

**Independent  
Evaluation of  
OCHA's Role in  
Humanitarian  
Civil-Military  
Coordination**

Final Report – Volume I

December 2012



## Executive Summary

In March 2012, OCHA contracted Universal Management Group to conduct an independent evaluation of the role of OCHA in Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord). This evaluation was completed in December 2012.

OCHA has taken a lead role in providing humanitarian civil-military coordination in natural, environmental and technological disasters as well as complex emergency settings. It has done so through the creation of the Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS), and, along with other relevant partners, has developed the concept of the United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) function.

The purpose of the evaluation was to: review the relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency of OCHA's humanitarian civil-military coordination function, activities, and resources; provide information on progress made in the area of humanitarian civil-military coordination; collect good practices in the implementation of the function; and provide recommendations at both the strategic and operational level.

### Methodology

The evaluation was based on a mixed-method approach combining quantitative and qualitative elements that included document review, surveys, field missions, desk reviews, interviews and focus groups. Validity of data was ensured through data triangulation (using convergence of multiple data sources), the use of standardized instruments, and compliance with standard practices in evaluation.

The document review included internal OCHA documents; UN-CMCoord programming documents, policies and guidance notes; relevant evaluations and studies; relevant military documents; and country level documents on preparedness and response.

Surveys were conducted of three groups: OCHA Head of Office and designated UN-CMCoord officers (100 per cent response rate), IASC Task Force on Humanitarian Space and Civil Military Relations (20 per cent response), and Cluster Leads from Global Cluster Groups (24 per cent response).

The Evaluation Team conducted field missions to Afghanistan, Haiti, Colombia, South Sudan, and Somalia; undertook desk reviews of Pakistan and Libya; and conducted interviews with 230 key informants either in person, by telephone or Skype.

Limitations included low survey response rates for IASC and Cluster Leads, difficulty in contacting staff who had been involved in preparedness and response, and limited access to military actors and national stakeholders due to security and time constraints. To the extent possible, these limitations were mitigated by follow-up telephone interviews and by engaging a senior ex-military advisor.

### Findings: Relevance

All parties agree that the military plays and will continue to play a crucial role in natural disaster and conflict situations, and that competent coordination of civil-military intervention will inevitably take on increasing importance. Member states sometimes involve their military in humanitarian interventions even where principles and guidelines might advise against this, and OCHA's engagement in upholding these instruments is well received by many actors. While opinions regarding OCHA's suitability to carry out civil-military coordination is mixed (some NGOs see it as less than neutral and impartial while many evaluation respondents have a more positive view), no other organization seems to be better placed to assume the overall coordination role now and in the foreseeable future. Humanitarian civil-military coordination involves coping with increasingly blurred lines between humanitarian and military space, the emergence of non-state actors, and the direct intervention of national and regional military actors, all of which reinforce the need for effective coordination.

## Findings: Effectiveness

In recent years OCHA has assumed its role in humanitarian civil-military coordination with increasing competence. The CMCS is seen as a good focal point for UN-CMCoord, and appropriate staffing, expansion of operations, and a more effective engagement in New York have all helped to facilitate greater civil-military coordination.

Despite the generally positive perception of OCHA's overall effectiveness in UN-CMCoord, results on the ground suggest that it needs to place more emphasis on mainstreaming and systematizing UN-CMCoord in organizational structures at the field level.

OCHA has established partnerships to advance and solidify the UN-CMCoord agenda, and is appreciated at the global and regional levels for building alliances and engaging actors in both the military and the humanitarian community. The UN-CMCoord function has become better understood and anchored within OCHA, but could still be more systematically integrated throughout OCHA. UNCMCoord still remains on the periphery of political discussions at the UN focused on the humanitarian agenda.

**Policy:** Over the years, and principally through CMCS and IASC, OCHA has advanced the normative agenda on civil-military coordination which now includes natural disasters and conflict situations. Further areas to be defined include protection of civilians, the police, and ensuring that there is sufficient guidance for humanitarian actors in their interactions with national militaries.

**Staffing and Human Resource Management:** Adequate and timely recruitment, deployment and retention of qualified UN-CMCoord staff remain key challenges for the organization, as they are for many organizations staffing humanitarian positions in the countries where UN-CMCoord operates.

**Support of RC/HC/HCT:** OCHA provides necessary and sometimes critical support to Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators, though this was sometimes judged inadequate by the coordinators.

**Country-specific guidance:** The effectiveness of UN-CMCoord and compliance with normative guidelines and principles varies in the field, and is seen as highly dependent on the development of standard operating procedures (SOP) and/or country-specific guidelines developed and accepted by country stakeholders. The evaluation identified best practices in the use of guidelines (Haiti, South Sudan, Pakistan) and the development of standard operating procedures (Afghanistan, Libya, South Sudan).

**Dialogue/coordination with military and humanitarian actors:** OCHA has engaged with partners through a variety of fora to advance and solidify the UN-CMCoord agenda. The evaluation identified a best practice in JOTC Haiti.

**Training and Capacity Development:** Training and to an extent capacity development have been significant components supporting civil-military coordination in general and UN-CMCoord in particular. CMCS has recognized the importance of building partnerships to increase the success and reach of its training. While all UN-CMCoord Officers and the majority of OCHA Heads of Offices feel they have adequate training in UN-CMCoord, the training has not yet reached sufficient numbers of other relevant groups – such as Cluster Leads, OCHA staff at headquarters and in the field, Humanitarian Coordinators, and NGOs.

**Responding to requests for MCDA or Armed Protection:** Although formally committed to norms and roles as outlined in various relevant fora and instruments – including IASC and country-specific guidelines to which they have contributed – many stakeholders involved in civil-military coordination (including UN agencies, member states, and the humanitarian community) do not always abide by agreed guidelines but make their own arrangements with the military, sometimes in ways that do not accord with agreed principles and norms. The evaluation identified a best practice in developing SOP in South Sudan.

**Monitoring and Evaluation:** The monitoring and evaluation of the UN-CMCoord function remains ad hoc. Data collection, reporting, conducting reviews, and collating results into best practices and lessons learned are not systematic. OCHA has also faced challenges in managing its knowledge on UN-CMCoord among the various field offices and in identifying lessons learned and good practices in civil-military coordination.

**OCHA Effectiveness in Phases of Operations:** At the preparedness stage, UN-CMCoord is constrained by its speed of deployment, which itself is affected by outside factors such as infrastructure capabilities and priorities of those calling capabilities forward, as well as by its role in assessment and UNDAC missions. The evaluation identified a best practice in building awareness and capacity for disaster preparedness in Haiti. In the response phase, OCHA has yet to adapt its UN-CMCoord approaches to the national contexts. In Colombia, the evaluation identified a best practice for countries with no international military force.

**Other Emerging Issues in Operations:** Variations in leadership for UN-CMCoord at regional offices has affected the overall support that regional offices provide to country offices.

The UN Country Team and humanitarian actors working in countries with Integrated Missions in co-existence situations express concern with the impartiality and neutrality of the Mission, as well as efforts related to state-building and stabilization. OCHA has demonstrated some success in balancing the interests of humanitarian and military actors in this regard but has given insufficient attention to challenges in Integrated Mission contexts. In co-existence settings and conflict situations, OCHA has begun to improve its deconfliction efforts. The evaluation identified best practices in Libya concerning deconfliction, early dialogue and leadership.

## **Findings: Efficiency**

Assessing the efficiency of OCHA is challenging in the absence of commonly accepted indicators and data to measure elements such as how military assets are used, the speed of deployment of MCDA, and for what purpose. OCHA has established more streamlined processes for UN-CMCoord, which has led to more efficient use of MCDA in emergency settings. Many respondents in the field suggested that OCHA's development of country-specific guidelines and SOPs encourages better information sharing, which leads to faster decision making.

OCHA has also increased efficiency in information sharing. In the Cluster Leads survey, 82 per cent of respondents viewed OCHA's capacity to quickly respond to information requests as good. In Afghanistan OCHA supported a dedicated website on humanitarian response and telephone hotline for humanitarian actors, and in Haiti, it helped increase sharing/exchange structures between military and humanitarian actors and developed an Action Plan 2012 that strengthened information management and liaison/relationship functions.

## **Conclusions**

Humanitarian organizations and military actors are increasingly operating in the same emergency environments. There is thus value in reviewing the strategic and operational processes within OCHA to coordinate humanitarian response where both civil and military actors are present.

At the conceptual level, OCHA through CMCS has helped to bring forward stronger civil-military coordination guidelines and policies and has worked to enhance dialogue, advocacy and training. OCHA has also made efforts to increase its reach on UN-CMCoord through global and regional partnerships. The evaluation found that its stakeholders generally see these efforts as valuable and as contributing to an improved global humanitarian coordination system. To increase its effectiveness and reach, OCHA will need to increase its attention to and innovation in training and capacity building of national emergency actors with a view to meeting the diverse needs of a greater number of audiences through more comprehensive policies and up-to-date delivery methods. OCHA is already taking action in this regard

and is developing an accreditation system that will expand its coverage by allowing other training organizations to provide training that meets OCHA standards for quality and consistency.

At the operational level, the evaluation field visits and desk reviews suggest that the OCHA UN-CMCoord function is achieving some results on the ground in terms of improved coordination of MCDA, usage of armed escorts, and deconfliction in conflict settings. However, the achievement of greater results is hindered by a general lack of systematization of processes and procedures as well as human resource constraints. OCHA’s monitoring and evaluation is weak or non-existent in terms of identifying lessons learned on the use of MCDA, particularly regarding the situations in which it should be used and the results of MCDA support. Without this information, it is often difficult to ascertain the benefits of military assistance in humanitarian settings.

Generally speaking, OCHA insufficiently engages with military in the preparedness stage of an emergency, and at the post-response phase, there are not always clear mechanisms for handover to national authorities. During the response phase, integrated missions in complex emergencies have been particularly challenging, with one notable issue being humanitarian actors wanting to receive assurances from OCHA about the maintenance of humanitarian space during a crisis. Integrated missions suffer from an absence of clear guidance on how to address humanitarian space issues and face scepticism from humanitarian actors, leading to inconsistent coordination and application of guidelines. OCHA in general does not bring all parts of its organization to bear on supporting civil-military coordination as well as it could, and often does not take strong stands on behalf of the agreed principles and guidelines both before and during emergencies.

There are, however, recent indications that OCHA is beginning to put in place the right mix of country-specific guidelines backed up by political leadership and appropriate communication to be able to engage on UN-CMCoord while protecting the humanitarian imperative. This is part of its larger effort to clarify and formalize the UN-CMCoord function over the past decade, and ultimately to make civil-military coordination more effective despite the relatively small size of the function and indeed of OCHA itself. This has been an incremental process, one whose various strands are now being definitively pulled together in a recently developed policy instruction that responds to many of the concerns expressed during this evaluation with respect to such issues as clarity of roles and responsibilities, policies and tools.

## Recommendations

1. The following recommendations are intended to build upon the recently developed policy instruction, provide impetus for its implementation, and improve the management of the UN-CMCoord function within OCHA. Recommendations have been prioritized according to their importance: “high”, “medium” and “low”.

Prioritization of Recommendations	
High	
Recommendation 1:	OCHA should fully implement the policy instruction and should allocate sufficient resources to ensure that UN-CMCoord becomes a core competency within OCHA.
Recommendation 2:	OCHA, as a key agency for UN-CMCoord policy guidance under the IASC, should improve support and assistance to the humanitarian community in their interactions with national militaries in various scenarios.
Recommendation 3:	The mainstreaming of UN-CMCoord within OCHA called for by the policy instruction should be continued through the existing mechanisms (advocacy, training and awareness), in order to enhance the profile of the function within the organization and respond to accountability gaps.
Recommendation 8:	OCHA regional offices should develop clear strategies for advancing UN-CMCoord in their regions, and should have UN-CMCoord personnel trained and competent to provide surge support in country offices where required.

<b>Prioritization of Recommendations</b>	
Recommendation 14:	OCHA should mandate that UN-CMCoord country-specific guidelines and standard operating procedures be developed in emergencies in which military actors are engaged. Where possible, these should be part of OCHA's overall contingency/preparedness stage of planning in priority natural-disaster prone countries.
<b>Medium</b>	
Recommendation 4:	In line with the IASC transformative agenda, it is strongly suggested that OCHA move forward on implementing its improved knowledge management structure in order to share lessons learned and disseminate best practices; it should also systematize its M&E function such that it can recognize successes, identify best practices and increase the accountability of the function to the rest of the organization
Recommendation 5:	OCHA should engage more systematically with DPKO in developing best practices and lessons learned related to ensuring neutrality and impartiality in countries with integrated peacekeeping missions, so as to facilitate decision making, communication, and leadership.
Recommendation 6:	OCHA should further develop and enhance strategic relationships and partnerships as well as synergies with regional organizations, and should use senior political level engagement to raise the profile of such partnerships.
Recommendation 9:	OCHA should, at the first opportunity, conduct an in-depth assessment of the education, awareness building, and capacity development needs of its multiple external stakeholders in civil-military coordination, and should design creative policies and approaches to meet them.
Recommendation 10:	OCHA should seek innovative ways to expand knowledge of UN-CMCoord such as through the use of computer assisted training modules and engaging with military-academic institutions.
Recommendation 11:	OCHA should improve access to and the reach of UN-CMCoord training, making a particular effort to focus upon NGO participants and participants in developing countries, Humanitarian Coordinators, OCHA staff in complex emergency settings, and national emergency coordination agencies and national military forces.
Recommendation 12:	OCHA and the IASC should place an increased emphasis on pre-deployment planning and training with appropriate actors.
<b>Low</b>	
Recommendation 7:	OCHA should develop short, reader-friendly basic UN-CMCoord materials to increase their relevance and accessibility.
Recommendation 13:	OCHA should optimize the UN-CMCoord function with its current staffing of country offices, regional offices and in CMCS, so that it is drawing on the resources it has and thus avoids any gaps in meeting UN-CMCoord staffing needs in high-demand countries.

## Acronyms

ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
AMISOM	The African Union Mission in Somalia
APC-MADRO	Asia-Pacific Conferences on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CMCS	Civil-Military Coordination Section (OCHA)
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
CMPS	NATO Civil-Military Planning and Support section
CO	Country Office
COE-DMHA	Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (Hawaii, USA)
CRD	Coordination and Response Division (OCHA)
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
ECOSOC	The United Nations Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ESB	Emergency Services Branch (OCHA)
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Forces
FCSS	Field Coordination Support Section (OCHA)
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HAO	Humanitarian Affairs Officer
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HPG	Humanitarian Policy Group (ODI, UK)
HPN	Humanitarian Practice Network
HQ	Headquarters
HSU	Humanitarian Support Units
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
JOC	Joint Operations Centre

## Acronyms

JMAC	Joint Military Affairs Center
MCDA	Military and Civil Defence Assets
MCDU	Military and Civil Defence Unit (predecessor of CMCS)
MINUSTAH	Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haiti
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
OCHA	The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODI	The Overseas Development Institute (UK)
OECD DAC	The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
PDSB	Policy Development and Studies Branch (OCHA)
QIP	Quick Impact Projects
RC/HC	Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator
RO	Regional Office
ROAP	OCHA Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific
ROLAC	OCHA Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean
SCS	Surge Capacity Section (OCHA)
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SHAPE-SOC	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Operations Centre
TFG	Somalia's Transitional Federal Government
TOR	Terms of Reference
UMG	Universalia Management Group
UN	The United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UN-CIMIC	The United Nations Civil-Military Coordination (DPKO)
UN-CMCoord	The United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UN-DPA	The United Nations Department of Political Affairs
UN-DPKO	The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UN-DSS	The United Nations Department of Safety and Security

## Acronyms

UNHCR	The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMISS	The United Nations Mission in South Sudan
USG/ERC	The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator
USPACOM	The United States Pacific Command
WFP	The United Nations World Food Programme

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## 1. Background Context

2. An essential component of emergency response, to natural disasters or conflict situations, is coordination between civilian and military actors. Such coordination is even more important given the increasing scale and number of humanitarian emergencies, as well as the complexity of those emergencies. At the request of Member States and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), OCHA has taken a lead role in providing humanitarian civil-military coordination in natural, environmental and technological disasters as well as complex emergency settings. It has done so through the creation of the Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS), and, along with other relevant partners, has developed the concept of the United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) function.
3. The UN-CMCoord function “is the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and, when appropriate, pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.”<sup>1</sup> This means that UN-CMCoord officers advise the humanitarian community on civil-military issues and facilitate the establishment, maintenance and review of appropriate relations between the humanitarian and armed actors present. They may also serve as liaisons between the humanitarian community and military forces, with key elements of the function including information sharing, task division and planning. Importantly, all UN-CMCoord Officers are expected to be fully aware of the Security, Safety or Medical policies and procedures established by the UN Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS).<sup>2</sup>
4. The strategy implemented by OCHA to establish contact and maintain a dialogue between civilian and military actors in a particular emergency situation can range from coexistence to cooperation. When co-existence is the strategy implemented, the focus of the coordination aims at “minimizing competition and conflict to enable different actors to work in the same geographical area.” When cooperation is the strategy implemented, the focus of the coordination “consists in improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the combined efforts between military and civil actors.” The two coordination strategies and the methods used for each are further detailed in the figure below.<sup>3</sup>


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<sup>1</sup> IASC Reference Paper on Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies, 28 June 2004; Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines), Revision 1, January 2006; Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines), Revision 1.1, November 2007.

<sup>2</sup> UNDSS is responsible for helping to ensure the safety and efficient conduct of UN programmes and activities. As a result, it gathers crucial information regarding on the ground security situations, information that it often shares with OCHA. In so doing, it contributes to supporting the OCHA UN-CMCoord function in many countries.

<sup>3</sup> For further definitions of the civil-military function by various organizations, as well as a history of OCHA’s goals and objectives, see Appendix III in the Volume II of this report.

**Exhibit 1.1 Possible Interfaces for Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination<sup>4</sup>**



OCHA’s civil-military coordination role takes place within an ever more complex global environment and institutional context. As a result, many parties feel that OCHA faces underlying obstacles that will always make its task of civil-military coordination a challenging one. These parties say that the UN’s intergovernmental nature and political activities make the aim of true neutrality and impartiality in humanitarian situations close to impossible to attain. It is also widely believed that in any pressing situation, the military will intervene in accordance with its country’s perceived interests regardless of OCHA’s positions. The UN’s difficulties in working with the increasing numbers of non-recognized in-country parties also limit OCHA’s outreach compared with the ICRC and certain NGOs, while simultaneously strengthening the perception that the UN is unable to fully engage with the humanitarian reality in the field. Even within the UN, OCHA’s role and its authority are not fully accepted by all. Yet despite these many challenges, all parties concur – however grudgingly – that no organization is better placed to carry out the civil-military coordination role.

## 1.1 Evaluation Scope and Purpose

5. As outlined in the Terms of Reference, the purpose of the evaluation was to:
  - Review the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and impact of OCHA’s humanitarian civil-military coordination function, activities, and dedicated resources, to highlight OCHA’s capacity to perform this crucial function.
  - Collect lessons learned and good practices in the implementation of OCHA’s humanitarian civil-military coordination function that can be used and further improved in the future.

<sup>4</sup> Source: OCHA Policy Instruction on the Roles and Responsibilities in Humanitarian civil-military coordination

- Provide actionable recommendations at both the strategic and operational levels on how OCHA’s humanitarian civil-military coordination function might be strengthened to improve its effectiveness and/or modified in light of changes in the humanitarian context, and mainstreamed into OCHA’s organizational strategies.
- Provide OCHA with specific information on progress made in the area of humanitarian civil-military coordination.

## 1.2 Organization of the Report

6. The report is divided into two volumes. Volume I is broken down into the following sections:
  - Section 1 – **Introduction**: presents the context and purpose of the evaluation;
  - Section 2 – **Evaluation Methodology**: provides the methodology and evaluation matrix for the assignment including indicators and data collection and data analysis methods used for this evaluation;
  - Section 3 – **Evaluation Findings**: provides the main findings of the evaluation in terms of the relevance, the effectiveness and the efficiency of the role of OCHA in UN-CMCoord;
  - Section 4 – **Conclusions and Recommendations**: presents the conclusions of the evaluation and a list of the recommendations for OCHA to improve its performance relative to its role in humanitarian civil-military coordination.
7. Volume II includes all supporting documents including: Terms of Reference, evaluation matrix, definitions, policies and doctrines on civil-military coordination, OCHA goals and objectives (2007-2009) and (2010-2013), list of people interviewed, list of documents reviewed, interview protocols, table of selected countries, dashboard for examining the operational effectiveness of the UN-CMCoord function of OCHA, and survey results.

## **2. Evaluation Methodology**

### **2.1 Overview**

8. The evaluation was based on a mixed-method approach combining quantitative and qualitative elements. As detailed in the Terms of Reference, it was guided by three fundamental questions in examining OCHA's humanitarian civil-military coordination:

- Is the organization doing the right things?
- Is the organization doing them in the right ways?
- How can OCHA better perform its humanitarian civil-military coordination function in the future?

### **2.2 Methods**

9. The evaluation used several interconnected methods: (i) document review; (ii) surveys; (iii) field missions; (iv) desk reviews; (v) interviews and focus groups.

