



THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE
NINETEENTH REPORT FROM THE
HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
SESSION 2010–12 HC 1446

Roots of violent radicalisation

**Presented to Parliament
by the Secretary of State for the Home Department
by Command of Her Majesty**

June 2012

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GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE COMMITTEE'S NINETEENTH REPORT OF SESSION 2010-12: *ROOTS OF VIOLENT RADICALISATION*

Introduction

1. We welcome the Committee's analysis of evidence on the root causes of violent radicalisation in the UK.
2. We recognise that the terrorist threats we face have changed significantly over the past ten years. Al Qa'ida is now substantially weaker than at any time since 09/11 and has lost its people, its facilities, its freedom of action and much of its support and reputation.
3. But we need to be realistic about the threats that remain. In Great Britain we continue to arrest very significant numbers of people for terrorist offences – over 2000 since 09/11 and just over 280 in the two year period to September 2011. This is more than other countries in Europe. The current terrorist threats are more diverse and in some ways more unpredictable than we have faced before.
4. The new Prevent strategy that we published last summer covers all forms of terrorism and explicitly includes the extreme right wing. However, that threat is much less widespread and systematic than terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida and our resources are allocated accordingly.
5. Our Prevent strategy is about tackling the threat from terrorism both on and offline. The internet plays an important role in sustaining and reinforcing extremist and terrorist ideologies and enabling communication between like-minded individuals and groups. The extent of the role of the internet in the radicalisation process remains the subject of debate; direct interaction with people is usually the most important factor in the radicalisation process.
6. We are working hard, and across government, to develop our approach to tackling the corrosive extremist ideologies conducive to violence that can proliferate on the internet, and we are taking a number of internet-specific measures to tackle the threat of radicalisation online. They include work:
 - to remove sites that breach UK terrorism legislation (with the police Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit);
 - to develop a list of unlawful websites that can be shared with industry; and

- with civil society groups to encourage them to challenge terrorist narratives.
7. We are now engaging with industry to explore the Committee's proposal for a Code of Conduct to remove material which breaches acceptable behaviour standards.
 8. We know that some people who have been convicted and imprisoned for terrorist-related offences have sought to radicalise and recruit other prisoners. Equally, we know that prisons offer an opportunity for disengagement from terrorism and extremism. An extensive programme of training continues with prison and probation staff to develop their understanding of Prevent and terrorism. The National Offender Management Service (NOMS) continues to use existing and new interventions with radicalised offenders or those who may be susceptible to radicalisation. As the Committee acknowledges, working with prisoners after release is vital and this requires liaison between the families and probation staff.
 9. We are committed to continue to work closely on all of these issues with the Devolved Administrations in support of the delivery of their own preventative strategies.
 10. We have considered the Committee's recommendations in detail and our response is set out below.

Our detailed response to the Committee's conclusions and recommendations

11. **We suspect that violent radicalisation is declining within the Muslim community. There may be growing support for nonviolent extremism, fed by feelings of alienation, and while this may not lead to a specific terrorist threat or be a staging post for violent extremism, it is nevertheless a major challenge for society in general and for the police in particular. There also appears to be a growth in more extreme and violent forms of far-right ideology. Indeed it is clear that individuals from many different backgrounds are vulnerable, with no typical profile or pathway to radicalisation. However, there is a lack of objective data, much of the evidence inevitably being anecdotal. Only 250 people have been convicted in the UK of terrorism-related offences since 11 September 2001. However, there is a wealth of knowledge held by people working with individuals judged to be vulnerable to violent radicalisation at a local level that could better inform our understanding of why some of these individuals do become radicalised and, crucially, why some do not. One of the aims of the increased auditing demands to be placed on Channel providers should be the collection of a wider range of data to contribute to this evidence base. We recommend that the Government publish the methodology whereby this data will be collated and analysed, and make arrangements for suitably de-sensitised data to be made available to the wider research community. (Paragraph 21)**
12. We have no material to confirm the Committee's hypothesis about growing support for non violent extremism. We provided data to the inquiry which indicates support for violent extremism may be declining.
13. As part of the Prevent review in the first part of 2011, the Government recognised the need to improve data collection from Channel. We have committed to developing a new Case Management Information System (CMIS) which will provide a more robust and consistent risk assessment framework to enable better performance monitoring. It will also enable longer term evaluation of the Channel referral process and interventions. We plan to publish the risk assessment framework and to release aggregated data when it is available.
14. **One of the few clear conclusions we were able to draw about the drivers of radicalisation is that a sense of grievance is key to the process. Addressing perceptions of Islamophobia, and demonstrating that the British state is not antithetical to Islam, should constitute a main focus of the part of the Prevent Strategy which is designed to counter the ideology feeding violent radicalisation. (Paragraph 22)**
15. We agree with this analysis and believe it is reflected in the Prevent strategy (paragraphs 5.26-5.28).

