

# Review of using aid funds in the UK to promote awareness of global poverty

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**Prepared for:**  
DFID

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Full responsibility for the report and its recommendations rests with the authors.

## Key Terms

The area of 'development' and in particular 'support for development' is bedevilled by confusing and contradictory use of terms. For the purposes of this review, we use the following definitions of three key terms:

*Public opinion* - The aggregate of individual attitudes or beliefs held by the population. This includes whether the public is 'concerned' about an issue, claims to 'support' or not 'support' a particular policy when asked, 'agrees' or 'disagrees' with a particular question.

*Support (for development)* - Includes both public opinion (e.g. agrees with questions about development such as "do you think the United Kingdom should help less developed countries") and action (e.g. buying Fairtrade and donating to development).

*Development Sector* - We define the development sector for this review as:

1. UK based organisations and individuals including NGOs such as Oxfam, ActionAid and War on Want.
2. Academics and academic institutions such as DERC or IDS.
3. Businesses that are: (1) actively engaged in development through working in the developing world; (2) working to ensure that a supply chain that sources from the developing world is ethical; (3) engaged in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities that affect the developing world.

*Development Education* – Activity that aims to inform individuals and to enhance the public's ability to make critical judgements about globalisation and development. Note that this is not the same as support.

## Executive Summary

This review set out to identify whether DFID should continue to use aid funds in the UK to promote awareness of and public involvement in development issues, as a means of contributing to a reduction in global poverty. Our review is based on:

1. An examination of reports supplied by DFID. This includes a series of reviews of Building Support for Development (BSD) activities commissioned by DFID and carried out by a variety of consultancies in 2009.
2. Tracking surveys commissioned by DFID over the past decade.
3. Interviews with key stakeholders across the BSD field.
4. Written submissions from a range of stakeholders.
5. Other papers and reports identified by both stakeholders and the COI team.
6. Input from a group of independent experts (“the Expert Group”) composed of Lord Malloch-Brown (former Government Minister), Matt Tee (Permanent Secretary for Government Communication), John Young (Deputy Director, Overseas Development Institute) and Matt Robinson (Deputy Director, Cabinet Office Strategy Unit).

This led to a consistent set of findings to the three key questions that the review required us to address:

### 1. Does raising awareness in the UK of development issues contribute to reducing poverty?

We are confident that – and stakeholders in the sector quoted examples where – raising awareness of development issues in the UK has contributed to reducing poverty overseas. However, the evidence is circumstantial and consequently we have been unable to prove conclusively that this is the case. We can make the argument that it does, but there are simply too many causal connections to be able to prove it.

Similarly we have been unable to prove that DFID-funded awareness raising projects have made a direct contribution to reducing poverty. In part, this is because DFID’s historic approach to funding projects in this area has been unstrategic and individual projects have not been properly evaluated.

Evidence suggests that DFID’s Partnership Programme Agreements with NGOs have contributed to the level of public support that exists in the UK for development. However, again in part because of a lack of evaluation, we have been unable to prove this or the scale of contribution.

Recent UK experience demonstrates the important role that politicians play in setting a positive agenda for global poverty reduction. Evidence suggests that public support helps ensure ongoing political commitment. However, once again, we have been unable to prove a direct link.

*From the evidence reviewed, we conclude that raising awareness of development issues in the UK is likely to contribute to reducing global poverty but it is not possible to establish a direct link or quantify the contribution made by DFID-funded activity. Therefore, a decision to continue funding activity in this area cannot be entirely*

*evidence-based. Continued funding will, by default, therefore be a matter of opinion and judgement and therefore a political decision.*

## **2. Is it appropriate for DFID to fund and lead awareness-raising activity?**

Awareness-raising activity – in particular development education – plays an important role in creating an environment that supports efforts to tackle global poverty. We believe that raising awareness and understanding should be seen as an educational objective – and therefore any ongoing BSD activity should have an educational focus. We recommend DFID focus its investment within the school system because this is where the next generation (key to eradicating global poverty) is being educated. We also consider it appropriate for DFID as a government department to focus on the school system, leaving NGOs and businesses to target the adult population.

Based on the evidence reviewed and that provided by stakeholders, we believe DFID has a legitimate role to play in continuing to support the work that the UK's development-focused NGOs are already doing – and will continue to do – in raising awareness.

*However, without an empirical link between DFID's awareness raising activity and poverty reduction, we conclude that DFID should reconfigure its current programme of activity in this area.*

## **3. Is this an appropriate use of money that could be spent overseas?**

The use of aid money in the UK is an emotive issue and strong opinions were voiced by stakeholders, both for and against. There is a reasonable causal chain to suggest that DFID-funded activity undertaken in the UK contributes to a reduction in global poverty. However, because projects have not been properly evaluated, there is no conclusive evidence.

*Because a reasonable causal chain exists, we conclude that it is appropriate to use limited aid funding in the UK but only where, as the 2002 International Development Act states, the Secretary of State “... is satisfied that to do so is likely to contribute to a reduction in poverty”.*

# 1 Introduction

This review sets out to identify whether the Department for International Development (DFID) should continue to use aid funds in the UK to promote awareness of and public involvement in development issues, as a means of contributing to a reduction in global poverty. The review seeks to support the development of DFID's new communication strategy by identifying an appropriate future role and strategy for Building Support for Development (BSD).

Understanding DFID's objectives is central to this review but terms such as 'support' and 'development' are often poorly defined, if at all. Therefore, in order to produce robust evidence and recommendations, we have defined 'support for development' as both **public opinion** (attitudes and beliefs that lead to actions that reduce poverty and increase opportunity in less developed countries) and **individual actions** (behaviours that contribute to the reduction of poverty and the increase in opportunity in less developed countries).

Therefore, 'building support for development' (BSD) can be summarised as activity that increases support for development through favourable public opinion and action/behaviour.

## *Terms of reference*

The review's terms of reference are set out at Annex 1. They require us to:

1. Review existing evidence of programmes designed to raise awareness of development in the UK and examine their effectiveness.
2. Set out the evidence and arguments around the value of using aid funds to raise awareness in the UK of global poverty and public involvement in addressing this, and recommend a way forward.

*If we find there is a case for continuation of aid funding, to:*

3. Set out a framework for assessing the effectiveness of development awareness work.
4. Recommend which instruments and methods (including new and innovative approaches) available to DFID are likely to be most effective in raising awareness / promoting involvement, and to suggest impact measures for these. In doing this, the review should compare the relative merits of using aid funds to promote awareness of development issues and involvement with using DFID's own press and communications activity on the impact of the Government's own aid programme.
5. Look specifically at the reach and effectiveness of projects supported under the Development Awareness Fund.
6. Ensure that value for money and effectiveness are being achieved for all of the above.

It is beyond the remit of this review to set precise quantified and time-specific objectives for future BSD activities. Any future funding or interventions agreed as a

result of this review should be set precise, quantified and time-based objectives against which success can be evaluated.

### *The review team*

In response to a request from DFID, this review has been carried out by a cross-divisional team from the Central Office of Information (COI) – the government’s centre of excellence for marketing and communication. Details of the team are included at Annex 2.

## 2 Context

Three distinct but related issues have shaped the context of this review. These are:

1. The ongoing development agenda.
2. Government proposals for the future reform of public services.
3. Proposed reform of Government communication.

### 2.1 The development agenda

The development agenda has broadened and evolved since DFID's Building Support for Development strategy was launched in 1999, in terms of both priority issues (climate change, volatile markets, the effects of globalisation and population movements, for example) and key participants. In particular, the interconnectedness of nations and how they must work together on development issues has seen an increase in multi-national organisations, fora and campaigns.

We believe the pace of change is increasing, and that in five years time the sector will look different again. This presents challenges for DFID in terms of both communication and engagement with regard to:

1. Language: how development and associated issues are labelled, explained and made relevant to people's lives.
2. Evaluation: how objectives are developed that enable activities and interventions to be justified and their impact to be judged.