#### **2.2.1 Document Review**

10. A full list of documents used for this evaluation is included in the Appendix VI in Volume II of this report. In summary, the Evaluation Team reviewed:

- Key internal documents provided by OCHA, at both the Headquarters and Regional Office and Country Office/Liaison Office level,<sup>5</sup> including strategy, planning and annual reporting documents linked to UN-CMCoord;
- Key programming documents related to the design and management of UN-CMCoord, such as policies and guidance notes and adaptations to the Oslo Guidelines and Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) guidelines;
- Evaluations and studies linked to UN-CMCoord and humanitarian response as well as those related to OCHA, the Cluster response to humanitarian disasters, and the development of the UN integrated approach in emergency settings;
- All available relevant military documents to which the Evaluation Team was able to gain access;
- At the country level, documents linked to preparedness (such as agreements with government on MCDA, humanitarian response plans, and UN-CMCoord training documents) as well as documents linked to the assessment and response phases of an emergency, and evidence of planning towards a return to normalcy.

#### **2.2.2 Surveys**

11. Surveys were conducted with three groups and all surveys were posted on-line. Respondents were given four weeks to respond and were sent three reminders. The three groups were:

- OCHA Head of Office and designated UN-CMCoord officers. This group was targeted to gain an OCHA perspective. The response rate was 100 per cent (23 respondents);
- IASC Task Force on Humanitarian Space and Civil Military Relations. This group was targeted to gain a perspective on UN-CMCoord from the Headquarters level. The response rate was 20 per cent (13 respondents);

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<sup>5</sup> OCHA Country Offices include sub-offices and antenna offices.

- Cluster leads from Global Cluster Groups. This group was targeted to gain the perspective of humanitarian actors. The response rate was 24 per cent (46 respondents).
12. Given the low response rates from the IASC Task Force and the Cluster leads, these responses were used to illustrate findings but were not used as a basis to generalize conclusions.
  13. The survey protocols are presented in Appendices X to XII in Volume II.

### **2.2.3 Field Missions**

Universalialia conducted field missions to five countries affected by humanitarian natural disaster or complex emergencies. The countries were selected using the following criteria:

- Suggestions of key respondents during the inception phase;
  - At least one country where the humanitarian situation is part of a complex emergency;
  - At least one country where the humanitarian natural disaster included a national force civil-military response;
  - At least one country where there is a peacekeeping or UN-DPKO presence.
14. Given these criteria, five countries were selected: Afghanistan, Haiti, Colombia, South Sudan, and Somalia. Field visits were prefaced by telephone interviews to ensure that the body of evidence for each case study included key civil-military staff members and stakeholders who were present in the preparedness and immediate response phases of the crisis.

### **2.2.4 Desk Reviews**

15. In addition to the field missions, Universalialia conducted desk reviews for Pakistan and Libya. Although these were not part of the original proposal, they were added to the methodology in response to feedback obtained during the Inception phase to add additional countries to our review in order to broaden the number of UN-CMCoord scenarios for the evaluation. Desk reviews consisted of an in-depth document review and telephone interviews with five to seven key informants in each country.

### **2.2.5 Interviews and Focus Groups**

16. Appendix V in Volume II presents the full list of respondents interviewed. In addition to interviews carried out during the five field missions and as a part of the two desk reviews, interviews were carried out with key informants involved in civil-military coordination and humanitarian response across the globe. A total of 230 interviews were conducted in person, by telephone or SKYPE with the following categories of respondents: (i) OCHA Headquarters (HQ) staff in Geneva and New York City; (ii) OCHA staff in the Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean (ROLAC) and in the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (ROAP); (iii) Regional Organizations, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and the African Union (AU); (iv) donor groups and military attachés in Geneva and New York City and in the field; (v) members of major international organizations, including the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) as well as the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA); (vi) members of the IASC Task Force on Humanitarian Space and Civil Military Relations and Working Groups on UN-CMCoord, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN-DPKO) and other members of the UN family with strong links to civil-military coordination; (vii) the military, including both national militaries and peacekeeping forces.

## 2.3 Evaluation Conceptual Framework

17. The evaluation focused on three dimensions of the performance of the UN-CMCoord function: (i) relevance; (ii) effectiveness; (iii) efficiency.<sup>6</sup> It also gave special consideration to gender equality and the impact of UN-CMCoord activities on women and girls, children, and the elderly. These dimensions and their use within the context of this evaluation are explained in the following sub-sections.

### 2.3.1 Relevance<sup>7</sup>

18. The OECD DAC glossary defines the concept of relevance as “the extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and donors’ policies.” The relevance of UN-CMCoord operations was understood as the extent to which the function and its operations respond to the needs of various stakeholders in terms of humanitarian civil-military coordination. As such, the Evaluation Team examined the relevance of the UN-CMCoord activities (i.e., advocacy activities, training activities, type of information shared, etc.) in any given context, drawing upon respondent feedback as well as expert judgement as key sources of data. The relevance of the overall UN-CMCoord strategy at the country and regional levels was also examined.

### 2.3.2 Effectiveness

19. The OECD DAC glossary defines the concept of effectiveness as “the extent to which the development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.” The evaluation examined effectiveness at two levels:

20. At the strategic level, it examined the extent to which the UN-CMCoord function as implemented at the global level and in-country supports the third broad objective as defined in OCHA’s Strategic Framework, namely a more effective humanitarian coordination system. In regions and countries, the evaluation examined the extent to which the regional and national UN-CMCoord strategies (where such strategies exist) are being operationalized. A final element in the evaluation’s consideration of effectiveness focused upon the extent to which the UN-CMCoord function is implemented within the normative framework defined by: the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement<sup>8</sup> which highlights the key humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality; the Oslo Guidelines; the MCDA Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies; and IASC Guiding and Operating Principles.

21. At the operational level, the evaluation examined the effectiveness of the UN-CMCoord function’s components, namely: (i) Advocacy of the policy and guidance; (ii) Liaison arrangements and relationships with key actors; (iii) Needs assessment/ situational analysis; (iv) Information management; (v) Monitoring and evaluation; (vi) Humanitarian Cluster coordination with the Military. The team made all attempts to assess the effectiveness of these functions during the preparedness, response and post-response phases. The dashboard used to examine the operational effectiveness of the UN-CMCoord function can be found in Volume II, Appendix IX.

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<sup>6</sup> The Terms of Reference called for a fourth dimension, impact. Please see the Limitations section for why the evaluation did not ultimately include this dimension.

<sup>7</sup> All terms are used according to the OECD DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management. This glossary may be found at the following link: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/2754804.pdf>

<sup>8</sup> The Code of Conduct for International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief was drawn up in 1992 by the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response

### 2.3.3 Efficiency

22. The OECD DAC glossary defines efficiency as “a measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results.” The Evaluation Team gave great consideration to the concept of efficiency, especially to the set of indicators to be used to examine it. The two indicators that were put forward most frequently during the Inception phase were the speed of operations and the cost of operations. But from a methodological perspective, the team was faced with several constraints: the absence of benchmarks, baseline data, and efficiency data both in countries and in the Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS). As a result, the Evaluation Team was limited to assessing the internal efficiency of UN-CMCoord operations in the host countries visited (i.e., human resources, communication mechanisms, clarity of roles and responsibilities for the function to streamline operations, etc.).

### 2.3.4 Other Foci

23. During the course of the evaluation, the Evaluation Team came to recognize that UN-CMCoord necessarily has to take into account issues of gender equality and the impact of UN-CMCoord activities on women and girls, children in general, and the elderly. Security Council Resolution 1325 on Gender, Women, Peace and Security also points to the role and contribution of women and their participation during complex emergencies, and encourages a more prominent consideration of the gender perspective in training and exercises. To this end, the Evaluation Team gave special emphasis to how UN-CMCoord activities and training encourage the participation and active engagement of women, and also address the needs of women and girls, children in general, and other disadvantaged groups particularly the elderly, who in many instances are impacted more seriously in humanitarian emergencies than other categories of people.

## 2.4 Analysis

24. The scope of this evaluation required that the analysis consider perceptions as well as concrete data across a range of environments at the country, regional and headquarters levels. It thus demanded a variety of methodological approaches, including data collection from interviews and focus groups to gather the more subjective and perception-based data, as well as extensive document reviews and the observations of the Evaluation Team. Elements of all of these approaches were incorporated into the data collection methodology, and ensured that findings were based upon a wide array of carefully chosen and well-balanced information.

25. Data analysis involved triangulation between different data sources. The various evaluation tools asked similar questions of different stakeholders and different types of documents, which allowed for assessment of performance against the overarching evaluation criteria. Qualitative responses and quantitative data were reviewed and compared to answer the overarching evaluation questions. The main forms of analysis were content and narrative analysis, as well as comparative analysis.

26. Content and narrative analysis was used for data gathered through interviews, focus groups, document review and other sources, to pinpoint the internal and external structure of OCHA’s UN-CMCoord function, to ascertain its performance, as well as to situate it within the wider context of humanitarian responses in various countries. Content analysis provided the framework for classifying qualitative and quantitative information – including documents and interviews – according to particular themes and issues. Comparative analysis made it possible to highlight best practices and/or lessons learned in relation to the different methods and approaches used to support results achievement.

27. Validity of the data has been ensured through data triangulation (using convergence of multiple data sources), the use of standardized instruments, and compliance with standard practices in evaluation. The results of the analyses have been synthesized to arrive at the overall evaluation findings. These formed the basis for the draft evaluation report, which provided evidence for the findings and provided references to the data.

## 2.5 Limitations

28. Several challenges were noted by the Evaluation Team for this evaluation, each of which was mitigated to some extent by modifications to methodology and approach. The first was that the original Terms of Reference called for the inclusion of an impact dimension to the evaluation. However, during the course of the evaluation it became clear that there was a lack of pertinent indicators for assessing the impact of OCHA's role in UN-CMCoord; thus this element was not included in the final evaluation report.

29. A second limitation was a low survey response rate for Cluster Leads (24 per cent and 46 responses) and members of the IASC Task Force on Humanitarian Space and Civil-Military Relations (20 per cent and 13 responses). To mitigate this, Cluster Leads were interviewed in most field mission countries regarding their views on this evaluation, rendering the survey responses less critical for the overall views on the evaluation.

30. A third limitation arose due to the time that has lapsed since emergency situations were extant in some of the field mission countries, exacerbated by the level of staff rotation within both military and humanitarian circles. This meant that those staff involved in preparedness and response were sometimes no longer available in the country for interviews, and thus that some in-depth knowledge of the emergency response was lost. The Evaluation Team mitigated this by requesting and carrying out telephone interviews with these key informants in order to obtain some of this relevant information.

31. A fourth limitation was a more limited possibility to engage with military actors throughout the evaluation as compared to humanitarian actors, UN agencies and donors. A survey of military actors was not deemed feasible, and some military actors required clearance from their superiors before participating in the evaluation (which was sometimes not forthcoming). To mitigate this, Universalia engaged a senior ex-military person with significant experience in humanitarian civil-military coordination. As a result, the Evaluation Team was able to enhance its own expertise in military issues, as well as connect with additional senior military leaders recommended by our expert.

32. It should be noted that the Evaluation Team did not conduct interviews with affected communities or with non-state armed actors due to security issues and time restrictions. As well, few interviews with government officials were carried out, again due to time restrictions as well as difficulty in arranging interviews with these individuals. As such, this report does not offer a comprehensive analysis of how humanitarian civil-military coordination is perceived by national stakeholders.

### 3. Evaluation Findings

#### 3.1 Relevance

**Finding 1: All parties agree that the military, whether national or international, plays and will continue to play a crucial role in natural disaster and conflict situations, and that consequently the capacity to provide competent coordination of civil-military intervention will be of the utmost importance.**

33. There is strong evidence based on a literature review, interviews with respondents as well as survey data that the role of coordinating national or international military actors or peacekeeping missions as they deliver humanitarian assistance remains relevant in the current humanitarian environment. Although this role is not a new phenomenon,<sup>9</sup> it appears that it will continue to be a critical one for OCHA. Respondents from both the cluster lead group as well as IASC task force members who were surveyed for this evaluation confirm the continued relevance of OCHA in UN-CMCoord. Indeed, over 90 per cent of respondents said that they either agree or strongly agree that OCHA is relevant in coordinating between civil and military actors in emergencies.

34. An important recent literature review on civil-military coordination carried out by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) in 2012<sup>10</sup> sets out a first rationale for this continued relevance. It cites the growing complexity of operational and policy spheres and the increasing number of situations in which humanitarian and international military forces have come into close physical proximity with one another. Interviewees generally echoed this view, suggesting that humanitarian emergencies increasingly occur in complex environments globally, putting humanitarian actors in direct contact (and at times competition) with military respondents.

35. National military forces and related national emergency management offices are often among the first responders to emergency situations within their sovereign territory. In developing countries, many emergency response organizations are managed by the government in close cooperation with the military. In responding to emergency situations, military actors have distinct advantages not only in terms of assets but also in terms of planning and strategic abilities at the tactical level that can complement existing humanitarian structures and systems.

36. For instance, the response to the mega-floods in Pakistan in 2010 was initially carried out by “first responders”, particularly the military, which immediately deployed troops and assets to evacuate people and distribute essential relief supplies to displaced and isolated populations. Many interviewees felt that military efforts had prevented massive loss of life throughout the country. This point of view was supported by a number of post-emergency reports – in the words of one, “*a strong and well-equipped national military force can bring important benefits to the logistical aspects of humanitarian response in a natural disaster, as was shown in Pakistan. One review refers to an 80/20 split between the aid supplied through the Pakistani military and through the international community in the first weeks of the response (Ahmed and MacLeod, 2007, in Cosgrave and Herson, 2008).*”<sup>11</sup> (ALNAP, 2008: p.7).

37. In the context of very large emergencies, however, national capacities are sometimes insufficient and need to be supplemented by foreign military actors or peacekeeping forces. Such military forces have a larger capacity to move assets and people, as well as to offer MCDA in complex emergency settings. For

<sup>9</sup> Brzoska and Erhart, 2009; Bessler and Seki, 2006 and as illustrated by the 1935–36 Abyssinian Crisis and the Berlin Airlift in 1948 (Slim, 2011; Wheeler and Harmer, 2006).

<sup>10</sup> ODI (2012) Trends and challenges in humanitarian civil-military coordination. A review of the literature. Victoria Metcalfe, Simone Haysom and Stuart Gordon. HPG Working Group. May 2012.

<sup>11</sup> ALNAP (2008) Cyclone Nargis: Lessons for Operational Agencies, 16 pages.

example, the very strong military presence in Afghanistan, coupled with the very high number of humanitarian actors, meant that a coordinating role between civil and military actors was particularly important. This example also underlines the sometimes crucial role of military forces in humanitarian responses in both natural disaster settings and complex emergencies. In such cases, the coordinating role expands to cover both the national and the international force(s).

**Finding 2: OCHA is impacted by the strong will of member states to at times involve their military in humanitarian interventions even where principles and guidelines might advise against their doing so. The engagement by OCHA in upholding the principles and guidelines has been well received by many actors.**

38. The 2012 ODI/HPG literature review<sup>12</sup> suggests that “(...) *the principal driver of military engagement in humanitarian action has been the succession of large-scale international interventions in crisis contexts, and their changing nature. Over the last decade in particular, interventions have become characterised by ‘comprehensive’ or ‘stabilisation’ strategies that have explicitly sought to combine humanitarian, military and other spheres of action under an over-arching political objective. Within this rubric, military forces have increasingly undertaken a range of humanitarian activities themselves in order to achieve strategic or tactical objectives. These two trends are challenging existing frameworks of civil–military coordination in the humanitarian sphere.*”<sup>13</sup>

39. This excerpt makes it quite clear that there is a strong geo-political and strategic interest in involving military actors in humanitarian response. It also alludes to a fact that was noted explicitly by evaluation interviewees: that some countries engage their militaries in humanitarian response while also colouring the missions with underlying political interests. This has important

implications for OCHA, which is a product of the international member states that give it funding and resources, but which is simultaneously tasked with acting as a counter-balance to the tendency for self-interest

“Nation states do what they want and further their political interests at the expense of humanitarian ideals. The military are at their service and sometimes anyway have their own ambitions... But they are a reality we have to deal with, and increasingly so.”  
(a respondent from the humanitarian community)

amongst these very same member states. It is to achieve the latter goal by advocating for internationally agreed upon guidelines and humanitarian principles, and has been seen by some to achieve this with greater effectiveness in recent years. In particular, OCHA has been seen as a loud and clear advocate for humanitarian principles and the overarching civil-military guidelines.

40. The fact that humanitarian considerations can play a secondary role to political and military interests and that a good understanding of civil-military coordination guidelines can get lost in the shuffle is illustrated by the recent example from Libya. Also clear in this example is the role played by OCHA in advocating for those guidelines.

41. During the 2011 uprising in Libya, military contingents from the European Union (EU) were under significant pressure to intervene and respond to the humanitarian needs on the ground, this despite the fact that EU forces were also belligerents. Thus EU member states through the European Union Forces (EUFOR) HQ in Rome developed plans that would allow for the deployment of military assets with specific capabilities in support of a humanitarian response. This required raising forces able to do this, through a “force generation” process with EU Member States. Consequently, an agreement was reached that EU MCDA would only be deployed in response to a request by the OCHA Under-Secretary-General

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<sup>12</sup> ODI (2012) Trends and challenges in humanitarian civil-military coordination. A review of the literature. Victoria Metcalfe, Simone Haysom and Stuart Gordon. HPG Working Group. May 2012.

<sup>13</sup> ODI, 2012: p.5.

and Emergency Relief Coordinator (USG/ERC). The agreement was the result of much pressure, and was seen as essential for public relations purposes. The view from OCHA was that a formal request would have to be made, and that the USG/ERC would have to respond to this request. This was considered an effective approach, but it also placed great responsibility and political pressure on the USG/ERC. In the end, the USG/ERC never called for support from EUFOR, largely due to the fact that this would have blurred the lines between the humanitarian response and military activities. The example thus shows OCHA taking a strong stand to ensure that humanitarian space<sup>14</sup> in the country was respected, and more broadly shows its efforts to promote adherence to the guidelines.

42. Another example that shows how humanitarian considerations can play a secondary role to political and military interests and that civil-military coordination guidelines can be challenged comes from Pakistan. According to a Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN) paper, “on 20 August 2010, NATO announced its intention to create a strategic air bridge to transport in-kind donations from its member states to Pakistan. Additionally, and without prior consultation, this capability was offered to humanitarian organizations, and publicized as such. Of key concern to the humanitarian actors on the ground was the potential security risk to humanitarian actors if they openly associated themselves with a military alliance whose supply convoys to Afghanistan were coming under frequent violent attack within Pakistan (more than 100 attacks were documented against NATO assets inside Pakistan in 2010, killing 37 people and injuring 64). Following extensive internal discussions, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) in Pakistan concluded that it could not approve its members’ use of the air bridge as it was not an option of last resort because air and sea transport was available commercially. Despite the clear policy framework, at least two UN agencies<sup>15</sup> decided to make (albeit limited) use of the air bridge, as did a number of small NGOs who were not members of the HCT. The Pakistan government and several donors challenged the HCT’s attempt to maintain a principled position, arguing that no time should be wasted in moving goods into the country and that the use of the NATO air bridge would make the humanitarian operation more cost-efficient.<sup>16</sup>”

**Finding 3: Opinions regarding OCHA’s suitability to carry out civil-military coordination is mixed, with some NGOs believing it to be less than neutral and impartial in the role and many evaluation respondents having a more positive view. Yet no other organization seems to be better placed to assume the overall coordination role today and in the foreseeable future.**

43. According to the vast majority of respondents in all categories, OCHA is best placed within the multilateral community to ensure the humanitarian coordination between civil and military actors (see example in sidebar). It is also in the best position to dispel the misconception that such coordination is synonymous with compromises in neutrality and impartiality. This is reinforced by its mandate and its place within the UN system.

<sup>14</sup> Also known as the humanitarian operating environment, humanitarian space is “a key element for humanitarian agencies and organizations when they deploy, consists of establishing and maintaining a conducive humanitarian operating environment (this is sometimes referred to as “humanitarian space”). The perception of adherence to the key operating principles of neutrality and impartiality in humanitarian operations represents the critical means by which the prime objective of ensuring that suffering must be met wherever it is found, can be achieved. Consequently, maintaining a clear distinction between the role and function of humanitarian actors from that of the military is the determining factor in creating an operating environment in which humanitarian organisations can discharge their responsibilities both effectively and safely. Sustained humanitarian access to the affected population is ensured when the receipt of humanitarian assistance is not conditional upon the allegiance to or support to parties involved in a conflict but is a right independent of military and political action” (UN-CMCoord officer field handbook, 2008: p.10).

<sup>15</sup> WFP representatives confirmed that WFP used the NATO air bridge.

<sup>16</sup> Bennett, N. (2011) Civil-military principles in the Pakistan flood response, Issue 49 (February 2011), Humanitarian Practice Network – Humanitarian Exchange magazine.

44. OCHA’s relevance to ensure humanitarian coordination between civil and military actors flows mainly from its long tradition of dealing with humanitarian affairs. Indeed, OCHA’s mandate and its Strategic Framework legitimate its role in UN-CMCoord. According to OCHA’s mission,<sup>17</sup> it is mandated to:

- Mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors in order to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies;
- Advocate the rights of people in need;
- Promote preparedness and prevention; and
- Facilitate sustainable solutions.