16. Following our review of Prevent, we concluded that it was important that work on developing an integrated and cohesive community should not be seen through the counter-terrorism prism or managed within CONTEST, although it is certainly true that Prevent will not succeed if integration fails. The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) leads on integration and published a policy statement on that work on 21st February 2012¹.
17. The Government is determined to tackle anti-Muslim hatred and counter extremism and racism wherever it occurs. We deplore all religious and racially motivated attacks and will not tolerate racists and trouble-makers disrupting our local communities. DCLG has set up a cross-Government working group on anti-Muslim hatred, reporting to the Deputy Prime Minister, which is made up of people from Muslim communities, academics and officials from across Whitehall. The working group has met twice since January 2012 and has agreed to look at the conditions that create anti-Muslim hatred and what we need to do to prevent it. This will shape future activity in this area. Additionally DCLG is providing funding for a community based study, MAMA (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks), which collates and analyses anti-Muslim incidents in England and offers support to victims.
18. **The Government notes in the Prevent Strategy that individuals “who distrust Parliament” are at particular risk of violent radicalisation. This appears to be borne out in our inquiry, both in terms of Islamist and extreme far-right radicalisation. Individuals are frustrated because they feel unable to participate in the political process and feel that mainstream parties do not recognise their concerns. This may not be true and we stress that we are talking about perceptions. Clearly there is much to be done by Parliamentarians and by political parties to ensure that there is a nonviolent outlet for individuals throughout society, but we also consider that there is an insufficient focus within Prevent on building trust in democratic institutions at all levels. This should be emphasised more strongly, including how work currently being undertaken by the Government Equality Office to implement the 2010 recommendations of the Speaker’s Conference on Parliamentary Representation feeds into Prevent. (Paragraph 23)**
19. We believe the analysis in the Prevent strategy quoted here is sound. It is vital for Prevent that there is trust in democratic institutions. But this is an issue that goes far beyond the scope of Prevent and we continue to believe it would be wrong for Prevent itself to focus on it. Empowering local communities will develop a stronger sense of trust in the ‘state’ and this is certainly part of the wider integration agenda.

¹ *‘Creating the conditions for integration’*
<http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/communities/integration>

