



Solution Design Advisory Group (SDAG)

BIS Conference Centre

2 July 2013

Agenda: SDAG #8

BIS Conference Centre

10:00 Tuesday 2 July 2013



Department
of Energy &
Climate Change

No	Time	Subject	Lead
1	10.00 – 10.15	Actions from previous meeting	Colin Sawyer
2	10.15 – 10.45	Processes to support MOP working	Mike Bennett
3	10.45 – 11.30	Parse and Correlate Feedback	Terry Underwood
4	11.30 – 12.00	Feedback on Workshops – Firmware, Service Management and Prepayment	Colin Sawyer/Stuart Scott/Tim Hall
5	12.00 - 12.30	GB Security Extensions – Update	Peter Morgan
6	12.30 – 13.00	HCALC Update Privacy Pin	Peter Morgan
7	13.30 – 14.00	Q&A on SMETS2 CONDOC Response	Charlotte Middleton
8	14.00 - 14.20	Privacy Pin	Tim Bailey
9	14:20 – 15:00	AOB - Update on Tech and Sec Arch Documents - SMETS2 - export consumption on twin element meters - update on GBCS informal and formal review process - Firmware - PPM - Consolidated Issues Log	Julian Hughes Peter Morgan Peter Morgan Nigel Orchard Nigel Orchard Colin Sawyer



1. ACTIONS FROM PREVIOUS MEETING

Colin Sawyer

Actions



No.	Action Details	Date	Owner	Status
SDAG_2.11	<p>Billing reads: Npower agreed to inform DECC if they have any residual concerns with billing cycle orchestration & push/pull comments once they have read the Technical Architecture document</p> <p>Update: AC agreed to provide DECC with information on where processes are misaligned and a list of the risks associated. Complete</p> <p>Update: DECC were to respond to the information provided by AC. PH to follow up</p> <p>Update: AC accepted the offer of a 1:1 session to discuss this action in greater detail. Meeting to be arranged</p>	02.07.13	AC PH	Closed Open
SDAG_2.15	<p>Outage reporting: DECC to talk to Alan Creighton of the ENA to discuss Outage Management requirements and confirm requirements from the ENA and ensure alignment within the CSP schedule 2.1</p> <p>Update: Alan Creighton agreed to write to the Chairman on service levels by 28.03.13.</p> <p>Update: clarification on device states following power outage is documented in the ALC ELPM</p> <p>Update: AC and CS agreed to discuss this matter separately and AC would be sent a copy of the HCALC model.</p>	02.07.13	Alan C CS	Ongoing

Actions



SDAG_3.01	DECC agreed to issue product descriptions to SDAG Members when they had been completed Update: Following agreement of PDs submitted by bidders, DECC would issue to SDAG members		CS	Ongoing
SDAG_3.02	DECC agreed to clarify the timetable and prepare the process for GB security extensions.	02.07.13 – Within Agenda item 5	AA	Closed
SDAG_4.02	HHT Interface: It was agreed that the description of the Hand Held Terminal interface would be sent to SDAG Members as soon as it was available for review.	05.07.13 – Paper sent and workshop to be held on 5 July	JH	Closed
SDAG_4.09	Documentation Road-map: DECC agreed to prepare a documentation road-map (to be finalised when DSP delivery timescales are agreed) - this would include documents that will come from DCC and its service providers to allow DCC users to understand when key design documentation was to be issued. Update: DECC agreed to amend the Key Design document to include columns identifying the enduring ownership, and when it will be delivered in design stage (when known). Update: The joint industry wide Level 1 Draft plan was discussed at the meeting including the revised delivery schedule.	02.07.13 Completed	CS	Closed