45. Over the years, OCHA has established internal structures to accommodate UN-CMCoord within the organization, most notably through the creation of the Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) and before it, the Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU). Other ways that it has sought to accommodate UN-CMCoord include the establishment of guidance and policies through the IASC structure (consisting of UN humanitarian agencies, with standing invitees from the RC/RC and NGO community), and its involvement in humanitarian reform in 2005, which led to a number of changes and decisions including the creation of the Humanitarian Coordinator, the clusters, the UN-CMCoord officers, etc.

46. In addition, OCHA has a strong global geographic presence both nationally and regionally. At the beginning of 2012, OCHA was present in over 50 countries, working through 24 country offices (COs), 8 regional offices (ROs) or sub-regional offices, and various humanitarian support units (HSUs) and liaison offices.

47. Some interviewees suggested that because OCHA is part of the United Nations Secretariat and system, it has a strong image of being neutral, impartial and independent. However, some international NGOs see the role of OCHA as less than neutral or impartial. This is due in part to the challenges faced by the UN more generally within the global system, as well as to perceptions of the UN’s integrated mission structure.<sup>18</sup>

In Pakistan, the humanitarian community considered civil-military coordination to be a priority to ensure a sound humanitarian response. From their point of view, humanitarian actors view OCHA as the most suitable organization to fulfill this function.

Civil-military coordination issues in Pakistan are particularly important because of the recurrent natural disasters and the internal conflict that affect the country, which in turn demand coordination to ensure that there is no overlap between military forces and civilian actors in the emergency response.

According to respondents, OCHA’s relevance in carrying out the role of UN-CMCoord results from a combination of three main strengths: its very strong political analytical lens and experience, its leadership abilities, and its core competency in coordination of humanitarian affairs.

*“The UN is not only intergovernmental and therefore less than impartial and neutral, but also a spent force and a less-than-credible humanitarian entity in today’s complex world. It cannot be relied on to defend the interests of people in the field, to provide vision and leadership, and is anyway not really sensitive to or representative of all ranges of opinion.”*

(a respondent from the humanitarian community)

<sup>17</sup> Full details of OCHA’s mission can be found on OCHA’s official website: <http://www.unocha.org/about-us/who-we-are>.

<sup>18</sup> On 26 June 2008, in Decision No. 2008/24, the UN Secretary-General endorsed the recommendations of the 25 June 2008 United Nations Policy Committee meeting concerning integration. Per the Secretary-General’s decision, the term “integrated UN presence” refers to any context in which the United Nations has a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission in addition to a United Nations Country Team. Typically, an integrated UN presence will be led by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General. When it includes a multidimensional peacekeeping operation, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN-DPKO) will be the lead department at headquarters. When it includes a political mission, either the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) or UN-DPKO can take the lead.

48. Yet it is important to underline that there is nothing inherent in the concept of an integrated UN presence that is contrary to humanitarian principles. As outlined in the guidance on Integrated Missions,<sup>19</sup> experience suggests that the structural relationship that a Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and/or OCHA should have with a peacekeeping or political mission in a situation involving an integrated UN presence is best determined by a careful analysis of the political and security contexts, as well as of three additional and related factors: (1) the role of non-UN humanitarian actors, (2) the role of national authorities, and (3) the likely external perceptions of the peacekeeping or political mission within an integrated UN presence. Regarding the latter factor, *“If the mission is not accepted or seen as not neutral and impartial by any of the parties to the conflict, there is a risk that humanitarian actors, which typically provide the bulk of assistance to a country emerging from crisis, will avoid interaction with the mission in order to avoid any damage to their own impartial, neutral image (...) they may (also) become less willing to support or allow the delivery of assistance.”*<sup>20</sup>

49. The point remains, however, that neutrality and perceptions of neutrality are crucial in emergency situations, and that at least some humanitarian actors perceive OCHA as being less than neutral in carrying out its coordination role, believing that it serves the broader peacekeeping or peacemaking goals as well as seeking to back up stabilization efforts from individual member countries.

**Finding 4: Civil-military coordination increasingly involves coping with more blurred lines between humanitarian and military space, the further emergence of non-state actors (including criminal actors), and direct intervention of national and regional military actors. This further reinforces the need for effective coordination.**

50. Recent humanitarian emergencies have underlined some emerging trends that reinforce the need for, and the importance of, Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination. These trends relate to the increasingly blurred lines between humanitarian assistance and military operations, the emergence of non-state actors, and the interaction between regional and national military actors.

51. The concept of humanitarian space refers to a conducive humanitarian operating environment. Humanitarian actors working in complex emergencies seek access to areas of greatest need. While the specifically UN military presence does bring many advantages, from the point of view of humanitarian actors the fact that the humanitarian space may be occupied by military forces – whether UN or national – or may be part of the wider military theatre risks placing humanitarian efforts at risk due to physical danger for workers and beneficiaries as well as in terms of their appearing to be impartial and independent.

*“A number of commentators assert that the increasing engagement of foreign militaries in disaster response has further blurred the distinction between military and humanitarian spheres and competences.”*<sup>21</sup>

52. Furthermore, military and peacekeeping actors have developed Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) as well as their own civil-military (CIMIC)<sup>22</sup> functions to engage with civilians in a way that is seen positively by beneficiaries and that thus helps them to “win hearts and minds”. But as both sets of actors seek to do so, beneficiaries risk failing to adequately distinguish between military and humanitarian respondents and thus the lines of the humanitarian response and of humanitarian space might be further blurred.

<sup>19</sup> Note of Guidance On Integrated Missions (December 2010). This document may be found in the following link: <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2CC1B08A594391F2C125712500534E5C-Note%20of%20Guidance%20on%20Integrated%20Missions.pdf>

<sup>20</sup> OCHA (2011) Policy Instruction OCHA’s Structural Relationships within an Integrated UN Presence. At 5.2

<sup>21</sup> ODI (2012) Trends and challenges in humanitarian civil-military coordination, A Review of the literature. Victoria Metcalfe, Simone Haysom and Stuart Gordon. HPG Working Group. May 2012, 39 pages – p.15.

<sup>22</sup> See Appendix III in Volume II for explanation of terms.

53. This blurring of the lines of humanitarian space and of the distinctions between military intervention and humanitarian action also risks being furthered as a result of the desire of several states and multilateral bodies, including the UN, for more integrated or comprehensive approaches:

*“These concerns relate to the fact that humanitarian actors consider protection as a primary objective, whereas military actors, particularly those operating within a stabilisation strategy, often view it as a secondary objective that contributes to more important security or political aims (HPG and UNHCR, 2011). Humanitarian actors are also concerned about the impact of coercive military tactics on their operations. At the same time, however, there is recognition that the ‘non-coercive’ actions humanitarians can take may have more limited impact (HPG and ICRC, 2012).”*<sup>23</sup>

54. Another emerging trend that reinforces the need for civil-military coordination in many humanitarian settings is the emergence of non-state actors. As has been seen in the Somalia, Afghanistan, and more recently the Mali humanitarian contexts, such actors cannot easily be identified; this in turn leads to a lack of clarity regarding where humanitarian actors can operate safely while still respecting the humanitarian principles. As regards OCHA’s role in interacting with non-state actors, the most vocal humanitarians regret that it is not driven by the reality on the ground. More particularly, they feel that OCHA needs to deal with situations pragmatically as they occur on a case-by-case basis, by regularly talking to and negotiating with all parties, including the many that are not systematically involved. This may include such non-state actors as Al-Shebab, the Taliban, and others.

55. A final trend that makes OCHA’s role in UN-CMCoord even more relevant is the increasing interventions by national and regional military actors. This points toward a more complex civil-military coordination landscape, especially in light of the growing number and the greater intensity of recent emergencies. Such coordination could involve such regional actors as the African Union, the European Union, NATO, and ASEAN, as well as a wide variety of national actors as capacity grows.

## **3.2 Effectiveness**

### **3.2.1 Overview**

56. This section presents the findings on the effectiveness of OCHA’s UN-CMCoord function in four sections.<sup>24</sup> Section 3.2.2 on Overall Effectiveness presents the overall findings for OCHA. Section 3.2.3 on Policy deals with the policy environment for civil-military coordination within which OCHA operates. Section 3.2.4 on Operations focuses on the support that OCHA provides in terms of training and capacity development regarding UN-CMCoord as well as on the operational structures in place on the ground, including how well OCHA carries out its UN-CMCoord function in natural disasters and complex emergencies at the preparedness, response and post-response phases of programming, and how it supports integrated missions. Together, these three areas cover the breadth of OCHA’s UN-CMCoord function, encompassing the work at HQ, Regional Offices and at the Country Office levels.

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<sup>23</sup> ODI (2012) Trends and challenges in humanitarian civil-military coordination, A Review of the literature. Victoria Metcalfe, Simone Haysom and Stuart Gordon. HPG Working Group. May 2012, 39 pages – p.26.

It should be noted that some Security Council resolutions for peacekeeping missions include protection mandates while others do not. It is these mandates that guide the military component in terms of protection.

<sup>24</sup> This breakdown also reflects the Policy Instruction on OCHA’s roles and responsibilities in humanitarian civil-military coordination.

### 3.2.2 Overall Effectiveness

57. From an overall point of view, humanitarian civil-military coordination is defined as “*a core component of OCHA’s coordination mandate.*”<sup>25</sup> In humanitarian operations with a military presence, OCHA takes the lead on the establishment and management of interactions with military actors. It supports humanitarian and military actors through training and advocacy of the guidelines that govern the use of foreign military and civil defence assets and humanitarian civil-military interaction. OCHA also seeks to establish a predictable approach to the use of these assets by considering their use during preparedness and contingency-planning activities. OCHA’s Geneva-based Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) supports relevant field and headquarters-level activities. As custodian of UN-CMCoord related guidelines, CMCS helps humanitarian actors develop context-specific guidelines tailored to a particular situation. CMCS also runs a training program that equips humanitarian and military actors with the skills and knowledge necessary to communicate and, where appropriate, effectively interact with each other. It also prepares and deploys personnel to act as dedicated UN-CMCoord experts in the field.

58. When necessary, CMCS advises the international community on needs related to mobilizing foreign-military assets in support of relief operations or humanitarian assistance. This takes place through an advocacy strategy that complements and supports discussions at the Under Secretary-General level, coupled with the publication of operational guidance to the international community.

**Finding 5: While in the past, OCHA was seen as less than committed to UN-CMCoord, it has in recent years assumed its Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination role with increasing competence, due in part to the CMCS section.**

59. Evidence collected in the course of this evaluation suggests that there is a general appreciation of the global role played by OCHA in leading humanitarian civil-military coordination in recent years. The evaluation data suggests that OCHA has made critical contributions to UN-CMCoord that support its overall vision, as outlined most recently in its Strategic Framework (2010-2013) and the objectives contained therein. At another level, the evaluation found that key partners in the military and humanitarian community were satisfied with the work of the CMCS section, suggesting that it serves both the internal needs of UN-CMCoord while playing a catalytic role in underlining for the rest of the UN and humanitarian community the imperatives and importance of such coordination.

60. Through CMCS, OCHA has contributed to the first two goals of its Strategic Framework, namely an improved enabling environment for humanitarian affairs and a more effective humanitarian coordination system. While many observers in the past felt that CMCS did not have the profile or depth needed to strongly advocate for and lead on UN-CMCoord, OCHA stakeholders in Geneva, New York, and in countries suggested that it has more recently had good reach, leadership and vision in supporting a better enabling environment for UN-CMCoord where needed. OCHA respondents from Geneva and New York felt that CMCS has caught the ear of senior management within OCHA, which was likely made easier by the high profile nature of recent crises that in turn helped to ensure that UN-CMCoord would gain a higher profile within the organization.

61. Respondents also felt that OCHA has played its role in helping to put in place a more effective humanitarian coordination system. While the evaluation’s survey of Cluster Leads had a relatively low number of respondents, 80 per cent of those who did respond were satisfied or very satisfied with OCHA’s performance in coordinating with the military, NGOs and other UN agencies. Other successes include the reinvigorating of the Consultative Group on the Use of MCDA, the creation of the IASC Task Force on Humanitarian Space and Civil-Military Relations, and the appointment of UN-CMCoord personnel on the ground. OCHA’s role as facilitator in humanitarian civil-military affairs has been increasingly

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<sup>25</sup> OCHA (2012) Policy Instruction on OCHA’s Role and Responsibilities in Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination, Approved on September 15th 2012, 29 pages

recognized at the inter-agency level. Many donors also noted their approval of OCHA’s improved level of engagement and leadership of USG/ERC compared to in the past. This was made clear at a recent meeting of the USG/ERC with the OCHA Donor Support Group, in which the USG/ERC said that the areas in which donors noted particular progress included IM/advocacy, needs assessment, civil-military coordination, transparency, field staffing and financial management/resource mobilization. Some representatives of the Permanent Missions to the United Nations particularly highlighted the leadership skills of the USG/ERC in ensuring that humanitarian principles are respected and that the UN-CMCoord dialogue with key member states and other stakeholders is maintained.

62. Most of the donors interviewed see the CMCS as a good operational platform for humanitarian emergencies in which speed and decisiveness are of the essence in civil-military coordination. They also commended OCHA for training sessions for OCHA staff and external stakeholders (civil and military) which are visible evidence of the work being done on UN-CMCoord, and are simultaneously a useful advocacy tool to promote UN-CMCoord and the role of OCHA.

63. In sum, OCHA through CMCS and in collaboration with Policy Development and Studies Branch (PDSB) and Coordination and Response Division (CRD) has in the last couple of years begun to bring much needed systemization of civil-military coordination. Systemization is an essential factor in achieving more complementarity between the military and civilian elements during emergencies, particularly in complex emergency operations. It helps eliminate a key basis of civil-military tensions that arises because of military impressions that much of the civilian sector lacks clear objectives and plans to accomplish them. Moreover, through systematization, the civilian side is able to better work with the military as a partner, thereby reducing some of the traditional asymmetry between the two.

**Finding 6: CMCS is seen as a good central focal point for UN-CMCoord within OCHA. Appropriate staffing, expansion of its operational elements, and a more effective engagement in New York have all helped it to facilitate greater civil-military coordination.**

64. CMCS, like MCDU before it, has played a useful coordination and facilitation role on UN-CMCoord within OCHA. Evaluation respondents highlighted the following characteristics of CMCS:

- An expanded CMCS has taken steps to become more operational in recent years, and is developing a closer relationship with actors at the country level in coordination with CRD. It has also developed a Field Support and Operations unit which focuses greater attention on the operational side of UN-CMCoord.
- A more effective CMCS engagement in New York has increased its collaboration with CRD and PDSB. This much needed engagement in New York has given greater prominence to UN-CMCoord issues within the United Nations political environment. In July 2012, for example, during the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) meetings, side discussions on humanitarian civil-military coordination were organized and carried out. CMCS, through its New York staff, is also able to have a larger footprint in the Americas, which it can use to support regions in training, advocacy or response. One military respondent appreciated that OCHA staff in the region were available to review and discuss guidelines as part of a military working group, thus providing much-needed counsel on humanitarian issues.
- CMCS staffing is seen as reflecting an appropriate balance between humanitarian-civilian and military experience. The team is also well suited to leading policy discussions at the IASC and member state level. A further strength is that it balances its team with crisis managers and operational facilitators who are familiar with military and DPKO doctrine and policy. This range of expertise amongst the nine staff within CMCS ensures that the Section is relatively well equipped to develop policies that are true to principles and applicable on the ground.

65. According to stakeholders both within and outside OCHA, these improvements in CMCS mean that OCHA now has a more responsive UN-CMCoord function at the HQ level and a greater ability to engage across political issues and policy issues, and to engage in operations and capacity building.

**Finding 7: Despite a positive perception regarding the overall effectiveness of OCHA’s UN-CMCoord, results on the ground suggest that greater emphasis needs to be put on mainstreaming and systematizing UN-CMCoord in the organizational structures at the field level and throughout OCHA.**

66. Data collected during field visits and through desk reviews suggests that the systemization of UN-CMCoord that has to a large extent been achieved at the HQ level has not yet been extended to the regional or country levels within OCHA. At the time of the evaluation, CMCS was developing a policy instruction for UN-CMCoord which was to create some of these structures and systems on the ground.<sup>26</sup> This policy instruction is timely as it addresses questions of UN-CMCoord coverage across a range of country types, as well as regional office coverage.

67. At the country level, a number of deficiencies have affected the implementation of UN-CMCoord. These include:

- Complex emergencies such as those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia lacked full-time UN-CMCoord officers, or the rotation of UN-CMCoord officers was seen as detrimental to achieving improved coordination;
- Some sudden onset disasters occurring in complex emergencies (due to either armed conflict or otherwise insecure environments) lacked clear country-specific guidelines on how to coordinate between civil and military actors in the country (e.g., Haiti and Pakistan). In other cases, such guidelines were developed late or were disregarded;
- A lack of mainstreaming of UN-CMCoord knowledge or expertise across OCHA, resulting in a far too great reliance on the deployment of UN-CMCoord expertise and/or an on the ground officer;
- An unclear role for OCHA regional offices with regard to UN-CMCoord, leading to some Regional Offices being strongly engaged and others remaining less so;
- A dearth of collective knowledge, experience or lessons learned on the UN-CMCoord function.

68. The result of these deficiencies is that the effectiveness of UN-CMCoord on the ground has been mixed, and depends more on strong personalities than clear systems and procedures. This issue is discussed in more detail below.

**Finding 8: The civil-military function has become better understood and anchored within OCHA. Yet the UN-CMCoord function still remains on the periphery of political discussions at the UN focused on the humanitarian agenda.**

69. CMCS has sustained the policy, planning, training and partnering competencies of its predecessor organization, MCDU, while also placing greater emphasis on field operation needs and support. In the eyes of many internal stakeholders, the UN-CMCoord coordination function has become better understood and anchored in OCHA, and the technical competence of the function has grown. Nevertheless, it remains on the margins of UN political awareness rather than being mainstreamed more widely in political and policy discussions across the UN.

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<sup>26</sup> Full details may be found in OCHA Policy Instruction on the Roles and Responsibilities of Regional Offices and OCHA Policy Instruction on the Roles and Responsibilities of Country Offices.

70. The PDSB plays one of the key political support roles in the organization. PDSB sections, including the Protection and Displacement Section, the Policy Planning and Analysis Section, and the Intergovernmental Support Section, each have significant contributions to make to UN-CMCoord policy and the political debate, and indeed are engaged on UN-CMCoord issues in the context of various broader policy discussions including regarding humanitarian space. The fact that PDSB and CMCS work together in a variety of areas is important to civil-military coordination, and even if the relationship is not always easy – possibly on account of geographical distance – such strong working relationships are crucial to the achievement of strong civil-military coordination.

71. OCHA has a low level of engagement with member states. Interviewees noted that the Consultative Group on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) only meets once a year, which is seen as insufficient to fully engage politically on a number of key fronts.<sup>27</sup> Those stakeholders involved in such meetings believe that more time is required to build greater political engagement on a number of issues, such as:

- Support for natural disasters versus complex emergencies, and more fundamentally, determining what each entails;
- Carrying out joint exercises and undertaking case studies from a donor or humanitarian perspective;
- Elaborating the role of protection and the role that police and other services may play in protection of civilians;
- Elaborating the role of national military and addressing concerns about sovereignty.

72. While donors have generally appreciated the openness and transparency of CMCS in recent years, as well as the regular updates and progress reports, these do not replace a more sustained political dialogue with member states on these issues.

73. A third factor that has impeded wider political engagement has been the perception – noted by interviewees – that the domain of humanitarian civil-military coordination remains the province of technical coordination experts, which in turn has discouraged engagement by a broader spectrum of users.

*“More of a link needs to be made between military decisions and political processes. Military intervention is part of a political package. UN-CMCoord activities should not be seen only through a technical spectrum, they also need to be an element of engagement with member states.”*

(a member of the IASC Task Force)

This was particularly felt within the humanitarian community, where some actors noted that the policy discussions on UN-CMCoord remain too technical and disparate, covering a multitude of topics (such as MCDA, humanitarian space, armed escorts for humanitarian convoys, protection of civilians, deconfliction, etc.) but remaining too abstract and irrelevant to what was happening on the ground. One response to this concern has been a one-page OCHA On-Message to provide a more simple and straightforward primer on the topic, as well as a reader-friendly pamphlet on the specific issue of ‘Last Resort’.

**Finding 9: OCHA has been innovative and progressive in establishing a wide range of partnerships to advance and solidify the UN-CMCoord agenda, and is appreciated at the global and regional levels for building alliances and engaging actors in both the military and the humanitarian community.**

74. The effectiveness of OCHA as a leader in humanitarian civil-military coordination is a function of its reach; the broader the range of actors and partners who are familiar with and can act in coordination with stated humanitarian goals and principles, the better off the overall coordination effort in emergency

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<sup>27</sup> There are also working groups on specific issues.

settings. OCHA has enshrined this goal through its Objective 1.2, whereby OCHA will “(...) *systematically engage the expanding number of stakeholders involved in humanitarian preparedness and response. This involves both nurturing existing relations with operational partners (such as IASC organizations) and engaging more strategically and systematically with – and influencing – other actors such as UN-DPA, UN-DPKO, PBSO, UN-DSS, the World Bank, and the private sector.*” The objective therefore focuses on promoting partnerships and ensuring that coherent and consistent approaches are brought to interactions with the military and with military assets. The evaluation suggests that much has been done to help meet this objective, with some specific examples pointing the way to future collaboration with military and humanitarian actors.

