with one rather than the others. They also attended other mosques outside the immediate area.

24. Khan was a leading figure here. He is described by many in the area as a mentor, who young people naturally looked up to. Tanweer appears to have got to know him again (having known him a little as a child) through one of the gyms and to have become increasingly close to him in recent years. Hussain also became close to both men through this youth activity.

25. Information about what went on in these places is mixed and incomplete. Much is hearsay. Accounts from those with more direct knowledge are conflicting. It is difficult to be sure what the facts are. Some have said the clubs, gym and bookshop were well known locally as centres of extremism. For example, that one of the gyms was known as ‘the Al Qaida gym’ because of who frequented it, and that the local bookshop was used to watch extremist DVDs and videos, access extremist websites, and for extremist lectures. Others present a very different picture. There is little evidence so far that Khan, Tanweer or Hussain were big internet users at home. Some who attended talks by Khan say that he focussed on clean living, staying away from crime and drugs and the value of sport and outdoor activity. Others heard rumours that he held extreme views and some felt that Khan could preach aggressively. Some have said extremist preachers have visited the bookshop and one of the mosques. Others that none of the mosques were in any way extreme. It is of course familiar from previous investigations that the normal activities of a mosque can be entirely proper, but with extremists – unknown to the mosque hierarchy – operating on the margins.

26. It is not possible to draw firm conclusions at this stage. But, it seems likely that Khan used the opportunities these places afforded at least to identify candidates for indoctrination, even if the indoctrination itself took place more privately to avoid detection. In the months before the bombings, Khan, Tanweer and Hussain were observed spending a lot of time together.
27. Khan was not the only leading figure in this informal social network. The extent to which others may have been involved in indoctrinating the group, have known what they were planning, or been involved in the planning, is unknown at this stage.

28. Beyond Beeston the picture is unclear. It appears that Khan and Tanweer travelled on occasions outside the immediate Leeds area to attend Islamic events of one kind or another, but it is not clear what these visits amounted to. They may simply have been for discussion on religious matters, or they may have been more operational. This remains under investigation. In the more immediate locality, Khan in particular was active in Islamic groups and mosques in Huddersfield, Dewsbury and other places around Leeds. The fact that Khan and Tanweer were picked up on the margins of another investigation is covered in the Intelligence and Security Committee’s report.

Outdoor activities

29. Camping, canoeing, white-water rafting, paintballing and other outward bound type activities are of particular interest because they appear common factors for the 7 July bombers and other cells disrupted previously and since.

30. Khan and others from the youth centre and bookshop arranged many of these. Khan and Tanweer were known to have attended a camping trip in the UK with others in April 2003, and a white-water rafting trip just weeks before the bombings. Such trips are varied in location and informal: there is no particular centre or centres where they are based. There is no firm evidence about how such trips might have been used. But it is possible that some trips were used to identify candidates for indoctrination. It is worth noting that for some extremist activities – e.g. fighting overseas – physical fitness and resilience are essential. They may also be used to help with bonding between members of cells already established, or for more direct indoctrination or operational training and planning.

Jermaine Lindsay

31. Lindsay was the outsider of the group. He was born in Jamaica on 23 September 1985. His mother was 19 at the time. His natural father remained in Jamaica and appears to have played little role in Lindsay’s subsequent life. His mother moved to Huddersfield the following year with another man. This first stepfather is described as having been harsh to Lindsay. The relationship broke up in 1990. Lindsay was closer to his second stepfather who stayed with the family until 2000. He had 2 younger stepsisters.

32. Lindsay was a bright child, successful academically at school and good at sport. He is described as artistic and musical. As a teenager, he became interested in martial arts and kickboxing. Like the other 3 he was physically fit and regularly worked out.
33. Lindsay’s mother converted to Islam in 2000. He converted almost immediately thereafter and took the name “Jamal”. His behaviour around this time was mixed. At school, he is said to have begun associating with troublemakers and was disciplined for handing out leaflets in support of Al Qaida. At his local mosque and in Islamic groups around Huddersfield and Dewsbury, he was admired for the speed with which he achieved fluency in Arabic and memorised long passages of the Quran, showing unusual maturity and seriousness. He began wearing the traditional white thobe³.

34. It is believed that he was strongly influenced by the extremist preacher Abdallah al Faisal (also of Jamaican origin) now serving a prison sentence for soliciting murder, incitement to murder and incitement to racial hatred and distributing material of a racial hatred nature. Lindsay is believed to have attended at least one lecture and to have listened to tapes of other lectures by him.