Actions



Department
of Energy &
Climate Change

SDAG_5.01	Design Phase Milestones. It was agreed that the design phase of the DSP and CSP would be discussed at a future SDAG meeting.	24.07.13	CS	Ongoing
SDAG_6.02	SDAG members were invited to provide evidence that the gas enable function was a safe process at the earliest opportunity. Update: SDAG members advised that the evidence was being collated and report would be issued in the near future	02.07.13	ALL	Ongoing
SDAG_6.03	A final version of the PPMID DDS was complete it would be issued to SDAG members for information. Update: The DDS was undergoing legal review at DECC and would be issued to SDAG members in early June 2013. 02/07/13 Update – Legal review period was longer than anticipated, DECC is undertaking a further internal review following this, documentation will be shared 27/06/13 Update – Legal review complete, however over a longer timeframe and the late start of the legal review due to necessary further iterations of PPMID. Mark to provide timetable for sharing with SDAG.	02.07.13	PM	Ongoing
SDAG_7.01	The consolidated comments log on CHTS DDS created from SDAG members had not been recirculated. It was agreed that these would be sent out to all members asap. 02/07/13 – Update – Circulated	02.07.13	CS	Closed

SDAG_7.02	The email from the Information Commissioners Office describing the responsibilities for IHD data was to be circulated to the members – Sent	02 07 13	CS	Closed
SDAG_7.04	DECC agreed to confirm the number of CAD that could be connected to the comms hub. 02/07/13 – Update – Three CAD can be connected	02.07.13	CS	Closed
SDAG_7.05	DECC agreed to propose a solution to SDAG in order to provide more information on HHT functionality before the next SDAG meeting.	02.07.13 Workshop being held on 5 th July	CS	Closed
SDAG_7.06	GBCS: the outline timetable for the review of the GBCS was to be issued to SDAG to assist in resource planning.	02.07.13 On Agenda item 9. AOB	CS	Closed

DECC clarified that IHD firmware is not in the scope of day one DCC Services: the volumes for IHD firmware distribution were not included in the volume profiles used for DCC Service Provider procurement. Accordingly the DCC Service Provider contracts (which will be derived from ISFT documentation) do not support the distribution of IHD firmware. The introduction of a firmware update service for IHDs would need to be subject of a change control.

Action – DECC to analyse potential implications of supporting IHD firmware updates and report back via SDAG

DECC suggested that Energy Suppliers should not need to be aware of Comms Hub Firmware upgrades. This hypothesis was challenged by the group, stating that it was essential that Energy Suppliers were informed of Comms Hubs that had firmware updates planned over a future period (to be defined). There was discussion as to whether this information could be updated onto the DCC Self Service Interface to DCC Service Users.

Action – DECC to add Energy Supplier as “informed” to the Comms Hub responsibilities matrix.

Concerns were raised by the group over the level of involvement of different parties for firmware updates that affected the Gas Proxy. Energy Suppliers raised the concern that they should be involved as it may affect gas meter functionality and therefore should not be a sole CSP responsibility to manage.

Action – DECC to provide further analysis and report back to SDAG in relation to how to identify when Gas Proxy firmware updates should involve Gas Suppliers and how such a process could operate

Actions – Pre-payment Workshop



Department
of Energy &
Climate Change

As part of this discussion a suggestion was made that, in the event of an invalid ID, the customer should be provided with the name and phone number of their registered Energy Supplier. This solution could be implemented if Energy Suppliers could look up the registered supplier via DCC or other industry systems and pass details back to the customer at the point of payment (e.g. by printing the registered supplier name and phone number on a receipt).

3.17. DECC reminded the workshop that this service requirement had previously been discussed with stakeholders but not pursued due to potential security concerns around data mining by DCC Users and concerns over data ownership of industry registration data. It was noted that this functionality was currently available to Energy Suppliers using the existing Industry Registration services and therefore there are options for delivery of this requirement without the need for a DCC service.

Action – DECC to re-consider the issue and determine if there is a way of providing registration look-up as a DCC Service, with appropriate controls to mitigate the security concerns.

The walkthrough of the business process led into a DECC presentation on how the new Smart Meter UTRN (Unique Transaction Reference Number) is proposed to be generated and on its constituent parts.

3.25. DECC informed the group that the slides presented in this section for UTRN had been updated since the original set of slides had been circulated in advance of the workshop. DECC confirmed that a revised sets of slides would be re-circulated to match those presented with the minutes of the workshop.

Action – DECC to circulate revised set of slides to all attendees with the workshop minutes.