20. **As with the scale and drivers of radicalisation, it proved difficult for us to gain a clear understanding of where violent radicalisation takes place. In terms of the four sectors we explored—universities, prisons, religious institutions and the internet—we conclude that religious institutions are not a major cause for concern but that the internet does play a role in violent radicalisation, although a level of face-to-face interaction is also usually required. The role of prisons and universities was less obvious. Much of the uncertainty relates to the fact that a number of convicted terrorists have attended prisons and universities, but there is seldom concrete evidence to confirm that this is where they were radicalised. The Home Office told us that violent radicalisation is increasingly taking place in private homes, particularly as the authorities clamp down on radicalisation in more public arenas. Given this, we are concerned that too much focus in the Prevent Strategy is placed on public institutions such as universities, and that it may be more accurate, and less inflammatory, to describe them as places where radicalisation “may best be identified”. We consider that the emphasis on the role of universities by government departments is now disproportionate. (Paragraph 38)**
21. In the UK we judge that radicalisation tends to occur in places where extremist and violent extremist ideologies, and those that promote them, go uncontested and are not exposed to free, open and balanced debate. Radicalisation is certainly occurring in private spaces. But we believe it can occur and has occurred in other more public areas and that it remains important to develop a tailored Prevent approach in the education sector. This is vital because Prevent work can not only disrupt radicalisation but also pre-empt radicalisation of young people that may otherwise occur when they leave education and the supportive environment of a school or college.
22. The Department for Education (DfE) is therefore introducing a range of measures to safeguard children and young people in England from extremist views in schools. Work with Ofsted will strengthen the inspection regime and those applying to establish Free Schools will be subject to effective financial and non-financial checks.
23. The Prevent strategy (paragraphs 10.56 -10.57) made clear that Prevent work in higher education was not simply based on an assumption that universities and colleges are places where terrorists radicalise and recruit. We do believe that some extremist groups radicalise some students. So, we wish to challenge extremist speakers and encourage open debate whilst maintaining our commitment to freedom of speech (paragraphs 10.65 -10.67).
24. **One further issue that came to our attention was that there may be a particular risk of radicalisation linked to membership of some criminal gangs, of which there is no mention in the Prevent Strategy. Given the fact that elsewhere some terrorist organisations appear to have identified recruitment to gangs within prison as providing an**

opportunity for radicalisation, we suggest that the authorities should be alert to the potential for a future threat in this area. We recommend that the Government commission a piece of research to explore these issues in more detail. (Paragraph 39)

25. We agree that there are strong parallels between gang membership and radicalisation and that people with a criminal background appear vulnerable to the radicalisation process. As we noted (paragraph 9.39) in the Prevent strategy, we have commissioned and published research into what Prevent can learn from studying gangs². We are also working on a much larger study of overlaps between criminal and terrorist organisations, which includes looking at prisons and offender management, as part of the Government's commitment in the Strategic Defence and Security Review to explore the potential synergies between organised crime and counter-terrorism policing operational capabilities.
26. **On the whole, witnesses supported the outcome of the Prevent Review. We too welcome many aspects of the new Strategy, which appears to address some of the major criticisms levelled at its predecessors. (Paragraph 41)**
27. We welcome the Committee's recognition of the positive outcome of the revised strategy.
28. **A view was expressed by some of those giving evidence to us, and those to whom we spoke less formally, that the revised Prevent Strategy only pays lip service to the threat from extreme far-right terrorism. We accept that Prevent resources should be allocated proportionately to the terrorist threat, and that to an extent we must rely upon the intelligence and security services to make this judgement. However, we received persuasive evidence about the potential threat from extreme far-right terrorism. The ease of travel and communications between countries in Europe and the growth of far-right organisations, which appear to have good communications with like-minded groups within Europe, suggest that the current lack of firm evidence should not be a reason for neglecting this area of risk. The Prevent Strategy should outline more clearly the actions to be taken to tackle far right radicalisation as well as explicitly acknowledge the potential interplay between different forms of violent extremism, and the potential for measures directed at far-right extremism to have a consequential effect on Islamist extremism, and vice versa. (Paragraph 46)**
29. Prevent addresses all forms of terrorism, including far-right extremist terrorism. As the Committee acknowledges, in a world of scarce resources it is clear that Prevent work must be targeted against those forms of terrorism

² The report can be found at <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/counter-terrorism-statistics/occ98>

which pose the greatest risk to our national security. Currently, the greatest threat comes from Al Qa'ida and those they inspire. The majority of Prevent resources and efforts will therefore be devoted to stopping people from joining or supporting Al Qa'ida, its affiliates, or like-minded groups.