35. In 2002, his mother moved to the US to live with another man, leaving Lindsay alone at the family home in Huddersfield. This has been described as a traumatic experience for Lindsay, for which he was ill equipped. He left school, and lived on benefit, doing occasional odd jobs selling mobile phones and Islamic books.

36. He married a white British convert to Islam, whom he had met over the internet and subsequently at a ‘Stop the War’ march in London, on 30 October 2002. They lived initially in Huddersfield but moved to Aylesbury in September 2003, where his wife’s family lived, although they continued to spend time in and around Huddersfield thereafter. Their first child was born on 11 April 2004. While in Aylesbury, Lindsay worked as a carpet fitter, a job he had obtained with the help of his brother-in-law, until early 2005. He was unemployed at the time of the bombings.

37. It is not clear when Lindsay met Khan, but they were close associates by the latter half of 2004. It is not surprising that they would have come across each other: Khan was also active in Islamic circles in the Huddersfield and Dewsbury area.

³Long white robe down to the ankles.
Motivation

38. The best indications of the group’s motivation are set out in Khan’s video statement, first aired on the Arabic television channel, Al Jazeera on 1 September and in his last Will and Testament, discovered by the police after the bombings.

39. The focus of the video is on perceived injustices carried out by the West against Muslims justifying violence through his own twisted interpretation of Islam. The key passages are:

“Our driving motivation doesn’t come from tangible commodities that this world has to offer.

Our religion is Islam – obedience to the one true God, Allah, and following the footsteps of the final prophet and messenger Mohammed...This is how our ethical stances are dictated.

Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters.

Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation....

I myself, I make du’a⁴ to Allah....to raise me amongst those whom I love like the prophets, the messengers, the martyrs and today’s heroes like our beloved Sheikh Osama Bin Laden, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and all the other brothers and sisters that are fighting in the...of this cause.”

40. Although Khan’s Will also touches on these, its focus is much more on the importance of martyrdom as supreme evidence of religious commitment. It also contains anti-Semitic comments. It draws heavily on the published Will of a young British man killed during the US bombing of Tora Bora in Eastern Afghanistan in late 2001, and who was married with young children like Khan. He appears as something of a role model to Khan.

41. As yet little material has been found directly from the others expressing their motivation. There is some evidence that Tanweer was motivated particularly by a desire for martyrdom. As described earlier, there are reports of Hussain and Lindsay expressing extreme views at school. Conspiracy theories also abounded, at least some of the bombers seem to have expressed the view that the 9/11 attacks were a plot by the US.

⁴The word du’a in Arabic means “calling”. In addition to formal prayers, Muslims “call upon” God throughout the day through personal supplications or prayers “du’a”.
WERE THEY DIRECTED FROM ABROAD?

42. It is not known when the group first developed the idea of an attack in the UK.

43. Khan and Tanweer’s visit to Pakistan from 19 November 2004 to 8 February 2005 may have been an important element in this.

44. Tanweer said to those around him that the purpose of this visit was to identify a suitable school to study Islam and that Khan knew a number which they would visit together. Khan was regarded as a reliable travelling companion and Tanweer’s family paid for Tanweer’s ticket and provided him with spending money. Other evidence suggests that Khan believed he was going to Pakistan to cross the border and fight in Afghanistan.

45. After arriving in Pakistan, Khan and Tanweer appear to have split up with the latter going to stay with his uncle’s family in Faisalabad. After a week or so, Khan appears to have collected Tanweer and the 2 went off for a period. Tanweer told his family they were checking out a school near Lahore. It is possible that they went up to the border areas with Afghanistan or over the border for training but we do not have firm evidence of this. Who they may have met in Pakistan has not yet been established, but it seems likely that they had some contact with Al Qaida figures. It is possible that Khan made his martyrdom video during this visit. Tanweer arrived back from this visit having lost a lot of weight, saying that he had not been well and had not found a suitable school.

46. Before this, Khan is believed to have had some relevant training in a remote part of Pakistan, close to the Afghan border during a two week visit in July 2003. It is unclear whether he met significant Al Qaida figures during this trip but we assume the visit would have had at least a motivational impact.

47. There has been material in the media about “training camps” in remote parts of Pakistan and Afghanistan. In practice, these are sometimes little more than groups of people getting together on an ad hoc basis in places where their activities will be difficult to detect.

48. It is also believed that Khan had visited Pakistan, and possibly Afghanistan, on a few other occasions since the late 1990s but there is no confirmation and no details of these trips. There were media reports soon after the attacks that Khan had visited Malaysia and the Philippines to meet Al Qaida operatives. These stories were investigated and found to have no basis. It is also reported that he went on a Hajj pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia with his wife in early 2003, also visiting Jordan and Jerusalem for a day’s sightseeing; and to Turkey on honeymoon with his wife in 2001. There is no evidence of anything suspicious on either of these visits.