3.34. A question was raised as to why the DSP played a role in the UTRN generation process (though the generation of a MAC code which would be passed back to the requesting Energy Supplier). If the DSP systems were unavailable the Energy Supplier could not complete the UTRN generation process and a customer could not add credit to their meters. This added a reliance on the DCC that was not expected.

Action - DECC to investigate this point further and provide updates to a future SDAG as the strategic intent was to avoid placing reliance on the DCC for the generation of UTRNs.

3.35. DECC confirmed that UTRNs can be applied to a Smart Meter out of sequence. This is achieved by referencing a “floor value” and re-setting the transaction number cache as part of the prepay mode change or initial configuration of the Smart Meter. These transactions would be sent by Energy Suppliers as Service Requests, defined in the DCC User Gateway Catalogue. This action would also need to be performed on CoS.

Action - DECC to check if this point was discussed in the recent CoS workshop and provide an update to SDAG.

5.6. A further question was raised as to whether smaller Energy Suppliers are aware of the impacts of prepayment changes for Smart Meters. DECC confirmed that smaller Energy Suppliers had been invited to this workshop and there has been representation from smaller suppliers at other recent workshops. It was suggested by the group that there would be value in DECC preparing a briefing document on prepayment or presenting this subject to the Small Suppliers' Forum.

Action - DECC to investigate ways of briefing smaller suppliers.

Actions – Pre-payment Workshop



Department
of Energy &
Climate Change

Several workshop attendees requested an update on progress with the prepayment issues log and prepayment roadmap, which had been led by the Programme's Consumer Engagement and Rollout team. James Biott from DECC gave an update and informed the group that there is an on-going process for monitoring and updating both documents and that updated versions would be distributed shortly

Action - DECC to send out updated prepayment issues list.



2. PROCESS TO SUPPORT MOP WORKING

Mike Bennett

Meter Operators and Meter Public Credentials



Department
of Energy &
Climate Change

- Meter requires public credentials prior to deployment
 - currently defined as Supplier's KA and DS
- Thus under current model meters are pre-allocated to Supplier
- Meter Operators installing on behalf of multiple Suppliers
- Thus carrying meter stock for several Suppliers
- Efficiencies available by assigning meter to Supplier at point of install
 - this is particularly an issue "out of area"
 - affects both small Suppliers and Big 6
- Requires a valid and secure yet, updateable set of credentials for some meters


Operation	Context	Pros	Cons
DSP certs on meters	For small volumes of MOP managed devices – cert allows only credential update	Allows operational flexibility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cannot personalise devices to Supplier - Dependency on updating security credentials
MOP operating on behalf of supplier	Supplier delegates access to DCC to MOP	Allows MOPs to undertake all Supplier activities	Supplier is responsible for MOP actions
MOP certs on devices	MOP cert populates Supplier slots on meter - cert allows only credential update	Allows operational flexibility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cannot personalise devices to Supplier - Dependency on updating security credentials - MOPS have to interface to DCC
MOP operating as supplier	MOP organisation has supplier role	MOP signs up to SEC in supplier role and accesses DCC as a Supplier	

- Gas Proxy is deployed with DSP credentials in Supplier “slots” (KA and DS)
- Hand over process via SR 6.21 Handover of DCC Controlled Device
 - DSP updates security credentials to Supplier on receipt of valid request
- Proposed that the same approach is available as an option
- Thus some meters could be manufactured with DSP credentials present in Supplier “slots”
- DSP credentials allow only update of security credentials
- Requires an additional step to handover devices in the install process:

High Level Install and Commission (with DSP credentials)



Department
of Energy &
Climate Change



- Increases time to install
- Increases potential failure points
- Prevents personalisation/pre-configuration of meters
- Allows flexibility for installers
- Creates efficiencies in logistics chain
- Proposed as an option
- Risks:
 - DSP compromise
 - Bogus credentials
 - Bypass checks
 - Commissioning availability
 - Performance (volume of installs)