75. One area in which UN-CMCoord thinking has advanced has been regarding the role of civil-military coordination in the Asia Pacific region, inspired by several key factors. First are the lessons learned during the Tsunami disaster in late 2005 and the role that greater national and regional military engagement could play in saving lives during similar natural disasters. Second is the growth in middle-income countries in the region, whose citizens are increasingly demanding improved response to natural disasters. A final factor is that national militaries are increasingly playing a first response role in the region. Together these factors have set the stage for the development of regional agreements and standards through which to coordinate humanitarian response. For the past six years, OCHA has had a UN-CMCoord officer working in this region in order to develop partnerships and to discuss the use of the guidelines in the region and how they apply under various circumstances, e.g. through the Asia-Pacific Conferences on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations (APC-MADRO).

76. OCHA has fostered other partnerships with organizations such as ASEAN, the African Union, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This has been done through a purposeful strategy by OCHA to engage with regional organizations through its Regional Office presence, often supported by CMCS staff. However, this engagement has not yet been applied equally across all regional organizations and some ROs are more heavily engaged in regional UN-CMCoord activities than others.

### **3.2.3 Policy**

77. The Civil Military Coordination Section (CMCS) is part of the Emergency Services Branch (ESB) in OCHA Geneva, and also has a cell in New York. It is the UN and IASC humanitarian focal point for the efficient mobilization and employment of foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) in response to emergencies, and for interaction with governments, international organizations, and military/civil defence organizations responsible for deploying MCDA.

78. CMCS advocates for humanitarian civil-military coordination, safeguarding of humanitarian principles and space, and use of MCDA according to internationally established guidelines. It also facilitates the development and maintenance of these guidelines, documents and associated policies. CMCS works with member states’ governments and military to increase their understanding of UN-CMCoord and to build capacity, as well as to engage national and alliance military actors during the development of their humanitarian related policy and doctrine. It also participates in major military conferences, seminars, pre-deployment training and exercises comprising significant humanitarian scenarios.

79. In developing and advancing guidelines and policies, CMCS works with other sections in ESB – especially the Field Coordination Support Section and the Surge Capacity Section – as well as with PDSB and CRD in New York. There is however a number of other work units within OCHA, some of which have been created in recent years, that believe they could make a useful contribution to advancing civil-military coordination in collaboration with CMCS and that would welcome the opportunity.

**Finding 10: OCHA has done well, principally through the work of CMCS, in advancing a normative agenda on civil-military coordination and in updating substantial parts of that agenda over the years (e.g., covering natural disasters and conflict situations). Further areas remain to be defined, for instance with regard to public order and safety and the police.**

80. OCHA’s policy obligations with regard to UN-CMCoord are reflected in its role as the UN and IASC humanitarian focal point for the efficient mobilization and employment of foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) in response to emergencies and for interaction with the governments. As a focal point, it plays a role in coordination and leadership within the IASC Task Force on Humanitarian Space and Civil-Military Relations, as well as the Consultative Group on the Use of MCDA. Out of this and related fora have emerged some of the key guidelines which broadly capture areas of coordination between the civilian and military community. These include:

- Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) in Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines) (1994; updated and re-launched Nov. 2006; Rev. 1.1 November 2007);
- The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Support of United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines) (2003; Rev. 1 January 2006);
- Discussion paper and non-binding guidelines on the Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys (2001 – 2001; being updated under the auspices of the IASC Task Force on Humanitarian Space and Civil-Military Relations);
- IASC Reference paper on Civil-Military Relationships in Complex Emergencies (2004).

81. The growing complexity of operational and policy spheres and the increasing number of situations in which humanitarian and international military forces have come into physical proximity with one another is one reason suggested for the proliferation of guidelines regulating civil–military interaction on humanitarian issues.<sup>28</sup> The underpinnings for these guidelines are found within Security Council Resolutions, including those covering humanitarian space and broader humanitarian principles and instruments which guide OCHA’s work. The guidelines are also grounded in the UN reform agenda<sup>29</sup> in that they incorporate such reform innovations as Integrated Missions and the role of the Humanitarian Coordinator. Importantly for the CMCS team as well as the UN-CMCoord function at the country and regional levels, these policies and guidelines form the basis of, and justification for, the work that is done in favour of civil-military coordination. They are thus the building blocks from which all other UN-CMCoord work emerges, including operational work, training and country guidelines.

82. Within OCHA’s Strategic Framework, Objective 1.1 sets out to “*strengthen relationships at the policy, operational and financial levels with a more diverse group of Member States and regional organizations. The relationships should facilitate improved humanitarian response in a changing humanitarian landscape.*” Interviews conducted both in the field and at OCHA Head Offices suggest that most policy actors are satisfied with the way in which OCHA has engaged with and reached out to its humanitarian and military partners on policy issues. For example, interviewees noted that actors such as the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) and DPKO have worked cooperatively with OCHA on guidelines and policy issues in recent years, and that there has been greater engagement on policy issues with regional structures such as the African Union (AU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

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<sup>28</sup> IASC/OCHA (2006) Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies – “MCDA Guidelines” - Rev. 1 (January 2006).

Note: These were the most recent Terms of Reference available at the time of the Evaluation.

<sup>29</sup> OCHA (2009) Compilation of United Nations resolutions on humanitarian assistance, Policy and Studies Series, 162 pages.

(ASEAN). One military officer interviewed also commented on the willingness of CMCS staff to support them on developing guidance for their own military, thus ensuring that they were consistent with the broad guidelines.

83. Despite numerous achievements, the changing nature of humanitarian engagement suggests a continued role for OCHA in bringing actors together and facilitating on UN-CMCoord policy issues. Areas that require increased attention, according to stakeholders, include protection of civilians, the police, continuing the review of the language and applicability of existing guidelines, and ensuring that there is sufficient guidance for humanitarian actors in their interactions with national militaries.

### 3.2.4 Operations

84. Operationally, OCHA's role in UN-CMCoord centers on providing emergency coordination at the field level and, to some extent, support from the Regional Offices. More particularly, OCHA identifies, prepares and deploys OCHA UN-CMCoord capacity to the field and provides guidance and technical advice to deployed OCHA UN-CMCoord officers. Generic Terms of Reference for a UN-CMCoord officer have been developed, including the range of activities and tasks for which an officer is responsible.

85. In its assessment of effectiveness of operations the Evaluation Team considered three factors: the extent to which these guidelines and Terms of Reference are followed, the different ways in which UN-CMCoord operates in natural disaster and complex emergency situations, and the extent to which UN-CMCoord is carried out effectively in each of the three phases of operation (e.g., preparedness, response, and post-response).

86. The following findings are organized according to eight functions of the UN-CMCoord as adapted from the Terms of Reference of a UN-CMCoord officer:<sup>30</sup> staffing; supporting HC/RC; assisting/advising in country specific guidance; dialogue/coordination with military and humanitarian actors; training/exercises/capacity development (with CMCS); UN-CMCoord civil-military forum; responding to requests for MCDA; and monitoring and evaluation. The final sections examine OCHA effectiveness in phases of operations and other emerging issues in operations.

## Staffing and Human Resources Management

### **Finding 11: Adequate and timely recruitment, deployment and retention of qualified and diverse UN-CMCoord staff remain key challenges for the organization.**

87. The current CMCS structure, which includes a presence in both Geneva and New York, is seen by most respondents at OCHA as an improvement from past years as it allows for greater dialogue between CMCS and other OCHA desks in New York, as well as with US-based partners and the missions of Member States. However, the CMCS function in New York is still modest and has some limitations in establishing all the dialogues expected (e.g., with DPKO, the Americas, Member States, etc.).

88. Staffing for the UN-CMCoord role is a key challenge for OCHA, as it is for many organizations staffing humanitarian positions in the countries where UN-CMCoord operates. This is especially due to high staff turnover as well as the particular skill sets required for success in the role. For both military and humanitarian personnel, missions in difficult contexts create incentives for shorter rotation periods and this leads to more vacancies and the need for more frequent recruitment.

89. At the time of the evaluation, the UN-CMCoord officer in Somalia had departed and a replacement had not yet been identified; similarly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the OCHA office was only staffed with a focal point. In Haiti, the absence of UN-CMCoord in the first weeks following the

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<sup>30</sup> OCHA (2004) United Nations (UN) Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Concept, Draft as of 1 December 2004, 27 pages

earthquake limited its initial deployment and its ability to play a leading role. Although current UN-CMCoord efforts respond to most of the functions expected, it remains unclear why there was not a permanent UN-CMCoord function in the country.

90. The challenges arising from rotation of staff are compounded by the concentration of the UN-CMCoord function in one person (particularly in international contexts) and the fact that UN-CMCoord skills are not sufficiently entrenched across staff in country offices. This increases the impact of the departure of UN-CMCoord officers as it limits the sustainability, continuity, and “rooting” of the function and negatively affects the long-term effectiveness of UN-CMCoord.

91. In terms of qualifications, there are various views as to the best profile and optimal skill set required for the UN-CMCoord Officer position. While strong knowledge of the humanitarian community and the military are seen as necessary, facilitation skills and a proactive attitude also appear to be crucial factors in the success of the role. Satisfying all of these requirements is a key challenge in staffing the position. In interviews, the evaluation found that the traditional role of a Humanitarian Affairs Officer can be easily adapted to include UN-CMCoord responsibilities, which would reduce pressure on the limited number of full-time UN-CMCoord specialists. This underlines the need for OCHA to encourage all staff to develop skills in UN-CMCoord and the ability to shift traditional staff to UN-CMCoord responsibilities and vice versa.

92. OCHA’s capacity to deploy its UN-CMCoord staff and equipment in the field received mixed reviews. While 65 per cent of OCHA staff survey respondents felt that its ability to deploy was good, roughly 35 per cent suggested it was poor. Among Cluster Leads, roughly 80 per cent suggested that OCHA had a good deployment capacity, but very few answered the survey.

## **Support of the RC/HC/HCT**

### **Finding 12: OCHA provides necessary and sometimes critical support to Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators.**

93. The Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) provides a critical brokering role which cannot easily be replicated, balancing humanitarian requests with available mission assets and thus ensuring a more efficient and effective use of assets. Knowledge of both the humanitarian sector and of the military is important to carrying out the task, though many RC/HC are relatively weaker in terms of awareness about the military side. The scope of tasks assigned to the RC/HC position in most countries is such that this position relies heavily on OCHA’s support, including from the UN-CMCoord officer. When the RC/HC position is coupled with the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) position in Integrated Missions – a position that involves important strategic oversight, and which also frequently is filled by staff with relatively weaker knowledge of the military side – the scope of tasks becomes even more daunting.

94. The evaluation found numerous examples in Haiti and the South Sudan of good support being provided to the RC/HC/HCT by OCHA with regard to humanitarian civil-military coordination, in terms of communication, information sharing, and managing requests for MCDA. This support is seen as especially critical when competing interests under the RC/HC/DSRSG fight for limited resources. In the South Sudan, for example, OCHA and the Logistic Cluster established general priorities for mobilizing and delivering humanitarian goods and services, based on needs rather than resources. They also established a list in conjunction with the cluster groups so that key emergency items could be prioritized in any United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) flights. This has gone some way to optimizing use of MCDA, while taking the burden off of the HC/RC/DSRSG to manage requests for MCDA.

95. In some countries, UN-CMCoord participated specifically in Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) meetings as well as in different cluster group meetings. However, it must be noted that a number of HCs have clearly stated that they overall feel they are inadequately supported by OCHA in carrying out their civil-military coordination role.

## Assisting in Country Specific Guidance

**Finding 13: The effectiveness of UN-CMCoord and compliance with normative guidelines and principles varies in the field, and is seen as highly dependent on the development of standard operating procedures (SOP) and/or country-specific guidelines developed and accepted by country stakeholders.**

96. OCHA's compliance with UN-CMCoord policies and guidance, including country-specific guidelines, was one of the most important dimensions of the performance of OCHA's role in UN-CMCoord. The results of the Cluster Leads survey show that 36 per cent of respondents viewed this dimension as very good and 36 per cent as good. In other words, 72 per cent of all the respondents of this survey view OCHA's compliance with UN-CMCoord policies and guidance in a positive way.

97. While other studies have placed much less emphasis on the importance of country-specific guidelines,<sup>31</sup> this evaluation noted their importance in effective humanitarian response. Guidelines drafted for South Sudan included a clause that permitted the management of existing armed protection convoys to fall under WFP and the logistics cluster. Guidelines drafted for Pakistan included language that accommodated the national military in Pakistan. See sidebar for example from Libya.

### Country-Specific Guidance in Libya

OCHA's dissemination of civil-military operational guidance proved instrumental in informing and directing the international community on the appropriate use of military assets to support the humanitarian response.

The development and early issuance of the guidance on use of MCDA to support humanitarian operations provided a useful tool at the political level, in influencing Member States and informing humanitarian actors.

However, we cannot say that OCHA was advocating from the very beginning of the humanitarian response. The initial advocacy was done internally by the EU (in particular the DG ECHO) and OCHA did not introduce the language of MCDAs or its role in the planning documents of the military operation since it was not fully aware of what was going on.

98. While country-specific guidelines are beneficial to greater coordination in and of themselves, they also pre-suppose a good level of coordination between humanitarian and military actors. A recent ODI study that reviewed country-specific guidelines across a range of countries<sup>32</sup> concluded that most guidelines provided a good level of specificity to assist in making decisions of last resort, and that most guidelines were heavily referenced at the country level.

<sup>31</sup> ODI (2012) Country-Specific civil-military coordination guidelines, Victoria Metcalfe and Michelle Berg, HPG Working Paper, August 2012, 10 pages.

<sup>32</sup> IBID

### Examples of Best Practices in the Use of Country-specific Guidelines

The evaluation noted the following examples of “best practices” in the development and application of country-specific guidelines.

#### Haiti

The conceptualization and development of national guidelines for civil-military cooperation in Haiti is a key element of the success of the UN-CMCoord function between MINUSTAH and the national/international humanitarian community. The Guidelines for Civil-Military Cooperation in Haiti have proven to be a key tool and asset in the sometimes tense or complicated relations between international battalions of the MINUSTAH and the humanitarian community as a whole. The role of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) in supporting these guidelines has been central in gaining the respect and acceptance of all UN agencies and INGOs and in their adaptation to local circumstances. Although the Guidelines were developed in the context of the January 2010 humanitarian crisis, they could provide a model that could not only be adapted to a peacekeeping force, but also to the Haitian National Police (HNP) and to any new national army that is created in the future.

#### South Sudan

In an integrated mission, strong leadership is essential to maximizing the efficiency and effectiveness of UN-CMCoord. The Humanitarian Coordinator and the Humanitarian Country Team are key actors in leading decision-making in humanitarian emergencies. The continuing deterioration of the humanitarian situation and the likelihood of increased use of the UNMISS MCDA to protect UN personnel, civilians, and by extension humanitarian personnel, will necessitate various forms of civil-military coordination and engagement. As such, the OCHA South Sudan UN-CMCoord function developed principles and practices for constructive civilian and

used as a last resort. Participation includes representatives from the DSRSG/RC/HC’s office, OCHA, representative from UN Humanitarian Agency, UN Military CIMIC/Ops, MLO, UNPOL, UNDSS and a representative from the NGO Forum.

#### Pakistan

The Pakistan country-specific guidelines represent one of the best practices of the role of OCHA in UN-CMCoord as they clearly mention the relationship between the host state military and the humanitarian community.

Unlike other country-specific guidelines, the Pakistan guidelines state the role of the national military, national authorities and the humanitarian community in both complex emergency situations and disasters in peacetime settings. These guidelines address civil-military coordination and aim at “promoting a clear distinction between military actors and humanitarian actors, and the ability of the latter to adhere to the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.” They also aspire to “promote operational independence of humanitarian action as a way of ensuring timely and sustainable humanitarian access to vulnerable populations.”

However, the application of the guidelines in Pakistan remains challenging. Although the national military was consulted in the development of the country-specific guidelines, they did not endorse the final document. This challenge also results from the Constitution of Pakistan,<sup>33</sup> since Article 245 (1) acknowledges the intervention of the Pakistan army into the humanitarian aid. Therefore, the national armed forces are frequently called upon by the civilian government to contribute to relief assistance, recovery and reconstruction in emergency response situations. In addition, since its creation in 2007, the Natural Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) facilitates the civil-military cooperation on behalf of the federal government.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>33</sup> The Article 245 (1) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan says that the national military forces are subject to law, act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973).

<sup>34</sup> National Disaster Management Ordinance of 2006 allows for creation of National Disaster Management Council (NDMC) headed by the Prime Minister. As an executive arm of the NDMC, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) is responsible for coordinating and monitoring the implementation of national policies and strategies on disaster management, and implementing disaster responses under the National Disaster Risk Management Framework. It also acts as an interface with the humanitarian community and foreign agencies.

military relations. The Guidelines are intended to address humanitarian civil-military coordination, and not CIMIC activities, which are substantially broader in scope. The Guidelines support the development of a relationship between military and humanitarian actors in which differences are recognized and respected. Acknowledging the need for both humanitarian actors and military and police actors to operate effectively within the same environment, the Guidelines aim to establish agreed principles and practices for constructive civil-military relations in South Sudan, avoid duplication of tasks, and promote and strengthen the coordination of activities.

At the technical level, OCHA South Sudan has established a Civil Military Advisory Group (CMAG). The main purpose of the CMAG is to provide practical advice to the Humanitarian Coordinator, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and humanitarian community. This may include good practice on humanitarian civil-military coordination or training on when UN MCDA should be

Finally, although OCHA drafted the guidelines for Civil-Military Coordination in Pakistan in March 2010, military assets are regularly deployed to complement the National Floods Response System. For example, the Pakistan military forces contributed to road infrastructure development and provision of strategic communication in remote regions, such as Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). They also reinforced NWFP government's recovery and reconstruction capacity. The Pakistan army's role in natural disaster response is strong and powerful, which can make it difficult to apply the specific country guidelines. As a principled approach based on an impartial, neutral and independent, humanitarian response was missing, the humanitarian space has been compromised, especially in areas such as Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa (KPK), FATA and Baluchistan.

### **Examples of Best Practices in the Use of Standard Operating Procedures**

The evaluation noted the following examples of "best practices" in the development and application of standard operating procedures.

#### **Development of Standard Operating Procedures**

In 2011, the United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Officer, in coordination with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), developed Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) on ISAF humanitarian assistance and disaster relief response. These procedures detail the steps to be taken by the military in cases of natural disasters, including the involvement of the humanitarian community and requests for ISAF assistance in situations of last resort.

The SOP have been accepted and understood by both the military and humanitarian actors. The SOP fit country-specific situations and clarify the roles and responsibilities of the military in the event of a natural disaster. The clearly articulated SOP demonstrate the value-added by the UN-CMCoord officer. They put the humanitarian vision into language the military can understand and help ensure that

or the humanitarian community. The establishment of SOP helped the military to understand the guidelines in a practical and contextual sense. For humanitarian actors, the SOP have clarified the process for ISAF support.

#### **Libya**

In Libya the SOP made OCHA's role in UN-CMCoord clearer for humanitarian actors and are seen as a useful coordination tool. The SOP detail the steps to be taken by the military during the crisis in Libya, including involvement of the humanitarian community and OCHA requests for assistance from military forces in situations of last resort.

During the planning phase of the humanitarian response in Libya, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) interacted less with Supreme HQ Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) but this did not hamper their operations. The humanitarian community only marginally and indirectly influenced the SOP's for the deconfliction process, which were drafted by the SHAPE and Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). The humanitarian community, however, was generally satisfied as the SOP were based on past practises.

military assets are deployed in natural disaster situations only as needed. Because they were developed with and signed by the military chain of command, the military has accepted the guidelines which commit ISAF to abide by the Oslo Guidelines in the field.

For humanitarian actors, the SOP are a useful tool in discussions with the military and in requesting assistance. For example, before the adoption of the SOP, the ISAF generally provided assistance in response to a request from a provincial or local government. Now, when there is a natural disaster, the ISAF contacts the UN-CMCoord officer to see if the humanitarian community has the capacity to take care of the problem or if they need military assistance.

#### **Afghanistan**

Until 2009, the interaction and coordination of military and humanitarian actors in Afghanistan were guided by country-specific guidelines developed by the Afghanistan Civil-Military Working Group, co-chaired by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR).

In 2009, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) became involved in Afghanistan. While the working group guidelines were still officially in force, they were not being followed by the military

#### **South Sudan**

The development of standard operating procedures for use of MCDA for South Sudan has been a critical step in improving effectiveness of the UN-CMCoord function. Demand for UNMISS MCDA from humanitarian actors has been significant in recent years. This demand has not always been well coordinated, with requests for MCDA being made directly to various levels of leadership of the Integrated Mission. Therefore, the development of a more coherent set of procedures in 2012 to respond to such demand is a welcome improvement in civil-military coordination in South Sudan. Under the new SOPs, assessed needs are communicated through OCHA's Civil-Military Officer at country level or through the Head of OCHA sub-office at State level. Heads of OCHA sub-offices have received training on UN-CMCoord from the UN-CMCoord officer. From there, OCHA, usually through the OCHA UN-CMCoord officer, confirms that the request is deemed a last resort according to clearly defined criteria. The UN-CMCoord officer then engages with UNMISS at the appropriate level to sanction and carry out the request. The SOPs have included a clause that maintains the current procedures developed by the logistics cluster in the case of large scale humanitarian convoys, which have already been in place in South Sudan for some time.