49. Tanweer and Hussain had both visited Pakistan with their families. There were reports in the media that on one of these visits Tanweer met senior members of militant groups but there is no reliable intelligence or corroborative information to support this.
50. Extended visits to Pakistan by young men are not unusual. Many go to visit family, attend schools for Islamic studies and sightsee, but a small minority have engaged in extremist activity and crossed into Afghanistan. There were nearly 400,000 visits by UK residents to Pakistan in 2004, of an average length of 41 days. The men’s visits would not have appeared out of the ordinary to their families and friends, although some associates now say there were rumours that Khan and Tanweer had been to Afghanistan for violent jihad.

51. We know little about Lindsay’s travel abroad. He visited Jamaica on at least one occasion to see his natural father. He claimed to others to have visited Pakistan, but there is nothing to corroborate this.

52. Between April and July 2005, the group was in contact with an individual or individuals in Pakistan. It is not known who this was or the content of the contacts but the methods used, designed to make it difficult to identify the individual, make the contacts look suspicious.

53. Khan’s video statement was broadcast together with a statement by Al Qaida’s deputy leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri supporting the attacks.

54. In a second video, broadcast on 19 September, Zawahiri went further stating that Al Qaida “launched” the attacks.

“London’s blessed raid is one of the raids which Jama’at QA’idat al-Jihad (Al Qaidah of Jihad Group) was honoured to launch....In the Wills of the hero brothers, the knights of monotheism – may God have mercy on them, make paradise their final abode and accept their good deeds....”

55. There is as yet no firm evidence to corroborate this claim or the nature of Al Qaida support, if there was any. But, the target and mode of attack of the 7 July bombings are typical of Al Qaida and those inspired by its ideologies.
HOW DID THEY DO IT?

56. Shortly after their return from Pakistan, Khan and Tanweer began putting in place the key elements of the plan. By now, both had left their jobs and were able to devote themselves more or less full-time to planning. These 2 appear to have been leader and right hand man, but Hussain and Lindsay also played important subsidiary roles in the planning.

The bomb factory

57. A key requisite was a location to construct a device away from the Beeston area of Leeds, where at least 3 of the group were well known.

58. In May the group rented 18 Alexandra Grove from an Egyptian chemistry PhD student at Leeds University (now in Egypt) who was himself subletting it to them. Lindsay had met this man at Leeds Grand Mosque in November 2004. 18 Alexandra Grove is a modern ground floor flat in a two-storey block next to the Leeds Grand Mosque. This is a student area, with much property to let and a transitory population. The group would not, in themselves, have stood out. The factory was discovered on 12 July. It was left with much of the bomb-making equipment still in place. It is not clear whether this was deliberate, or whether someone else was supposed to have cleared up and – for whatever reason – failed to do so. 3 of the bombers – Khan, Tanweer and Hussain – have so far been linked by DNA to the bomb factory. Forensic analysis of material taken from Alexandra Grove continues.
How the bombs were made

59. Expert examination continues but it appears the bombs were homemade, and that the ingredients used were all readily commercially available and not particularly expensive. Each device appears to have consisted of around 2-5 kg of home made explosive. The first purchase of material necessary for production so far identified was on 31 March 2005.

60. No great expertise is required to assemble a device of this kind. It is possible that the know-how necessary could be obtained from open sources, but more likely that the group would have had advice from someone with previous experience given the careful handling required to ensure safety during the bomb making process and to get the manufacturing process right. Materials consistent with these processes were discovered at Alexandra Grove. The mixtures would have smelt bad enough to make the room very difficult to work in. Both Tanweer and Lindsay bought face masks from shops and on the internet. The signs are that the bombs were made with the windows open but the net curtains taped to the walls to avoid being seen. The fumes had killed off the tops of plants just outside the windows.

61. The mixtures would also have had a strong bleaching effect. Both Tanweer and Hussain’s families had noticed that their hair had become lighter over the weeks before the bombing. They explained this as the effect of chlorine from swimming pools (the two men and Khan regularly swam together). There were shower caps at 18 Alexandra Grove which may have been used during the manufacturing process to try to disguise this.

62. It is also likely that the group would have needed to carry out at least one test explosion although when and where this may have taken place is not known.

How the operation was financed

63. Current indications are that the group was self-financed. There is no evidence of external sources of income. Our best estimate is that the overall cost is less than £8,000. The overseas trips, bomb making equipment, rent, car hire and UK travel being the main cost elements.