30. Extreme right-wing terrorism in the UK has been much less widespread, systematic or organised than terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida. Of the 120 terrorist related prisoners held in March 2012, 14 were associated with far-right extremist terrorism.
31. The Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) has developed a key training tool called the 'Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent' (WRAP) aimed at frontline staff. The workshop is an introduction to Prevent. It includes case studies and discussions around the extreme right-wing, as well as Al Qa'ida, in order to explore factors which may contribute to an individual's susceptibility to a terrorist ideology.
32. Channel, a police co-ordinated multi-agency partnership under Prevent, deals with individuals vulnerable to extreme right-wing radicalisation. Between April 2007 and December 2010 around 8% of the 1120 people referred to Channel had the referral made owing to concerns over extreme right-wing violent extremism.
33. A small number of intervention providers already exist to challenge the ideology of far-right extremist terrorists. OSCT are working to expand the level of provision available.
34. We will not tolerate groups who spread hate by demonising ordinary British Muslims, seek to divide us by stoking anti-Muslim hatred, and deliberately raise community fears and tensions by bringing disorder and violence to our towns and cities. We will:
 - speak out and condemn their views and actions where appropriate;
 - continue to develop an effective public order policing response;
 - engage with local areas to support local action to tackle extreme right-wing groups;
 - ensure that the response to the threat of terrorism from far-right extremists is prioritised alongside that from all other forms of terrorism;

- continue to engage with our European partners (including the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network) to understand the threats they face and the reach across to groups operating here; and
 - develop our knowledge base so that we better understand the drivers of the support for the extreme right-wing and can develop successful approaches to deal with the problem.
35. We support and work with local partners to do this. Local authorities take a leading role working through existing partnerships with the police, other agencies and business and voluntary sectors.
36. **We accept that some universities may have been complacent about their role, and, while we agree in principle that universities are ideal places to confront extremist ideology, we are not convinced that extremists on campus are always subject to equal and robust challenge. We recommend that the Government issue clearer guidance to universities about their expected role in Prevent, following consultation with university and student representative bodies. We would hope that college authorities and student bodies will recognise that individuals or groups expressing hatred against any particular race or nationality is simply not acceptable on a British campus, and certainly needs to be challenged immediately. (Paragraph 51).**
37. The Prevent strategy highlights the need for universities to exercise a duty of care to students who may be at risk of radicalisation and that they should challenge extremist ideology where this occurs on their premises. The reaction of universities to the strategy has been mixed. While many accept their duty of care responsibilities, they have expressed concerns over how this will work in practice and what action they should take.
38. We are aiming to address these issues through closer and focussed working with governance bodies, recruitment of Prevent trained co-ordinators focussed on the higher education sector, provision of guidance and support, and awareness-raising events. The National Union of Students (NUS) has already rolled out guidance on hate speakers including speakers with extremist views. The guidance provides practical advice for committees and groups dealing with this issue on campus.
39. We are appointing ten regional co-ordinators (two in London) to work closely with colleges and universities on Prevent. The co-ordinators will be required to strengthen the approach to the Prevent agenda on the ground. A core responsibility will be to identify key contacts and build the relationships with local authorities and Prevent Engagement Officers that will help an institution manage the risk of extremism and radicalisation on its campus. The co-

ordinators will organise events in their regions to disseminate good practice and share latest guidance.

40. A range of guidance and training is being developed to support different parts of the sector, including:

- a proposed website for Further and Higher Education practitioners containing links to Prevent resources, contacts, guidance and case studies;
- the provision of pastoral training by the Association of Muslim Chaplains in higher education institutions to increase capacity and raise awareness of how to challenge extremism; and
- production of guidance by the Association of Chief Police Officers, in conjunction with the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, for police officers responsible for Prevent delivery in universities and colleges.

41. **We further recommend that, a designated contact point with relevant expertise within Government is provided to student unions and university administrators to assist them in making difficult decisions about speakers on campus. (Paragraph 52)**

42. Universities, colleges and student unions have been given named contacts in the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills who will provide information on proposed speakers on campus.

43. **The Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit does limited but valuable work in challenging internet service providers to remove violent extremist material where it contravenes the law. We suggest that the Government work with internet service providers in the UK to develop a Code of Conduct committing them to removing violent extremist material, as defined for the purposes of section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2006. Many relevant websites are hosted abroad: the Government should also therefore strive towards greater international cooperation to tackle this issue. (Paragraph 59)**

44. We welcome the Committee's acknowledgement of the Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit's (CTIRU) valuable work to remove extremist material from the internet where it contravenes the law.