The review must also consider:

1. Government commitment to international development.
2. The growing demand for transparency in aid.
3. The UK's influence on the global development system.

We also note that the Government has committed to the International Citizen Service. Any recommended activity should be aligned with this initiative.

### 2.2 Public sector reform

Any recommendations made or decisions taken as a result of this review must also be consistent with the Government's desire to make two major shifts:

1. A power shift: reversing a century of centralisation.
2. A horizon shift: moving from short- to long-term thinking.

Additionally, appropriate recommendations and decisions should seek to be consistent with the principles behind the forthcoming Open Government White Paper on modernising public services. The five tenets likely to be most relevant to increasing public awareness of development are:

1. Promoting independent provision: not taking for granted that services and activity should be run by the state.
2. Identifying 'rights to provide': giving public sector workers or community groups and NGOs the incentive to think of better ways of providing services.
3. Offering new forms of accountability: providing more detailed information, for example, data on how effectively public money is spent.

4. Attracting external investment and expertise: looking for new ideas and expertise in public services; getting other people to invest money and expertise and rewarding them as appropriate.
5. Establishing payment by results: paying providers for what they achieve, not just for what they do.

Furthermore, any future activity on building support for development will need to take into account the emerging 'Big Society' agenda and reflect the principles of the forthcoming Giving White Paper.

## **2.3 Reform of Government communication**

Finally, the recommendations we make and any future strategy development must take into account proposed reform of government direct communication. This includes:

1. Government's responsibility to explain its actions and expenditure (transparency).
2. The (propriety) requirement not to promote a department as an end in its own right.
3. Outcome-based objectives.
4. Robust evaluation.
5. The effective use of owned and earned channels as well as those purchased.
6. A more effective use of partnerships.
7. Payment by results.

Taken together, these three contexts provide a detailed checklist for any future investment.

### 3 Methodology

The findings of this review are based on:

1. An examination of reports supplied by DFID, including a series of reviews of BSD activities commissioned by DFID and carried out by a variety of consultancies in 2009.
2. Tracking surveys commissioned by DFID over the past decade.
3. Interviews with key stakeholders across the BSD field.
4. Written submissions from a number of stakeholders.
5. Other papers and reports identified by both stakeholders and the COI team.
6. Input from a group of independent experts (the Expert Group) composed of Lord Malloch-Brown (former Government Minister), Matt Tee (Permanent Secretary for Government Communication), John Young (Deputy Director, Overseas Development Institute) and Matt Robinson (Deputy Director, Cabinet Office Strategy Unit).

All documents and papers considered are referenced. Information on the stakeholders interviewed is included at Annex 3.

The following seven reviews of BSD were analysed in detail (using an analysis grid developed for the review):

1. Review of DFID's Building Support for Development Strategy: Impact of Strategy, Expenditure and Activities (Verulam Associates, August 2009).
2. Review of DFID's work to Build Support for Development through the educational system (PriceWaterHouseCoopers, June 2009).
3. Enhancing the impact of DFID and DCSF global education programmes in schools (ISOS, October 2009).
4. Enhancing Global School Partnerships Programme - Impact evaluation report (NFER, January 2011).
5. Review of DFID's work to build support for development through the media (Oxford Global Media and The Partnership, June 2009).
6. Review of DFID's Work to Build Support for Development through work with Businesses, Trades Unions, Faith Communities, Black and Minority Ethnic Communities, and Diaspora Groups (Verulam Associates, July 2009).
7. Review of DFID's Work to Build Support for Development through the Development Awareness Fund and the Mini Grants Programme (Verulam Associates, June 2009).

We approached the reviews with the intent to identify:

1. The extent to which DFID programmes and activities were successful in raising awareness and promoting involvement in development issues among the target groups/end audiences.
2. The particular instruments/methods that were effective in raising awareness/involvement.
3. Comment and evidence on value for money.
4. How analysis and evaluation could be improved in future.

It is important to note that these reviews did not consider the degree to which DFID's BSD investment reduced poverty. Development Awareness Fund (DAF) projects were reviewed separately: the methodology used to do so is set out in section 9.

## 4 The Building Support for Development programme

DFID's investment of aid funds in BSD has grown considerably from £1.5 million in 1998/99 to £24 million in 2009/10. By the end of 2010 DFID had invested £116.05 million in Building Support for Development. This growth took place despite the fact that no impact studies, systematic monitoring or evaluation was carried out until 2009.<sup>1</sup>

A series of reviews of programme strands was commissioned by DFID in 2009 but none assessed the activity's impact on poverty. This is surprising, given that all expenditure of aid funds in the UK must be in accordance with the International Development Act. This states: 'The Secretary of State may....promote, or assist any person or body to promote awareness of global poverty and of the means of reducing such poverty, if he is satisfied that to do so is likely to contribute to a reduction in poverty.'<sup>2</sup>

This growth, together with a number of recognised limitations in the original strategy, has led to the current review.

### 4.1 Strengths and limitations of the original strategy

The 1999 Building Support for Development Strategy paper led directly to the BSD programme. The strategy was a bold attempt to deliver interventions in an arena that was poorly understood. It sensibly took a portfolio approach, which spread risk and encouraged innovation. However, the strategy failed to collect evidence on what worked and was therefore unable to refine the criteria for future interventions and enable improved performance.

The strategy paper was developed 12 years ago. Since then major changes have taken place with regard to development and within the development sector.

Consequently, from a 2011 perspective the strategy has a number of weaknesses:

1. It is based on an assumption that 'awareness' leads to a reduction in poverty, without articulating how this might happen. This has never been proven.
2. It lacks specific outcome-based objectives. Given the need to ensure that public money is spent as effectively as possible, this is no longer acceptable.
3. It does not consider evaluation in any depth. This makes it difficult to assess whether activities have or have not been successful.
4. It uses a number of undefined terms (such as "awareness", "concern", "understanding" and "support"), making any assessment of impact and success highly subjective.

### 4.2 Focus of the strategy and key programmes

The 1999 strategy paper set out four areas of focus:

1. Formal education.

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<sup>1</sup> Verulam Associates, 2009c; 3.

<sup>2</sup> International Development Act 2002, Section 4, Supplementary powers

2. The media.
3. Businesses and trade unions.
4. Churches and faith groups.

A number of programmes specifically targeted formal education and the media. Businesses, trade unions, churches and faiths were targeted through two competitive funds (the Development Awareness Fund [DAF], and the Minis Grants Scheme [MGS]) which were also open to the formal education sector and the media. These programmes and funds are described below.

The 2006 Development White Paper also led to an additional number of programmes becoming part of the BSD strategy.

#### 4.2.1 Formal education

The 1999 BSD strategy paper noted that while children learn through many channels, formal education remains key. Following the 1997 White Paper's call for every child to be educated about development issues, DFID focused the majority of BSD investment on the formal education sector.

Five programmes specifically target this sector:

1. Global Schools Partnerships (GSP): a programme managed by the British Council linking UK schools with schools in the developing world.
2. Global Student Forum (GSF): national and regional conferences to inspire and equip 16-19 year old students to teach and motivate their fellow pupils about development issues.
3. Support to Global Learning: funding the Development Education Association (Think Global) to embed global learning in the formal education system.
4. Development Education Research Centre (DERC): providing the research base necessary to convince policymakers that development education was key to building support and understanding of development.
5. Global Learning (Scotland): a programme to increase the capacity of the Scottish education system to deliver effective global learning.

#### 4.2.2 The media

Media engagement was the second area identified as a priority in the 1999 strategy as television was the main source of information for 80 per cent of people in the UK.<sup>3</sup> However, research by VSO found that 80 per cent of the UK public strongly associated the developing world with doom-laden images of famine, disaster and western aid (2002; 3), suggesting that the development narrative used by broadcasters is outdated.