64. The group appears to have raised the necessary cash by methods that would be extremely difficult to identify as related to terrorism or other serious criminality. Khan appears to have provided most of the funding. Having been in full-time employment for 3 years since University, he had a reasonable credit rating, multiple bank accounts (each with just a small sum deposited for a protracted period), credit cards and a £10,000 personal loan. He had 2 periods of intensive activity – firstly in October 2004 and then from March 2005 onwards. He defaulted on his personal loan repayments and was overdrawn on his accounts. Jermaine Lindsay made a number of purchases with cheques (which subsequently bounced) in the weeks before 7 July. Bank investigators visited his house on the day after the bombings.
Other aspects of the planning

65. There appears to have been at least one recce visit to London on 28 June by Khan, Tanweer and Lindsay, but not Hussain. They made a similar journey from Luton to King’s Cross early in the morning and travelled on the underground. They are picked up on CCTV near Baker Street tube station later in the morning and returning to Luton at lunch time. Lindsay was later found to have a chart of times taken to travel between stations which he might have written during this recce. Tickets found at 18 Alexandra Grove also suggest visits to London in mid-March.

66. Other things suggest discipline and meticulous planning with good security awareness including careful use of mobile phones and use of hire cars for sensitive activities associated with the planning of the attacks. There are some indications that Khan was worried about being under surveillance during this time.

Outward appearance of the bombers

67. The behaviour of the bombers in the run up to 7 July appeared generally normal to those around them, with the exception of Lindsay. Khan, Tanweer and Hussain spent a lot of time together including at each other’s houses, and were occasionally also seen with Lindsay. All 4 spent days and nights away from home, but that does not appear to have been unusual. Hussain switched to wearing western clothes in late 2004 without explanation. This may have been designed to draw less attention to himself. Over the period they either were, or claimed to be, spending much more time in Dewsbury rather than Beeston. Tanweer claimed to be going there daily for Islamic studies, Hussain to be going to a gym there. This may have been a device to explain away longer absences from their immediate locality.

68. It is reported that there was a marked change in Lindsay’s character after November 2004. He spent the last ten days of Ramadan in the first half of November, fasting and praying, first at the Regents Park Mosque in London and then at the Leeds Grand Mosque.

69. Lindsay’s behaviour thereafter became increasingly erratic, although not in a way that would suggest he had terrorism in mind. He was sometimes violent. He flirted openly having been very strict in contacts with women before (it is now known that he had at least one girlfriend and sought to contact other women over this time). He would not pray with his wife, shaved his beard and began wearing western clothes. He began associating with petty criminals. Police investigated a report of an aggravated burglary on 27 May involving Lindsay’s Fiat Brava at which one of the group was alleged to have been carrying a handgun. Police inquiries at the time failed to track the vehicle or the occupants. Indeed the injured party at the scene of the aggravated burglary made off and has never been identified. So the motivation of the attack remains unknown.
70. Lindsay spent money liberally in different ways, some which now appear to be linked to the bombings for example, purchases of perfumes which he then traded on the internet for material useful for the bomb-making process, and some which look like providing for his family when he was gone – nappies, children’s toys. He appears to have spent less time at home during this period and when he was there, to have locked himself away in the computer room. Shortly before the bombings, his wife confronted him about text messages she discovered on his mobile, apparently from a girlfriend. She asked him to leave the house, which he did with a holdall full of clothes.

71. In the immediate run up to the bombing, Hussain was in and out of his family home. On Monday 4 July, he told his mother he would be going to London in the next day or two. His mother saw him asleep in his room early on 5 July and again in the evening when she offered to make him sandwiches for the London trip. She believes he went out that night. She saw him again asleep in his room mid-morning on 6 July and his father talked to him briefly thereafter about his trip to London. At around 14.30 he came down to the kitchen in his pyjamas, had a bowl of cereal and told his mother the trip to London had been put back because the car had broken down and he was now going that evening. At around 15.30, his sister-in-law saw him getting ready to go out. That was the last his family saw of him.

72. Tanweer went to see some old school friends, unexpectedly, on the evening of 4 July. On 5 July he was away from home for most of the day and asked his mother for a bag to put clothes in, as he was going to Manchester to visit an Islamic school. On 6 July, he was playing cricket in a local park until late evening and then returned home saying he had lost his mobile phone. He appeared perfectly normal to those around him. He was last seen at home just after 23.00 hours and is assumed to have gone out shortly thereafter.