## **Dialogue and Coordination with military and humanitarian actors**

### **Finding 14: OCHA has engaged with partners through a variety of fora to advance and solidify the UN-CMCoord agenda.**

99. The underlying role of a UN-CMCoord officer is to facilitate and build relationships between military and humanitarian actors. The fora and sharing/exchange structures between military and humanitarian actors have enriched and increased UN-CMCoord information flow and thus contributed to improving coordination between civil and military actors.

100. In Haiti, at the strategic level, UN-CMCoord prepared and delivered a briefing for the new MINUSTAH Force Commander (FC) to engage in dialogue and brief the FC on the current context of the humanitarian community in Haiti. This meeting also initiated the process for the official endorsement through a MINUSTAH Internal Memorandum drafted by the Force Commander of the Country Specific Civil Military Guidelines for Haiti (2011). Another meeting between the MINUSTAH Force Commander and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) reviewed security risks in Haiti and the plan for the progressive withdrawal of MINUSTAH.

101. UN-CMCoord in Haiti, as in other countries, also participates in regular Inter-Cluster Meetings (ICC) or the Humanitarian Forum and has allowed humanitarian actors to develop a greater understanding of UN-CMCoord principles and functions. The creation of the Civil-military Coordination Workshop allowed it to

underline UN-CMCoord functions to a multidisciplinary audience (including DPC, MINUSTAH U3, U9, JOC, UN Agencies and various NGOs) as well as the importance of and the process for submitting requests from the humanitarian actors to the MINUSTAH through locally established channels (JOC).

102. In the Libya crisis, OCHA played an important role in ensuring that the guidelines were understood by both the military and the national government. Before the launch of military operations, OCHA's role in UN-CMCoord focused on disseminating the guidelines. OCHA organized training and activities to provide the main elements and the guidelines related to UN-CMCoord. As a result, the military representatives in NATO HQ in Brussels were aware of the generic guidelines before they were engaged in Libya. Both NATO and EU representatives of military forces who were interviewed said that they had received sufficient training on the guidelines on the use of the foreign MCDA and the main components of the UN-CMCoord.

103. Nevertheless, the level of understanding of the guidelines may vary. While the high-level representatives of the EU and NATO military forces who took part in pre-deployment meetings had an opportunity to become familiar with the guidelines on civil and military coordination issues at the HQ, representatives of the military deployed on the ground in Libya said they had little understanding of these guidelines. In addition, the interviews with representatives of government involved in the deployment of military forces in Libya show that they do not have the same level of understanding of the guidelines, in spite of the active and early advocacy played by OCHA. Thus, the understanding of the MCDA guidelines may vary and be interpreted differently among the parties and the actors engaged in humanitarian response, whatever the extent and the timeliness of the advocacy conducted by OCHA. This underlines the importance of OCHA's dissemination and advocacy of guidelines.

### **Examples of Best Practices: The Usefulness of a Joint Operations and Tasking Center**

#### **Haiti**

After the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, it took some time for the first OCHA UN-CMCoord officers to arrive, but the rapid construction and implementation of the Joint Operations and Tasking Center (JOTC) supported the application of clear, standardized and organized guidelines on the use of Military and Civil Defense Assets (MCDA) in support of one of the most important humanitarian operations ever.

For more than two years, the JOTC has coordinated requests from all categories of humanitarian organizations, and OCHA UN-CMCoord officers have supported the work of Clusters in selecting, vetting, and approving or refusing requests presented to them. The JOTC has prioritized the requests that it presents to MINUSTAH so that there is less need for and more effective use of military and civil defence assets (MCDA) to support humanitarian NGOs. The work of the JOTC has in great part been made possible through the key organizational, informational and supporting role of the OCHA UN-CMCoord function in Haiti.

The Joint Operations and Tasking Center (JOTC), a joint initiative between OCHA and MINUSTAH, has ensured an effective and smooth implementation of civil-military guidelines in the humanitarian response in Haiti as well as in sensitizing humanitarian and military operators to MCDA Guidelines since 2010.

Civil-military coordination has been a vital part of the Haiti response from 2010 up to now. In the early days of the international community response to the Jan 12<sup>th</sup> earthquake, 26 countries were providing significant military assets in support of the earthquake response, including field hospitals, troops, military aircraft, hospital ships, cargo ships, port handling equipment and helicopters, with Canada, the US and the Dominican Republic providing the largest contingents.

In combination with MINUSTAH, OCHA's contribution in civil-military coordination has been to set up the Joint Operations and Tasking Center as a single point of contact for requests for military or police assistance. This setup ensured that *“military and police forces received validated and prioritised requests from humanitarian organizations through a single source to provide for an efficient and coordinated*

utilisation of military and police assets”.<sup>35</sup> The JOTC became operational on 26 January 2010, working under the strategic guidance of the GoH, MINUSTAH and the humanitarian community, with management consisting of senior staff from these entities.<sup>36</sup>

Protocols addressed to the JOTC, and currently the JOC as well,<sup>37</sup> require that all requests for MINUSTAH support from external entities be processed through the JOTC and be initially vetted by the respective Cluster system for accuracy and validity, as well as to ensure that duplication in efforts are mitigated. The requests for MINUSTAH support must also be endorsed by the Cluster system to ensure that MINUSTAH assets are utilized as a last resort.


According to representatives of the MINUSTAH “the lead role of the OCHA UN-CMCoord representative in the Cluster system has been crucial to this process.” As such, the OCHA UN-CMCoord representatives have overseen, and continue to supervise, the following:

- MINUSTAH JOC protocols for submission of requests are adhered to;
- The requesting entity is legitimate and its request meets the overall humanitarian response criteria;
- Utilization of MINUSTAH military and police assets are in accordance with Oslo Guidelines as well as the Civil-military Coordination Guidelines specific for Haiti;
- All possible civilian alternatives have been exhausted before the request reaches MINUSTAH for final assessment; and
- The MINUSTAH process of action implementation for quality control (ensures proper MINUSTAH’s section and requesting entity coordination) are followed.

Exhibit 3.1 shows the breakdown of the types of requests made to the JOTC. Security support represents two-thirds of the requests presented to MINUSTAH. According to the Military Component (MC) of the mission, support for


humanitarian organizations represented a higher figure than other operational tasks

**Exhibit 3.1 Requests for Service to JOTC**



Out of 1,116 security requests addressed to the MC of the Mission (later transformed into “Tasking Orders”), 26 per cent are received from humanitarian organizations, 23 per cent for operational tasks, and an additional 15 per cent are related to infrastructure work, primarily engineering. Exhibit 3.2 shows the recipients of MC/MINUSTAH security support in 2011.

**Exhibit 3.2 Security Support from MC/MINUSTAH, 2011**




<sup>35</sup> Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake, Jan. 2011, p. 29.

<sup>36</sup> UNDAC Mission Report, Haiti Earthquake, January 2010.

<sup>37</sup> The JOTC mandate expired on 30 June 2012 and was replaced by the JOC.

Most of the requests from humanitarian organizations addressed to the MC are to provide security support to humanitarian organizations working in more than 700 IDP camps. Tasks have included such things as providing an escort and site security during food or non-food items distribution or for camp resident registration, which explains the relative concentration of security requests to a small number of organizations. See Exhibit 3.3 for a breakdown of these requests by organization.

**Exhibit 3.3 Requests for Security, by Organization, 2011**



Although the system seems – according to many – to have been running without major hurdles for the last two years, some criticism emerged as early as 2010 regarding the systematic resort to military escorts and security support in the implementation of humanitarian programs. One of the UN-CMCoord officers deployed by OCHA claimed in mid-summer 2010 that “NGO and UN staff regularly come to the Joint Operations and

*Tasking Centre (JOTC) to request military assets as a first response (resort), not as a last resort. They use troops to provide security in very benign areas where there is no history of any trouble and they request armed escorts for convoys in areas where there are no security issues reported”. The professionalism of some humanitarian organizations was questioned as early as August 2010, when it appeared that “many organizations operate perfectly well with no armed security all over the country with no problems. But this requires planning, well trained staff, the right equipment, and time spent working with communities to prepare for distributions.”*

The number of such incidents regarding the civil-military coordination system progressively decreased as JOTC assumed its coordinating role in the country. Indeed, the Evaluation Team observed several instances of this coordinating role operating effectively, with the UN-CMCoord officer questioning the reason for requesting support from the MINUSTAH by newly arrived CIMIC (G9) officers from an international battalion or by other humanitarian NGOs.

At the same time, key informants underlined the need to avoid complacency – for example, in regard to the recently established MPC or to infrastructure and/or engineering works, they noted the need to ensure that MINUSTAH support is not taken as a free service when any local/international humanitarian actor could be obtaining them through local operators at competitive prices. They also underlined that the humanitarian objectives should “do no harm, and thus efforts should be made to prevent further disruptions or distortions of local economical and productive mechanisms and assets in implementing them.

## Training and Capacity Development

104. CMCS delivers the United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) training program, including pre-deployment and in-mission training, to the civilian/humanitarian and military communities. As outlined in the latest Policy Instruction document on OCHA’s role and responsibilities in humanitarian civil-military coordination, the CMCS training catalogue is composed of four courses: a flagship, 5-day course consisting of eight modules (and a shortened flagship course of 2-3 days), a 5-day field course, a training of trainers’ course, and a familiarization module. It also provides ad-hoc courses as requested, mostly for the military.<sup>38</sup> These courses are described in more detail below.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>38</sup> A CD-ROM of the four courses exists, but is not functional due to software incompatibility and thus has not been distributed.

- **The United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Course:** This course aims at improving the effectiveness of international relief operations and the promotion of effective humanitarian-military relationships by raising mutual awareness and understanding regarding the roles of military and humanitarian actors in emergencies.
- **The United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Field Course:** This course aims at training experienced humanitarian personnel and potential Humanitarian Affairs Officers (HAO) and UN-CMCoord officers to fulfil UN-CMCoord responsibilities in on-going and/or future emergencies, in order to contribute to improving the effectiveness of international relief operations by promoting appropriate and effective humanitarian civil-military relationships.
- **The United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Training of Trainers (ToT) Course:** This course aims at developing a pool of trained facilitators that could be tapped to facilitate and deliver UN-CMCoord courses around the world.
- **The United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) Familiarization Module:** This course aims at familiarizing key government officials and staff of international humanitarian organizations, including the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement (ICRC, IFRC and national societies) on the principles and concepts underlying humanitarian civil-military coordination and its practical applications.

**Finding 15: Education, capacity-building, awareness raising and training are significant components through which to support civil-military coordination in general and UN-CMCoord in particular. CMCS has recognized the the importance of building partnerships to increase the success and reach of its training.**

105. Training on UN-CMCoord is a priority area for CMCS within OCHA, as a way of improving its own civil-military coordination effectiveness as well as that of its partners. Education, capacity-building, awareness raising and training are all elements in this effort. Training makes it possible to build capacity on UN-CMCoord issues, and also opens the door to collaboration between a range of regional organizations, peacekeeping missions and UN member states more directly, thus contributing to OCHA’s broader partnership and advocacy strategy.

106. The budget available for UN- CMCoord training has remained relatively constant over the past four years: since 2008, about \$500,000 from CMCS has been allocated to training.<sup>40</sup> Most of this consists of in-kind support on training sessions which are carried out around the world and that engage military, humanitarian staff and OCHA personnel. CMCS staff members also participate in ad-hoc training exercises when called upon, so that its reach can be further expanded. CMCS has agreements with various national (mostly military) institutions (e.g., in Switzerland, Finland and Spain) that provide venues and agreed-upon other costs and help deliver a given number of training sessions each year. For example, training sessions in 2011 were supported by such bodies as MINUSTAH in Haiti, the Australian Civil-Military Center and the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (COE-DMHA), U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) in Vietnam, and Swiss Land Forces in Switzerland. CMCS itself takes responsibility for between 8 and 11 training sessions per year.

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<sup>39</sup> There are also courses for SRSGs, D SRSGs, and HCs/RCs.

<sup>40</sup> The effective amount that can be used for training-related activities (which excludes staff and programme support costs) is only \$215,000/year, representing 9% of CMCS’ annual budget.

107. Flagship training courses provide a set number of places for the military, the UN, and the humanitarian community. Interviewees suggested that military staff are well-represented in such training, while UN and NGO participants are less strongly represented.<sup>41</sup>

108. Demand for training has far outstripped the supply of available courses. OCHA data suggests that only 685 of 1,820 applicants could be accommodated since 2009, therefore meeting just 38 per cent of the demand. CMCS has responded to this capacity gap by designing an Accreditation Programme (AP) that will permit other humanitarian-oriented institutions to deliver UN-CMCoord Courses, and that will hopefully make it possible to meet 70 per cent of demand in two years. As well as meeting more of the demand, this will allow CMCS to focus more of its limited resources on addressing the urgent operational requirements of OCHA field offices. The training sessions will be scheduled across the Asia Pacific, the Americas, Europe, Africa and the Middle East regions. CMCS will be responsible for granting, renewing and terminating the accreditation, will maintain custodianship over the course syllabus and learning resources, and will be responsible for the quality control of courses by monitoring validation feedback. CMCS will work with OCHA Regional Offices to achieve some of these steps in the Accreditation Programme.

**Finding 16: While all UN-CMCoord Officers and the majority of OCHA Heads of Offices feel they have adequate training in UN-CMCoord, the training has not yet reached sufficient numbers of other relevant groups – such as Cluster Leads, OCHA staff in the field, Humanitarian Coordinators, and NGOs.**

109. In assessing the effectiveness of training carried out by OCHA, the evaluation relied heavily on survey evidence from three groups (OCHA Heads of Office, OCHA UN-CMCoord officers, and Cluster Group leads) and also on stakeholder perspectives gathered during field mission interviews. While some respondents felt that the training was effective, others noted that more can be done to improve its effectiveness. It should be noted that other DPKO, military and humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross are engaged in various training efforts that are in line with many of the key guiding principles for humanitarian civil-military coordination. Following are details of the evaluation’s findings regarding the effectiveness and scope of UN-CMCoord training:

- Survey results suggest that OCHA has prioritized UN-CMCoord officer training in recent years. Indeed, 100 per cent of UN-CMCoord officer respondents consider the training they received thus far on civil-military coordination to be sufficient for them to carry out their duties. Over 86 per cent of these respondents report having an excellent level of understanding of UN-CMCoord, understood as an ability to fully apply UN-CMCoord principles and train others in UN-CMCoord. A similar percentage of officers claim to have this level of expertise for each of the four major UN-CMCoord policy guidelines. All UN-CMCoord officer respondents have taken part in multiple training sessions, both those offered by OCHA as well as other organizations such as ICRC and UNHCR. Roughly 67 per cent of the officer respondents had taken part in at least one training session within the last year.
- Among OCHA Heads of Offices (HoO), 67 per cent of survey respondents had taken at least some sort of UN-CMCoord course, suggesting that HoO give less attention to UN-CMCoord training than officers. The same percentage (67 per cent) of HoO respondents claimed to have received sufficient training in UN-CMCoord to carry out their work, but their reported overall understanding of UN-CMCoord and the various documents was much lower than among UN-CMCoord officers, with roughly 44 per cent reporting having a good understanding of UN-CMCoord.

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<sup>41</sup> There could be multiple reasons for this, and definitively determining those reasons was beyond the scope of the Evaluation.

- Among Cluster Leads surveyed regarding their knowledge of UN-CMCoord, the survey responses suggest that the leads of the protection cluster and the logistics cluster tend to have a much stronger understanding of civil-military coordination issues than clusters that have less engagement with military forces. Overall, 57 per cent of the Cluster Lead survey respondents had not participated in a briefing session or training on UN-CMCoord. Of the 43 per cent who have participated, 69 per cent participated in a training session – mostly briefings – other than the four formal UN-CMCoord training sessions. A slightly lower percentage (59 per cent) considers the training they received on UN-CMCoord to be insufficient for the duties that they are expected to carry out in their current positions. Just over half (56 per cent) of all the Cluster Lead respondents rate their level of understanding of UN-CMCoord as fair, in that they see themselves as having the ability to apply UN-CMCoord principles to some extent.

*“I have a feeling that most cluster coordinators do not understand UN-CMCoord issues and as such there is need to do training for most stakeholders to be able to understand our different roles as well as expectations we should have from UN-CMCoord.”*

(a Cluster Lead respondent)

110. In interviews at the field level, the Evaluation Team found that in addition to Cluster Leads, three other groups also require increased attention to training in UN-CMCoord. The first is OCHA staff, particularly those in the field and in sub-regional offices, who often come into close contact with humanitarian needs and requests for MCDA. The second is Humanitarian Coordinators, who play a critical political and leadership role in UN-CMCoord at the country level. The final group is the humanitarian community. It was noted that while many large international NGOs have a good understanding of civil-military coordination, the bulk of NGOs have very little practical knowledge and experience to related to UN-CMCoord.

111. Across many of the field missions, interviewees frequently noted that lack of training was one of the primary obstacles to greater UN-CMCoord engagement. This was noted strongly by respondents in the humanitarian community, many of whom have had little opportunity for such training, but also by respondents in some military contingents, such as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

### **NGOs**

112. OCHA CMCS has had some difficulties in filling the spots allocated to NGOs in several of their training activities organized by CMCS. Several reasons have been cited, including the scheduling of these sessions and costs associated with travel to the training sites. However, at the field level, the presence of NGOs in training is quite visible; the Evaluation Team attended training sessions in Haiti and in Colombia where the humanitarian community was well represented by active participants. The issue is that the humanitarian community, and specifically NGOs, rely on OCHA training sessions to build their skills in UN-CMCoord and the supply does not always meet the demand. Some NGOs commented that if they had more access to training they could in turn train their constituencies (sometimes in more remote areas) and spread the knowledge on UN-CMCoord.

113. Interactions with NGOs during the evaluation suggested that international NGOs such as Oxfam, Save the Children and World Vision had clear policies and instructions on civil-military coordination, while other NGOs had a much weaker understanding of how to co-exist with military forces. In Afghanistan, there was evidence that some NGOs did not have a clear understanding of how to co-exist with military forces, due in part to lack of formal training in UN-CMCoord. The large number and variety of international and local NGOs operating in Afghanistan has made it difficult to put in place a formal plan to enhance the knowledge of NGOs regarding the role of UN-CMCoord and the guidelines.

## Military

114. In the least five years, OCHA has provided training workshops for military forces on UN-CMCoord/protection/humanitarian principles around the world (see sidebar). In Somalia, many stakeholders noted that the unique nature of the AMISOM mission meant that their needs for training and capacity development were greater than for more traditional DPKO missions –including training on humanitarian principles as well as traditional UN-CMCoord issues. With some exceptions, AMISOM military personnel were not well informed on UN-CMCoord/CIMIC or humanitarian principles and more can be done to improve their knowledge on these issues through timely pre-deployment training.

### OCHA Training for Military Forces in Afghanistan

The UN-CMCoord officer provided training for military forces on the IASC guidelines to ensure broad understanding.

The UN-CMCoord officer participated in ISAF pre-deployment training and exercises prior to the ISAF deployment in Afghanistan in 2011 and 2012. This one-week training took place in Stavanger, Norway in 2011 and in Grafenwoehr, Germany in 2012.

Others organizations like International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were invited to this training to provide participants with a good overview of the humanitarian community in Afghanistan.

## Constraints

115. The factor most cited as a key constraint to the effectiveness of training was staff and military rotations in humanitarian settings, particularly in complex emergencies where staff deployments may last anywhere from six months to a year. The constant movement of staff at all levels was underlined as a barrier to sustained UN-CMCoord engagement, due to loss of trained personnel. While some feel that this decreases the overall effectiveness of training, the case of Haiti during the 2010 earthquake response suggests that the long-term benefits of training can extend well beyond the current mission. In Haiti at that time, there were reportedly over 55 military and humanitarian personnel on the ground who had received at least one OCHA UN-CMCoord training session during previous missions, which greatly facilitated the UN-CMCoord response.

## Responding to requests for MCDA or armed protection

**Finding 17: Although formally committed to norms and roles as outlined in various relevant fora and instruments – including IASC and country-specific guidelines – many stakeholders involved in civil-military coordination (including UN agencies, member states, and the humanitarian community) do not always abide by agreed guidelines but make their own arrangements with the military, sometimes in ways that do not accord with agreed principles and norms.**

116. Although one of the fundamental roles of the UN-CMCoord officers and OCHA is to coordinate the deployment and use of MCDA during emergencies, the evaluation found that deployment does not always respect the agreed-upon guidance. Key deviations from guidelines revolve around poor observance of the guidelines and requests for armed escorts or MCDA that do not follow standard procedures.

117. In Pakistan, despite the existence of a clear policy framework and HCT efforts to develop unified positions on the use of military assets, the practical implementation of principles in the Pakistan flood response has not been without challenges. The first problem has been an apparent lack of respect for agreed principles among some humanitarian actors as well as UN member states, as illustrated by the case of the NATO air bridge. On 20 August 2010, NATO announced its intention to create a strategic air bridge to transport in-kind donations from its member states to Pakistan. Additionally, and without prior consultation, this capability was offered to humanitarian organizations, and publicized as such. Of key concern to the HCT was the potential security risk to humanitarian actors if they openly associated themselves with a military alliance whose supply convoys to Afghanistan were coming under frequent

violent attack within Pakistan (more than 100 attacks were documented against NATO assets inside Pakistan in 2010, killing 37 people and injuring 64). Following extensive internal discussions, the HCT concluded that it could not approve its members’ use of the air bridge as it was not an option of last resort because air and sea transport was available commercially. Despite the clear policy framework, at least two UN agencies decided to make (albeit limited) use of the air bridge, as did a number of small NGOs who were not members of the HCT.

