HM Government

CONTEST
The United Kingdom's
Strategy for
Countering Terrorism

Annual Report

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£16.00

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Foreword by the Home Secretary

As Home Secretary, I am reminded every day about the threat we face from terrorism, and the vital importance of our counter-terrorism work.

In July 2011, I published the UK's revised counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. This progress report comes at the end of an extraordinary period for the agencies and organisations involved in counter-terrorism in the UK and overseas. The Olympic Games will be remembered as a spectacular sporting event, and this is the greatest tribute we can pay to the military and police officers, agency staff, civil servants and volunteers who delivered the largest peacetime security operation in this country's history. The security of the Games depended on the counter-terrorism capabilities which we have developed as part of our broader strategy. It was testimony to the success of CONTEST.

There have been no successful terrorist attacks in Great Britain during this period and serious attempted attacks have been foiled. We are taking the necessary steps to ensure that we can continue to detect, investigate, prosecute and otherwise disrupt terrorist threats. We are not only maintaining but enhancing counter-terrorism policing capabilities against the background of the most ambitious reform of policing for a generation. We have strengthened protective security arrangements at the border. And we have significantly improved the capability of the emergency services to work together to deal with a terrorist incident.

But there is no room for complacency. As the Director General of the Security Service said last year, the UK has faced the prospect of a terrorist attack on the scale of 7/7 on average once a year since 9/11. The threat from terrorism is changing but remains substantial. This is reflected in the number of people arrested and convicted for terrorism-related offences. Furthermore, as the Prime Minister has said, we face a generational battle to defeat our adversaries and their ideologies.

Staying ahead of the developing threat will not be easy. We must secure legislative changes that preserve our ability to disrupt terrorist activity and deal with those responsible. We must continue to strengthen our approach to border security. And we must continue to challenge extremist and terrorist ideologies and the people who promote them. I am confident that the strategy will continue to provide a basis for this work.

Theresa May MP
Home Secretary

PART 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1   In October 2010, the Government published a new National Security Strategy which identified terrorism as one of the four highest risks which we face. The strategy committed to giving top priority to countering the threat from terrorism at home and overseas.

1.2   The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR, October 2010) stated that the Government would maintain, and in some areas enhance, the UK's counter-terrorism capabilities. Reflecting the Coalition Programme for Government, the SDSR also committed to:

- a review of our most sensitive and controversial counter-terrorism powers and, consistent with protecting the public, a correction in favour of liberty;

- a reform of the counter-radicalisation workstream of CONTEST;

- further capabilities in policing to deal with a terrorist firearms attack;

- new measures to reduce the vulnerability of the UK to terrorist use of unconventional materials; and

- the introduction of a programme to preserve the ability of the security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies to obtain communications data and to intercept communications within the appropriate legal framework.

1.3   In July 2011, the Government published the third version of the United Kingdom's counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. The strategy set out the threat we face and our priorities for dealing with it through to 2015, reflecting the National Security Strategy, the SDSR and our wider Coalition Programme for Government. The strategy is supported by a significant work programme, involving every part of the UK counter-terrorism community and many international partners.

1.4   In 2011 the Government committed to produce an annual report on CONTEST. This report (prepared by the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism in the Home Office, responsible for co-ordinating CONTEST) covers the period from July 2011 to December 2012, to enable inclusion of security work for the Olympic Games. More detailed documents about aspects of CONTEST can be found at www.gov.uk/government/publications.

1.5   This report does not cover domestic terrorism in Northern Ireland, responsibility for which lies with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Many of the policies and programmes for tackling terrorism in the longer term are devolved to the Northern Ireland Executive. For that reason, CONTEST does not extend to dealing with terrorism in Northern Ireland but many of the issues dealt with in the strategy and the principles it sets out are relevant to the threats we face there.

The Threat from Terrorism

1.6   After a very rapid increase between 2003 and 2008, the number of terrorist attacks around the world has levelled off, and casualties from terrorism have marginally declined. But the global threat from terrorism remains high. In 2011 (the latest year for which statistics are available), over 10,000 terrorist attacks occurred in some 70 countries, causing almost 45,000 casualties and over 12,500 fatalities. About three quarters of those attacks occurred in the Near East and South Asia; attacks in Africa and the Western Hemisphere were at a five-year high.

1.7   Pakistan and the tribal areas along the Afghan border remain of the highest importance to our national security. Although depleted in numbers and capability, Al Qa'ida continues to operate from this region and still has the capability to conduct terrorist attacks in the UK and other countries. People from this country continue to travel to this area to join Al Qa'ida and receive Al Qa'ida training.

1.8   During the period covered by this report, Al Qa'ida affiliates around the world have become a greater threat in their own right, collaborating more closely with each other and taking advantage of regional instability and the breakdown of law and order:

• In Yemen, despite a partially successful counter-terrorism campaign by the Government, Al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to pose a significant threat both to the UK and to UK interests in the region. AQAP propaganda has continued to encourage acts of lone terrorism in and against the West. In April 2012, AQAP attempted a third attack on a civilian aircraft, following earlier unsuccessful operations in December 2009 and October 2010;

• Across North Africa there has been a sharp increase in terrorist activity conducted by Al Qa'ida in the Maghreb (AQM) and smaller, like-minded associated organisations. AQ-related groups are now stronger in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia than ever before and have greater freedom of movement. The attack on the gas installation at In Amenas in Algeria in January 2013 demonstrates their current capability and intent. AQM has kidnapped and ransomed western hostages, securing significant funds for further operational activity;

• AQM has moved south into Mali and provides practical support to the Nigerian militant Islamist group, Boko Haram and a splinter organisation, Ansaru. Boko Haram has conducted almost daily attacks in Nigeria during this period, causing large numbers of fatalities; Ansaru has a more international agenda and has kidnapped and murdered western (including British) hostages; and

• In Somalia, progress has been made by the Somali Government in containing the threat posed by Al Shabaab. But this is fragile: Al Shabaab is still capable of mounting attacks throughout the country, collaborates with other terrorist organisations and aspires to attack targets in the region, including UK interests.

1.9   The uprising in Syria, beginning in early 2011, has involved many organisations with different political views and tactics; some are connected with and supported by Al Qa'ida in Iraq. These terrorist groups conducted over 600 attacks in 2012 and, like others associated with Al Qa'ida, continue to attract recruits from this country and elsewhere in Europe. There are now hundreds of foreign fighters from Europe in Syria. As and when UK residents return here there is a risk that they may carry out attacks using the skills that they have developed overseas.

1.10   Kidnapping for ransom has become an increasingly common terrorist tactic during this period. Over 150 foreign nationals have been kidnapped by Islamist terrorist groups since 2008 (at least 13 of whom were British nationals). But numbers kidnapped in 2012 (almost 50) were more than double those in 2010. In many cases ransoms have been paid, and we conservatively estimate that AQ affiliates and other extremist groups (such as the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines and the Taliban and Pakistan Taliban) have collected at least 60 million USD in foreign national ransom payments since 2008.

1.11   The terrorist threats we face are now more diverse than before, dispersed across a wider geographical area, and often in countries without effective governance. This poses significant challenges to our national security and to the security and intelligence agencies and departments working on counter-terrorism: operating in these areas is difficult and dangerous, requires very significant resources and is complicated and at times made impossible by the breakdown of governance and law and order.