3. PARSE AND CORRELATE FEEDBACK

Terry Underwood

- Correlate capabilities are needed by DCC Service Users to ensure 'Critical' Service Requests transformed into HAN commands by the DCC match the original Service Requests sent by the Service User. Service Users can then electronically sign the HAN Command confident that it is the intended instruction.
- Parse capabilities are required to support Service Users in converting ZigBee and DLMS messages into a standard format for integration with their Smart Metering Systems. This removes the need for the DCC to transform Responses and Alerts which would have broken the security credentials required by Service Users for authenticating Responses and Alerts.
- DECC issued the first draft of Parse & Correlate requirements on 10th May 2013. One hundred and forty eight comments were returned
- The following slide deck summarise the key issues raised and DECC's preliminary position on each.

- The document did not adequately outline how encryption of sensitive values could be supported.
 - ❑ DECC are attempting to standardise the format of sensitive values between ZigBee, DLMS and the DCC Service User-facing interface specifications. This will ensure that once values are encrypted then no further conversions are required. Should this not be achievable then DECC will revisit these requirements.
 - ❑ Parse & Correlate should not be involved with cryptography as this would require the function to interact with supplier's keys. This significantly increases the necessary security.
 - ❑ Encryption/Decryption must therefore be undertaken before or after P&C interactions.
 - ❑ For Correlate, this is only relevant for one Service Request and the encrypted blob is compared to verify its integrity.
 - ❑ For Parse, DECC's view is that un-encryption should occur after parsing as this removed the need for Suppliers to understand ZigBee and DLMS.

- Concerns were raised regarding the need for the flexibility for DCC Service Users to customise the configuration of Parse & Correlate (rules to apply and Service Request versions).
 - ☐ The requirements oblige the DCC to issue a common configuration file for each DCC Data Services (DSP) release.
 - ☐ In order to accommodate gradual upgrades if and when DCC services are upgraded, suppliers ****MAY** need to run different configurations.
 - ☐ Also, suppliers may choose to amend rules to tighten/loosen based on their own implementations (e.g. to avoid short term software releases whereby validation doesn't align).
 - ☐ A specific problem may arise regarding enduring CoS message correlation if rules are different. Otherwise the impact of individual configuration differences are localised.

DECC invite views as to the preferred approach!

- The purpose of supporting multiple message versions and the number of versions supported was not elaborated
 - ☐ Changes to DC Service Requests and HAN commands- whilst undesirable are almost certain.
 - ☐ The rules associated with Parsing and Correlating are also likely to be subject to improvements over time.
 - ☐ DECC believe that this is better managed as configuration change rather than code change.
 - ☐ The number of message versions and associated rules specified in the requirements are testable values and do not represent expected change.

- The cost of support for additional platforms, application servers and Java versions is unclear.
 - ❑ The Requirements oblige catalogue pricing for additional support.
 - ❑ Additions will require Changes to be agreed via the SEC Panel's Technical Group. The mechanism for charging (shared or otherwise) for such additions will be for them to decide.
- Installation of specific Java versions may impact pre-existing Java software
 - ❑ pre-agreed Java versions and Application Servers will be supported. A requirement to 'encapsulate' java versions is also included to minimise the impact on existing Java versions installed. DECC believe this will work for most deployment scenarios.

- Concern that support was not aligned with business needs.
 - ☐ Support obligations will apply for the duration of the license.
 - ☐ Support now aligns to the wider DCC Service Management regime and associated severity levels.
 - ☐ Appendix 3 of the next iteration of the requirements document outlines these severity levels.
 - ☐ Note that DECC believe that the level of support should be reviewed after the functionality has bedded in as 24 hour support will be a big cost driver and may not prove appropriate for a packaged product.

- The mechanism for calculating the 34 transactions per second stated volumetric and support for higher volumes was not clear.
 - ☐ 34TPS was an approximate average of the largest supplier's expected transactions.
 - ☐ In order to ensure this was measurable an entry level virtual cluster was specified for test purposes.
 - ☐ There are many ways that additional/higher peak transaction volumes can be supported:
 - ✓ More powerful virtual servers and/or
 - ✓ More servers per cluster and/or
 - ✓ More instances of the software and/or
 - ✓ Splitting Parse traffic from Correlate traffic.
 - ☐ The requirements oblige the DCC to demonstrate how the design accommodates scalability and ensures splitting processing is not precluded by the design.