73. The next that is known of Khan, Tanweer and Hussain is the CCTV image of the Nissan Micra leaving Leeds on the morning of 7 July; and of Lindsay, the CCTV image of the Fiat Brava arriving at Luton Station car park an hour or so later.
CONCLUSION

74. This report is a snapshot of where the 7 July investigation has reached. It is still very much a live investigation. The scale is enormous. For example: the police have taken over 12,500 statements; there are over 26,000 exhibits of which over 5,000 are being forensically examined; they have seized 142 computers along with thousands of exhibits relating to associated hard and software; and there are more than 6,000 hours of CCTV footage. Much analysis of this remains to be done, and as such there is still much more to be discovered about how the group were radicalised, how the bombings were planned and executed and whether others were involved.

75. So any conclusions drawn at this stage are subject to further developments in the investigation. But the main points that emerge are as follows:

   a) this case demonstrates the real difficulty for law enforcement agencies and local communities in identifying potential terrorists. All 4 were open about their strict religious observance but there was little outward sign that this had spilled over into potentially violent extremism. Khan generally appeared to others as a role model to young people; Tanweer as mature, modest and balanced. Hussain’s character did not stand out much: extremist doodling on his schoolbook was picked up but it is a long jump from this to identifying a potential suicide bomber. Lindsay, particularly towards the end, appears to have behaved erratically and possibly criminally, but not in a way that aroused suspicion of terrorist intentions;

   b) there is little in their backgrounds which mark them out as particularly vulnerable to radicalisation, with the possible exception of Lindsay. Khan, Tanweer and Hussain were apparently well integrated into British society. Lindsay appears to have had more instability at various points in his life, but not exceptionally so;

   c) in the absence of evidence of other methods, the process of indoctrinating these men appears principally to have been through personal contact and group bonding. Lindsay appears to have been strongly influenced by a known extremist preacher. For the others the picture is less certain. They would have had the opportunity to attend lectures, watch videos and read material by extremists but it is not known if any did to any significant extent. Their indoctrination appears to have taken place away from places with known links to extremism;

   d) their motivation appears to be typical of similar cases. Fierce antagonism to perceived injustices by the West against Muslims and a desire for martyrdom;

   e) the extent of Al Qaida involvement is unclear. Khan and Tanweer may have met Al Qaida figures during visits to Pakistan or Afghanistan. There was contact with someone in Pakistan in the run up to the bombings. Al Qaida’s deputy leader has also claimed responsibility;

   f) it remains unclear whether others in the UK were involved in radicalising or inciting the group, or in helping them to plan and execute it. But there is no evidence of a fifth bomber;
g) the planning was deceptively simple. The operation did not cost much and was financed by methods that would arouse little suspicion. The devices were constructed with materials that are readily available commercially and which required little expertise to turn into bombs;

h) the group showed good security awareness and planning discipline. They employed methods which seems to have been effective in disguising what they were doing from others;

i) it is not clear when the group decided on a UK attack but they appear to have begun planning it shortly after their return from Pakistan in February 2005;

j) it is not clear why the group chose suicide attacks as the appropriate method. They may have decided this approach was the easiest to plan, most likely to be successful and have the most impact. But the desire for martyrdom may also have been a factor. This may also have been behind Khan’s decision to participate. In other cases, the mentor has often stood back from actual operations, to enable him to indoctrinate others in the future;

k) there is no evidence that the timing was linked to the G8 summit or any other event at the time.
ANNEX A
THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST THREAT

1. When examining the circumstances of these attacks, it is important to understand the broader context. A key part of this is the development of Al Qaida and its associated ideology.

2. Al Qaida’s stated objective is to create a single Islamic nation, bringing to an end what they perceive as the oppression of Muslims and Western occupation of Muslim lands; removing “apostate” regimes in Muslim countries which are perceived as un-Islamic, or too sympathetic to the West; and implementing a partial and strict version of Islamic law across the Muslim world. They believe violent jihad (holy war) against the West and its supporters is necessary to achieve this.

3. Although these views existed before Al Qaida, it has now become a global threat. Its followers believe that any means are justified to achieve its ends, including the killing of civilians. They have used a variety of methods, including truck bombs, remote detonation and bombs attached to people.

4. The key event in the founding of Al Qaida was the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. It was here that Usama bin Laden (UbL) first came to prominence as a resistance leader. After the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989, UbL returned to his home country, Saudi Arabia. In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. UbL fiercely opposed the Saudi Government’s decision to allow US forces to be stationed in the Kingdom and campaigned strongly against this. He moved to Sudan in 1991 and in the following period developed Al Qaida from being a predominantly paramilitary organisation into a terrorist organisation. In 1992, the Al Qaida leadership published a fatwa (religious ruling) calling for jihad against the Western occupation of Islamic lands, specifically referring to US forces. During this period, the first attacks against US targets took place (the extent of Al Qaida’s direct involvement in these remains unclear), including in Somalia in 1992 and 1993 and the first World Trade Centre attack in February 1993.