1.12   Since the publication of CONTEST in July 2011, the threat to the UK from international terrorism (which is set by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre) has remained at 'SUBSTANTIAL', meaning that the threat of a terrorist attack remains a strong possibility and may occur without warning.

1.13   In the twelve months to 30 September 2012, there were 245 terrorism-related arrests in Great Britain: 45 people were charged with terrorism-related offences and 18 convicted; a further 25 people were awaiting trial as at 18 January 2013. Some notable cases are set out below:

- In December 2010, twelve people were arrested in connection with a plot to conduct terrorist attacks in the UK. Nine were charged with terrorism offences. All

pleaded guilty shortly before their trial and in February 2012 they were sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from 5 to 21 years. Potential targets of the group included diplomatic premises, the London Stock Exchange and named individuals. Others involved in this plot had planned to take part in and fund terrorist training overseas with a view to carrying out terrorist acts in the future;

- In August 2011, a married couple were charged with the preparation of terrorist acts and possessing information likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terror. They were both convicted in July 2012. Their likely targets were in Manchester;

- Between September and November 2011, twelve people were arrested by West Midlands Police on suspicion of the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism in the UK. The trial of three of the defendants commenced in October 2012 and ended on 21 February 2013 when they were all found guilty of all charges, including planning attacks intended to cause mass casualties in crowded places. Sentencing is scheduled for April 2013. Two further trials of other defendants will begin later this year;

- In April 2012, four people were charged in connection with planning terrorist attacks in the UK and are due to stand trial in April 2013. They are suspected of having links to terrorists in Pakistan. On 1 March 2013, all pleaded guilty to the charge against them;

- In July 2012, six people were charged with preparing acts of terrorism. They are suspected of plotting an attack in West Yorkshire on an English Defence League demonstration. Their trial is scheduled to begin in April 2013;

Key Achievements

There were no successful terrorist attacks in Great Britain during this period. A number of serious attempted attacks were foiled and significant arrests have been made. The security of the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games was maintained. All this reflects the very strong capabilities of the security and intelligence agencies and the police.

We have made progress with all our commitments in the SDSR and CONTEST. We have implemented the findings of a major review of counter-terrorism powers and legislation. We have removed powers that were unnecessary, disproportionate and ineffective. We have introduced new legislation, the Justice and Security Bill, that will provide more rigorous oversight of the activities of our security and intelligence agencies and better protect secret material from open disclosure in civil proceedings in this country. And we have published draft legislation to maintain vital police and agency capabilities regarding communications data.

We have begun to implement a new strategy to prevent people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. We regard this as vital, particularly given a trend towards 'home-grown' terrorism in this country and elsewhere in Europe. We have taken a much stronger position on extremism, which not only undermines integration and is inconsistent with our British values, but can draw people into terrorist activity.

We have made significant changes to roles and responsibilities at the border. We have separated the Border Force from the UK Border Agency and are setting up a Border Policing Command as part of the new National Crime Agency. These changes will help us to protect the border and detect cross-border crime, including terrorism. We have continued to adapt other aspects of our protective security to deal with the developing threats we face. We have made significant changes to aspects of our aviation security regime. We have agreed new EU-wide measures to restrict the sale of explosive precursors.

We have developed our capability to deal with terrorist attacks that use firearms. Recognising the need for a rapid and co-ordinated response to any terrorist attack we are taking forward a programme to ensure that our emergency services are able to work together more effectively at the scene of a terrorist incident.

Our counter-terrorism strategy needs to be flexible in response to the changing terrorist threat. This is reflected in this report. With close allies and multilateral organisations we will build our collective capabilities to deal with new international terrorist threats. We will support countries most affected by terrorism and, where necessary, strengthen governance and sponsor judicial reform. We will seek international consensus on dealing with the growing threat of terrorist kidnapping. We shall continue to develop our *Prevent* work in the light of the challenge from domestic radicalisation and home-grown terrorism. We will respond to challenges presented by new technology by providing further capabilities for the police and agencies.

We have worked with the Northern Ireland Office and the authorities in Northern Ireland to ensure that we benefit from each other's experiences, and provide what support we can to assist their efforts to counter the threat from terrorism in Northern Ireland.

- In July 2012, three people were arrested in London and charged with preparing acts of terrorism. They were suspected of travelling to Pakistan for terrorist training and travelling abroad to commit acts of terrorism. On 15 March 2013, all three pleaded guilty to the single charge faced by them. Sentencing will follow; and

- In October 2012, two people were arrested at Heathrow Airport; one was charged with terrorism-related offences while the other was released without charge. In November 2012, another person was arrested at Heathrow and later charged with the same terrorism-related offences. A further person was arrested and charged in January 2013 with preparation of terrorist acts. All are alleged to have been involved in the kidnap in 2012 of a British journalist and his colleague in Syria and are due to face trial in June 2013.

1.14   Over the period covered by this report there have been 33 terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland. 246 people have been arrested and 88 charged. The latest figures are reported by the Police Service of Northern Ireland and can be found on their website at www.psni.police.uk/directory/updates/updates_statistics.htm.

1.15   We judge that the terrorist threat to the UK from far right extremism is low in comparison to the threat from international terrorism. NDEU data shows that in 2012 there were five arrests under terrorism legislation in relation to far right wing activity. We continue to monitor for any indications of increased activity from far right groups.

London 2012 Safety and Security Programme

1.16   The London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games was the largest sporting event in UK history. From the Olympic Torch Relay in May to the athletes' parade on 10 September, the Games involved 14,700 athletes from 205 countries at over 30 competition venues in London and across the UK; more than 10 million spectators attended Olympic events.

1.17   Protecting the Games required the largest ever peacetime security operation in this country. Up to 14,500 police officers and 18,000 armed forces personnel were deployed on Games security duties. About one million accreditation application background checks were completed for Games Family Members, workers, volunteers, athletes, journalists and officials: a significant number were refused for national security reasons. Nearly 6 million people arrived at Heathrow alone during July and August 2012. In 2010 the Government announced that it expected to deliver the programme for additional policing and wider Games security for £475 million, although up to £600 million remained available if required. Separately, £553 million was provided to the London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games (LOCOG) for venue security, including infrastructure and personnel. In December 2012 the outturn for policing and wider Games security costs was estimated at £455 million. In February 2013 the estimated outturn for venue security was reduced to £451 million, reflecting the settlement reached between LOCOG and the private security company, G4S. Final figures will be published later this year.

1.18   The Games time venue security operation was the responsibility of LOCOG working to Government requirements and with Government advice. G4S, contracted by LOCOG, was unable to deliver the agreed levels of Games venue guards and the planned military contribution to venue security rose accordingly, to a peak of 12,200 personnel. The Home Affairs Select Committee conducted an inquiry into venue guarding in September 2012 and concluded that contingency plans put in place by the Home Office, LOCOG, the military and the police had functioned well. G4S is paying all additional costs arising from additional military and police deployments.

1.19   The Government is committed to the successful delivery of the 2014 Glasgow Commonwealth Games. Lessons from the 2012 security programme have been shared with Glasgow and the authorities in Brazil for the Rio de Janeiro 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games.