- Concern that the proposed testing is not enough to provide the necessary security assurance.
 - ☐ DECC security specialists have assessed the risks posed by the Correlate function (largely false positives and code exploits).
 - ☐ These can be sufficiently mitigated by functional testing and third party code reviews.
 - ☐ DCC Service Users' IT domains will provide additional layers of security.
 - ☐ An additional requirement has been added to include a means for DCC Service Users to validate the integrity of the delivered version of software.

- Mandating Parse & Correlate
 - ☐ DECC are considering an obligation for Service Users to ensure commands represent that which was intended. The mechanism for achieving this can be Parse & Correlate but suppliers could choose to fulfil this in other ways.
 - ☐ Similarly, DECC may not oblige use of 'Parse.
- IPR ownership
 - ☐ The DCC as the contracting and managing body is the obvious owner of IPR.
 - ☐ Ownership should transfer freely as part of the DCC license.
- Support for HHTs
 - ☐ Code segments can be used by suppliers on HHTs.



4. FEEDBACK FROM WORKSHOPS

SERVICE MANAGEMENT

FIRMWARE

PREPAYMENT

Colin Sawyer, Tim Hall, Stuart Scott



Topics covered:

- DCC Service Management System approach
- Service Desk Principles
- Incident Management Process Flows
 - On-demand messages
 - Calendarised meter readings
 - DCC-scheduled messages
 - Future-dated messages
 - DCC-detected failure
 - Major incident



Service Desk Principles

1. Service Desk logic will be highly automated
2. Self help will be available to guide problem diagnosis
3. Initial investigation to be done by the party that receives the failure message
4. the DCC infrastructure will be proactively managed



- Actions:
 - Analyse implications of including firmware updates to IHDs
 - Confirm requirement for DSP to 'MAC' firmware images
 - *Not required – allows for use of multicast by CSPs*
 - Ensure Energy Suppliers are informed of CH firmware updates
 - Analyse involvement of gas suppliers in firmware update of GPD



- Actions:
 - Analyse whether, on invalid top-up, the ‘invalid’ supplier could look up the registered supplier (via DCC) and provide details to consumer
 - Confirm requirement for DSP to ‘MAC’ the UTRN
 - *Not required – supplier will be sole party involved in generating the UTRN*
 - Confirm requirement to re-set the ‘floor value’ of the sequence number at CoS
 - Arrange further briefing for small suppliers
 - Circulate updated PPM issues log



5. GB SECURITY EXTENSIONS - UPDATE

Peter Morgan

ZigBee and DLMS Update



Department
of Energy &
Climate Change

ZigBee

- SEP 1.3 MRD written, reviewed by SSWG and awaiting imminent submission to ZA
- SSWG has written to ZA confirming its support for the SEP 1.3 approach

DLMS

- DLMS use case work underway
- GB security requirements submitted to DLMS UA
 - Requirements and solutions discussed with DLMS UA
- Target date for acceptance of GB requirements and solutions in line with programme plan



6. OPTIONS FOR SETTING PRIVACY PIN AND PROTECTED FUNCTIONALITY BEHIND THE PIN

Tim Bailey

Options for setting PIN



Department
of Energy &
Climate Change

Option 1: Supplier sets privacy PIN to 0000 – and sends consumers instructions on how to set a PIN locally.

- Supported by manufacturers;
- Suppliers support providing this as an option; some would use this as default, others would set and provide PIN as default but support this as additional capability for a consumer who wants to change the PIN;

Risks:

- Privacy risk if used as default on CoT – where meter is in a shared space as will leave meter in a state where anyone can enter a PIN;
- If supplier doesn't hold PIN then will not be able to reset when WAN is unavailable (which may be when consumer needs to access the meter – e.g. to activate EC and enable supply.)