Four DFID-funded programmes targeted the media to promote more development-related content and promote a more balanced and informed perspective on developing countries, specifically:

1. Broadcast Media Scheme: run by the Commonwealth Broadcasting Association (CBA) to improve the quality and quantity of viable programme proposals for

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<sup>3</sup> TNS, 2008, Public attitudes to development, survey commissioned by DFID.

development-related content, leveraging small initial investments by DFID to the point where programme proposals could secure funding from other sources.

2. 'What makes me happy': DFID commissioned Ragdoll Productions to produce a series of 10-15 minute films featuring children from developing countries for screening on Channel 5 and BBC World.
3. Media research: funding the International Broadcasting Trust (IBT) to influence producers and programmers to ensure that more development-related content was screened.
4. Malaria No More: supporting Malaria No More (MNM) in its development awareness and fund raising in the UK, principally through popular media.

### 4.2.3 Competitive funds

Businesses, trade unions, churches and faiths were targeted through two competitive funds. Both were also open to the formal education sector and the media.

1. Development Awareness Fund (DAF): grants were available of up to £100,000.
2. Mini Grants Scheme (MGS): grants were available of up to £30,000.

### 4.2.4 The 2006 White Paper

The 2006 White Paper added a number of additional commitments:

1. Diaspora Volunteering Programme (DVP): funding for skilled professionals from UK diaspora communities to volunteer and work in their countries or continents of heritage.
2. Global Community Linking (GCL): funding for UK community groups to link with a community group or institution in a developing country.
3. Platform 2: funding for young adults to volunteer on overseas development projects

### 4.2.5 Summary of key programmes

As of November 2010 the current BSD programmes were:

**Figure 1: BSD Programmes**

Focus	Programme	Amount*
Education	Global Schools Partnerships (GSP)	£19,865,000
	Global Student Forum (GSF)	£999,349
	Support to Global Learning	£1,000,000
	Development Education Research Centre (DERC)	£239,107
	Global Learning Project (Scotland)	£990,500
2006 White Paper	Diaspora Volunteering Programme (DVP)	£2,880,306
	Global Community Linking (GCL)	£3,000,000
	Platform 2	£9,200,000
Media work	Broadcast Media Scheme	£2,246,958
	'What makes me happy'	£225,000
	Media research	£468,000
	Malaria No More	£594,400
Competitive funds	Development Awareness Fund (DAF)	£13,483,625
	Mini Grants Scheme (MGS)	£1,366,074
Total:		£56,558,319


\* Note: Amounts are amounts allocated rather than annual budget. The sums allocated are for different periods (one, two or three years) and different start dates, some running into

2013. The projects greyed out are either just about to finish (Diaspora Volunteering and Platform2) or a decision has been taken to phase them out (DAF and MGS).

### 4.3 Growth in investment


DFID's investment in BSD has grown by a factor of 16 since the strategy was launched in 1999. DFID had invested £116.05 million in Building Support for Development by the end of 2010

**Figure 2: DFID Investment in BSD 1998/99 – 2009/10**



While investment in BSD also grew as a proportion of the total aid budget, it remained a *tiny* proportion of the overall aid budget. Even now, BSD remains less than half of one per cent of the total aid budget.

**Figure 3: DFID Investment in BSD 1998/99 – 2009/10 as a proportion of total aid**



It should be noted that this section describes direct DFID investment in projects specifically intended to build support for development.

DFID also encouraged the UK's main development NGOs to support activities to build public support through their Programme Partnership Arrangements (PPAs). Encouraging activity and providing unrestricted funding through PPA agreements was a significant contribution by DFID to this agenda. However, we suspect that some of these NGOs would have undertaken much of this promotional activity without DFID support.

## 5 The case for Building Support for Development

The 1999 BSD strategy was based on the assumption or assertion that public ‘awareness’ and ‘support’ are crucial to the delivery of international development targets. It stated that “without such support, the prospects of achieving the targets will be significantly weakened.”<sup>4</sup>


However, exactly how an increase in ‘awareness’ would help reduce global poverty was never articulated and has never been evaluated. Such an implicit assumption is no longer an acceptable basis for government communication – particularly where the Secretary of State is constrained by the requirements of the International Development Act to be confident in this connection. In order to justify continued investment in BSD, a case must be made.

In this section we examine in detail the assertion that underpins the BSD strategy and attempt to identify an evidence base to support it.

### 5.1 Articulating the link between public opinion and poverty reduction

Teasing apart the statements within the BSD Strategy Paper, it is possible to construct a graphical representation of the model that implicitly informed the strategy. We have called this ‘the public opinion is critical’ model.


**Figure 4: Public opinion is critical model**



DFID did not explain in the 1999 strategy how this might work, nor has it done so since. There are two possible ways in which this might work. These are not either/or options. It is perfectly feasible that both mechanisms are at work. These are:

1. Public opinion supports political commitment.<sup>5</sup>

**Figure 5: Public opinion supports political commitment**



<sup>4</sup> DFID, 1999, Building Support for Development: Strategy Paper, p. 1. This presumed link is still used as a rationale, see for example HoC IDC, 2009, “public support is essential to an effective development policy” ‘Aid Under Pressure: Support for Development Assistance in a Global Economic Downturn’. [http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary\\_committees/international\\_development/ind0809an03.cfm](http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/international_development/ind0809an03.cfm)

2. Public opinion leads to individual activity.

**Figure 6: Public opinion leads to individual action**



Each of these ‘models’ is discussed in the following section but first we consider the difficult issue of understanding public opinion in this domain.

## 5.2 Understanding public opinion as it relates to development

Public opinion as it relates to development is extremely difficult to measure.<sup>6</sup> There are issues around how individuals interpret the words ‘aid’ and ‘help’<sup>7</sup> – as humanitarian aid rather than development aid, for example. The majority of people interpret ‘aid’ as “donations made to charities in response to disasters” (Creative, 2006). Tracking research designed to gauge support for aid asks (and continue to ask) questions such as: “In your opinion, is it very important, fairly important, not very important or not at all important to help people in developing countries?”

More specific questions which indicate cost (such as “The Government has committed to increase its spending on overseas aid to poor countries. How much do you agree or disagree with this?”) were not asked until September 2007.

DFID has used the question of how ‘concerned’ people feel about the levels of poverty in poor countries as a measure of ‘support’. This has been criticised by the House of Commons International Development Committee (IDC, 2009). As a result, DFID’s tracking research was revised to include supplementary measures of support for development: the measure of ‘concerned’ was used more as a measure of ‘engagement’. This is the only ‘proxy’ for which we have consistent time series data. Using this measure suggests that public opinion has shifted little over the past decade despite increasing investment by DFID into public awareness raising.

Even very large cross-sector campaigns such as Make Poverty History appear to have had little lasting impact. However, it is worth noting that Atkinson et al’s survey of charitable giving to development charities finds a significant and lasting increase associated with the Ethiopian famine, Band Aid and Live Aid (Atkinson et al, 2008). However, we lack a counterfactual – what might have happened to public opinion without increasing investment by DFID and the sector generally.


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<sup>5</sup> Or provides a ‘licence’ for development policy might be a better term.

<sup>6</sup> See Darnton, 2009, for a thorough discussion of the methodological issues.

<sup>7</sup> The word ‘help’ is used in the Eurobarometer series.

**Figure 7: Public opinion 1999 to 2010**



It is worth noting that while public opinion measured by ‘concern’ remains high; DFID’s own profile is low. TNS survey data for February 2010 shows ‘spontaneous’ attribution of activity to DFID at two per cent (2010; 38).

### 5.2.1 Impact of economic crisis?

Public support for increased aid spend has fallen consistently since first measured in 2007-8 although interestingly it sits between those ‘very concerned’ (about 20%) and simply ‘concerned’ (about a further 50%), reinforcing arguments that ‘concern’ is not a particularly useful measure.