Code of Conduct

45. Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2006 has legal weight. The majority of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) already have an effective relationship with the Government and remove content that breaches legislation.
46. We are now engaging across government and with industry on what role a Code of Conduct could play in this area. We will also explore whether there is an appetite to move towards more consistent policies on acceptable use across the industry.

International Cooperation

47. There is a significant international dimension in relation to tackling extremism and radicalisation on the internet. The UK is already working with governments overseas to share knowledge and compare programmes. The CTIRU is seen as a model of best practice and engages with international counterparts through the Counter Terrorism and Extremism Liaison Officers Overseas Network. The CTIRU contributes to European initiatives in this area.
48. The CTIRU has also provided visiting overseas law enforcement colleagues, including Australia and the US, with details of its remit and the key role it plays in work to prevent radicalisation through the internet. We will continue to develop and strengthen our approach in this area.
49. **Given the impossibility of completely ridding the internet of violent extremist material, it is important to support defences against it. We support the Government's approach to empowering civil society groups to counter extremist ideology online. The whole area of communications technology and social networking is complex and extremely fast-moving. A form of interaction that is commonly used by thousands or even millions of people at one point in time may only have been developed a matter of months or even weeks earlier. It follows that legislation and regulation struggle to keep up and can provide a blunt instrument at best. Leaders in fields such as education, the law and Parliament also need to be involved. Evidence taken by this committee in regard to the riots in London last August showed that some police forces have identified social networks as providing both challenges and opportunities, with the message from one chief constable that the police recognised that 'we need to be engaged'. In respect of terrorism, as in respect of organised crime, the Government should seek to build on the partnership approach to prevention that has proved successful in the field of child abuse and child protection. (Paragraph 60)**
50. We recognise that there are lessons which Prevent can learn from work to deal with child abuse and child protection although the legal framework is different. We are in touch with the UK Council for Child Internet Safety and the Internet Watch Foundation.

Countering Extremist Ideology

51. We recognise that this is an area where the Committee expressed concern. The Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) has provided training for civil society groups to increase their ability to engage in counter narrative activity online.
52. The Home Office is collaborating with the Metropolitan Police and other agencies and departments on two key strands of work relating to social media: to identify lessons which can be learned from how social media was used in the August 2011 riots, and to agree how it can be more effectively used in future to counter and contain such issues. We have also been collaborating more closely with industry. This work is certainly relevant to RICU.
53. **Good aftercare is critical to ensuring that prisoners who may have been vulnerable to violent extremist ideology in prison can make the transition safely into the community, and family involvement is critical to good aftercare. We are concerned that the National Offender Management Service has not paid more attention to ensuring that conditions of release do not unnecessarily restrict family contact and indeed actively encourage positive family support and engagement. Where there is a tendency for a family to reject the offender it can be important for the mosque to encourage the family to provide support and engagement. We are not convinced that the work of the chaplaincy in facilitating the transition from prison to the home community is as effective as it needs to be, although we were impressed with the hopes and aspirations which were described to us by the Imams we met and it is clear that there are serious moves within the Muslim community to create the necessary structures and arrangements. We recommend that this is always taken into account. We also heard conflicting evidence about the level of support available in the community and recommend that resources are prioritised towards closing any gaps. (Paragraph 65)**

Family contact and reintegration into the community

54. We agree that support from the family and community is important in the offender rehabilitation process. All prisoners sentenced to prison terms of 12 months or more will, on release, be subject to licence conditions, supervision and support overseen by Probation Trusts. But it may not always be appropriate to return an offender to their community directly on release. Some families and individuals in the community may support the offender's criminal activity or hold extreme views. In principle it is certainly the case that a mosque can play a vital part in the rehabilitation process and a prison imam may facilitate mosque engagement. In some establishments some chaplains, in line with their pastoral work, have also supported and helped repair family links. However, it is not the remit of the multi-faith chaplaincy to make links with families of prisoners and support the transition from prison to community.
55. A number of independent Community Chaplaincy schemes have been set up, with the help of the third sector, to support the reintegration of prisoners into

their families and communities. They are, in the main, independent bodies managed by charities and trusts, but a few community chaplains are also prison chaplains. They offer resettlement support to minority groups and, in 2011, community chaplaincies supported approximately 1300 ex-prisoners.