PART 2: OUR RESPONSE

2.1   The CONTEST strategy covers all forms of terrorism and continues to be based around four workstreams:

- **Pursue:** to stop terrorist attacks;

- **Prevent:** to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism;

- **Protect:** to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack; and

- **Prepare:** to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack.

PURSUE

2.2   The *Pursue* strand of CONTEST aims to disrupt and stop terrorist attacks, wherever possible by prosecuting those who are engaged in terrorism-related activity. The numbers of people arrested for and charged with terrorism-related activity (paragraph 1.13 above) reflect the competence and capability of the organisations responsible for this work. The police and intelligence agencies all work to common objectives, use the same standards and have access to the same information. Continuous improvement in the capabilities of the police and Security Service, close co-operation between them, dedicated Counter-Terrorism Units and budgets, and the integration of our work in this country and overseas are all critical to our success.

2.3   The Government has made major changes to policing in this country during the period covered by this report. A National Crime Agency (NCA) has been established and, subject to the passage of the Government's Crime and Courts Bill, will be fully operational by the end of 2013. The NCA will lead our work on serious, organised and complex crime, including cyber crime and border security. No decision has been made on whether the NCA should have a counter-terrorism role in the future; this will be considered when the NCA is up and running. In the meantime, the NCA and the police counter-terrorism network in England and Wales will collaborate on issues of common interest including financial crime, border security, work in prisons, forensics, specialist technical capabilities and corporate support functions.

2.4   The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 abolished police authorities for police forces in England and Wales, and introduced directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) in their stead. PCCs will ensure that the policing needs of their communities are met as effectively as possible, bringing communities closer to the police, and building confidence in the criminal justice system. A new Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR) covering England and Wales sets out the policing capabilities required to meet national threats, including counter-terrorism. In holding the Chief Constable and their force to account for policing in their area, Police and Crime Commissioners must have regard to the standards set out in the SPR.

2.5   Our programme in CONTEST 2011 set out to:

- Continue to assess our counter-terrorism powers and ensure they are both effective and proportionate;

- Improve our ability to prosecute and deport people for terrorist-related offences;

- Increase our capabilities to detect, investigate and disrupt terrorist threats;

- Ensure that judicial proceedings in this country can better handle sensitive and secret material to serve the interests of both justice and national security; and

- Work further with other countries and multilateral organisations to enable us to better tackle the terrorist threats we face overseas.

COUNTER-TERRORISM AND SECURITY POWERS

2.6   The Government review of counter-terrorism powers was published in January 2011 and made significant changes across counter-terrorism legislation.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs)

2.7   In December 2011, Control Orders were abolished and replaced with Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs). The purpose of TPIMs is to reduce the risk from people believed to be engaged in terrorism-related activity whom we are unable to prosecute or deport. The TPIMs package includes: specific measures to restrict terrorism-related activities, which are more proportionate than those provided for by Control Orders; and additional resources for the police and Security Service to maximise the opportunities to put terrorists on trial in an open court. Eight people were subject to a TPIM as of 28 February 2013.

2.8   On 26 December 2012 a person on a TPIM absconded. The Home Secretary announced a review of this incident in a statement to Parliament on 8 January 2013.

2.9   The Government has been clear that, in exceptional circumstances, more stringent powers may be needed to protect the public. Draft emergency legislation for 'enhanced' TPIMs has been prepared and subjected to pre-legislative scrutiny in case such exceptional circumstances should arise.

Pre-Charge Detention

2.10   The review of counter-terrorism powers published in January 2011 recommended that the limit on pre-charge detention for terrorist suspects should be reduced from 28 to 14 days. This change was introduced through the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, which received Royal Assent on 1 May. The Government believes that the 14 day limit strikes the right balance between safeguarding national security and protecting individual rights: in practice, in the year ending 30 June 2012, only three of the 52 people arrested under section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 in Great Britain were held in pre-charge detention for more than seven days and they were all subsequently charged within the 14 day limit.

2.11   The Government recognises that, in rare cases, a longer period of pre-charge detention may be required. For this reason, draft fast-track legislation to temporarily increase pre-charge detention to a maximum of 28 days has been published and subjected to pre-legislative scrutiny.

Proscription

2.12   There were three amendments to the list of banned terrorist organisations in the reporting period. The Indian Mujahideen and Ansaru (suspected of the killing of British hostages in Nigeria in March 2012 and March 2013) were proscribed in July and November 2012 respectively; and, in December 2011,

Muslims Against Crusades was proscribed as an alias of an organisation in this country already proscribed under other names, including Al Muhajiroun and Al Ghurabaa.

Terrorism Stop and Search Powers

2.13   The review of counter-terrorism powers recommended significant changes to the stop and search powers provided by the Terrorism Act 2000 in light of concerns about their necessity and proportionality. These changes were implemented through the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and came into force on 10 July 2012. The Act repealed the powers (commonly known as 'Section 44') in the 2000 Act, which had enabled the police to stop and search people and vehicles without suspicion and replaced them with more limited powers. The new powers (under section 47A of the Terrorism Act 2000) enable the police to stop and search people and vehicles with no suspicion only in exceptional circumstances, where a senior police officer reasonably suspects that an act of terrorism will take place and where the powers are considered necessary to prevent such an act.

2.14   There has been no use of the new stop and search powers under section 47A of the Terrorism Act 2000 in Great Britain. A total of 679 people were stopped and searched under section 43 of the Terrorism Act 2000 by the Metropolitan Police Service in the year ending 30 June 2012, down from 1,283 in the previous 12 months. The Police Service of Northern Ireland publishes statistics on use of stop and search powers in that jurisdiction.

Stop and Search at Borders

2.15   Powers contained in Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 enable the police to stop, search, and question people at the border and at ports. These are important powers to keep the UK safe, but there have been concerns they can operate unfairly. In line with the Government's commitment to counter-terrorism powers which are both effective and proportionate, the Government has completed a review of the operation of Schedule 7 and a public consultation on proposals to amend how the powers might operate in future. Responses to that consultation, which ended in December 2012, are being considered and proposals to amend the legislation will be brought forward at the earliest opportunity.

PROSECUTION AND DEPORTATION

Intercept as Evidence

2.16   The lawful interception of communications plays a critical role in protecting the British public. At present, intercept material (i.e. the records of the content of telephone calls, emails etc) is used very effectively as intelligence, which regularly facilitates an investigation, but not as evidence in court. In some other countries, often with different legal systems, intercept material is evidential. The Government is committed to trying to find a practical way to allow the use of intercept as evidence, where a legally viable model can be found and the intelligence value of intercept material is not adversely affected.

2.17   The current review into the potential use of intercept as evidence in court proceedings is being overseen by an independent cross-party Privy Council Group, chaired by Sir John Chilcot. Its purpose is to address the likely balance of advantage and the cost and risk of a legally viable model for using intercept as evidence.

Deportation of Foreign Nationals Engaged in Terrorism

2.18   The Coalition Programme for Government committed to further work to better enable the deportation of foreign nationals who pose a threat to our security.

The Government remains committed to strengthening the UK's ability to deport foreign national terrorists in a manner which is consistent with our legal and human rights obligations.