**Figure 8: Support for increasing overseas aid**

	Sep-07	Sep-08	Feb-09	Sep-09	Feb-10
Agree with increasing overseas aid	55%	46%	45%	47%	40%

However, a recent Eurobarometer survey suggests that support for overseas aid remains high. In answer to the question “In your opinion, is it very important, fairly important, not very important or not at all important to help people in developing countries?” 50 per cent of the UK sample responded that it was ‘very important’; a further 41 per cent felt it was ‘fairly important’. The report notes that the last three surveys have registered significant changes in intensity of support.

The proportion of Europeans who felt aid was ‘very important’ declined significantly from 53 per cent in 2004 to 39 per cent in 2009. It is now recovering with 45 per cent of the European public rating aid ‘very important’ (European Commission, 2010; 9).

Again, it is important to emphasise that survey results are highly sensitive to question wording. It is uncertain whether “aid” (or “help” in the Eurobarometer series) is seen by survey respondents as humanitarian aid rather than development aid. There are also concerns about the extent to which people factor in the perceived effectiveness of aid when answering such questions (Hudson & van Heerde, 2010; 12).

### 5.2.2 Comparison with other countries

It is difficult to argue that Britain is any different from other developed countries when it comes to public opinion about development aid.

Hudson and van Heerde claim that “one of the more robust findings of surveys of public opinion and aid is that since the 1990s support for development assistance is stable and on average above 70 per cent” (2010; 2). The latest Eurobarometer survey places the UK slightly above average with 91 per cent of sample agreeing it is very important to help people in developing countries. The average for all European countries was 89 per cent (EC, 2010; 9). A survey by World Public Opinion.Org of eight OECD countries in 2008 found that 79 per cent of Britons would be willing to pay to achieve the MDGs compared with an average of 77 per cent across all eight OECD countries. The accompanying broader survey of 20 countries found 81 per cent of Britons believed that developed countries had a moral responsibility to work to reduce hunger and severe poverty in developing countries. The average for the 20 countries was also 81 per cent.<sup>8</sup>

## 5.3 Evidence for the link between public opinion and poverty reduction

In this section we explore the two mechanisms hypothesised in section 5.1 i.e.

1. Public opinion supports political commitment.
2. Public opinion leads to individual activity.

### 5.3.1 Does public opinion support/maintain political commitment?

There is a common assumption – or assertion – that public opinion is vital for there to be political commitment to aid (Olsen, 2000; 1, Hudson and van Heerde, 2010; 2). However, there is little evidence to support this view. On the contrary, it *appears* that political commitment to aid is more a question of leadership than of following public opinion. It is *likely* that the profile of poverty in the developing world makes this an attractive issue for politicians to take a lead on.

Hudson and van Heerde note that there is no empirical evidence demonstrating a statistical relationship between opinion and aid levels (2010; 1). Olsen goes further. He argues that the relationship is ‘top down’ because of the high degree of centralisation of decision-making and the weak link between government and society in this particular policy field (2000; 1). Olsen points to other times and countries to

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
<sup>8</sup> World Public Opinion.Org, 2008, Publics in Developed Countries Ready to Contribute Funds Necessary to Cut Hunger in Half By 2015. See: <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/btdevelopmentaidra/554.php?lb=btda&pnt=554&nid=&id=> (website accessed 29<sup>th</sup> February 2011)

illustrate his point, for example France where aid was reduced between 1992 and 1998 despite consistent high levels of public support for aid (2000; 5).

When we look specifically at the relationship between aid and opinion in the UK over the past decade, there is no significant statistical relationship. However, it is important to note again that we are using the proxy of 'concern'. It is also important to note that we lack a solid counterfactual.

It is possible that there is a level of public support below which it would be politically impossible to increase or even maintain levels of aid. But existing measures of public support are of poor measurement validity and fail to measure the concepts they intend to (Hudson & van Heerde, 2010; 1). For example, it is easy to argue that one would expect 'concern', the proxy for awareness/support used here, to actually fall as aid increased and people felt the issue was being addressed.

**Figure 9: The relationship between public opinion and development aid**



Many stakeholders felt UK public opinion enables DFID to exert influence internationally to progress its agenda. However, as noted above, it is difficult to argue that UK public opinion is significantly different from that in any other developed country.

Development aid is only one aspect of development policy. When we consider development policy more broadly, we find a number of specific development-related issues where public opinion (or at least the issue profile) appears to have informed policy. Jubilee 2000 led arguably to Government action on debt relief. A number of local authorities have adopted Fairtrade policies in response to local action.

### 5.3.2 Does public opinion lead to individual action?

Individuals contribute to the reduction of poverty through the choices they make shopping every day, donating their own money to development charities, campaigning and volunteering their time. But, given the lack of evaluation, it is impossible to evaluate the impact of DFID's investment in raising awareness: based on the limited evidence available, we believe it to have been negligible.

There are four ways in which individuals act to reduce poverty:


1. Product – adopting ethical criteria in choosing products and services e.g. Fairtrade.
2. Voice – advocacy and campaigning.
3. Money – donating money.
4. Time – volunteering.

It has proved difficult to find consistent time series data on these issues, so the following analysis is based on proxy/signature data and snapshots.

#### *Product*

According to The Co-operative Bank's annual Ethical Consumerism Report, the overall ethical market in the UK was worth £43.2 billion in 2009 compared to £36.5 billion two years earlier. A key or signature issues is the sale of Fairtrade products, amounting to £749 million in 2009 – still less than one per cent of all sales of food and drink products but up from £22 million in 1999.

**Figure 10: Sales of Fairtrade products**



DFID provided 'seed corn' funding to help set up the Fairtrade Foundation (the coordinating body in the UK). It does illustrate the importance of an ethical and pro-development 'seed corn investor' but there are other ways this might be achieved, for example through the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC)<sup>9</sup>.

<sup>9</sup> There may be an overlap between the communication interests of CDC and DFID. However, any proposal would need to be agreed with the Board of CDC, of which DFID is not a

## Voice

The Co-operative Bank's Ethical Consumerism Report 2010 finds that the proportion of people who reported actively campaigning on a social or environmental issue increased from 15 per cent in 1999 to 20 per cent in 2010. However, the Ethical Consumerism Report 2005 finds that the proportion of people who campaigned reached 25 per cent in 2004, so this number has risen and fallen over the decade – similarly to the level of 'concern' (albeit rising by one third when taken over the decade as a whole). This exercise of 'voice' potentially opens up political and other civic spaces for the change necessary to tackle global poverty.

One must offer the caveat here that technology has made exercising 'voice' much easier in the last decade. For example, people can now click on a Facebook link to express their support for a particular issue. There has been some discussion of this 'clicktivism' (see, for example, Bond, 2011; 38).

## Money

Charitable giving is important in the UK. The UK public gives the equivalent of 25% of the aid budget to international development work by charities (Atkinson et al, 2008; 1). Absolute levels of donations<sup>10</sup> to the largest development charities increased between 1978 and 2004 from £106m to £719m - an annual growth rate of 7.5%. There was also significant growth in giving to 'next 200' charities from £5.2m in 1986 to £27.4m in 2004. Growth among the larger development charities was larger than for equivalent non-development charities which was 5.7% (Atkinson et al, 2008; 4). Growth was not even during this period. Atkinson et al identify four periods (2008; 5):

- 1978-82 'Before the surge'.
- 1983-85 'The surge'.
- 1986-96 'Marking time'.
- 1997-2004 'Renewed growth'.

The 'surge' was very clearly driven by coverage of Ethiopian famine and associated activity i.e. Band Aid. It is worth noting that despite the increased levels of donations, this is widely regarded as having left an unhelpful legacy in terms of public understanding of the issues around international development (VSO, 2002; Darnton, 2009; IBT, 2009).

Atkinson et al leave it as an open question as to whether increased government commitment contributed to renewed growth in the period 1997 to 2004, noting that an alternative hypothesis is the increase in globalisation over this period (2006; 6).