118. The Pakistan government and several donors challenged the HCT’s attempt to maintain a principled position, arguing that no time should be wasted in moving goods into the country and that the use of the NATO air bridge would make the humanitarian operation more cost-efficient. Both claims were inaccurate. While the emergency response did suffer a number of delays in the delivery of relief goods, cluster leads repeatedly stressed to donors that these were related to supply shortages in items such as tents and tarpaulins, not to any gap in global airlift capacity. With regard to cost-efficiency, civil–military guidelines stipulate that cost may not be used to justify the use of military assets; in fact, the Pakistan floods confirmed that the costs involved in using military assets tend to be met from governments’ humanitarian budgets.

**Best Practice: Standard Operating Procedures**

In South Sudan, the development of standard operating procedures (SOP) for use of MCDA has been a critical step in improving the effectiveness of the UN-CMCoord function. Demand for UNMISS MCDA from humanitarian actors had been significant in recent years but had not always been well coordinated, with requests being made directly to various levels of leadership of the Integrated Mission.

OCHA developed of a more coherent set of procedures in 2012 that were a welcome improvement in civil-military coordination. Under the new SOPs, assessed needs are communicated through OCHA’s Civil-Military Officer at country level or through the Head of OCHA sub-office at State level.

**Monitoring and Evaluation**

**Finding 18: The monitoring and evaluation of the UN-CMCoord function remains ad hoc. Data collection, reporting, conducting reviews, and collating results into best practices and lessons learned are not systematic.**

119. Improved monitoring and evaluation is part of the IASC Transformative Agenda, to which OCHA strongly subscribes.

120. Good policy and planning performance are tied to a cycle that starts with honest, insightful after-action reviews and identification of best practices and lessons learned. This is the bedrock for the praxis that can result in useful, relevant policy, and dynamic, functional planning. A lack of good data hinders a proper assessment of the benefits of the UN-CMCoord officer, particularly in managing MCDA. However, 70 per cent of OCHA survey respondents acknowledge that OCHA carried out training and learning events which have included UN-CMCoord in their duty country

121. In 2012, UN-CMCoord officers came together to discuss lessons learned from Somalia, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Haiti, Asia and Pacific, and Pakistan. CMCS intends to create a network of HAO/UN-CMCoord officers - UN-CMCoord Focal Points in order to facilitate on-going discussion across UN-CMCoord officers around the world.

122. In Haiti, M&E functions of UN-CMCoord plans and activities seem to have been weak to non-existent. Reporting has been poor both internally and externally (although reporting seems to have improved significantly in 2012), and inter-institutional working relationships within CMCS and across the organization seem to have been non-existent. A review of the CMCS organigram shows three working

units. Although the Policy and Planning Unit is the custodian of the body of normative guidance, reference papers and guidelines related to UN-CMCoord, the limited working relations between the Unit and local UN-CMCoord representatives has so far prevented the generation of policy or guidance leads or instructions that could benefit current or future local UN-CMCoord developments. Another problem is that the Operations and Field Support Unit, which is tasked with providing support to the field with a number of different activities (drafting of specific civil military guidelines, integration of UN-CMCoord into emergency preparedness and response), has so far developed limited working relationships that could support UN-CMCoord Haiti. Limited working relationships have also prevailed with the CMCS Training and Partnership Unit, although the participation of the Evaluation Team in two simulation and briefing exercises with the MINUSTAH shows that training is conceived and (re)designed at the local level to adapt it to existing Guidelines in Haiti.

123. Compounding these communication and reporting problems is the fact that institutional memory of past UN-CMCoord experience in Haiti is virtually non-existent, with the exception of the independent (and relevant) Evaluation of OCHA response (2011). No other structured evaluation has analyzed the effectiveness and efficiency of past UN-CMCoord activities in a systematic manner.

124. The general reporting system which actually feeds into weekly and monthly OCHA reports has been improved and is aligned with the Action Plan 2012, which supports UN-CMCoord work development for the year to come and which seeks to improve awareness of upcoming UN-CMCoord activities/events. Although the overall quality and regularity of the weekly and monthly reports by the UN-CMCoord officer has recently improved, almost no feedback is provided by CMCS or ROLAC and little guidance is provided by the regional offices or by HQ. This directly compromises the quality and thus the usefulness of the reports.

125. In many cases, the lack of the most basic indicators for UN-CMCoord points to the absence of systematization of UN-CMCoord which would allow for a more complete picture of progress and constraints. Indicators that might be collected would include:

- Number of requests for MCDA
- Nature of requests for MCDA
- Mapping of locations of requests
- Number of days to approve request
- Number of missions carried out
- Tons of emergency supplies delivered by military
- Number of civilian staff moved in convoys with armed escorts
- Number of MCDA or civil-military meetings
- Number of revisions of country specific guidelines
- Number (and percentage) of people trained on UN-CMCoord in the HCT.

**Finding 19: OCHA has had difficulty in managing its knowledge on UN-CMCoord among the various field offices and in identifying lessons learned and good practices in civil-military coordination.**

126. While the potential for recognizing excellence and identifying best practices in civil-military coordination exists in some countries, most of the OCHA field offices visited as part of the evaluation had not collected or analyzed data to identify lessons learned. The lack of identification of lessons learned means that OCHA field offices and Head Offices are largely ignorant of the challenges and successes that happened in their own country or other countries.

127. As is often the case in organizations that are dealing with emergencies, much more emphasis is placed on coordination during the crisis and less on managing knowledge about good practices. This is a challenge for many emergency organizations and UNHCR and ICRC respondents interviewed in the field said their organizations were experiencing the same problem. However, the lack of attention to collecting data on good practices and sharing these among field offices leads to several problems: field offices miss opportunities to learn from other regions and sometimes have to reinvent the wheel, and CMCS has insufficient data to demonstrate success or challenges to senior management of OCHA.

128. Survey results of OCHA staff revealed that roughly 45 per cent of respondents consider OCHA's use of lessons learned on civil-military coordination as either good or very good, while 30 per cent consider it poor. Among a list of OCHA accountabilities/functions, use of lessons learned received the lowest score on the survey.

129. OCHA has already acted to improve this situation in some countries. For instance, in Libya OCHA took part in lessons learned activities with NATO, the EU and some other humanitarian actors involved in the Libya crisis to outline what worked well, what did not, and what could be improved in a future emergency. Such efforts will make it possible for OCHA to put in place many more concrete measures for improving civil-military coordination, and thus to build on such initiatives as its March 2011 work with volunteer communities to produce an online Libya crisis map that shows live information relevant to relief efforts such as health needs, security threats, and refugee movements.

## **OCHA Effectiveness in Phases of Operations**

### **Finding 20: At the preparedness stage, UN-CMCoord is constrained by its speed of deployment and its role in assessment and UNDAC missions.**

130. Country visits confirm that the preparedness phase is a critical determinant of the quality and effectiveness of the ensuing coordination between civil and military actors during crisis situations.

131. A crucial aspect of this phase is assessment, which is an essential building block for determining the range of issues involved in civil-military coordination. Good assessments are the building blocks for determining the range of issues involved in civil-military coordination, and for refining the list of specified and implied tasks that NGOs and UN agencies might need from the military in terms of operational support. Good assessors (in OCHA and in each of the participating UN agencies) are vital to constructing the individual and collective components for a convincing and saleable UN Consolidated Financial Appeal. OCHA has the lead in convening donor pledging conferences and in developing, advocating, and getting donor performance out of this appeal. OCHA needs to see itself as a center of excellence for assessment – not least because effective civil-military interaction depends so much on symmetrical situational awareness – as clear and comprehensive on the civilian agency side as it is traditionally on the military side. While OCHA demonstrates leadership in assessments, it has so far failed to fully integrate UN-CMCoord into them.

132. OCHA and the IASC have underlined the importance of preparedness through its presence within the Transformative Agenda. According to OCHA UN-CMCoord officers and HoO in the field, preparedness was seen as the best phase for OCHA's UN-CMCoord response: 20 per cent of respondents to the OCHA country staff survey viewed OCHA's performance during this phase as very good and 55 per cent as good. In contrast to OCHA staff perceptions, Cluster Leads saw needs assessment as the weakest part of OCHA's function in UN-CMCoord: according to the results of Cluster Leads survey, 45 per cent considered the efficiency of OCHA's involvement in humanitarian needs assessment as poor; 27 per cent considered the performance of needs assessments as poor; and 27 per cent considered the performance of OCHA's involvement in cluster coordination as a way to quickly assess needs of MCDA as poor.

133. The United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) is part of the international emergency response system for sudden-onset emergencies. There is evidence that at the pre-deployment or planning phase, OCHA does indeed play a role in informing the military about the specific and implied tasks that would be required of them to ensure that humanitarian actors can inform their work, and simultaneously in incorporating input from the military on actions taking place in the military theatre. This helps to avoid unnecessary conflict and miscalculations. However, the role has not been well developed in most of the countries visited during the evaluation.

134. In Libya, UNDAC deployments have used a range of support networks and organizational partners. OCHA worked closely with the International Humanitarian

Partnership (IHP) in Libya, while also helping IHP work with WFP, UNHCR and ECHO. In Haiti, however, the same engagement in UNDAC did not occur. As pointed out in the Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake (p. 12), *“OCHA's failure to facilitate a quality needs assessment has been a serious handicap in the entire response, and this has meant loss of opportunities for the humanitarian community to influence the role of military in the humanitarian response as well as in the planning of recovery and reconstruction plans which were developed after the PDNA.”*

#### Haiti

In 2010, OCHA did not have the human resource capacity to effectively and rapidly deploy UN-CMCoord officers in response to the earthquake. Subsequent staffing problems also give rise to doubts about the organization's capacity to recruit appropriate UN-CMCoord experts of sufficient quality and in sufficient quantity.

It took some weeks after the 2010 earthquake before OCHA could deploy a small UN-CMCoord unit of four qualified experts to Haiti in order to start coordinating emergency humanitarian operations. The first “Evaluation of OCHA response to the Haiti Earthquake” (2011) mentioned that *“the HC, HCT and OCHA were not sufficiently strategic in managing civil-military coordination issues. They waited too long to engage MINUSTAH and foreign military. As a result, strategic civ-mil coordination was conducted primarily in Miami (US SOUTHCOM) and Washington, DC, where strategic level decisions were being made by the US”*.

Similarly, although OCHA awarded a one-year contract to a former UN-CMCoord officer who was present between Oct. 2010 and Oct. 2011, it took three more months for OCHA to recruit an interim UN-CMCoord officer before finally recruiting the current officer, who took office in April 2012.

These observations raise two issues: The first relates to the capacity of OCHA HQ to properly fill UN-CMCoord positions in a timely and coordinated fashion, while the second revolves around the issue of a permanent UN-CMCoord function within Latin America and the Caribbean, to liaise, network and foster civil-military relations in disaster-prone countries in the region as well as with intervening countries prior to any possible rapid and effective deployment in Haiti or elsewhere.

#### **Best Practice: Building National Awareness and Capacities for Disaster Preparedness**

The OCHA UN-CMCoord provides information and capacity building support to national Haitian NGOs interested in building community preparedness for natural disasters and increasing emergency response capacities. This should be an inspiring policy model for other fragile and natural disaster prone countries.

#### **Haiti**

At the inception of the 2010 humanitarian crisis, national NGOs played a limited role in the phenomenal humanitarian response led by the international humanitarian community and

the MINUSTAH. This frustrated local communities and operators. However, in partnership with other long-term initiatives supported by other donors and agencies (World Bank, UNDP, ECHO), OCHA UN-CMCoord has played a sensible and critical role in supporting the development of understanding of the importance of national and community involvement in humanitarian efforts. In cooperation with other stakeholders (Southern Command, EU, UNDP), OCHA UN-CMCoord actively supports the development, multiplication and preparation of simulation exercises that prepare local, departmental and national organizations in the preparation for and response to possible natural emergencies and disasters.

**Finding 21: In the response phase, OCHA has yet to adapt its UN-CMCoord approaches to the national contexts.**

135. Affected national military actors, who often belong to quite different cultures and may in certain instances be implicated in domestic issues, are not all well catered to by current normative texts and guidelines or capacity development, and OCHA’s engagement with them has been generally inadequate.

136. In Pakistan, OCHA had difficulty communicating with the national government and the Pakistan military forces. This can be explained by the fact the government and the military forces at the national level did not intend to request humanitarian assistance from OCHA or other agencies. Clearly communicating agreed positions (including the nuances of certain civil–military principles) proved another challenge. Particularly for those who had not participated in the HCT’s lengthy discussions, there appeared to be a direct contradiction between the humanitarian community’s reluctance to use the NATO air bridge, while at the same time agreeing to use Pakistani and foreign military assets to reach cut-off communities within Pakistan. This led to accusations that the HCT was being inconsistent.

137. In fact, the HCT treated each case on its own merits. Recognizing the complexities of the situation, the HCT did not place any ban on the use of military assets (including the air bridge), but merely requested that HCT members consult amongst themselves on each case to ensure a unified approach that would meet the criteria outlined in global and national guidelines. Similarly, the HCT could not publicly or permanently associate itself with a conflict party – instead, it agreed that humanitarian actors could coordinate with military counterparts around a set of relatively narrow and time-bound activities.

**Best Practice: The UN-CMCoord function in countries where there is no international military force**

**Colombia**

In Colombia, the OCHA UN-CMCoord has strengthened the humanitarian civilian focus of an important national policy on demining through discussions and exchanges.

The OCHA UN-CMCoord supported and facilitated inter-agency and inter-institutional dialogue on demining in Colombia. At the invitation of the Ministry of Defense, OCHA Colombia represented and defended the interests of the humanitarian community to support civilian populations and a humanitarian approach in a highly political policy dialogue environment

**Other Emerging Issues in Operations**

**Finding 22: Variations in leadership for UN-CMCoord at regional offices have affected the overall support that regional offices provide to country offices.**

138. Variations and gaps in UN-CMCoord leadership in OCHA regional offices significantly affect the quality of support regions give to individual country offices, and limit opportunities for maximizing the regional perspective that is so essential to individual country success.

139. Two regional offices were visited during this evaluation and were vastly different in their approaches to UN-CMCoord. The Regional Office for Asia and Pacific was very much engaged in regional dialogue and the Regional Office for Latin America and Caribbean much less so.

140. In Haiti, UN-CMCoord function was not well integrated into a constructive and dynamic regional effort. UN-CMCoord in Haiti functioned in relative isolation from other national or regional efforts that support the development of a civil-military coordination strategy at the regional level. This finding should be tempered by recognition that the efforts made and investments undertaken by the US Southern Command, particularly following the 2010 earthquake, are presumably based upon a sound and expert experience in disaster response and planning in the sub-Caribbean region. Yet this observation should not distract from the isolation of UN-CMCoord Haiti and the impact that such isolation has on its effectiveness.

141. In Somalia, the East Africa Regional Sub-Office deployed one of its staff to Somalia to support the UN-CMCoord requirements in that country. This staff member was not a UN-CMCoord officer but was provided training in UN-CMCoord before her engagement. This deployment was seen as ad-hoc rather than part of a strategic capacity support from the regional office to support UN-CMCoord.

**Finding 23: The UN Country Team and humanitarian actors working in countries with Integrated Missions in co-existence situations express concern with the impartiality and neutrality of the Mission, as well as efforts related to state-building and stabilization. OCHA has demonstrated some success in balancing the interests of humanitarian and military actors in this regard.**

142. Promotion of UN-CMCoord principles and practices in conflict settings is a fundamental, though sometimes problematic role for OCHA. In these settings, mobilizing a humanitarian response while engaging with parties to a military conflict, including peacekeeping forces, is a delicate balance. In missions reviewed in conflict settings, particularly Somalia and Afghanistan, there appeared to be room to improve the way in which OCHA has acted forcefully and decisively in these settings to protect humanitarian space.

143. In Afghanistan, the co-location of OCHA with UNAMA generated concerns regarding OCHA's neutrality. The steps for implementing an integrated mission which would help to ensure the neutrality of the humanitarian actors – to the degree that this is possible – have been insufficiently defined. Even if this is true only for the international staff that are accommodated on the UNAMA compound in Kabul, numerous actors have criticized the co-location of OCHA with UNAMA, claiming that OCHA risks being perceived as part of the political mission and thus not taking a sufficiently neutral stance. Some humanitarian actors refuse to go into an OCHA office that is located in the same compound as UNAMA, and some others refuse to cooperate at all with OCHA. Some humanitarian actors also refuse to participate in activities that they consider to be associated with UNAMA.

144. In Somalia, OCHA's relationship with AMISOM and the UN Integrated Mission (UNMISS) placed a number of NGOs in direct conflict with OCHA in terms of its linkage with the UN. They felt that OCHA and the Humanitarian Coordinator working within an Integrated Mission were de facto supporting the inherently political mission of the UN, once again putting neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian coordination in jeopardy. Almost all humanitarian actors in Somalia expressed concerns that AMISOM's "liberated areas" were being politicized by the UN mission, and that AMISOM CIMIC activities were placing humanitarian actors at risk. One of the roles carried out by the UN-CMCoord officer was to liaise with the CIMIC officer at AMISOM. Donor funds had been made available to AMISOM to support the idea of winning hearts and minds in Somalia. In a number of instances, these engagements were seen to impede the humanitarian space of the UNCT and NGO actors in Somalia (see sidebar).

145. Part of the challenge that OCHA faces has to do with the nature of integrated missions, an area which has been reviewed in previous assessments. But additional confusion and concern can largely be linked to insufficient communication, lack of civil-military dialogue as early as possible, and the lack of clear guidance from the RC/HC.

146. The mark of character of a leader in a diverse, multi-cultural setting such as the UN is a commitment to do one's mandated duty, however uncomfortable this may be from one's personal background and world-view perspective. In this regard, one of the military experts cited Deputy UN Secretary General Louise Frechette, who he said disliked the idea of invading Iraq in 2003 but unflinchingly did her duty in mobilizing a response from the entire UN family to deal with the humanitarian and reconstruction needs associated with that action. Similarly, an HC may be personally uncomfortable engaging with military forces in the interest of humanity, but his or her mandated duty affords no choice. OCHA's challenge to become a worthy partner of the military also defines another duty, that is, to transform its own structure and

processes so as to be less asymmetrical with the output orientation and management style of its military counterparts.

147. Another area of concern with regard to humanitarian space was a Trust Fund established in Support of AMISOM.<sup>42</sup> It revolves around typical CIMIC-style activities to be carried out by troops. In several

In Somalia a hospital was constructed in Mogadishu to treat fistula and carry out other surgeries. For many humanitarian actors, this was seen as putting many other actors at risk. During one offensive by AMISOM, a borehole was appropriated in a village for use by the AMISOM forces. In this instance as well, there was a concern amongst the NGOs and community. After an exchange of information with elders, some solutions were proposed in the village, including the construction of a second borehole and a pipe to connect to the village. Nevertheless, wider engagement of water and sanitation by CIMIC was viewed with much scepticism by the humanitarian community.

areas, humanitarian actors expressed concerns over the nature of the trust fund, both for the targeting which was taking place as well as the nature of the work. First of all, the trust fund was geared towards projects aimed at the Somali general population, and specifically mentions those *“living in close proximity to AMISOM deployments/camps, and/or communities recently liberated from Al-Shabab control where AMISOM needs to provide a peace dividend.”* Humanitarian actors expressed great concern over the way in which AMISOM presented the idea of “recently liberated zones” in that this language left the impression that these liberated zones would be favoured for any type of humanitarian response, thus putting the impartiality of humanitarian assistance in doubt. Secondly, the types of projects suggested for support from the trust fund included short-term infrastructure rehabilitation, such as *“small-scale projects, including schools, playgrounds, clinics, street lighting, potable water and water well drilling, road repairs, waste and drain clearance and removal of debris from areas being rehabilitated.”* Humanitarian actors working in health and water and sanitation expressed concern over these types of projects being mentioned as those for which AMISOM has a comparative advantage. One positive aspect of the strategy for the trust fund was the potential to engage with the humanitarian community and the UNCT in the process of defining the priorities under the fund.

148. Integrated missions use Joint Operations Centers (JOCs) or Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMACs) as coordinating mechanisms, with actual decision-making power residing elsewhere. This kind of layering tends to leave the UN-CMCoord mechanism even further removed from the decision-making loop. In multinational civil-military training simulations and actual operations, some interviewees believe that civil-military coordination should reside in an operations center that includes line military officers, is tied to the decision-makers assigned as members of the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) team. In coordinating with military, especially in non-conflict countries like Haiti, the humanitarian community appears to have varied interpretations of the 'principle of last resort' for use of military and civil defence assets under the Oslo guidelines. An additional factor complicating OCHA's role has been the relationship between OCHA's humanitarian mandate and a UN mission's long-term role in the country. Clear guidance does not exist that clarifies how in times of major crises that warrant sizeable deployment of OCHA and clusters, the latter's humanitarian role interfaces with those of the mission.