2.19   Domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights have agreed that the approach of using bilateral diplomatic assurances to protect the safety and human rights of people being deported on national security grounds is sound. The Government is seeking to extend the range of countries which may provide bilateral assurances to us of safety on return, prioritising those with the most nationals engaged in terrorism-related activity in the UK or judged the most likely to do so. We now have bilateral agreements in place with Algeria, Jordan, Ethiopia, Lebanon and Morocco and have discussed the scope for agreements with a number of other countries.

2.20   For much of this period the specific case of Abu Qatada has attracted significant attention as it progresses through the courts. In November 2012, the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) allowed Abu Qatada's latest appeal against deportation to Jordan. On 11 March, the Court of Appeal heard the Government's appeal against this decision. As at 18 March, the Court of Appeal's judgment had not yet been handed down. We continue to work to achieve Abu Qatada's lawful deportation, both through the courts and by working with the Jordanian Government to overcome the remaining legal issue raised by SIAC. On 21 December 2012, we deported another Jordanian national on national security grounds under the bilateral agreement we have in place with Jordan.

2.21   Responding to the difficulties that the Government has faced in cases such as that of Abu Qatada, the Government is working on reforms to reduce delays and strengthen our ability to deport foreign nationals who pose a threat to national security. We are already tightening the legislation on the right to an in-country appeal for national security deportations and are exploring other measures to expedite such cases through the courts and to restrict the provision of legal aid.

MAINTAINING AND IMPROVING OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

Communications Data

2.22   Communications data (CD) is a term used to refer to data about a communication or the use of communications services. CD can help identify who has made a communication, when, where and how. CD is distinguished from the content of a communication and, unlike the content of communications obtained through interception, can be used as evidence in court. CD is of considerable value to law enforcement agencies in the investigation of all kinds of serious crime, including terrorism.

2.23   CD is presently retained by the communications industry for their own commercial reasons (e.g. in order to bill their customers). With the necessary approvals the police and the intelligence agencies can access CD where it can facilitate a specific investigation. But new internet-based communications do not always generate CD and some CD is no longer retained for business reasons. CD is therefore not always available when needed by public authorities to help in the investigation of crime. Legislation is necessary to ensure that CD continues to be available to law enforcement agencies in the future, as it has been in the past.

2.24   Draft legislation on CD was published on 14 June 2012 and has been scrutinised by a Joint Committee of both Houses who published their report on 11 December 2012 and by the Intelligence and Security

Committee who published a summary of their report on the same day. The Home Office considered the Joint Committee's recommendations carefully and accepted the substance of them all. The Bill has been redrafted and will be introduced at the earliest opportunity. The proposed legislation will put in place the necessary regulations and safeguards to ensure that our response to this technological challenge is compatible with the Government's approach to information storage and civil liberties.

Terrorist Finance

2.25   Terrorists need money to travel, train, radicalise, fund attacks and establish support networks. Funds raised in this country are being used to support terrorist-related activity both here and overseas.

2.26   We are particularly concerned by the diversion of funds collected for charities in the UK for terrorist and extremist purposes. We have significantly increased support to the Charity Commission's work in this area, which will enable better advice to charities and further investigations where there is evidence that charities have behaved improperly or been exploited. We have sponsored a campaign to provide community guidance on 'Safer Giving'.

2.27   Funds raised in this country may move overseas through the Money Service Business (MSB) sector. As the regulator, HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) is working to reduce the vulnerability of the MSB sector and increase its compliance with regulations. HMRC's regulatory powers have been strengthened to better ensure that unfit or improper individuals cannot control MSBs.

2.28   Overseas, donors in the Gulf and in East Africa provide significant funding for some terrorist groups. The UK has played an active part in the efforts of the multinational Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to strengthen work against terrorist financing and money laundering.

2.29   Kidnapping for ransom continues to support terrorist activity, notably in North and West Africa (paragraph 1.10 above). The Government is concerned at the very significant amount of revenue raised by Al Qa'ida through ransom payments. In the UK, we work to ensure that British citizens and companies have access to the latest travel advice, including advice about kidnap risks, so they can plan their travel accordingly. Internationally, the Government is working with partners to reduce the risk of kidnapping as a means of terrorist financing; we plan further activity in this area during our Presidency of the G8.

THE PROTECTION OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

Justice and Security Bill

2.30   Over the past few years there has been an increase in civil litigation in connection with counter-terrorist operational activity. The number of cases is small but the issues they raise are disproportionately significant. These claims often involve allegations of Government involvement in very serious wrong-doing in connection with counter-terrorist operations around the world. Resolution of many of these cases requires access to sensitive intelligence, derived from the security and intelligence agencies and our intelligence allies.

2.31   At present, the only way for the Government to protect highly sensitive national security material from disclosure in civil litigation is by claiming Public Interest Immunity (PII) to exclude the material from the case or to seek to settle the claim. If a Government claim for PII is successful, that material will be excluded from the court

proceedings entirely. If a claim for PII is unsuccessful, the Government must either disclose material that would damage the national security of the UK, or build its case without relying on that material, or seek to settle the case to avoid such disclosure which could potentially put the lives and safety of intelligence officers and their sources at risk: this can mean paying significant sums of public money to people whose case the courts have not upheld. The Justice and Security Bill, introduced in the House of Lords in May 2012, addresses this problem by providing for closed material procedures in the small number of civil cases involving relevant national security material which the Courts recognise is too sensitive to disclose.

2.32   The Justice and Security Bill also limits a legal mechanism which has become known as the 'Norwich Pharmacal' jurisdiction. This provides for a claimant who is involved in litigation anywhere in the world to seek disclosure of relevant information from a third party in Great Britain. Applied in the context of national security, for which it was never intended, Norwich Pharmacal has been used to seek access to sensitive material, including that shared in confidence by our allies. This undermines the principles of confidentiality and trust on which international intelligence-sharing arrangements are based and can damage these critical relationships. The Bill therefore proposes that Norwich Pharmacal should not be available for information held by, originating from, or relating to, the security and intelligence services, or information certified by the Secretary of State as information which ought not to be disclosed as it would be contrary to the public interest.

2.33   The Bill also seeks to extend the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC)'s remit by granting it additional investigative powers and resources and bringing it closer to Parliament. It would also extend the remit of the Intelligence Services Commissioner.

The Bill has now completed its initial stages in both the House of Lords and House of Commons. It will transfer back to the House of Lords in late March for Lords Consideration of Commons Amendments.

INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION AND CAPACITY BUILDING

2.34   Successful counter-terrorism work requires very close international co-ordination and collaboration and this has been a hallmark of CONTEST over the past few years. Much of this collaboration is operational, managed by the security and intelligence agencies and police with counterparts overseas, with the specific intention of disrupting terrorist attacks. Some is policy driven and aims to use international collaboration to deliver CONTEST in the UK.

2.35   A significant amount of work is directed to building capacity in other countries across all parts of CONTEST – for example, improving the capability of security forces, protective security, crisis management and counter-radicalisation. Successful action against Al Qa'ida in Pakistan and Afghanistan has been accompanied by the dispersal and diversification of the terrorist threat, notably into Africa and the Middle East. At the same time, political change in these areas has led to significant change and sometimes disruption to countries' legal and security structures. The need to build capacity in countries which are vital to our own national security is therefore urgent. Of particular importance is work to ensure that countries' legal systems and security agency capabilities and practices allow for effective co-operation. As the Foreign Secretary set out in a speech on 14 February 2013, the UK is seeking to build justice and human rights partnerships with countries where there is

both a threat to the UK's security and a need to develop their law enforcement and criminal justice systems.