Charitable giving as a whole has experienced a great expansion. The absence of any significant correlation between changes in giving in the development sector and changes in giving in all other sectors suggests that giving to the development sector does not come at the expense of giving to other charitable causes (Atkinson et al, 2008; 8).

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member. DFID's policy is not to tie aid to trade and it would not suggest that CDC should seek to invest in UK companies subsidiaries.

<sup>10</sup> Atkinson et al, define donations as all voluntary income excluding legacies. The largest charities are those that fall within the top 200 defined by 'donations'.

Note that this analysis predates the current financial crisis. It is reasonable to assume that this might be different now. However, there are no signs of any erosion in levels of support to overseas causes. In 2009/10 almost a quarter of donors (24%) gave to overseas causes. This is significantly higher than in previous years (CAF, 2010; 21). Both the proportion of donors and the population giving to international charities is at its highest for six years (CAF, 2010; 23).

These data do not distinguish between development aid and disaster relief. It appears that disaster relief is a key driver for overseas aid. As the CAF report on giving notes:

“Spontaneous giving in response to major emergencies has remained extremely robust, political issues, and indeed concerns about corruption, also seem to have little impact on the public’s generosity. This was shown particularly starkly by the DEC Pakistan Floods Appeal which has raised over £50 million despite predictions that it would fail in some parts of the media.”

(CAF, 2010; 23)

### *Time*

Here again it is difficult to find consistent time series data. The most helpful data source is the 2007 ‘Helping Out’ survey by the Office of the Third Sector. This found that 11% of current volunteers<sup>11</sup> gave their time to organisations addressing overseas aid and/or disaster relief. Overseas aid and disaster relief ranked 8<sup>th</sup>. Interestingly, the proportion of current volunteers giving their time to overseas aid/disaster relief was significantly higher among 16 to 24 year olds – 17 per cent.

## 5.4 The case for BSD: Our conclusion

We believe, on the basis of the evidence available, that public opinion does contribute to a reduction in global poverty. To return to our two hypotheses:

1. Public opinion supports political commitment: **case made with caveats**
2. Public opinion leads to individual action: **case made**

While it is difficult to establish a link between levels of development aid and public opinion, we must consider three key factors:

1. The absence of a counterfactual: we believe that this level of aid would not be politically viable if the levels of public opinion were radically lower. However, we cannot prove this.
2. The fact that development aid is only one aspect of development policy and one can find examples of public opinion influencing development policy (certainly on a local level). Debt relief as a result of Jubilee 2000 stands out as an example of the power of public opinion and the profile of this issue.

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<sup>11</sup> The survey defines ‘current volunteers’ as anyone who has given time to an organisation rather than helping out a friend, neighbour or family member in the twelve months before the survey.

3. The profile of the issue has made this an area where politicians are willing to take a leadership role: the importance of this cannot be overstated both domestically and internationally.

The argument that public opinion leads individuals to act in ways that contribute to a reduction in poverty is easier to make. Donations to UK-based charities working to reduce poverty overseas have risen consistently. The purchase of Fairtrade products has also risen consistently. However, the purchase of Fairtrade products is not necessarily only driven by attitudes about development and aid. In some cases, a Fairtrade product may be the only choice available. In others, the Fairtrade choice may simply be a better product.

## 6 A review of Building Support for Development

In 2009, DFID commissioned a range of reviews on the Building Support for Development programme. We have analysed these reviews and an associated overarching paper produced by Verulam Associates, to ascertain whether the programme was been successful or not.

Verulum's paper illustrates the key problem we faced in conducting this review:

“Assessing the impact of the BSD Strategy interventions is problematic given that no impact studies, systematic monitoring or evaluation have been carried out since 1999.” (Verulam Associates, 2009c; 3)

There is a fundamental difficulty in reviewing in 2011 projects conceived of and established in the preceding decade, when the focus on evaluation and value-for-money was less sharp. This problem is by no means unique to DFID and the UK. Nygaard, writing of the Norwegian experience, asks:

“How can results be measured in cases where funding was originally given in an era before the current results-based language was in vogue or in use in this field of work?”

(2009; 19)

It is also worth noting that none of the reviews carried out in 2009 were tasked with identifying if activities led to a reduction in poverty. Consequently none of the reviews attempted to make this link.

### 6.1 Overview and summary

Our key findings are:

1. There is some evidence of success in raising 'awareness' levels.
2. It is difficult to assess the extent of any impact on poverty.
3. Programme evaluation was inadequate.
4. This led to a weak evidence base from which to judge impact and success.
5. It is not possible to separate out the impact of DFID-funded BSD activities from underlying trends.

All the reviews point to *some* success in raising awareness and promoting involvement in development. However, as project evaluation has been poor, it is difficult to judge the *extent* to of this success.

A number of written responses to this review cited the lack of a 'programmatic' approach to evaluation i.e. evaluation designed to measure the impact of the whole programme and the different strands, rather than simply project by project. Many of the stakeholders interviewed also expressed frustration with the lack of robust evaluation.

The evidence base available for the programme in general is weak. Many of the reviews depended on interviewing stakeholders who had a vested interest in the

programmes continuing and who were, unsurprisingly, largely supportive of the projects.

It also proved difficult for reviewers to separate out what would have happened without support from DFID. Some stakeholders stated that they would carry out awareness-raising programmes with or without support from DFID – whilst maintaining that DFID has a key role to play, particularly in supporting new initiatives and co-ordinating the sector.

We conclude that there has been a general cultural shift towards greater public awareness of global issues such as development over the last decade (most likely beginning with the Jubilee Debt campaign and continuing as a result of a continued focus on globalisation). However, we are unable to make a link between this shift and DFID-funded activity.

## 6.2 Education

The Verulam overview report notes:

“There were some useful project level outputs but DFID’s work was not sufficiently visible or strategically focused.” (Verulam, 2009c; 5)

It also notes a number of specific achievements, including:

- The integration of the global dimension into the secondary school curriculum in England.
- The institutionalisation of Education for Sustainable Development and Global Citizenship across the education and youth sectors in Wales.
- A significant impact on school children throughout the UK who now have a better understanding of their place in the world and how other countries impact on them.
- A wealth of high quality educational resources produced.
- An estimated 3.3 million learners across the UK and developing countries linked through DFID’s Global School Partnerships programme.

In 2010 DFID also commissioned an evaluation of the impact of the school linking programme, Global School Partnerships, by the National Foundation for Educational Research. This large scale survey of pupils and teachers, comparing linked with non-linked schools, found a significant positive impact of linking on pupil awareness of development issues as well as recording ‘life-changing’ experiences and attitudinal change by both pupils and teachers.

## 6.3 Media

DFID’s investment in media projects was intended to address the issue of the distorted portrayal of development issues common in the media. IBT’s 2009 research, *The World in Focus*, found that little had changed since the VSO research of 2001. The term ‘developing world’ prompted deeply ingrained responses from focus group participants. Responses were overwhelmingly dominated by clichéd

images of malnourished children, flies, disease, dying babies, primitive villages, mud huts etc (2009; 4). The Verulam overview report notes:

“Media interventions supported were all sound and in some cases the individual projects punched above their weight. However, media activities [that] focused on building support for development as a whole have not punched above their weight and DFID has not succeeded in making its portfolio of projects more than the sum of their parts... More attention should have been paid to steering the overall direction of the media strategy and coordinating it with DFID’s in house operations.” (Verulam, 2009c; 5)

Through the Commonwealth Broadcasting Association (CBA), DFID provided documentary film-makers with small grants to help them secure funding to produce documentaries (money used to produce a ‘taster’, pay for research etc). The money invested undoubtedly leveraged significantly greater funds. In nine years of funding the Commonwealth Broadcasting Association, over £2 million of DFID investment in ‘seed corn’ funding leveraged just under “16 million of production funds, a multiplier of nearly eight.<sup>12</sup> Some of the programmes seed funded by DFID presented positive and challenging alternatives to the stereotypical and unhelpful depictions of Africa that are commonplace in the media. However, despite DFID’s investment, most people’s ideas of the developing world remain coloured by the ‘Live Aid legacy’ – this despite the securing of new primary purposes for the BBC and Channel 4 to respectively ‘bring the world to the UK’ and ‘challenge people to see the world differently’ (Verulam, 2009c; 6).