- 56. The National Offender Management Service must be an equal participant in the Prevent strategy, alongside other agencies. We are very concerned that prison authorities are not receiving feedback about prisoners vulnerable to radicalisation after their release. Such information would be critical to improving understanding of prison radicalisation and prison processes for monitoring and dealing with it. We recommend that the Government should a) implement a system whereby this information is fed back into prisons and b) develop a portal that would allow the relevant agencies dealing with prisoner intelligence, including the UK Border Agency, to share data more quickly and easily. (Paragraph 66)**
57. Whilst the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) supports the principle behind this recommendation, they would anticipate significant issues in determining how the suggested portal would work, where ownership would sit, how access would be managed and what value it would add. It is the view of NOMS that more work would need to be done to understand whether such a system would add value to structures and procedures already in place.
58. NOMS has developed a well-established intelligence infrastructure which facilitates the identification of the risks and threats within prisons, ensuring that intelligence is shared beyond the prison where relevant. NOMS works closely with partners at a local (establishment), regional and national level and has in place established procedures which set out roles, responsibilities and provisions for information-sharing.
59. The prison intelligence infrastructure will shortly be enhanced by the implementation of Project Mercury. This is a networked system with analytical capability, which will start delivery to early adopters in March 2012 with full roll out over the rest of the year.
60. When offenders are released into the community, prison and probation services work closely with partners through Multi-agency Police Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) to enable the sharing of both pre and post-release information. This is to ensure that appropriate licence conditions are put in place as part of broader risk management processes.
61. The Ministry of Justice and the National Offender Management Service are closely engaged with other government departments and agencies in developing learning around radicalisation and violent extremism. NOMS is working to ensure that where applicable, as in the case of developing intelligence requirements and the interventions targeted at terrorist offenders, learning is appropriately shared.

62. **We fully agree with the Government that public money should not be used to fund groups who hold views that contradict fundamental British values. However, we are concerned that the parameters for this policy are not sufficiently clear and that the situation could arise whereby risk-averse public authorities discontinue funding for effective groups because of unfounded allegations of “extremism”. The Government should draw up and issue guidelines with clear criteria to potential funders. We also note that several Channel providers have recently lost funding and there is currently a lack of capacity on the ground to deliver the Strategy. This should be rectified urgently. (Paragraph 74)**
63. We agree that it is vital that funding for groups is not discontinued because of unfounded allegations of extremism. The Home Office will support local authorities in providing clear guidance on policy in this area and sharing available information on specific organisations.
64. It is clearly vital that we select intervention providers carefully, understand how they work, their values and outlook, and are completely clear about the results they obtain. We are encouraging local areas to identify community intervention providers to supply support to Channel referrals to increase capacity. These providers will, subject to risk assessment procedures, become part of an approved list from which local areas can draw. We will undertake light touch refreshes of the list annually to ensure the approved providers still meet our competency and security thresholds. We are also producing new guidance for public authorities to help inform funding decisions. This will sit alongside enhanced central controls over standards for interventions suppliers and greater ongoing scrutiny and monitoring of their work by OSCT. We anticipate that this guidance will be available in May 2012.
65. **The view came across strongly in our evidence that Prevent is most successful at the local level where it is mainstreamed into local safeguarding procedures, youth services, neighbourhood policing and so forth. We support this approach and encourage the Government to do the same. (Paragraph 75)**
66. The Government agrees strongly that Prevent local delivery is best taken forward when streamlined within local safeguarding which enables access to a wide range of services, multi-agency partners and interventions. This is happening round the country and there is emerging best practice. But it is less practical where local authorities do not have expertise of Prevent and a track record of delivery.
67. **Despite the Government’s efforts to remedy this perception, there is a lingering suspicion about the Prevent Strategy amongst Muslim communities, many of whom continue to believe that it is essentially a**