2.36   Some capacity building is multilateral. The new Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF), for example, established by the US and Turkey in September 2011, brings states together to work on areas such as the rule of law and border management. The UK and the United Arab Emirates chair a working group which shares best practice on *Prevent*. Through the EU important progress has been made improving aviation cargo security. EU counter terrorist strategies for Pakistan, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel have been agreed.

2.37   Bilaterally, the UK has a wide range of such capacity building projects in priority countries, co-ordinated with development programmes run by DfID. In Afghanistan we maintain a major programme to support the Afghan National Army and are building Afghan investigation, arrest and prosecution capabilities. The UK has begun another major programme to support the Government of Pakistan in reforming the CT legal process, from crime scene management and evidence collection through to prosecutor training and changes to legislation. This programme is now co-ordinated with many other international donors and has been supported by EU funding.

FORWARD LOOK

2.38   We will continue to ensure that the police, and the security and intelligence agencies have the necessary powers and capabilities to stop terrorist attacks in this country. That requires continued investment and innovation. We will seek closer collaboration between agencies and police working on counter-terrorism and organised crime, ensuring that resources and methods are shared as effectively and efficiently as possible.

2.39   Given the way the terrorist threat is changing we will need to develop even further our collaborative work with countries overseas and with multilateral organisations. We will continue to respect human rights and promote the rule of law, which we regard as the foundation for successful counter-terrorism work in this country and overseas. We need to ensure the closest possible co-ordination between our work on national security and our international development programmes: good governance and poverty reduction are an essential foundation for better security in many of the countries where terrorists are most active at present.

2.40   Pakistan and Yemen remain very high priorities for our overseas counter-terrorism work. In the coming year we will need to ensure that effective counter-terrorism capabilities remain in Afghanistan after the drawdown of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces in 2014. We will also need to respond to the growing threat to our interests in North and West Africa.

Engagement with and support for our Security Industry

A strong and competitive UK security industry is vital to our national security and in particular to the success of CONTEST in this country and overseas.

The February 2012 Defence and Security White Paper, 'National Security through Technology', noted the contribution of the industry to developing and sustaining key security capabilities, as well as contributing to export-led growth and a balanced economy. A well-regulated trade in security products can support our strategic relationships around the world and enhance the counter-terrorism capability of our allies. The White Paper also recognised that exports can reduce the costs of programmes to the UK and improve the long-term viability of our own suppliers.

The global security market is worth £384bn. It grew by more than 5 per cent in 2010/11 and is predicted to continue growing strongly out to 2015. In 2011, the global security export market was worth £62bn. UK exports were valued at £2.6bn, a market share of 4 per cent. This contrasts to the defence export market where the UK averages a 20 per cent share.

The UK security industry has a strong reputation, not least because the UK has faced significant terrorist threats for a number of years and the industry is a key supplier to Government and the police. London 2012 has further enhanced the reputation of the UK Government and industry working in partnership.

In the White Paper the Government committed to increasing support for our security industry, recognising that responsibilities in this area have historically been dispersed across Government. The Home Office has now been given the task of co-ordinating this effort in close conjunction with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK Trade and Investment (UKTI) and others. We want to see our security industry supporting our CONTEST work in the UK and overseas and operating in tandem with Government.

PREVENT

2.41   Preventing people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism is an important part of our counter-terrorism strategy and has been the subject of growing international interest and collaboration. The Government introduced a new *Prevent* strategy in June 2011 after an extensive period of consultation.

2.42   In common with CONTEST as a whole, the new strategy covers all forms of terrorism (with the exception of domestic terrorism in Northern Ireland), including from the far right. It also deals with non-violent extremism and extremist groups which, sometimes deliberately, can draw people into terrorist-related activity. But the allocation of resources will be proportionate to the threats we face. At present the greatest threat to the UK as a whole is from Al Qa'ida and the violent Islamist ideology associated with it. The strategy draws a clear distinction between *Prevent* and work in support of integration; responsibilities have been realigned between the Home Office and the Department for Communities and Local Government in England, respectively.

2.43   The strategy also reaffirmed the Government commitment in the Coalition Programme for Government to deny public funds, including *Prevent* funding, to any group that has recently espoused or incited violence or hatred or undermined British values.

2.44   The revised *Prevent* strategy seeks to:

- Respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and aspects of extremism, and the threat we face from those who promote these views;

- Provide practical help to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and

- Work with a wide range of sectors (including education, criminal justice, faith, charities, the internet and health) where there are risks of radicalisation or which support our counter-radicalisation work.

2.45   Local Authorities are vital to all aspects of *Prevent*. We now have a network of co-ordinators in priority Local Authority areas who support Prevent programmes and co-ordinate with community organisations, agencies and Departments. We regard local expertise and accountability as essential to the programme. Local Authorities are increasingly merging *Prevent* into other aspects of their work (e.g. child protection) and we strongly support this: authorities have begun to develop a new range of community-based projects in conjunction with the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office. Over 80 projects were approved in 2012. Local Authorities work closely with dedicated *Prevent* police teams, neighbourhood police and wider counter-terrorism policing.

CHALLENGING TERRORIST IDEOLOGY

2.46   We continue to believe that ideological challenge is the core of our *Prevent* work. We need to refute the claims made by extremist and terrorist organisations and their propagandists here and overseas. In particular, we must challenge views promoted by extremist Islamists and the far right. We also need to be confident about and assertive of our own values. As the Prime Minister made clear in his Munich speech in 2011, 'a genuinely liberal country…believes in certain values and actively promotes them. Freedom of speech, freedom of worship, democracy, the rule of law, equal rights regardless of race, sex and sexuality'.

2.47   Since publication of the *Prevent* strategy, we have significantly improved our understanding of the people and organisations who are most heavily engaged in radicalisation in the UK and overseas. We have worked closely on this with other concerned Governments and shared our work widely across Departments here. We have identified structured, co-ordinated, and well funded networks of Islamist extremists in this country whose messages are divisive, anti democratic, anti western, intolerant of other faiths and lifestyles and highly critical of people who do not follow their interpretation of Islam. We have seen how far right groups have developed an Islamophobic and white supremacist ideology, which is also anti democratic, intolerant and conducive to violence. We know these extreme Islamist and far right organisations feed off one another and try to create enmity, suspicion and hatred between our communities.

2.48   In the UK, the Security Service and police can take action against people and groups who are engaged in radicalisation. We have proscribed several groups who condone terrorist activity. We have provided advice to Local Authorities and institutions about the threats from extremism and the statutory powers available to them for challenging extremist speakers. We continue to share with Local Authorities the Counter-Terrorism Local Profile (CTLP), a summary of available information about terrorism and extremism in a specific area.

2.49   We have also continued to fund a specialist police unit that assesses internet content against the criteria set out in our terrorism legislation and collaborates with industry to remove illegal content from the internet if it is hosted in this country. Over 4,000 URLs which breach UK terrorism legislation have been taken down by the unit since it was established in 2010. We have also worked with industry to share unlawful websites which can then be included in commercial filtering products.

2.50   We have supported community-based campaigns that rebut terrorist and extremist propaganda and offer alternative views to our most vulnerable target audiences. We have worked with digital communications experts to help fifteen civil society groups exploit the potential of the internet.