In our judgement there are two reasons for this lack of impact:

1. Documentaries are predominantly watched by those with an existing interest – and an existing viewpoint that is supportive – in the subject. DFID is, in effect, ‘super servicing’ an already committed constituency.<sup>13</sup>
2. The overall share of voice is low i.e. the total number of hours broadcast and – critically – seen is only a small proportion of total hours of imagery relating to the developing world that most people see (e.g. news reports on disasters and charity appeals).

It is not possible to judge whether the broadcast situation would be worse without DFID investment in this activity.

## 6.4 Civil society

Programmes targeting civil society have been less successful than those targeting the formal education sector and the media. The main criticism directed at this area of work is its focus on individual projects, rather than continued investment in relationship building with potential partners (i.e. reliance on funding to structure relationships that, as a result, have tended to be contractual and short term rather than strategic and long term). The Verulam overview report notes:

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<sup>12</sup> Data supplied by Commonwealth Broadcasting Association (CBA).

<sup>13</sup> The theory of cognitive dissonance predicts that we will tend to look for information or ideas that maintain consistency and avoid the discomfort of incompatible opinions (for example Festinger, 1957 in McQuail, 2005).

“Objectives focused on civil society were restricted to business and the trade unions and churches and faith communities. Whilst those for business and the trade unions were tangible, the objective for working with churches and faiths was too ambitious and an inappropriate objective for the BSD [strategy]...

...No significant relationships have developed with business in the UK on the building support for development agenda despite ‘Fairtrade’, ‘Rough Guide’ and the ‘Call to Action’ successes. Overall there has been a lack of understanding of the respective roles and commitments between DFID and its partners in business and the Trade Unions...

...DFID seems to have limited knowledge of faith communities and this objective was never really addressed...

...The complexity of the relationship between UK BME communities and development does not appear to have been well understood by DFID and attempts to identify significant institutional points of contact and invest in relationship building and mutual understanding were limited.”

(Verulam, 2009c; 6)

## 6.5 The Development Awareness Fund and Mini Grants Scheme

The Development Awareness Fund (DAF) and Mini Grants Scheme (MGS) were heavily criticised for their lack of focus and programme evaluation. In their favour, they allowed experimentation and innovation – a key requirement when the BSD strategy was initially developed. However, the lack of any robust programme evaluation has made it impossible to assess whether experimentation and innovation was successful. The Verulam review notes:

“They [DAF and MGS] have allowed innovation and experimentation and appear to have worked effectively in some areas, notably in formal education and less effectively in others, e.g. with trade unions, business and faith. Little is known about the overall effectiveness and impact since regular review and lesson learning were not effectively integrated into the programme.”

(Verulam, 2009a; 1)

Our review of DAF projects draws the same conclusion, although we note that the most recent DAF projects have clear objectives and evaluation frameworks. They are subject to some level of individual evaluation and, in some cases, annual reviews of projects report clear impact on both increased awareness and action.

We also note that because of the structure of the programme, a disproportionate amount of administrative resource is required i.e. the approach does not allow for economies of scale in administration.

## 6.6 Linking: a special case?

Cutting across the various reviews of the BSD programme and evidence from stakeholders has been a consistent message about the value of linking.<sup>14</sup> Linking offers:

1. High levels of engagement (although for relatively small number of people).
2. Benefits overseas.
3. Reciprocal benefits in the UK.
4. The ability to create advocates.

Each of these benefits is discussed below. We also consider the limitations and potential of the Community Linking programme at the end of this section.

### *High level of engagement*

Linking offers a very intense and in-depth experience for the immediate participants. Spending time in a developing world can be a life changing experience, although very few people involved in a community link will spend time in their link community/country. Just communicating directly with their southern partners can also be a life changing experience. It certainly changes people's understanding of the issues. Changes in attitude and understanding are found even with those more loosely associated with linking schemes (see NFER review of Global Schools Partnerships Programme for example, NFER, 2011). A European report on the contribution of development education and awareness raising makes this point strongly:

“Where development awareness and education have created a lasting impact on the public they have tended to be based on dialogues between European citizens and citizens of countries in the South.”

EC, 2006; 2

### *Benefits overseas*

Linking is certainly not the most cost effective way to deliver development aid. However, anecdotal evidence from stakeholder interviews suggests that at their best, they facilitate real change in developing countries. However, it has not been possible to evaluate this evidence.

### *Reciprocal benefits*

Linking projects also report reciprocal benefits in the UK, such as improved community cohesion. Again, this is largely anecdotal (stakeholder interviews) although Ofsted's report on sustainability notes the positive impact of the schools partnership programme on behaviour (Ofsted, 2009).

### *Creation of advocates*

From the perspective of BSD, the potential of linking programmes to create advocates is of huge value. There is consensus that the best 'spokespeople' for development are people from the developing world, and the next best are people

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<sup>14</sup> See NFER review of Global Schools Linking Partnership (NFER, 2011).

who have spent time in the developing world. Linking programmes offer the opportunity to add to the supply of such advocates.

### *Limitations of the Community Linking Programme*

Due to the way that the Community Linking programme has been set-up, grants can only be used for awareness raising activities in the UK (although this can include bringing southern partners to the UK). Therefore, the programme is unlikely to deliver benefits overseas and is less likely to lead to high levels of engagement than more reciprocal linking programmes such as the Global Schools Partnerships programme and the new Hospital Linking programme.

Nonetheless, if it was redesigned, there is scope for embedding skills transfer within the programme. Firemen, ambulance crews, builders, mechanics to name just a few groups within the community all have practical skill sets that could benefit communities in the developing world in a similar fashion to Hospital Linking and Global Schools Partnerships programmes.

## **6.7 The reforms of 2009**

Following the 2009 reviews of its BSD programme, DFID decided to provide more consolidated, coordinated and strategic support to development education in schools by:

1. Phasing out the DAF and the MGS, with the last grants awarded in the 2009/10 funding round that was then underway. Sixty per cent of DAF projects targeted the formal education sector.
2. Closing a programme of 12 regional development education networks.
3. Starting a new Global Learning Project to support teaching on development issues in English schools, with similar projects in each of the devolved nations aiming to embed development into the curriculum and teaching practice and thereby obviate the need for further DFID support. This project was expected to be worth £20m over five years, with the budget based on the assumption that this would be sufficient to support teaching on development issues at Key Stages 2 and 3 in 75% of English schools. DFID considered that this would meet demand and have a considerable impact on learning on development across England. A design and build tender for the Global Learning Project England failed to produce a successful bid. DFID then contracted the Specialist Schools and Academies Trust (SSAT) to design the Global Learning Project, expecting to tender for an implementing agency in late 2010. This tender is now on hold pending the outcome of this review, and whether to proceed is a key operational decision for DFID.

## 7 Conclusions

This review was unable to identify evidence that could prove whether or not DFID's Building Support for Development strategy had made a direct contribution to reducing poverty. This is a consequence of poor objective setting at the inception of the strategy, together with a subsequent lack of effective monitoring and evaluation.

Nonetheless we were able draw a number of conclusions from our research and these are set out below.

### 7.1 Primary conclusions and recommendation

#### 7.1.1 Primary conclusions

1. Positive public opinion can encourage positive actions such as donating money or purchasing Fairtrade goods.
2. The *cumulative* impact of these individual actions contributes to a reduction in global poverty.
3. Whilst it is difficult to prove a direct link between DFID's investment in BSD and a reduction in global poverty, there is a reasonable causal chain that can be used to justify future investment.
4. Based on available research, it is likely that DFID's investment in this area has contributed to a reduction in global poverty. However, this contribution cannot easily be measured and is likely to be one of many factors. Some initiatives supported by DFID such as Fairtrade labeling, have had a particularly significant impact on the public and public behaviour.
5. The significant change in political opinion towards international development since 1997 has been as a result of a wide range of issues.