Options for setting PIN



Department
of Energy &
Climate Change

Option 2 Supplier generates and sends a privacy PIN to the meter and to consumer (e.g. email, SMS)

- Supported by manufacturers;
- Suppliers support providing this as an option; some would use this as default,
- Some suppliers would set a PIN and provide it but not store it;
- Some suppliers would set a PIN and retain it to provide if consumer forgets PIN (e.g. last four digits of account number)

Risks:

If supplier doesn't hold PIN then will not be able to reset when WAN is unavailable (which may be when consumer needs to access meter);

Options for setting PIN



Department
of Energy &
Climate Change

Findings from Request for information:

- Wide support for adding capability to change a PIN locally – including to turn PIN protection off – on entry of existing PIN where set;
- Wide support for adding capability to set a PIN remotely – including to turn PIN protection off (e.g. setting a 0000 PIN)
- This will allow suppliers to use a combination of remote and local PIN setting in line with their privacy and risk assessments;
- Manufacturers have not said that this will have any significant impact on meter design;
- Already supported by ZigBee/DLMS

Options for setting protected data/functions



Department
of Energy &
Climate Change

Option 1: Total configurability – a new data item sets the protected meter screens (data items/functions) – e.g. 01100010 (1 = protected; 0 = not protected)

- No support from manufacturers or suppliers;
- Additional HAN commands would be required to provide the configuration to be set and this would add complexity to the meter;
- May create consumer confusion as protected screens may differ from meter to meter;
- Will however provide future flexibility should privacy requirements change.

Options for setting protected data/functions



Department
of Energy &
Climate Change

Option 2: Partial configurability – new data item to configure whether privacy and/or PPM function screens are protected.

- Suggested as an option during discussions with suppliers;
- Would allow a supplier to protect private data where a meter is in shared space; but to allow PPM functions – add credit, activate emergency credit and enable supply to be accessible (or vice versa);
- An additional HAN command would be required to provide the configuration to be set and this would add complexity to the meter;
- Will allow a supplier to decide which sets of functions to protect in line with privacy and safety assessments.

Options for setting protected data/functions



Department
of Energy &
Climate Change

Option 3: No configurability – Private meter screens protected but PPM functions not protected.

- May require a meter change if a gaining supplier's risk assessment requires the 'enable' function to be protected where a meter is in a shared space;
- Reduces the complexity and requirements on a meter compared to requiring configurability;

Options for setting protected data/functions



Department
of Energy &
Climate Change

Option 4: No configurability – Private meter screens and PPM functions protected when PIN is set.

- Reduces the complexity and requirements on a meter compared to requiring configurability;
- Will not support a suppliers who wish for some consumers to protect private data but not PPM functions (or vice versa).
- Preferred option for suppliers and manufacturers

Options for setting PIN



Department
of Energy &
Climate Change

NEW OPTION 5:

- When a PIN is set, all functions and data (with the exception of certain data) is protected except for the 'add credit' function.
- Receipt of a valid UTRN then achieves the same result as entering a valid PIN – i.e. allows consumer to access all protected functions.
- Consumer can then enable their supply.
- For gas, the following also achieves the same result as entering a valid PIN:
 - a.) receipt of a valid UTRN via the HAN (from PPMID); or
 - b.) receipt of an activate emergency credit command via the HAN.

If accepted then need to consider whether the 'lock-out time' should be greater for these commands – e.g. 5 minutes.

Options for setting PIN



Department
of Energy &
Climate Change

Findings from Request for information:

- Need to further consider viability of option 5 with manufacturers and suppliers;
- If suppliers do not require flexibility to:
 - set PIN to protect data privacy screens and local CAD pairing function; but
 - not set PIN to protect PPM function screens(or vice versa) then only configurability will be on/off.
- Need to agree through further work which data/functions should be protected as standard when PIN is set – whilst all agree that debt information should be protected, there is lack of consensus on items such as meter balance.

Other issues raised:



Department
of Energy &
Climate Change

Will a “set PIN” command include a hashed or encrypted PIN?

- To be determined.

Will Programme specify display sequences?

- No – down to implementation;

What will happen on CoT?