2.51   We have also worked closely with other countries where apologists for terrorism and extremism are most active and where terrorist and extremist propaganda can have a direct impact on communities here. We have made increasing use of powers available to the Home Secretary to exclude people from this country who are engaged in extremist activity.

SUPPORTING VULNERABLE PEOPLE

2.52   We have made progress in meeting the commitments in the *Prevent* strategy to support people who are vulnerable to radicalisation. We have extended 'Channel', a multi-agency programme to identify and support people who are at risk, across England and Wales. The standards for this safeguarding programme are set nationally by the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office. But each Channel project is run and managed by local agencies, including the Local Authority and the police. Between January 2007 and December 2012, almost 2,500 referrals were made to Channel, generally by the police and statutory organisations. Over 500 people have received support. In April 2012, we introduced a system for assessing the vulnerability of people who have been referred to Channel, which will in future make it possible to accurately evaluate its impact.

2.53   Channel relies on the engagement of trained frontline professionals and communities. We continue to fund an extensive education programme to make people more aware of the risks of radicalisation and how the risks might be addressed.

2.54   We continue to attach particular importance to *Prevent* work in prisons where there is a significant risk of radicalising activity by terrorist offenders or other prisoners. Working with the police, the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) has made more widely available programmes that help prisoners disengage from terrorism and extremism. Pilots of new interventions to challenge Al Qa'ida related ideologies have shown promise.

SUPPORTING SECTORS AND INSTITUTIONS

2.55   We have continued to support sectors and institutions that may be targeted by radicalisers or which have an important role to play in challenging terrorism and violent extremism:

- The Department for Education (DfE) has implemented rigorous checks on proposed Free Schools; strengthened Independent School Standards and published new Teachers' Standards which set out conduct required and clearly state that teachers' actions should not undermine 'fundamental British values'. Ofsted has also updated its inspection frameworks, setting out how inspectors should make judgements against the revised Independent School Standards. Regulatory action could be taken where these standards are not met. We encourage schools to engage with local *Prevent* networks and to make use of their material, and projects in

Prevent priority areas support teachers to discuss and challenge extremism in the classroom;

- For Higher and Further Education we continue to support work by the National Union of Students to provide guidance on the risks associated with extremist speakers and by Universities UK to share best practice with university staff, including putting in place a network of co-ordinators to advise Higher and Further Education institutions about countering extremism;

- We remain concerned about the potential abuse of charities by extremist organisations, both to raise funds (including for use overseas, see paragraphs 2.25-2.27 above) and to distribute propaganda. We have provided additional funding for the Charity Commission to deal with these issues and help the public understand how to give safely to charitable causes;

- We continue to work with the faith sector, which we recognise has a unique role to play in engaging with young people at risk of radicalisation and addressing claims made in the name of religion by apologists for violence; and

- We continue to see connections between radicalisation and health issues. We provide *Prevent* training to NHS front-line workers. From 1 April organisations in England who receive NHS funding for healthcare services will need to demonstrate that they reflect *Prevent* in their policies and procedures.

- ## FORWARD LOOK

2.56   We will continue to implement the revised *Prevent* strategy. We want to see more progress across all the main areas of work but notably on the internet, with key sectors and in our *Prevent* priority areas:

- We will continue our work with the police to tackle online material which breaches UK terrorism legislation. We will increase collaboration with industry and continue sharing unlawful websites for inclusion in commercial filtering products; we want to see more work done to ensure the communications industry is aware of extremist material circulating on their communications services and is actively assessing that material against their own codes of practice to determine whether it should be removed;

- We want to see more websites established to refute claims made by terrorist and extremist organisations. Wherever possible these websites should be created and sustained by communities and not by Government;

- In prisons, we will increase the capability of prison staff and practitioners to identify and address extremism and work with terrorist offenders and those vulnerable to radicalisation;

- We will do further work to understand risks in organisations offering religious education, to raise standards of safeguarding and challenge the use of divisive material that undermines mutual respect and tolerance of other faiths;

- We want to see tangible results from new Local Authority *Prevent* projects, including, in particular, projects for vulnerable people and support for families; and

- We will look to *Prevent* co-ordinators in universities and colleges to work with the National Union of Students and Universities UK more effectively to challenge extremist speakers on campus, and to increase awareness of Channel.

PROTECT

2.57   The purpose of this part of CONTEST is to strengthen our protective security in order to reduce our vulnerability to a terrorist attack in the UK or against our interests overseas. We aim to:

- Strengthen UK border security;

- Reduce the vulnerability of the transport network;

- Increase the resilience of the UK's infrastructure; and

- Improve protective security for crowded places.

STRENGTHENING THE UK BORDER

2.58   In the past year we have made important changes to roles and responsibilities at the border. We have separated the Border Force from the UK Border Agency, recognising the very significant differences in their responsibilities and required capabilities. The Border Force is now primarily responsible for the protection of the physical border; the Border Agency is responsible for visas and migration issues. A new Border Policing Command (BPC) will be part of the National Crime Agency and will co-ordinate the investigation of border-related crime. The BPC will work very closely with the counter-terrorism police.

2.59   Our border security depends on having accurate data regarding people who are intending to travel to this country, notably by air. We now obtain Advanced Passenger

Information (API) for all flights originating from or terminating outside the EU: API is the biographical information contained on a passport – name, date and place of birth, nationality and document number – transmitted by the airline to Border Force in advance of travel. The Government remains committed to obtaining passenger data on flights to the UK from within the EU and is engaging with EU Member States and their national Data Protection Authorities to allow API collected by EU airlines to be provided to us.

2.60   Passenger Name Records (PNR), data recorded when a travel booking is made (such as telephone numbers and means of payment), provide valuable additional information about people entering and leaving this country. The proposed EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) Directive, supported by the Council of Ministers, is currently with the European Parliament for consideration. The Directive would provide a basis for the collection, storage and use of PNR by Member States to combat serious crime and immigration offences. The Government remains committed to working with Member States, the Commission, and the European Parliament to secure a Directive that will provide for the acquisition of PNR data on targeted flights between Member States and on flights to and from Member States from outside the EU.

2.61   The rollout of biometric residence permits to all non-European Economic Area (non-EEA) nationals seeking to stay in the UK for more than six months is now complete. As part of the application process a digital facial image is recorded along with fingerprints, which are checked against immigration and police databases. Successful applicants receive a secure, biometrically-linked residence permit. Overseas, fingerprints are recorded and searched against the same databases for all applications from non-

EEA nationals applying to visit or stay in the UK. Work to fully implement a biometric watchlist continues.

Cyclamen

2.62   We have completed the major programme for the installation of equipment to detect and deter the illicit importation of radiological and nuclear material (known as Cyclamen). Fixed installations are supported by mobile radiation detection units that can be deployed to any location nationally and in support of police operations. We will continue to invest in maintaining and developing this capability to keep abreast of changes at the border and improvements in technology.

TRANSPORT SECURITY

Aviation Security

2.63   Terrorist groups continue to target civilian aircraft and have tried to do so on at least three recent occasions: in December 2009, October 2010 and April 2012. We are also aware that some terrorist groups have acquired surface to air missiles as a result of the breakdown of law and order in parts of North Africa. Aviation security is a high priority part of our protective security programme.