**Finding 24: OCHA has given insufficient attention or thinking to UN-CMCoord challenges in Integrated Mission contexts.**

149. Field missions and Integrated Missions in both conflict and humanitarian settings provided a good overview of some of the key challenges in these settings. As noted above, the Integrated Missions have placed an impetus on OCHA to ensure its neutrality while working alongside DPKO under the banner of the Integrated Mission. Integrated Missions also require coordination that goes beyond the cluster system. Examples on the ground suggest that few best practices have been developed to streamline UN-CMCoord practices and guidelines within Integrated Missions.

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<sup>42</sup> Strategy and priorities for outreach projects under the Trust Fund in Support of AMISOM

- An inter-agency real-time evaluation in Haiti noted a lack of coordination between the UNCT and MINUSTAH and an unclear division of roles and responsibilities arising from the fact that there are no policy guidelines on how the cluster system should relate to integrated UN missions and foreign military forces in different humanitarian settings. These factors further complicated international coordination in Haiti.
- The inter-agency real-time evaluation for Haiti also reported that “*in the provinces, OCHA field offices did not take advantage of the presence of MINUSTAH Civil Affairs Officers who had good local knowledge and long standing relations with local authorities.*”<sup>43</sup>
- Decision-making mechanisms for the use of military assets for humanitarian purposes were often not clearly defined. Integrated Missions often use the Joint Operations Center (JOC) or Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) as coordinating mechanisms with OCHA for requests for MCDA. This was the case in Haiti and South Sudan. However, actual decision-making power often resides elsewhere. This kind of layering tends to leave the UN-CMCoord mechanism even further removed from the decision-making loop, and some requests for military assets go directly to the HC or even the DSRSG.
- Reporting on the use of DPKO assets in support of humanitarian objectives as compared to its military assets was not well developed. While there is little data on the extent to which peacekeeping assets were used to provide escorts or move humanitarian assets, one DPKO Field Commander expressed concern over the number and scope of MCDA requests for humanitarian purposes, these requests negatively affected the wider objectives of the peacekeeping mission. In line with this was the question of a varied interpretation of the 'principle of last resort' for use of military and civil defence assets under the Oslo guidelines

**Finding 25: In co-existence settings and conflict situations, OCHA has begun to improve its deconfliction efforts.**

150. Deconfliction is defined as “*the exchange of information and planning advisories by humanitarian actors with military actors in order to prevent or resolve conflicts between the two sets objectives, remove obstacles to humanitarian action, and avoid potential hazards for humanitarian personnel. This may include the negotiation of military pauses, temporary cessation of hostilities or ceasefires, or safe corridors for aid delivery.*”<sup>44</sup> OCHA has made dedicated efforts to better understand humanitarian access,<sup>45</sup> and this remains critical in situations of co-existence, such as Afghanistan, Somalia and Libya. Not only does it require assiduous communication lines between actors, but also requires good political engagement at the highest levels to ensure that potential hazards are avoided. Examples in Somalia and Libya suggest that OCHA is beginning to gain experience and recognition for its efforts in deconfliction.

151. During the AMISOM and Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) offensive in Afgoye, in Somalia's Lower Shabelle region, it was suggested to the AMISOM force commander by OCHA and other humanitarian actors that the direct route to Afgoye could be avoided, thus protecting the lives of civilians living along the main road. In the end, the AMISOM forces chose another route which caused little disturbance and displacement of civilians, and no major disruptions to existing refugee camps along the corridor. Methods of indirect firing in the Afgoye offensive were also seen to have saved lives. While there were various views on the extent of the occupation of refugee camps along that corridor, it is clear that this

<sup>43</sup> Bhattacharjee, A. & Lossio, R. (2011) Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake, 118 pages, p.29.

<sup>44</sup> OCHA (2011) To Stay and Deliver, Good Practice for humanitarians in complex security environments, Policy and Studies Series, 2011, 105 pages

<sup>45</sup> ODI (2012) HPG, The Police, Humanitarians and the Protection of Civilians: Coordinating “Civilian” contributions, Roundtable on Civil-Military Coordination. 1 March 2012

is the kind of engagement where UN-CMCoord can influence decision making to the benefit of civilian protection. Given the level of military engagement in Somalia, and the range of actors, including AMISOM, TFG forces, the KDF and the Ethiopian forces, the collaborative environment required to achieve results in deconfliction is significant.

**Best Practice: The Deconfliction System in Libya**

OCHA's relations with NATO, as a party to the conflict, were sensitive and there was strong engagement on a range of issues. This included ensuring that public communications avoided implying a NATO role in humanitarian action, which had happened in the past in a few instances.

The most important element of the discussions with NATO military command dealt with deconfliction efforts relating to the movement and location of humanitarian goods and personnel on land, sea and air. While it took time to set up, the deconfliction system created an effective conduit for humanitarian organizations to inform NATO of humanitarian movements and locations of goods and personnel on land, sea and air, and also allowed them to get information about zones being targeted in military operations.

A UN-CMCoord officer conducted a short visit to Zarzis in July 2011 to support the deconfliction

system. This visit included briefings to OCHA and INGOs and increased the overall confidence level in the deconfliction system. Some humanitarian actors cited this as a positive initiative.

Also worth highlighting is the role of the WFP in the deconfliction system in Libya, specifically their deployment to the Operational Command Centre to deconflict the Log Cluster operational activities from the NATO military operation Unified Protector.

In general, the deconfliction system is considered a success by both NATO and the humanitarian community. However, what constitutes humanitarian movement is not always clear. While the generic definition allows for flexibility in managing the air, sea and land space, a more specific definition would give more guidance to the military (e.g., which air movements to allow in the no fly zone and which ships can be exempted from hailing and boarding under the arms embargo).

152. In Libya, the most important element of the discussions with NATO and EU military command deals with deconfliction issues.<sup>46</sup> The focus of OCHA in UN-CMCoord in Libya was on establishing dialogue with NATO and the EU, particularly in deconfliction efforts relating to the movement and location of humanitarian related goods and personnel on land, sea and air. It has to be noted that it took time for OCHA to set up a system agreed by the Libya Humanitarian Country Team enabling NGOs to inform NATO about ground movements. OCHA also took part in an informal meeting about the deconfliction process organized by SHAPE on 14 December 2011 in Geneva and also met with NATO in May 2012 to talk about the Libya experience.

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<sup>46</sup> The deconfliction system was a major emulation/structure set up by OCHA that allowed a wide range of humanitarian actors to get information about zones being bombed and where the military was operating.

**Best Practice: The Importance of Early Dialogue****Libya**

The early establishment of dialogue with key humanitarian actors and the military in the planning phase of the emergency response enabled OCHA to define a sound strategy to coordinate civil and military relationships at the operational level.

In contrast with other emergency responses, OCHA established contacts with military forces and with the humanitarian community before the deployment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU) military forces. OCHA engaged with NATO and the military components of the EU ahead of the political process that authorized the use of military forces to enforce the Security Council resolution(s) or the use of military assets to support humanitarian operations. Many issues were therefore addressed at the initial stages and this proved highly advantageous.

The early dialogue and contacts at the onset of the crisis enabled OCHA to have a greater role at the operational level. It was important to get involved in the planning process in order to make sure that military operations would respect humanitarian principles. A visit by a member of the NATO HQ Civil-Military Planning and Support Section (CMPS) to the combined United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and OCHA in Geneva during this early pre-operational stage was noted as very positive and helpful.

Finally, OCHA and the World Food Programme (WFP) felt that the timing of the dialogue was crucial (i.e., before any North Atlantic Council (NAC) decision on possible NATO support to humanitarian actors in particular and on NATO's operation in Libya in general) and that this gave the humanitarian community a chance to disseminate their guidance on the use of military assets.

**Best Practices: Leadership in Libya**

In Libya, OCHA took charge early and often, demonstrating leadership on civil military

coordination in a way that earned accolades from many donors and NGOs.

**3.3 Efficiency**

153. Efficiency is generally measured in terms of the extent to which resources have been allocated for their best use for the intended task or purpose. In the dynamic context of a humanitarian emergency, where humanitarian and military actors and other stakeholders are responding across sectors and geographic regions, defining efficient coordination is difficult at the best of times. It is even more challenging in the absence of institutional documentation and monitoring reports on UN-CMCoord.

154. The evaluation sought examples of efficient and innovative use of human and financial resources to “do more with less” and enhance the effectiveness of results at a lower cost. Overall, 100 per cent of respondents to the Cluster Lead survey as well as interviews held at OCHA Head Office in New York suggested that OCHA had a good capacity to elaborate innovative tools that save time and improve UN-CMCoord.

**Finding 26: OCHA has established more streamlined processes for UN-CMCoord, which has led to more efficient use of MCDA in emergency settings. However, assessing the efficiency of OCHA is challenging in the absence of commonly accepted indicators and data to measure elements such as how military assets are used, the speed of deployment of MCDA, and for what purpose.**

## Country-Specific Guidelines and Standard Operating Procedures

155. Many respondents in the field suggested that the development of country-specific guidelines and SOPs encourages better information sharing, which leads to faster decision making.

156. In Afghanistan, the establishment of the SOP particularly demonstrated OCHA's efficiency in its role in UN-CMCoord. Multiple key informants noted that the UN-CMCoord officer's strong understanding of military culture meant that he understood the challenges of ensuring the military would respect UN-CMCoord guidelines. The adoption of the SOPs pointed to a clearer understanding on the part of the military regarding their role and that of the humanitarian community in cases of natural disaster, which helped to avoid conflict between the two.

157. In Haiti, OCHA has helped to structure and facilitate dialogue between MINUSTAH militaries and humanitarian organizations and has prevented unnecessary direct assistance from the military by enforcing the Guidelines for the engagement and coordination of humanitarian actors and military and police actors in Haiti. Nonetheless, there have been many instances of various international military contingents trying to deploy direct assistance (mostly in good faith and out of a desire to "do good") in contravention of the civil-military guidelines (e.g., a military contingent set up a field clinic in an area where health INGOs were operating), and situations in which military contingents contravened the Guidelines by interfering in humanitarian direct assistance activities (again largely out of a desire to "do good"). In spite of these incidents, the Guidelines have proven to be a dynamic tool adapted to the local realities of a sometimes insecure peacekeeping environment. In particular, the consultation and liaison function devolved to OCHA UN-CMCoord seems to have greatly contributed to diffusing and dissipating potential misunderstandings and wrong doing in the course of the stabilization operations of MINUSTAH, especially in Port-au-Prince.

158. In Libya, the development of NATO Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) made OCHA's role in UN-CMCoord clearer for humanitarian actors. Along with clarity, the flexibility of the NATO SOP reinforces the effectiveness of this coordination tool and ultimately, the efficiency of OCHA's role in UN-CMCoord. The SOP were seen as a useful coordination tool. The SOPs detailed the steps to be taken by the military during the crisis in Libya, including involvement of the humanitarian community and the request for assistance from OCHA to military forces in situations of last resort. ICRC interacted less with SHAPE during the planning phase but this did not hamper their operations.

In short, the SOP and the country-specific guidelines constitute some useful mechanisms and tools to make the role of OCHA in UN-CMCoord efficient.

## Information Sharing Systems

159. In the Cluster Leads survey, 82 per cent of respondents viewed OCHA's capacity to quickly respond to information requests between civil humanitarian actors and military forces as good. These results show the positive perception of the cluster leads with respect to OCHA's capacity in saving time in the humanitarian coordination between civil and military actors.

160. The evaluation found many examples of innovative tools that help to ensure efficient dissemination and use of information for decision-making purposes. In Afghanistan, one OCHA innovation for improved communications is a dedicated website on humanitarian response that includes a section specifically relevant to UN-CMCoord. OCHA Afghanistan established a successful website with the aim of sharing information with both the military and civilian actors (<http://afg.humanitarianresponse.info>). The website is not identified as an OCHA website but rather as a humanitarian response website so as to emphasize its neutrality. This helps to ensure the humanitarian community's use of and commitment to the information on the website, thus fostering greater cooperation and information sharing between them. The website is mostly used by the humanitarian community to support the coordination of the clusters and reporting to donors. Military stakeholders interviewed also noted that they have used the website to obtain information on the activities of humanitarian actors during natural disasters in the country. The Guidelines and other

useful documents, including the ISAF SOP on humanitarian response, have also been published on the website. Some improvements remain to be done to the website, mainly in terms of the quality of information. In particular, humanitarian actors could provide more complete information, which would allow OCHA to give a better overview of the situation in the country. Another weakness is that the website is only in English, which means that it can only be used in a very limited way by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). OCHA is working to have the next version of the website be available in the local language so as to ensure that GIRoA and local NGOs can fully use it.

161. In addition to the website, the OCHA country office in Afghanistan established a telephone hotline for humanitarian actors to report incidents between the military and the humanitarian community, or for reporting a military action that contravenes the Guidelines. In the case of an incident, the UN-CMCoord officer works to mitigate it or initiates discussions with the different parties to resolve the issue. The appropriate OCHA staff is identified on the humanitarian response website as a point of contact in case there is any problem in a particular region. The hotline is also available to the military, who published information on the OCHA hotline and the phone number in one of the ISAF Frag O.<sup>47</sup> Some NGOs do not know about the hotline and OCHA is working to ameliorate this situation by publicizing the hotline.

162. In the context of the humanitarian response in Haiti, OCHA helped increase of fora and sharing/exchange structures between military and humanitarian actors that enriched and increased UN-CMCoord information flows and thus contributed to improving coordination between civil and military actors. OCHA's Action Plan 2012 for the UN-CMCoord function has developed and strengthened the Information Management and Liaison/Relationship functions of UN-CMCoord in Haiti in various ways. In particular, the Action Plan has sought to facilitate "an effective humanitarian coordination system" in support of OCHA's strategic plan by ensuring that UN-CMCoord links, inputs and information sharing are structured through both strategic and tactical channels.

### **Single Access Point for UN-CMCoord Information**

163. The creation of a Civilian Advisor at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)<sup>48</sup> has played a significant role in the coordination of civil and military actors and is seen as a best practice coordination tool. The Civilian Advisor can help deal flexibly but decisively with matters and questions in "grey areas" and has a direct line to NATO Civil-Military Planning and Support section (CMPS) for higher level direction and guidance when necessary.

164. In addition to the Civilian Advisor, a Single Point of Contact within NATO was appointed to ensure the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Operations Centre (SHAPE SOC) watch, in a 24/7 manner. This Single Point of Contact was trained in civil-military interactions and clearly communicated to the humanitarian community.

165. In Haiti, OCHA in combination with MINUSTAH contributed to more efficient civil-military coordination by setting up the Joint Operations and Tasking Center as a single point of contact for requests for military or police assistance.

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<sup>47</sup> HQ ISAF FRAGO 176- Guidelines on support to GIRoA in case of drought and food insecurity fall/winter 2011-2012, July 2012.

<sup>48</sup> The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) is the Headquarters of Allied Command Operations (ACO), one of NATO's two strategic military commands. It is located at Casteau, north of the Belgian city of Mons. ACO is commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and is responsible for all Alliance military operations. More information may be found in: <http://www.aco.nato.int/shape.aspx>

## 4. Conclusions and Recommendations

### 4.1 Conclusions

166. Humanitarian organizations and military actors are increasingly operating in the same emergency environments. There is thus value in reviewing the strategic and operational processes within OCHA to coordinate humanitarian response where both civil and military actors are present.

167. At the conceptual level, OCHA through CMCS has helped to bring forward stronger civil-military coordination guidelines and policies and has worked to enhance dialogue, advocacy and training. Yet there is still a long way to go, particularly since CMCS continues to be too isolated and to be over-relied upon, which in turn leads to the mistaken view that civil-military coordination is only for specialists. OCHA has also made efforts to increase its reach on UN-CMCoord through global and regional partnerships. The evaluation found that its stakeholders generally see these efforts as valuable and as contributing to an improved global humanitarian coordination system. To increase its effectiveness and reach, OCHA will need to increase its attention to innovation in training and capacity building of national emergency actors. OCHA is already taking action in regard to training and capacity building, including by developing an accreditation system that will expand its coverage by allowing other training organizations to provide training that meets OCHA standards for quality and consistency.

168. At the operational level, the evaluation field visits and desk reviews suggest that the OCHA UN-CMCoord function is achieving some results on the ground in terms of improved coordination of MCDA, usage of humanitarian convoys protected by armed escorts, and deconfliction in conflict settings. However, the achievement of greater results is hindered by a general lack of systematization of processes and procedures as well as human resource constraints. OCHA's monitoring and evaluation is weak or non-existent in terms of identifying lessons learned on the use of MCDA, particularly regarding the situations in which it should be used and the results of MCDA support. Without this information, it is often difficult to ascertain the benefits of military assistance in humanitarian settings. OCHA's early leadership efforts in countries like Libya are highlighted as a strength by NGOs and donors.

169. Generally speaking, OCHA insufficiently engages with military in the preparedness stage of an emergency, and at the post-response phase, there are not always clear mechanisms for handover to national authorities. During the response phase, integrated missions in complex emergencies have been particularly challenging, with one notable issue being humanitarian actors wanting to receive assurances from OCHA about the maintenance of humanitarian space during a crisis. Integrated missions suffer from an absence of clear guidance on how to address humanitarian space issues and face scepticism from humanitarian actors, leading to inconsistent coordination and application of guidelines. OCHA in general does not bring all parts of its organization to bear on supporting civil-military coordination as well as it could, and often does not take strong stands on behalf of the agreed principles and guidelines both before and during emergencies.

170. There are, however, recent indications that OCHA is beginning to put in place the right mix of country-specific guidelines backed up by political leadership and appropriate communication to be able to engage on UN-CMCoord while protecting the humanitarian imperative. This is part of its larger effort to clarify and formalize the UN-CMCoord function over the past decade, and ultimately to make civil-military coordination more effective despite the relatively small size of the function and indeed of OCHA itself. This has been an incremental process, one whose various strands are now being definitively pulled together in a recently developed policy instruction that responds to many of the concerns expressed during this evaluation with respect to such issues as clarity of roles and responsibilities, policies and tools. The next vital step will be to develop an implementation plan to ensure that the policy instruction is implemented across the organization at all levels.

## 4.2 Recommendations

171. The following recommendations are intended to build upon the policy instruction and to provide impetus for its implementation, and thus to improve the management of the UN-CMCoord function within OCHA. They mirror the findings in being preponderantly concentrated on the effectiveness dimension. It should be noted that not all findings merited a recommendation, as in the case of positive findings that do not require action. Following each recommendation we have noted the findings related to it.

172. Some of these recommendations have resource implications for OCHA. Yet it is important to underline that the recommendations are not calling for additional resources so much as for OCHA to more fully draw upon its existing resources. Recommendations focusing upon effectiveness in terms of training and capacity building should be particularly highlighted in this regard. While costing of these is beyond the scope of the evaluation, the recommendations should be examined by OCHA to ensure that it is investing resources in the areas that it wants to prioritize. Any increases in spending on training that result from such an examination would be because of a comprehensive prioritization of training decided upon within the context of OCHA's Organizational Learning Strategy. In regards to training and capacity building, it should be further noted that these are not the panacea for all ills but are merely aids to progress – quality operational outputs in the field should also be emphasized.

173. An important point to underline is that UN-CMCoord is not a stand-alone priority for OCHA, but rather forms a part of the underlying strategies for expanding relationships with member states and operational partners. As OCHA develops its next Strategic Framework for 2014-17, it will be important to link evolving UN-CMCoord requirements to emerging goals in this regard; it will also be important to determine focus areas for UN-CMCoord partnerships as it develops its partnership/inclusivity strategy.

174. A further important point is that some of the recommendations may require OCHA to interface with other bodies or groups, such as the IASC – but because the evaluation is concerned with OCHA's role, the recommendations focus on OCHA alone. Relatedly, the evaluation's concern with OCHA and what it can do means that there are no recommendations that would fall into the responsibility areas of other organizations.

175. Regarding the recommendations that focus wholly or in part upon effectiveness in terms of operations – as noted in the Conclusions, the recently developed UN-CMCoord policy instruction has gone some way toward addressing operational issues within OCHA. The policy instruction expands upon and clarifies the reach of the UN-CMCoord function across the organization, including mainstreaming the roles and responsibilities of OCHA staff in implementing and helping to ensure compliance with UN-CMCoord guidelines. The policy instruction also formalizes responsibilities and accountabilities at each level of the organization with regard to UN-CMCoord. Many of the effectiveness recommendations focused upon operations will be addressed, either fully or partially, by the full implementation of the policy instruction.

### Effectiveness

**Recommendation 1: OCHA should fully implement the policy instruction and should allocate sufficient resources to ensure that UN-CMCoord becomes a core competency within OCHA.**

#### Related to finding 7

176. The USG/ERC's development of the policy instruction on the roles and responsibilities for UN-CMCoord is a clear signal of the desire to ensure that UN-CMCoord becomes a core competency of the organization. Support for the implementation of the policy instruction is vital and should be a priority.

177. The implementation plan should consider the implications at all levels of the organization. This will include the responsibilities of current sections and branches and how to adapt existing mechanisms to pursue its mandate in coordinating humanitarian affairs. Greater attention should be given to Humanitarian

Affairs Officers, who are deployed on the ground and who should be able to establish and maintain dialogue with the military. The policy instruction will also have implications for CMCS responsibilities and for allocation of resources at both CMCS and ESB.