Our conclusions are substantiated by stakeholder consensus. This is also the conclusion of the Expert Group.

#### 7.1.2 Primary recommendation

We conclude that it is legitimate to use aid funds to build support for development only where the probability is that the activity makes a direct contribution to tackling global poverty. We recommend a more limited and focused future role for DFID in this area given the difficulty in proving this, together with the likelihood that some parts of the development sector may continue to build support for development without DFID funding.

#### *There is a valid role for DFID because*

1. Public opinion and support makes a difference: DFID can provide leadership for the development sector to ensure this happens in an effective and coordinated way.
2. Many major organisations in the development sector are looking to DFID to take a leadership role.
3. With a reasonable causal chain between BSD activity and a reduction in poverty, it is justifiable to use aid funds in this area.

### *DFID's future role should be more limited because*

4. Other actors will continue to raise awareness and build support and increasingly take the place of DFID (in part because their business models require them to).
5. The current evidence base for the impact on poverty does not offer clear conclusions. This strategy should be reviewed in future when a robust evidence base has been developed.

## 7.2 Specific conclusions

### 7.2.1 DFID's role in building support for development

Two specific conclusions:

1. Public understanding of the causes of global poverty and effective ways to reduce it is desirable because of increasing globalisation and interdependence; the changing nature of development (its relationship with climate change for example); and the issue of responsibility: many problems in the developing world stem from actions of the developed world. There is less agreement on whether it is *necessary*.
2. Many key stakeholders want DFID to provide leadership in BSD. Stakeholders are not convinced that DFID has always played that leadership role within BSD effectively, in contrast with its much admired leadership role internationally.

### 7.2.2 Public opinion and its impact

Three specific conclusions:

1. There is a small but resilient base of support for development in the UK. This group cares about the reduction of poverty and act, as individuals and groups, in ways that contribute to the reduction of poverty.
2. Wider understanding of development is poor. The majority of the general public have a simplistic and inaccurate view of developing countries, the causes of poverty and the effectiveness of development interventions.
3. Political commitment to development *appears* to be more a question of leadership than public opinion. However, tacit approval provides government with a 'licence to operate' and the *profile* of humanitarian issues and major public mobilisation around development issues (e.g. Jubilee 2000 and Make Poverty History) makes this an arena where politicians can take a lead.

### 7.2.3 DFID's investment in building support for development

Four specific conclusions:

1. It is impossible to attribute the base of support identified directly to DFID's BSD activity.
2. The BSD programme has lacked strategic focus and robust evaluation. It can be characterised either as a 'scattergun' approach or as an approach that 'let a thousand flowers bloom'. The lack of effective evaluation makes it impossible to judge which description is most appropriate.
3. The BSD programme has focused on (short term) projects rather than (longer term) building relationships and leveraging DFID's expertise and authority.
4. There is little evidence that DFID's investment in BSD has contributed to the reduction in global poverty (as required by the International Development Act,

2002). However, a lack of evidence does not prove that DFID's investment has *not* contributed to the reduction in global poverty.

5. However, there have been notable successes with the integration of the global dimensions into the school curriculum, the institutionalisation of Education for Sustainable Development and Global Citizenship in Wales, the production of high quality resources, improved teaching for learners and 3.3 million learners involved in Global School Partnership links.

#### 7.2.4 Key channels and methods

We also note that:

1. The formal education sector and media are key *channels* to reaching the UK public.
2. Linking offers opportunities to contribute to *both* development and BSD. It is more suited to influencing public opinion in the UK than to contributing directly to development. It is a very expensive mechanism for delivering aid – if that is its sole or main criteria.
3. In our opinion, the business sector could have untapped potential with respect to contributing to raising public awareness of development issues although it was not within the terms of reference of this review to look at this area in detail.

## 8. Evaluation

Robust evaluation must be embedded in any future strategy at programme level.

It is critical to invest in evaluation. Typical best practice guidance indicates that it is appropriate to invest between five and ten per cent of any communication budget in evaluation (see, for example, DH, 2009). It must be built into the programme from the very start. The latest guidance (in development) from COI offers four key measurement principles. Measurement should be:

1. Continuous.
2. Consistent.
3. Comparable.
4. Comprehensive.

It also offers a framework for measurement:

**Figure 11: Evaluation framework**

Measurement	Description	Examples
Inputs	The activity that you carried out.	Press releases issued, training materials developed, events held
Outputs	How many people saw or heard your activity?	Visitors to a website, TV audience, attendees at an event
Out-takes	What effect did activity have on their awareness, understanding & attitude?	Awareness, understanding and attitudes demonstrated in tracking research
Intermediate outcomes	Did they do anything as a result of your activity?	Activities indicating engagement such as downloading a toolkit
Final outcomes	Did you achieve your overall objective?	The desired behaviour change e.g. purchase of Fairtrade products, donations

'Intermediate outcomes' have been included because with many public campaigns the desired behaviours are longer term and difficult to measure (condom use for example).

The historic BSD programme was structured in such a way that evaluation was limited to inputs in most cases, only occasionally including outputs and out-takes.

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## Annex 1: Terms of Reference

### Background

1. DFID is preparing a revised communications strategy. DFID currently employs a number of methods to communicate to the UK public: press work to ensure stories about Government aid expenditure are carried in the media; a website and new media tools to provide information to the public on UK aid spend / impact and on development issues more generally; funding programmes with aid money to raise awareness of development issues in general and to encourage public action to address poverty in the developing world.
2. The objectives of the new communications strategy are being defined. A key objective of the strategy will be to ensure that DFID provides information effectively to the public on its activities and spend so that it is accountable to UK taxpayers. DFID will also support, through its aid budget, two new programmes which involve and engage the UK public: International Citizen Service and a scheme to give British people a say over how an element of the aid budget is spent.
3. More broadly than this, in preparing the revised communications strategy, DFID wishes to consider whether it should continue to use aid funds in the UK to promote awareness of and public involvement in development issues, as a means of contributing to the reduction of global poverty. All expenditure of aid funds in the UK must be in accordance with the International Development Act. This states: 'The Secretary of State may....promote, or assist any person or body to promote, awareness of global poverty and of the means of reducing such poverty, if he is satisfied that to do so is likely to contribute to a reduction in poverty.' Aid funds cannot be used to promote support for DFID's own activities, although promoting understanding of the role of the UK and other governments in reducing poverty is legitimate.
4. Over the last decade DFID has spent around £90m of aid funds in the UK directly on activities to raise awareness / get people involved, primarily in the education sector. DFID has also provided support to the UK's major NGOs to build development support through its Programme Partnership Agreements (PPAs) with them, though this is no longer a requirement of PPAs.
5. In 2009, DFID commissioned a series of reviews of the impact of its expenditure and activities to raise awareness / promote involvement since 1999. A review of the evidence on how British public opinion on development has evolved and of what messages and channels are likely to be most effective in influencing public opinion was also commissioned. A number of other studies have also been supported / commissioned recently with a view to establishing the efficacy of particular interventions / how messages on development can be most effectively communicated to the UK public.
6. DFID now wishes to commission experts to contribute to the formulation of its communications strategy by taking a fresh look at the recent reviews and studies, drawing on other relevant literature e.g. on behaviour change, and gathering

views from key voices, with a view to arriving at evidence based conclusions on what role development awareness / public involvement work should play in the UK aid programme.

### **Purpose of the Review**

7. To contribute to the development of DFID's communications strategy by providing evidence based advice on whether DFID should continue to use aid funds in the UK to promote awareness of global poverty and public involvement in efforts to address this, and, if so, to recommend how this can be done most effectively.