2.64   We have accelerated the deployment of new airport security scanners, which give us the best chance of detecting the threat from non-metallic improvised explosives: following a risk based assessment these are now operational in all terminals at major UK airports. Overseas, our regional aviation security liaison officers work with local aviation officials to increase aviation security capacity. This has included, for example, the provision of explosive trace detection equipment and associated training.

2.65   We have implemented no fly arrangements in line with our commitment to strengthen pre-departure checks and prevent

people who pose a terrorist threat from flying to or from the UK. The Security and Travel Bans Authority to Carry Scheme, introduced through secondary legislation in July 2012, requires airlines providing us with API to seek authority to carry to the UK some named foreign nationals who we judge to pose a specific high threat.

2.66   Over the past year we have introduced measures to improve the security of cargo entering the UK. The UK was at the forefront of work to establish a new EU Inbound Cargo Regime which came into effect in early 2012 and requires all airlines around the world to screen cargo to EU standards before being loaded onto an aircraft destined for the EU. High risk cargo is subject to additional security screening pre-departure. We regard this regime as a major step forward and continue to work closely with the European Commission and other member states on its implementation.

Rail Security

2.67   We increased emergency service communication capacity at key London Underground stations ahead of the Olympic Games and from February 2012 armed British Transport Police (BTP) patrols were introduced across the rail and London Underground network to be deployed in line with operational requirements. Over the past year, the Department for Transport has continued installing measures to improve security at the highest risk mainline railway stations and has published guidance on station design.

Science and Technology in Support of Counter-Terrorism

Our CONTEST science and technology (S&T) programme has contributed to work across CONTEST and preparations for the London 2012 Games. The programme improves our counter-terrorism capabilities by developing and applying new technologies, and informs our decision-making by providing better evidence. S & T is co-ordinated and funded from OSCT, and involves other Government research bodies, industry, academia and international partners.

Ongoing priorities include:

- Developing our ability to characterise, detect and protect against the effect of different home-made explosives, including screening technology and detection at a distance. We opened a Homemade Explosives Facility (HME) and Centre of Excellence in June 2012 to undertake this specialist work;

- Further improving our capability to detect radiological and nuclear devices and materials;

- Improving our ability to detect a biological or chemical attack, treat victims and decontaminate the affected areas;

- Supporting the emergency service response to complex incidents, including through technology, training and exercising;

- Strengthening border and aviation security, including through better use of data to identify threats and more effective screening technology;

- Better identification of terrorist threats and activity, through work with our security and intelligence agencies; and

- Reviewing the effectiveness of Olympic site security procedures to inform guidance for securing large public events in future.

PROTECTION AND RESILIENCE OF UK INFRASTRUCTURE

Critical National Infrastructure (CNI)

2.68   The UK's essential services for communications, energy, emergency services, finance, food, government, health, transport and water are collectively termed 'critical national infrastructure' (CNI). In 2012, we introduced improved performance reporting for CNI to determine security gaps, and Government Departments and Devolved Administrations continue to work closely with CNI operators to deal with any significant vulnerabilities, supported by the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI). Upgrading physical security at key energy sites is expected to be completed by 2017. CPNI continues to publish protective security advice and help set national and international standards that facilitate good security practice. CPNI products are available on their website at www.cpni.gov.uk.

Protection of the Civil Nuclear Industry and Hazardous Materials

2.69   We have kept nuclear security policy and regulation under constant review. The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) issued new, classified security guidance to the civil nuclear industry in October 2012.

2.70   We have also continued to make it harder for terrorists to acquire chemical, biological, radiological and explosives substances:

- CPNI and the police network of Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers (who are dedicated to protective security work) have assessed security measures at the UK's most dangerous chemical sites and advised site operators about opportunities for improvement.

- We have secured agreement on EU-wide regulation to restrict sale of substances that can be used as explosives precursors, such as hydrogen peroxide. We will implement the regulation in the UK by September 2014. The agreement will make it more difficult for terrorists to exploit lower standards in other European countries.

- On the rare occasions when we have identified the unlawful sale of chemicals that could be used to make explosives and chemical agents, we have worked with enforcement authorities, including trading standards, to stop it. This has recently included a national recall of some products that are now prohibited.

- In October 2012, a new list of controlled biological agents under Part 7 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 came into effect. The Act aims to ensure that dangerous pathogens and toxins that are required in important medical and scientific research are used and held securely.

CROWDED PLACES

2.71   Improvements to protective security at high risk crowded places, such as sports stadia, pubs, nightclubs and bars, visitor attractions and commercial centres, have continued. Police Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers continue to advise businesses on the terrorist threat and measures they should take and online guidance has also been updated. Since April 2012, measures have been taken to improve security at about 20 per cent of priority sites e.g. through hostile vehicle barriers or laminated glass.

FORWARD LOOK

2.72   The reorganisation of security and intelligence agency and police work at the border is not yet complete. It will be vital to ensure that the new Border Policing Command works effectively alongside the Border Force, the UK Border Agency and those co-ordinating counter-terrorism policing to maintain our security. We will continue to prioritise improvement to aviation and cargo security, recognising that this must be a global effort where multilateral organisations and agreements have an important role to play. We remain concerned about the use made by terrorists of new technologies and want to continue to invest in our own science and technology programmes to ensure we have adequate counter measures in place.

Applying the Lessons from the London Bombings on 7 July 2005

In June 2011, we responded to the recommendations of the Coroner following the inquest into the London bombings of July 2005.

We published another report in May 2012 in which we set out what we had done to address the Coroner's recommendations and observations. In it, we reported on progress made by the Security Service to improve:

- information technology systems and processes, in particular how photographs are shared with key partners and are shown to sources; and

- arrangements for the prioritisation of operational targets, the recording of those decisions, and the development of better tools to record the progress of an investigation.

We also undertook to ensure that emergency services and other key partners work more effectively and efficiently together when responding to an emergency, including through:

- a Government co-ordinated review of emergency service training outside London;

- the development of joint operating principles, training and exercising; and

- a national interoperability programme, led by the emergency services and with the Home Secretary's oversight, to deliver a better joint response to any major incident.

The Coroner raised concerns about the bombers being able to purchase and store hydrogen peroxide to build their explosive devices. We have since taken measures to:

- reduce the risks posed by hydrogen peroxide-based explosives, including undertaking awareness raising campaigns with retailers and suppliers;

- test technology automatically to identify suspicious transactions;

- consider how inhibitors can be used in commercial products containing explosive precursors to prevent their use in the manufacture of homemade explosives; and

- pursue effective and legally binding regulation throughout the EU on the marketing and use of explosives precursors.

The Government and emergency responders have also acted on the Coroner's recommendation to review emergency medical care arrangements, of the type provided by London Air Ambulance and Medical Emergency Response Incident Teams (MERIT).