5. With the emergence in Afghanistan of a group committed to establishing a fundamentalist state there (the Taliban), the Al Qaida leadership relocated in 1996. In 1998 Al Qaida published a fatwa signed by the leaders of four other extremist groups calling for jihad “to kill the Americans and their allies”. Al Qaida had put themselves in the vanguard of an international extremist movement, which attracted associates, followers and sympathisers around the world. Group identities, formerly rooted in nationalist causes, became less important whilst loose networks of individuals, often centred on a leading figure, became more commonplace. Al Qaida could now be described as a “network of networks”. These groups and networks had varying degrees of relationship with the Al Qaida leadership itself – some received support and direction, others simply inspiration.
6. In parallel, a number of other events over this period contributed to a
feeling – nurtured by Al Qaida propaganda – among some Muslims that
Muslims around the world were being “victimised”. These included: the
cancellation of the Algerian elections in 1992, when it looked certain that
the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) would win, followed by military rule; the
wars in Chechnya and Bosnia; and a crackdown in Egypt after a campaign
of terrorist attacks.

7. By 1998, Al Qaida had developed the intention and capacity to operate
outside its immediate environs. The US was a principal target. Al Qaida
launched attacks on the US Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, the
USS Cole off the coast of Yemen in 2000, and most devastatingly on New

8. The coalition action which followed the 9/11 attacks led to the expulsion of
the Taliban and Al Qaida from the main areas of Afghanistan, dismantling of
the training camp infrastructure that had been established there and the
derelsal of many Al Qaida fighters. The loss of Afghanistan and other
counter-terrorist activity was a significant blow to Al Qaida, leading to a
decentralisation of its command structure. But it was able to capitalise on
the “network of networks” which proved resilient, and since 2002, there
have been many attacks under the broad Al Qaida umbrella, including the
bombing of a nightclub in Bali in October 2002, the Istanbul attacks in
November 2003, the multiple attacks on the Madrid train network in March
2004 and the 7 July bombings in London.

The Link to the UK

9. As Al Qaida developed in the 1990s, a number of extremists in the UK,
both British and foreign nationals – many of the latter having fled from
conflict elsewhere or repressive regimes – began to work in support of its
agenda, in particular, radicalising and encouraging young men to support
jihad overseas. These included Abu Hamza and Abdallah al Faisal (both
now serving prison sentences), Abu Qatada (currently detained pending
possible deportation) and Omar Bakri Mohammed (now outside the UK and
excluded from returning here). During the 1990s, it is now known that there
was a flow of young Muslims, from the UK and elsewhere, travelling to
Pakistan and Afghanistan for indoctrination or jihad.

10. The first concrete sign that the UK had become a target for attack, although
there was no indication of Al Qaida involvement, was in November 2000
when two British citizens of Bangladeshi origin were arrested in
Birmingham. One of those arrested was convicted of explosives related
offences and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.
11. In the aftermath of 9/11 and the UK’s robust line against international terrorism and involvement in coalition action in Muslim countries since, it has become clear that the UK is a primary target for Al Qaida and associated groups and networks. A number of public statements by UbL and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri have singled out Britain for criticism and encouraged attacks against us: for example, the Istanbul attacks targeted the UK Consulate General and HSBC in 2003; and a number of plots targeted the UK itself – including the so-called Ricin plot. The threat remains. At least three further potential attacks have been disrupted since last July.
ANNEX B
RADICALISATION IN CONTEXT

1. What we know of previous extremists in the UK shows that there is not a consistent profile to help identify who may be vulnerable to radicalisation. Of the 4 individuals here, 3 were second generation British citizens whose parents were of Pakistani origin and one whose parents were of Jamaican origin; Kamel Bourgass, convicted of the Ricin plot, was an Algerian failed asylum seeker; Richard Reid, the failed shoe bomber, had an English mother and Jamaican father. Others of interest have been white converts. Some have been well-educated, some less so. Some genuinely poor, some less so. Some apparently well integrated in the UK, others not. Most single, but some family men with children. Some previously law-abiding, others with a history of petty crime. In a few cases there is evidence of abuse or other trauma in early life, but in others their upbringing has been stable and loving.