### **Objectives**

8. The specific objectives of the review are:
  - i. To review existing evidence of programmes designed to raise awareness of development in the UK and examine their effectiveness.
  - ii. To set out the evidence and arguments around the value of using aid funds to raise awareness in the UK of global poverty and public involvement in addressing this, and recommend a way forward.
  - iii. To set out a framework for assessing the effectiveness of development awareness work.
  - iv. To recommend which instruments and methods (including new and innovative approaches) available to DFID are likely to be most effective in raising awareness / promoting involvement, and to suggest impact measures for these. In doing this, the review should compare the relative merits of using aid funds to promote awareness of development issues and involvement with using DFID's own press and communications activity on the impact of the Government's own aid programme.
  - v. To look specifically at the reach and effectiveness of the projects supported under the Development Awareness Fund.
  - vi. For all of the above, to ensure that value for money and effectiveness are being achieved.

### **Recipient of the Review**

9. The recipient of the consultancy services is DFID.

### **Method**

10. The review will include:
  - analysis of key documents and appropriate related literature;
  - interviews with key stakeholders.
11. DFID will provide key documents for review and suggest stakeholders. However, the experts conducting the review are expected to take a proactive approach in identifying other relevant literature and to decide who to interview.

## **Deliverables**

12. These are as follows:

- A narrative report of no more than 20 pages, including an Executive Summary. This must be clearly laid out and easy to read.
- A presentation of the key findings and conclusions to DFID.

## **Inputs and Timing**

13. Up to ? days of work<sup>15</sup> by consultants with:

- excellent knowledge of the literature and debates on influencing public opinion and individual behaviour change;
- At least basic understanding of international development issues and how aid is delivered.

## **Reporting**

14. The consultants will report to James Helm, Director of Communications DFID, and Jenny Yates, Head of Outreach and Stakeholder Relations Team.

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<sup>15</sup> TBC following further discussions with COI team.

## Annex 2: Review Team

### **Humphrey Pring**

Humphrey is Group Strategy Director for International and Defence at COI, responsible for providing strategic guidance across the scoping, development, procurement, delivery and evaluation of marketing, engagement and communication programmes for departments. He has worked in marketing roles for Procter & Gamble, KPMG Consulting and as marketing director at cafédirect was responsible for all marketing and communication/advocacy. He worked in Africa for Oxfam as programme manager in Darfur/Sudan and Somaliland/North West Somalia, and in fundraising roles for Oxfam and CARE International.

At COI he worked in the Strategic Consultancy group as consultant, managing consultant and deputy director, for a wide variety of departments including DFID, Health and Defence.

### **Sean Larkins**

Sean is Director of Strategy & Planning at COI where he leads a team of communication professionals developing effective marketing, communication and planning strategies for government departments and the public sector.

He began his career in government communications, working primarily with the Department of Health, Health Education Authority and Foreign & Commonwealth Office before joining The Body Shop International where he focused on public-facing global campaigns in areas such as health and community trade. He then worked with organisations including Barnardo's and Save the Children on campaigns in both the UK and West Africa.

After a spell working agency side - including on the launch of SA8000 (a global standard for managing human rights in the workplace) - he joined the COI: as Head of its Inclusivity Consultancy, he led efforts to improve government engagement with hard-to-reach groups. He subsequently joined the Youth Justice Board as Director of Communication before rejoining the COI in 2008.

### **Guy Dominy**

Guy joined COI in June 2006. Since then he has developed and reviewed communication strategies for DfE, CLG, Cabinet Office and Skills Third Sector among others. He has been, and is, responsible for developing and delivering GCN strategic communication training.

Immediately prior to joining the COI, Guy worked in the charity sector developing and leading campaigning activity to secure government funding for dementia care with the Alzheimer's Society and before that emergency accommodation for runaway children with The Children's Society. Before that Guy worked in the private sector in brand and Customer Relationship Management consultancy. His clients included

Marks & Spencer, First Choice, Royal & Sunalliance as well as charities including Oxfam, The Refugee Council and Friends of the Earth. His earlier career was in academic research and included lecturing in social research and working as a research officer at London School of Economics looking at modelling poverty at local level, modelling accessibility to road transport and rural pricing.

Guy has a BSc in Geography from London School of Economics and an MSc in Information and Communication Technology. He is currently studying part time for a second MSc in Politics and Communication at the London School of Economics.

### **Ra Goel**

Ra originally joined COI at the end of March 2008. With over eight years' private and public sector experience, Ra's core capabilities lie in the design and development of integrated marketing communication strategies.

Since starting at COI, Ra has worked on numerous strategic policy areas across a range of central Government departments including the Cabinet Office, DH, DECC, BIS, DoE and the QCA. In particular, he led part of a major multi-disciplinary cross-Government Green Paper engagement programme on the Reform of the Care and Support System with the Department of Health.

Most recently, Ra took a year out to work and live in Sydney, Australia. He was Marketing Manager for one of Asia-Pacific's leading business schools - the Australian School of Business at UNSW - where he was responsible for developing and implementing communication strategies to improve positioning across multiple markets and drive long term revenue growth. On his return to London at the end of 2010, he also spent five weeks working as a Volunteer Project Manager for an NGO in India helping street children.

Prior to joining COI in 2008, Ra was Marketing Manager at London Business School where he redefined their commercial arm's customer acquisition strategy in line with the business's aggressive growth plans. He also has experience in the financial services sector, having spent three years in the European head office of a global insurance firm, and one year developing marketing and brand strategies for the launch of a new global online bank.

Ra has a BSc in Philosophy & Economics from the London School of Economics, and is also Chartered Institute of Marketing qualified.

### **Kim Willis**

Since joining COI in 2005, Kim has worked on a wide range of projects for the FCO, Department of Health, Ministry of Defence and the Home Office. Her work has spanned a range of marketing disciplines including social marketing research, insight and segmentation, brand strategy and development, and digital communications and engagement.

Kim has also gained significant 'in-house' central government experience, most recently spending a year on secondment at DFID leading on communications strategy for the Economic Growth and Investment policy group. This wide-ranging role included working with Ministers and colleagues both at DFID and at Number 10 to design and deliver the 'Business Call to Action'; an international business conference hosted by the Prime Minister and attended by 80 of the most powerful CEOs in the world. She has also worked at UNHQ in New York, as a stakeholder engagement consultant at the Cabinet Office, and as a campaign manager for Barclays Bank.

Kim has a first class degree in Economics and Politics from Bristol University specialising in International Relations and the WTO. She also holds a Professional Certificate in Marketing from the Chartered Institute of Marketing.

## Annex 3: Stakeholders Interviewed

1. Brian Rockcliffe, VSO
2. Conrad Bird, FCO
3. David Prepiatt, British Red Cross
4. Doug Bourne, DERC
5. Dr Nick Maurice, Build
6. Glen Tarman, BOND
7. Hetan Shah, Think Global
8. Joe Cerell, Gates Foundation
9. Kevin Cahill, Comic Relief
10. Loretta Minghella, Christian Aid
11. Marc Cavey, DfE (Curriculum Review)
12. Marion Bowman, One World Media
13. Mark Galloway, IBT
14. Mark Vyner, Christian Aid
15. Martin Kirk, Oxfam
16. Matthew Hopkinson, DfE (Qualifications)
17. Mike Gidney, Fairtrade Foundation
18. Minouche Shafik, DFID
19. Myles Wickstead
20. Phil Hudson, VSO
21. Richard Calvert, DFID
22. Richard Miller, Action Aid
23. Roy Trivedy, DFID
24. Sally-Ann Wilson, CBA
25. Sarah Kline, Malaria No More
26. Shanti Rebello, DfE (Curriculum Review)
27. Sharon Edwards, VSO
28. Triple Line Consulting

In addition a number of other officials within DFID Communications Division were interviewed.