178. The plan should ensure that all OCHA staff acquire this core competency, for example through training, coaching, tools, and communication from HQ to the country level. OCHA will need to allocate sufficient resources in the short term to ensure staff are brought up to speed on UN-CMCoord.

179. While the policy instruction is a clear and very positive sign of OCHA's commitment to UN-CMCoord, it will now need to 'walk the talk' to ensure that this commitment is effectively demonstrated at the field level and throughout the agency. In doing so, OCHA should be sure to coordinate with other UN agencies involved with the military in their own right, including issuing a strong call for meaningful and practical collaboration and sharing of experiences beyond IASC.

**Recommendation 2: OCHA, as a key agency for UN-CMCoord policy guidance under the IASC, should improve support and assistance to the humanitarian community in their interactions with national militaries in various scenarios.**

**Related to findings 10, 13, and 21**

180. While the current UN-CMCoord guidelines address what military forces ought to do in interacting with the humanitarian community, they do not give sufficient guidance to the humanitarian community in its interactions with national military and civil defence forces. Such guidance should be developed in cooperation with relevant actors, including other UN agencies involved with the military in their own right. It should address various relevant scenarios, and should be incorporated into the guidelines such that improved support and assistance is provided to the humanitarian community.

**Recommendation 3: The mainstreaming of UN-CMCoord within OCHA called for by the policy instruction should be continued through the existing mechanisms (advocacy, training and awareness), in order to enhance the profile of the function within the organization and respond to accountability gaps.**

**Related to finding 7**

181. The need to engage with the military in humanitarian response extends beyond CMCS to other parts of OCHA, including regional offices and staff at the country level. The policy instruction helps to address this issue in its call for mainstreaming and formalization of the function, and thus it should be implemented to improve UN-CMCoord civil-military coordination at all levels.

**Recommendation 4: In line with the IASC transformative agenda, it is strongly suggested that OCHA move forward on implementing its improved knowledge management structure in order to share lessons learned and disseminate best practices; it should also systematize its M&E function such that it can recognize successes, identify best practices and increase the accountability of the function to the rest of the organization.**

**Related to findings 18 and 19**

182. The evaluation highlighted some good examples of best practices on the role of UN-CMCoord in emergencies, such as in Libya and Colombia. Such lessons learned and best practices constitute valuable information that staff can draw on, particularly regarding what has worked and what is less likely to work. One of the core pillars of OCHA's recently endorsed Organizational Learning Strategy is knowledge management. The strategy should be implemented so as to better capitalize on lessons learned and best practices by sharing them with staff – perhaps through a website or community of practice within the organization – and by having them feed into planning mechanisms

183. The transformative agenda's pillar on accountability points to the need for a commonly agreed-upon monitoring and reporting framework. While the evaluation noted some examples of data collection on MCDA (for example in response to the earthquake in Haiti), this was not consistent across all field mission countries. Improved M&E and reporting on results lends credence to the value of the UN-CMCoord function and the value of military actors working collaboratively with the humanitarian community. Improved M&E would also greatly enhance lessons learned with humanitarian and military actors.

**Recommendation 5: OCHA should engage more systematically with DPKO in developing best practices and lessons learned related to ensuring neutrality and impartiality in countries with integrated peacekeeping missions, so as to facilitate decision making, communication, and leadership.**

**Related to findings 23 and 24**

184. The evaluation noted the challenges facing UN-CMCoord in integrated missions. As a result, best practices and lessons learned in regard to integrated missions should be articulated together with DPKO, and areas of joint interest such as decision-making criteria for efficient use of DPKO assets should be explored, as a basis for better meeting these challenges. Having a CMCS staff member in New York provides an opportunity to engage more regularly with DPKO, and should be capitalized upon. As well, institutional strategic-level coordination with relevant offices of DPKO at Headquarters level should be further considered.

**Recommendation 6: OCHA should further develop and enhance strategic relationships and partnerships as well as synergies with regional organizations, and should use senior political level engagement to raise the profile of such partnerships.**

**Related to findings 9 and 15**

185. OCHA has been recognized in this evaluation for adhering to its strategic framework with regard to developing partnerships, especially with regional organizations. Its emphasis on partnerships is appreciated by donors and member states and efforts to develop and enhance such partnerships should be continued. In instances where key partnerships are stagnant, senior level political engagement should be used to raise the profile of UN-CMCoord and thus to facilitate their development.

**Recommendation 7: OCHA should develop short, reader-friendly basic UN-CMCoord materials to increase their relevance and accessibility.**

**Related to findings 7, 8, 13, and 17**

186. Evaluation respondents would like to have basic UN-CMCoord materials that are less abstruse and more relevant to non-specialist audiences. OCHA CMCS has recently produced a one-page document outlining the UN-CMCoord role. OCHA should build upon this effort by developing short, reader-friendly UN-CMCoord materials on specific issues as they arise (similar to the Last Resort pamphlet), to make them relevant and accessible to different audiences.

**Recommendation 8: OCHA regional offices should develop clear strategies for advancing UN-CMCoord in their regions, and should have UN-CMCoord personnel trained and competent to provide surge support in country offices where required.**

**Related to finding 19**

187. The evaluation noted some variation in investment in UN-CMCoord across different regional offices. The new policy instruction helps to clarify accountabilities for UN-CMCoord across regions, and should help to address this. In support of this, OCHA should assign regional offices a stronger role for UN-CMCoord. This would allow them to develop clearer strategies for advancing UN-CMCoord that take

regional specificities into account, in terms of such things as strategies, partnerships and training. Regional offices should also be encouraged to provide surge support for country offices where circumstances demand it.

**Recommendation 9: OCHA should, at the first opportunity, conduct an in-depth assessment of the education, awareness building, and capacity development needs of its multiple external stakeholders in civil-military coordination, and should design creative policies and approaches to meet them.**

**Related to findings 15 and 16**

188. OCHA's multiple stakeholders in civil-military coordination have particular needs in terms of gaining enhanced knowledge about and awareness of the UN-CMCoord function, as well as in developing their own capacities related to the function. OCHA should conduct an independent assessment to determine what those needs are, and should then design flexible and creative policies that clearly articulate approaches to address them. In so doing, OCHA would be able to reach much larger proportions of its target audience in much more effective ways. This should also include looking at financial resource implications.

**Recommendation 10: OCHA should seek innovative ways to expand knowledge of UN-CMCoord such as through the use of computer assisted training modules and engaging with military-academic institutions.**

**Related to findings 15 and 16**

The evaluation noted previous efforts to creatively expand the way training is carried out, and suggests that there may be an opportunity to revisit computer-based training both within OCHA and externally. This has the added advantage of being very cost effective. OCHA should also build upon its UN-CMCoord accreditation program by expanding to other training institutes. In doing so, it should be sure to retain control over content and delivery of courses, to ensure the quality of the courses. Finally, as was noted earlier, DPKO is already engaged in various training efforts that are in line with many of the key guiding principles for humanitarian civil-military coordination – OCHA should consider taking advantage of this overlap by looking at mechanisms for partnering together, for instance in providing mobile training and training of trainers regarding UN-CIMIC and UN-CMCoord issues.

**Recommendation 11: OCHA should improve access to and the reach of UN-CMCoord training, making a particular effort to focus upon NGO participants and participants in developing countries, Humanitarian Coordinators, OCHA staff in complex emergency settings, and national emergency coordination agencies and national military forces.**

**Related to findings 11, 15 and 16**

189. The evaluation noted the excellent in-kind support received from larger member states in carrying out joint exercises and UN-CMCoord training. The military often meets its participation quota for such training, but this is not always the case for humanitarian actors and the range of participants from developing countries is relatively limited. Efforts should therefore be made to specifically target increased attendance by humanitarian actors (both in the field and at HQ) and a wider range of participants in developing countries. As part of this effort, an eventual transition away from training carried out in developed countries should be encouraged in favour of training in the developing world where emergencies actually happen.

190. Training priority for UN-CMCoord staff should be given to those in complex emergency settings, where staff rotations and the need to interact with military are greatest. OCHA Heads of Office in these countries are critical actors in UN-CMCoord and should also receive priority training, as should OCHA

Humanitarian Affairs Officers, especially in sub-offices, where requests for MCDA can be significant. This recommendation is in line with the leadership initiative in the Transformative Agenda.

191. The evaluation noted the critical role played by the Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs) in complex emergencies, especially in terms of balancing humanitarian and military (CIMIC) interests and ensuring that UN-CMCoord is able to operate smoothly and effectively. This is particularly true in light of the growing importance of military actors in emergencies. Humanitarian Coordinators thus need to be given the proper tools to support the overall UN-CMCoord function, which includes appropriate UN-CMCoord training. OCHA should continue to work through the Humanitarian Leadership Strengthening Unit (HLSU) to put in place such training; the training could be incorporated as a session into the HC induction training.

192. Recent experience in the Asian region has shown that the role of OCHA in a number of member states is changing to one that increasingly involves facilitating initiatives to support national military actors and national emergency coordination agencies to be better equipped and better prepared to respond to their own emergencies and to those in the region. Similar efforts should be undertaken in other regions, through an expansion of engagement with regional organizations.

**Recommendation 12: OCHA should place an increased emphasis on pre-deployment planning and training with appropriate actors.**

**Related to findings 15 and 16**

193. Pre-deployment for DPKO missions as well as preparedness and early assessment roles in OCHA should better incorporate UN-CMCoord training and skills. This could be accomplished through workshops and exercises; in particular, joint exercises have been noted as an ideal way to assist in preparedness – these should be encouraged.

**Recommendation 13: OCHA should optimize the UN-CMCoord function with its current staffing of country offices, regional offices and in CMCS, so that it is drawing on the resources it has and thus avoids any gaps in meeting UN-CMCoord staffing needs in high-demand countries.**

**Related to finding 11**

194. This evaluation agrees with the policy instruction insofar as each country office should have the capacity to determine its own UN-CMCoord staffing. Full-time UN-CMCoord officers should be present in complex emergency settings and in the early stages of natural disasters, which should be facilitated by rapid deployment of staff to those theatres when there is a need.

**Effectiveness/Efficiency**

**Recommendation 14: OCHA should mandate that UN-CMCoord country-specific guidelines and standard operating procedures be developed in emergencies in which military actors are engaged. Where possible, these should be part of OCHA’s overall contingency/preparedness stage of planning in priority natural-disaster prone countries.**

**Related to findings 13, 17 and 26**

195. This evaluation found that many best practices on UN-CMCoord on the ground revolved around common guidelines having been agreed to by all actors in the humanitarian response. CMCS has also noted the importance of having such agreed-upon guidelines, and has been more insistent about developing them in recent years. This push should continue, with a particular emphasis on priority natural-disaster prone countries.

## Prioritization of Recommendations

196. In line with a request from OCHA and to facilitate their implementation, we have prioritized these recommendations according to their importance: “high”, “medium” and “low”.

Prioritization of Recommendations	
High	
Recommendation 1:	OCHA should fully implement the policy instruction and should allocate sufficient resources to ensure that UN-CMCoord becomes a core competency within OCHA.
Recommendation 2:	OCHA, as a key agency for UN-CMCoord policy guidance under the IASC, should improve support and assistance to the humanitarian community in their interactions with national militaries in various scenarios.
Recommendation 3:	The mainstreaming of UN-CMCoord within OCHA called for by the policy instruction should be continued through the existing mechanisms (advocacy, training and awareness), in order to enhance the profile of the function within the organization and respond to accountability gaps.
Recommendation 8:	OCHA regional offices should develop clear strategies for advancing UN-CMCoord in their regions, and should have UN-CMCoord personnel trained and competent to provide surge support in country offices where required.
Recommendation 14:	OCHA should mandate that UN-CMCoord country-specific guidelines and standard operating procedures be developed in emergencies in which military actors are engaged. Where possible, these should be part of OCHA’s overall contingency/preparedness stage of planning in priority natural-disaster prone countries.
Medium	
Recommendation 4:	In line with the IASC transformative agenda, it is strongly suggested that OCHA move forward on implementing its improved knowledge management structure in order to share lessons learned and disseminate best practices; it should also systematize its M&E function such that it can recognize successes, identify best practices and increase the accountability of the function to the rest of the organization
Recommendation 5:	OCHA should engage more systematically with DPKO in developing best practices and lessons learned related to ensuring neutrality and impartiality in countries with integrated peacekeeping missions, so as to facilitate decision making, communication, and leadership.
Recommendation 6:	OCHA should further develop and enhance strategic relationships and partnerships as well as synergies with regional organizations, and should use senior political level engagement to raise the profile of such partnerships.
Recommendation 9:	OCHA should, at the first opportunity, conduct an in-depth assessment of the education, awareness building, and capacity development needs of its multiple external stakeholders in civil-military coordination, and should design creative policies and approaches to meet them.
Recommendation 10:	OCHA should seek innovative ways to expand knowledge of UN-CMCoord such as through the use of computer assisted training modules and engaging with military-academic institutions.
Recommendation 11:	OCHA should improve access to and the reach of UN-CMCoord training, making a particular effort to focus upon NGO participants and participants in developing countries, Humanitarian Coordinators, OCHA staff in complex emergency settings, and national emergency coordination agencies and national military forces.
Recommendation 12:	OCHA and the IASC should place an increased emphasis on pre-deployment planning and training with appropriate actors.

Prioritization of Recommendations	
Low	
Recommendation 7:	OCHA should develop short, reader-friendly basic UN-CMCoord materials to increase their relevance and accessibility.
Recommendation 13:	OCHA should optimize the UN-CMCoord function with its current staffing of country offices, regional offices and in CMCS, so that it is drawing on the resources it has and thus avoids any gaps in meeting UN-CMCoord staffing needs in high-demand countries.



## Appendix I List of Findings

- Finding 1: All parties agree that the military, whether national or international, plays and will continue to play a crucial role in natural disaster and conflict situations, and that consequently the capacity to provide competent coordination of civil-military intervention will be of the utmost importance.
- Finding 2: OCHA is impacted by the strong will of member states to at times involve their military in humanitarian interventions even where principles and guidelines might militate against their doing so. The engagement by OCHA in upholding the principles and guidelines has been well received by many actors.
- Finding 3: Opinions regarding OCHA’s suitability to carry out civil-military coordination is mixed, with some NGOs believing it to be less than neutral and impartial in the role and many evaluation respondents having a more positive view. Yet no other organization seems to be better placed to assume the overall coordination role today and in the foreseeable future.
- Finding 4: Civil-military coordination increasingly involves coping with more blurred lines between humanitarian and military space, the further emergence of non-state actors (including criminal actors), and direct intervention of national and regional military actors. This further reinforces the need for effective coordination.
- Finding 5: While in the past, OCHA was seen as less than committed to UN-CMCoord, it has in recent years assumed its Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination role with increasing competence, due in part to the CMCS section.
- Finding 6: CMCS is seen as a good central focal point for UN-CMCoord within OCHA. Appropriate staffing, expansion of its operational elements, and a more effective engagement in New York have all helped it to facilitate greater civil-military coordination.
- Finding 7: Despite a positive perception regarding the overall effectiveness of OCHA’s UN-CMCoord, results on the ground suggest that greater emphasis needs to be put on mainstreaming and systematizing UN-CMCoord in the organizational structures at the field level and throughout OCHA.
- Finding 8: The civil-military function has become better understood and anchored within OCHA. Yet the UN-CMCoord function still remains on the periphery of political discussions at the UN focused on the humanitarian agenda.
- Finding 9: OCHA has been innovative and progressive in establishing a wide range of partnerships to advance and solidify the UN-CMCoord agenda, and is appreciated at the global and regional levels for building alliances and engaging actors in both the military and the humanitarian community.
- Finding 10: OCHA has done well, principally through the work of CMCS, in advancing a normative agenda on civil-military coordination and in updating substantial parts of that agenda over the years (e.g., covering natural disasters and conflict situations). Further areas remain to be defined, for instance with regard to public order and safety and the police.

- Finding 11: Adequate and timely recruitment, deployment and retention of qualified and diverse UN-CMCoord staff remain key challenges for the organization.
- Finding 12: OCHA provides necessary and sometimes critical support to Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators.
- Finding 13: The effectiveness of UN-CMCoord and compliance with normative guidelines and principles varies in the field, and is seen as highly dependent on the development of standard operating procedures (SOP) and/or country-specific guidelines developed and accepted by country stakeholders.
- Finding 14: OCHA has engaged with partners through a variety of fora to advance and solidify the UN-CMCoord agenda.
- Finding 15: Education, capacity-building, awareness raising and training are significant components through which to support civil-military coordination in general and UN-CMCoord in particular. CMCS has recognized the the importance of building partnerships to increase the success and reach of its training.
- Finding 16: While all UN-CMCoord Officers and the majority of OCHA Heads of Offices feel they have adequate training in UN-CMCoord, the training has not yet reached sufficient numbers of other relevant groups – such as Cluster Leads, OCHA staff in the field, Humanitarian Coordinators, and NGOs.
- Finding 17: Although formally committed to norms and roles as outlined in various relevant fora and instruments – including IASC and country-specific guidelines – many stakeholders involved in civil-military coordination (including UN agencies, member states, and the humanitarian community) do not always abide by agreed guidelines but make their own arrangements with the military, sometimes in ways that do not accord with agreed principles and norms.
- Finding 18: The monitoring and evaluation of the UN-CMCoord function remains ad hoc. Data collection, reporting, conducting reviews, and collating results into best practices and lessons learned are not systematic.
- Finding 19: OCHA has had difficulty in managing its knowledge on UN-CMCoord among the various field offices and in identifying lessons learned and good practices in civil-military coordination.
- Finding 20: At the preparedness stage, UN-CMCoord is constrained by its speed of deployment and its role in assessment and UNDAC missions.
- Finding 21: In the response phase, OCHA has yet to adapt its UN-CMCoord approaches to the national contexts.
- Finding 22: Variations in leadership for UN-CMCoord at regional offices have affected the overall support that regional offices provide to country offices.
- Finding 23: The UN Country Team and humanitarian actors working in countries with Integrated Missions in co-existence situations express concern with the impartiality and neutrality of the Mission, as well as efforts related to state-building and stabilization. OCHA has demonstrated some success in balancing the interests of humanitarian and military actors in this regard.

- Finding 24: OCHA has given insufficient attention or thinking to UN-CMCoord challenges in Integrated Mission contexts.
- Finding 25: In co-existence settings and conflict situations, OCHA has begun to improve its deconfliction efforts.
- Finding 26: OCHA has established more streamlined processes for UN-CMCoord, which has led to more efficient use of MCDA in emergency settings. However, assessing the efficiency of OCHA is challenging in the absence of commonly accepted indicators and data to measure elements such as how military assets are used, the speed of deployment of MCDA, and for what purpose.



## Appendix II List of Recommendations

- Recommendation 1: OCHA should fully implement the policy instruction and should allocate sufficient resources to ensure that UN-CMCoord becomes a core competency within OCHA.
- Recommendation 2: OCHA, as a key agency for UN-CMCoord policy guidance under the IASC, should improve support and assistance to the humanitarian community in their interactions with national militaries in various scenarios.
- Recommendation 3: The mainstreaming of UN-CMCoord within OCHA called for by the policy instruction should be continued through the existing mechanisms (advocacy, training and awareness), in order to enhance the profile of the function within the organization and respond to accountability gaps.
- Recommendation 4: In line with the IASC transformative agenda, it is strongly suggested that OCHA move forward on implementing its improved knowledge management structure in order to share lessons learned and disseminate best practices; it should also systematize its M&E function such that it can recognize successes, identify best practices and increase the accountability of the function to the rest of the organization.
- Recommendation 5: OCHA should engage more systematically with DPKO in developing best practices and lessons learned related to ensuring neutrality and impartiality in countries with integrated peacekeeping missions, so as to facilitate decision making, communication, and leadership.
- Recommendation 6: OCHA should further develop and enhance strategic relationships and partnerships as well as synergies with regional organizations, and should use senior political level engagement to raise the profile of such partnerships.
- Recommendation 7: OCHA should develop short, reader-friendly basic UN-CMCoord materials to increase their relevance and accessibility.
- Recommendation 8: OCHA regional offices should develop clear strategies for advancing UN-CMCoord in their regions, and should have UN-CMCoord personnel trained and competent to provide surge support in country offices where required.
- Recommendation 9: OCHA should, at the first opportunity, conduct an in-depth assessment of the education, awareness building, and capacity development needs of its multiple external stakeholders in civil-military coordination, and should design creative policies and approaches to meet them.
- Recommendation 10: OCHA should seek innovative ways to expand knowledge of UN-CMCoord such as through the use of computer assisted training modules and engaging with military-academic institutions.
- Recommendation 11: OCHA should improve access to and the reach of UN-CMCoord training, making a particular effort to focus upon NGO participants and participants in developing countries, Humanitarian Coordinators, OCHA staff in complex emergency settings, and national emergency coordination agencies and national military forces.

- Recommendation 12: OCHA should place an increased emphasis on pre-deployment planning and training with appropriate actors.
- Recommendation 13: OCHA should optimize the UN-CMCoord function with its current staffing of country offices, regional offices and in CMCS, so that it is drawing on the resources it has and thus avoids any gaps in meeting UN-CMCoord staffing needs in high-demand countries.
- Recommendation 14: OCHA should mandate that UN-CMCoord country-specific guidelines and standard operating procedures be developed in emergencies in which military actors are engaged. Where possible, these should be part of OCHA's overall contingency/preparedness stage of planning in priority natural-disaster prone countries.