2. As for the process of radicalisation, there are a number of factors which have, in the past, contributed. Attendance at a mosque linked to extremists may be a factor. This will normally have nothing to do with the official mosque hierarchy, but rather extremists identifying potential candidates for radicalisation on the margins. However, evidence suggests that extremists are increasingly moving away from mosques to conduct their activities in private homes or other premises to avoid detection.

3. The influence of an extreme spiritual leader may also be important, either through direct meetings and sermons or via video, DVD and written material. But evidence suggests, again, that radicalisers will increasingly keep potential recruits away from too strong an association with a public figure. As such, extremists are more and more making extensive use of the internet. Websites are difficult to monitor and trace; they can be established anywhere and have global reach; they are anonymous, cheap and instantaneous; and it requires no special expertise to set up a website. The internet is widely used for propaganda; training (including in weapons and explosives); to claim responsibility for attacks; and for grooming through chatrooms and elsewhere.

4. The role of personal mentors and then bonding with a group of fellow extremists appears to have been critical in many cases. Mentors may first identify individuals from within larger groups who may be susceptible to radicalisation; then “groom” them privately in small groups until individuals in the group begin feeding off each other’s radicalisation.

5. There appear to be a number of common features to this grooming. In the early stages, group conversation may be around being a good Muslim and staying away from drugs and crime, with no hint of an extremist agenda. Gradually individuals may be exposed to propaganda about perceived
injustices to Muslims across the world with international conflict involving Muslims interpreted as examples of widespread war against Islam; leaders of the Muslim world perceived as corrupt and non-Islamic; with some domestic policies added as “evidence” of a persecuted Islam; and conspiracy theories abounding. They will then move on to what the extremists claim is religious justification for violent jihad in the Quran and the Hadith (the Hadith are the accounts recording the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammed by people who knew him); and – if suicide attacks are the intention – the importance of martyrdom in demonstrating commitment to Islam and the rewards in Paradise for martyrs; before directly inviting an individual to engage in terrorism. There is little evidence of overt compulsion. The extremists appear rather to rely on the development of individual commitment and group bonding and solidarity.
ANNEX C
TIMELINE OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST THREAT

1979  Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent occupation.

c1984  Radical preacher Abdullah Azzam set up an organisation called Maktab al-Khidmat (MAK) “Bureau of Services” to disseminate propaganda about jihad in Afghanistan. Usama bin Laden (UbL) joins.

1989  Withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. UbL returns to Saudi Arabia. Decision by MAK to continue to support further jihadist causes. Thinking around “the base” or “foundation” (translation: Al Qaida) for further operations articulated.

1988-89  UbL disagreement over focus of the cause and starts to form Al Qaida. November 1989, Azzam assassinated.

Early 1990s  Violence in a number of regions worldwide, including Afghanistan, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Chechnya, Bosnia, Tajikistan, East Africa, Yemen and Philippines. Groups that would later be a significant international terrorist threat formed eg Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines. Extremist support networks created in the UK and Europe.

Aug 1990  Iraq invades Kuwait. Saudi Government agrees to allow US troops to be stationed in the Kingdom for 1st Gulf War. UbL fiercely opposed.

1991  UbL leaves for Sudan. Al Qaida (AQ) changes from being predominantly paramilitary organisation into a terrorist group, focussing on the US.

1992  AQ publishes a fatwa calling for jihad against western “occupation” of Islamic lands.

1990s  Radical young men from the UK go to support jihad overseas eg Richard Reid, the shoe bomber, left for Pakistan/Afghanistan in 1997.


1993  First World Trade Centre attack.

1994  Taliban established.

1995  Start of 4-month GIA (Armed Islamic Group) campaign in France.

Mid-1996  Relocation of AQ leadership and many other extremists to Afghanistan.

Jun 1996  Truck bomb at housing complex in Saudi Arabia.

Aug 1996  UbL publishes fatwa “Declaration of War against the Americans occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places [Saudi Arabia]”.

Nov 1997  Islamic gunmen attack tourists in Luxor, Egypt.

Feb 1998  UbL’s second fatwa calling for jihad “to kill the Americans and their allies – civilian and military”.