- Up to suppliers to implement using SMETS capabilities – SMETS supports 2 ways of setting/changing PIN;

What will happen on CoS?

- Supplier may leave PIN unchanged or set/reset a new PIN and provide to consumer.



7. Q&A ON SMETS 2 CONDOC RESPONSE

Charlotte Middleton

Item 7 - SMETS2 Govt. Response



Department
of Energy &
Climate Change

History

- Opened consultation in August 2012 on future SMETS issues.
- 24 January 2013 - published first set of key decisions - designed to support the notification of that part of SMETS 2 on gas and electricity meters and the IHD.
- Standstill period ended on 25 April 2013. No 'detailed opinions' issued, nor concerns raised.
- Published the Second Part of the Government Response to the Consultation yesterday - e.g. responses to remaining 19 Questions and some issues where we had indicated a provisional position and committed to further work following Part 1 of the Consultation.



Key decisions....

Keypads – decision not to mandate on all meters

CAD – support local and remote pairing. More work on support services

EED - general requirement on ES in licence conditions that consumers must be provided with consumption data over the meter interface or internet – will add capability to record data in SMETS 2. Comes into force by 5 June 2014.

868MHz: Part 1 noted HAN strategy allows for the inclusion of an 868 solution when available. Part 2:

- ES clear incentive to develop 868MHz-based solution and welcome steps taking.
- ES will be required to report progress on their HAN strategies (including 868) as part of their annual reporting to DECC.



- First gen comms hubs will be single-band 2.4GHz – when CHTS amended to include additional HAN solutions, CSP(s) will be required to provide communications hub variants to reflect those and the commercial and operational preferences of suppliers

Assurance Smart Meter Interoperability – proposed position:

- suppliers required to obtain independent certification that the in-home equipment they install meets the communications and security standards described in SMETS, undertake their own testing of wider SMETS compliance and to show that their equipment will work with DCC systems
- CPA and Zigbee/DLMS certificates achieved, equipment will be placed on a 'certified products list' to be introduced and maintained by the SEC Panel. SMETS 2 equipment that is not on the certified product list will not be eligible to be automatically enrolled into the DCC.



- Propose larger suppliers should be ready to participate in testing of the DCC's systems

Consolidated proposition for testing and certification should be available for comment by industry in July 2013.

Security Governance and Assurance

- Security Sub-Committee will be created under the SEC Panel to keep security arrangements under review and consider whether they continue to be appropriately balanced against the SEC objectives and the wider threat and risk landscape.
- The DCC and DCC Users will be subject to independent assurance processes. For DCC Users, security assurance will be dependent on their SEC role code, whereas DCC will be audited in accordance with SOC2. The DCC and DCC Users will be subject to time based testing.
- We will consult further on the legal drafting for embedding the arrangements for the Security Sub-committee into the SEC.



Next steps

- Will reflect these changes in SMETS 2 for successful bidders – not expecting other significant changes
- Continue to develop the GBCS – use cases to successful bidders
- SEC drafting – consultation in autumn
- Notify SMETS and GBCS May 2014
- Introduce SMETS 2 into the regulatory framework as soon as possible after that
- There will be a limited period when SMETS 1 meters can be installed after this date



8. HCALC UPDATE

Peter Morgan

ALCS and HCALCS Update



Department
of Energy &
Climate Change

- ALCS and HCALCS use cases are currently being drafted
 - Check that current DLMS and ZigBee functionality supports original SMETS2a requirements and the additional minor features arising from the ALCS workshop
- On completion of use cases and associated reviews
 - SMETS will be updated to clarify ALCS and HCALCS operation (eg on loss of supply to meter)
 - HCALCS DDS will be drafted



9. AOB

- Update on Tech & Sec Arch Documents (Julian Hughes)
- SMETS2 – export consumption on twin element meters (Peter Morgan)
- Update on GBCS informal and formal review process (Peter Morgan)
- Firmware (Nigel Orchard)
- PPM (Nigel Orchard)
- Consolidated Issues Log (Colin Sawyer)



Next Meeting

- Meeting #9 – 24 July 2013

BIS Conference Centre, 10am–3pm,