PREPARE

2.73   The purpose of our *Prepare* work is to reduce the impact of a terrorist attack where the attack cannot be prevented. In CONTEST, we set out four objectives:

- to continue to build capabilities to respond to and recover from a wide range of terrorist and other civil emergencies;

- to improve preparedness for the highest impact risks in the National Risk Assessment;

- to improve the ability of the emergency services to work together during a terrorist attack; and

- to improve communications and information sharing for terrorist attacks.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND RECOVERY CAPABILITIES

2.74   The Government and local services have continued to implement the National Resilience Capabilities Programme (NRCP) which builds the capabilities needed to respond to the most likely disruptive incidents (both natural and malicious):

- The capability of the National Health Service (NHS) to respond to an incident involving significant numbers of casualties has been improved. More emergency response teams are available in England and Wales to rescue and treat casualties within hazardous areas;

- The review of the legislation for *Prepare*, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, has been concluded by the Cabinet Office. This Act was assessed as fit for purpose following public consultations and minor changes were made to regulations around co-operation and information

sharing. Where necessary, we have amended the supporting statutory and non-statutory guidance on emergency preparedness and response to reflect lessons learned from incidents; and

- The Cabinet Office, with the Emergency Planning Society and the Business Continuity Institute, has published a *Business Continuity for Dummies* guide, providing accessible and practical advice to support small and medium-sized businesses to improve their security and business continuity planning against all risks.

Responding to a Firearms Attack

2.75   We remain concerned at the trend for terrorists to use firearms as part of an attack. This kind of incident requires a very different response from an attack using an improvised explosive device. The police must be able to act quickly – if necessary with military assistance. The emergency services also need to be able to reach and treat casualties, possibly even while the attack is still underway. A cross-Government programme has developed a specialist joint response to a firearms attack, involving the police, fire and ambulance services. Small specialist teams have been formed in high priority areas. The emergency services have developed guidance for all control room and frontline staff to identify and respond to the initial stages of a possible terrorist firearms attack.

RESPONDING TO UNCONVENTIONAL TERRORIST ATTACKS

2.76   We have continued to invest in our capability to deal with the highest impact terrorist attacks set out in the National Risk Assessment, which involve a biological agent, radiological material or a nuclear device.

We have prioritised measures that would be likely to have the greatest impact in saving lives and would, where possible, improve our preparedness for other types of emergencies. Over the period covered in this report:

- Lessons from preparations for the Olympic Games have informed the wider programme of planning for high impact biological attacks.

- We have increased the stocks of medical supplies and put in place better plans to improve the speed and coverage of the health response to a large-scale terrorist attack using biological agents.

- We have improved our capability to undertake police forensic analysis on evidence that has been contaminated by chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) material. Last year we opened the Radiological Nuclear and Explosive Conventional Forensic Analysis Centre at the Atomic Weapons Establishment which provides world leading technical support in these areas.

- We are in the final stages of completing a three-year programme to ensure that effective plans are in place to respond to a CBRN incident in a major city or transport hub. We are finalising a two-year programme which will significantly increase the life-saving capabilities of the emergency services in the immediate aftermath of a CBRN incident. We will implement this programme across the UK throughout 2013.

EMERGENCY SERVICES INTEROPERABILITY

2.77   To save lives in the event of a terrorist attack, the emergency services need to provide a rapid, flexible and joint response. Although our emergency services are already among the best in the world, there is more we can do to make sure that the handling of any incident is as joined-up as possible. At the Government's request, in autumn 2012 the police, fire and ambulance services launched the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme to improve the immediate emergency response to any major or complex incident. The projects will ensure that the three services have a detailed understanding of each others' roles and responsibilities at an incident scene, that they have clear guidance on how to work together where appropriate, that they share information quickly and effectively, and that they can make rapid decisions supported by a joint assessment of risk. All of this will be supported by a greater emphasis on joint training and exercising at all levels of command.

BETTER COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SHARING DURING A TERRORIST ATTACK

2.78   A terrorist attack may damage communications infrastructure. In the aftermath of a terrorist attack there can be capacity constraints on communications networks.

2.79   We have updated plans to help ensure the public are better informed and advised in the event of a catastrophic emergency. We have run a trial to test how emergency alerts could be sent to the public during a crisis by assessing how the Environment Agency's flood-alerting system could be used to alert the public about other risks, including terrorist risks.

2.80   We are continuing to focus on improving the multi-agency use of the Airwave digital radio system to enable better communication during a major incident. In collaboration with the Department for

Transport, London Underground Limited and the British Transport Police we increased Airwave radio capacity at priority London Underground stations before the Olympic Games. We are also improving the Mobile Telecommunications – Privileged Access Scheme, which provides specified emergency responders with a higher likelihood of staying connected to mobile telecommunications networks in the event of extreme network congestion. We have completed the roll-out of, and exercised, the High Integrity Telecommunications System, which provides a highly resilient and secure network across the UK, including into central government crisis management centres and uses military communications satellites to provide a separate network to those used day-to-day.

FORWARD LOOK

2.81   The Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme is a high priority for us. We will continue to train frontline staff to prepare for a high impact or wide area emergency and continue to improve how we provide information and advice to the public in the event of a catastrophic emergency.

Devolved Administrations

Scotland

Responsibility for counter-terrorism preparedness is devolved. However, the Scottish Government and responders work very closely with UK partners to ensure that they can offer mutual aid to other areas in the UK if required. Post-Olympics, the focus is on planning for a safe and secure 2014 Commonwealth Games and working with the Home Office on the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP). The Scottish Government continues to focus on the implications for *Prepare* work of the inception of a single Scottish Police Service and a single Scottish Fire Service from April 2013.

In Scotland, significant resources were devoted to preparation for the Olympic Games. Delivery of *Prevent* in Scotland has progressed in line with Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS) and Scottish Government delivery plans and has focused on partnership working and raising awareness in priority sectors and institutions. For *Protect* in March 2011, the Scottish Government published 'Secure and Resilient – A Strategic Framework for Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) in Scotland.' Over the past 12 months the Scottish Government Critical Infrastructure Resilience Unit has completed a detailed analysis of assets against the CPNI criticality scale within each of the devolved sectors in Scotland, together with the further development of comprehensive Sector Resilience Assessments. Work has also started on a cyber security programme: a Cyber Group under the authority of the Scottish Government has been established to oversee and co-ordinate the delivery of the cyber security work programme across all sectors in Scotland.

Wales

Within Wales a strategic group has been established, regularly bringing together key stakeholders with a focus on the aims of CONTEST. The CONTEST Board Wales is jointly chaired by the police and Welsh Government and has developed a set of priorities to drive forward the strategy in Wales.

Under *Prevent*, proactive initiatives to challenge extreme narratives have been developed and adopted in some urban areas and efforts are underway to implement the Channel referral processes in Cardiff with the rest of Wales. A revised Counter-Terrorism Local Profile (CTLP) has been produced to support local partnership work in tackling extremism in communities. The CTLP outlines the threat and vulnerability from terrorism-related activity in a local area and is used to engage public sector organisations in Wales. A *Prevent* Co-ordinator has also been appointed for Cardiff. Under *Protect*, the Welsh Government is working closely with the Wales Extremism and Counter-Terrorist Unit and local government to mitigate the risks to crowded places. The *Prepare* element of CONTEST is linked closely to the work being taken forward on civil contingencies in Wales, particularly in respect of risk assessment and training and exercising.

Northern Ireland

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has responsibility for Northern Ireland related terrorism (NIRT) within Northern Ireland. The Home Secretary has responsibility for other terrorist threats, in particular Al Qa'ida related terrorism. The Northern Ireland Executive is responsible for co-ordinating wider consequence management and recovery issues associated with a terrorist attack.