Dec 1998  Yemen: kidnapping of 16 tourists, including 12 Britons.
Dec 1999  Indian airlines flight hijacked.
Nov 2000  UK: 2 British citizens of Bangladeshi origin arrested in Birmingham on suspicion of preparing a large quantity of home made explosives.
Jan 2001  India: The Red Fort in New Delhi attacked by Kashmiri militants.
Late 2001-
Early 2002  Coalition action expelled the Taliban, AQ and other extremist groups from main Afghanistan, dismantling training camps etc. Freezing of assets and targeting of support networks.
Dec 2001  India: militants attacked Indian Parliament in New Delhi.
Dec 2001  Singapore: disrupted plans to attack US, Australian and British missions.
Dec 2001  Richard Reid’s attempted “shoe bomb” attack on US airliner.
Jan 2002  Kidnapping and execution of US journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan.
Apr 2002  Tunisia: attack on Western tourists at synagogue in Tunisia.
May 2002  Pakistan: attack against a bus transporting French Naval engineers in Karachi.
Jun 2002  Pakistan: attack against the US Consulate in Karachi.
Jun 2002  Morocco: disrupted attacks on Strait of Gibraltar.
Oct 2002  Indonesia: attack on nightclub in Bali.
Oct 2002  Russia: Chechen terrorists occupy Moscow theatre, taking hundreds hostage.
Nov 2002  Kenya: attack on hotel and Israeli charter aircraft in Mombasa.
Feb 2003  Coalition action and removal of Saddam Hussain in Iraq.
May 2003  Saudi Arabia: attack on residential compounds and US/Saudi office in Riyadh.
May 2003  Morocco: attacks on various (including Jewish) targets in Casablanca.
Aug 2003  India: simultaneous bomb blasts in Mumbai.
Aug 2003  Indonesia: attack on Marriott Hotel in Jakarta.
Nov 2003  Saudi Arabia: attack on residential compound in Riyadh.
Nov 2003  Turkey: multiple attacks on Jewish and British targets in Istanbul.
Dec 2003  Pakistan: two assassination attempts on President Musharraf.
Feb 2004  Philippines: bomb on Superferry 14 in Manila.
Apr 2004  Saudi Arabia: Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) suicide attack.
May  2004  Saudi Arabia: multiple attacks in Al Khobar.
Aug - Sept 2004  Russia: Chechen terrorists down 2 passenger aircraft, mount suicide bombing on the Moscow metro and take over 1,000 hostage at a school in North Ossetia.
Sept 2004  Indonesia: attack on Australian Embassy in Jakarta.
Oct 2004  Egypt: attack on Israeli tourists at a hotel and campsites.
Dec 2004  Further AQ attacks in Saudi Arabia.
Mar 2005  Qatar: suicide car bomb against Western theatre.
April 2005  Egypt: IED detonated in Cairo bazaar, suicide attacks against tourists.
ANNEX D
TIMELINE OF THE FOUR INDIVIDUALS

20/10/74 Mohammad Sidique Khan (MSK) born in West Yorkshire
Attends local schools
Works in local Benefits Agency and the Department of Trade and Industry
Goes on to study at Leeds Metropolitan University

15/12/82 Shehzad Tanweer (ST): Born in West Yorkshire
Attends local schools
Goes on to study at Leeds Metropolitan University
Works in the family fish and chips shop

23/9/85 Jermaine Lindsay (JL): Born in Jamaica
Moves to the UK with his mother in 1986
Attends local schools in home town of Huddersfield
Occasional odd jobs

16/09/86 Hasib Hussain (HH): Born in West Yorkshire
Attends local schools
Goes on to college to study Advanced Business Programme

Late 1990s MSK: Starts youth work.
2000 JL: Following mother’s conversion, converts to Islam, takes the name Jamal.
2001 MSK: Joins staff of local primary school to work as a learning mentor.
Oct 2001 MSK: Marries. Later moves to Batley and then Dewsbury.
Mid-2002 ST: Religion appears to become the main focus of his life.
2002 HH: Makes Hajj visit to Saudi Arabia and to family in Pakistan.
Returns to England. Increasingly religiously observant.
Early 2003 MSK & ST: Become increasingly close.
Early 2003 MSK: Hajj visit with his wife.
Apr 2003 MSK & ST: Camping trip in the UK with other young men.
July 2003 MSK: Visits Pakistan for training.
Sept 2003 JL: Moves to Aylesbury.
April 2004 JL: First child born.
Works as carpet fitter until early 2005.
ST: Caution for disorderly conduct.
May 2004 MSK: Daughter born.
Oct 2004 HH: Cautioned for shoplifting.
Late 2004 MSK & JL: Close association.
Sep-Nov 04 MSK: Long period of sick absence from work. Job ends.
Nov-Feb 05 MSK & ST: Visit Pakistan.
Mar 2005 First purchase of material to make explosives.
May 2005 JL: Rents Alexandra Grove, the bomb factory.
June 2005 MSK & ST: White-water rafting trip with other young men.
28 Jun 05 MSK, ST & JL: recce visit to London.

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