tool for intelligence-gathering or spying. This might be mitigated if these communities felt more ownership of the strategy: the Government should be even more open and transparent about whom it engages with in the UK's varied Muslim communities and should seek to engage more widely. Only through engagement will the Government be able to get communities on their side and really prevent radicalisation. It would also be assisted by adopting a more pro-active approach to combating negative publicity, particularly in respect of the Channel programme. We saw plenty of evidence during our enquiry both of engagement and of considerable expertise within the Muslim community. This needs to be acknowledged and respected by the authorities in order to strengthen the foundations of the partnership approach, which is proving effective in many places. Finally, we believe there is a strong case for re-naming the Prevent Strategy to reflect a positive approach to collaboration with the Muslim communities of the UK, for example the Engage Strategy. (Paragraph 80)

68. We agree that, contrary to some claims, there is very extensive support for Prevent across the country. In some cases, support has been qualified, very often because Prevent has been misrepresented or misunderstood. We recognise, however, that in some areas confusion between Prevent work and integration has also led to community concern.
69. Clearer separation of integration and Prevent is intended to address some of these issues. But we recognise that wider and transparent engagement is also important.
70. We consider that 'Prevent' continues to be the most appropriate name for this strategy. We believe 'Engage' would be a misnomer: engagement is a means to an end and has many other non-CT related objectives.
71. **The language used to talk about Prevent, and counter-terrorism more generally, can have a detrimental effect on Muslim communities' willingness to cooperate with Prevent where it conflates terrorism with the religion of Islam. The Prevent Strategy largely manages to avoid this. However, those engaged in public life must ensure that the language they use reflects the same tone. (Paragraph 81)**
72. We agree with this recommendation.
73. **The Government recently reviewed proscription legislation as part of the review of counter-terrorism powers published in January 2011. We agree with the decision not to strengthen the law on proscription in a way which would allow for the banning of groups which are currently operating within the law, as the evidence suggests that proscription would not be effective and could be counter-productive. However, we are concerned that it is too difficult for groups who no longer pose a terrorist threat to obtain de-proscription, a move which might encourage**

some groups in their move away from active support for terrorism. We therefore endorse the recommendation of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation that the law be changed to make proscription orders time-limited. (Paragraph 87)

74. We welcome the Committee's endorsement of the conclusions of the review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers in relation to the test for proscription.

75. We note the Committee's concerns about the de-proscription process and its endorsement of the recommendation by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation that proscription orders be made time limited. Any organisation may apply to the Secretary of State to be de-proscribed, and a right of appeal is available to the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission. This process is currently under review and a range of options are being considered, including that of time-limited proscriptions.

76. As the report states, international cooperation is an important aspect of the proscription process. The need to support our international partners in combating the threat from terrorism is one of a number of factors taken into account during the consideration of a proscription. However, these factors are only considered where the statutory test – that the group is concerned in terrorism - is met.

77. Violent radicalisation is clearly a problem within the UK but it takes place within an international context and it is important for the UK authorities to be aware of developments elsewhere and to share information with partners abroad, both in respect of extremist Islamist organisations or movements, and in respect of extreme right-wing groups within Europe and America. However, the strongest forces against radicalisation are the partnerships of mutual respect and shared citizenship within the UK and within local communities in our towns and cities. The evidence given by Muslim organisations was impressive and we were encouraged by the evidence of greater effectiveness of local partnerships, of leadership within individual communities such as the student community, and the evidence of joined up thinking, for instance in preparing for the return of offenders to the community. It is important for the government to demonstrate, by action and words, strong support for these initiatives as well as maintaining the determination to support the work of intelligence agencies and the police in tackling those who choose the route of violence and intervening to protect those they seek to recruit. (Paragraph 88)

78. We agree with the Committee that it is important to support the work of intelligence agencies and the police in tackling those who choose the route of violence. We are committed to doing this through the Pursue strand of CONTEST.

79. We also agree that it is important to intervene to protect the people they seek to recruit. We set out our approach to this in chapter 9 of the Prevent strategy. We are committed to ensuring that interventions are part of an effective Prevent programme.



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