



INSPECTION REPORT

CBRN TRAINING MATTERS

ORGANISATIONS INSPECTED:

Police National Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Centre,
Winterbourne Gunner, Hampshire, together with police forces in England
Wales and Northern Ireland

Dates of Inspection: July 2005 to October 2006

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Foreword

This inspection has focused on training conducted by the Police National Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Centre located at Winterbourne Gunner and in a number of selected police forces. It is in eight sections with appendices:

1. Approach to Inspection, scope and methodology
2. Context
3. Capacity and Capability
4. Doctrine and Learning Requirement
5. Delivery
 - a. The Centre
 - b. CBRN Awareness through E-Learning
 - c. Immersive Learning
 - d. Forces
6. Quality Assurance and Evaluation
7. Procurement, Research and Development
8. The Future

Appendices

- A Adult Learning Inspectorate report
- B List of recommendations from report
- C List of ESA Recommendations

Recommendations made within the report have been written in a 'SMART' format and include identification of ownership, time scales, risk assessment and costing. Details of the criteria for each of the categories can be found at appendix B.

The report has been written at a time of considerable change for the Police Service with the forthcoming implementation of the National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA), and similar changes in policing to meet the threat from terrorism with, *inter alia*, the creation of the Police CBRN Operations Centre. The report has attempted to accommodate the future developments in this area and should be read in the context of the developing new structures and responsibilities.

HM Inspector is aware that, through the methodology adopted of highlighting issues as they became apparent during the inspection process, the considerable change required in the learning and development framework for CBRN has been identified

and is being progressed at a rapid pace. He is pleased to have had sight of the programme work already being undertaken prior to the publication of this report, which supports many of the recommendations in this report. There is however still a requirement to pursue either parts of, or full, recommendations to completion. This report is partly historical in context because of the time taken to ensure a thorough inspection and the speed of the programme work undertaken by ACPO TAM, Home Office CTID, and the ACPO CBRN portfolio holder. However it remains pertinent today.

This inspection provides Ministers, the service and other agencies with a specialist report on CBRN training. It includes the role and relationship with forces, CENTREX¹, (and, for the future, NPIA), Skills for Justice, the Military private sector organisations, and the newly created CBRN Operations Centre.

Acknowledgements

HM Inspector is grateful for the support and assistance provided by the staff of the Police National CBRN Centre, forces, CENTREX, Wiltshire Constabulary and the members of the reference group, which has supported and advised the inspection process.

He commends the team who undertook the inspection work as follows:

Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), and _____ of Her Majesty's
Police. He is also grateful for the assistance and support provided by _____ of the British Transport
of the Adult Learning Inspectorate to the inspection team.

1 APPROACH TO INSPECTION, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

1.1 The inspection was undertaken between July 2005 and October 2006 by Mr Robin Field-Smith, Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary and a small team of staff, including an internationally acknowledged subject matter expert.

1.2 The purpose of the inspection was to identify whether the Centre is sufficiently resourced, whether the training is fit for purpose, whether the service is benefiting from the training and whether training delivered in and by forces is fit for purpose. In particular the inspection focused on the following points;

- The clarity and relevance of the mandate under which the Centre operates
- The effectiveness of the client/contractor relationship and its relevance to the current mandate
- Implementation of recommendations from national reports relating to CBRN training
- The context within which CBRN training operates with the service and other agencies, including the military and private sector
- The leadership, resource and management processes and performance outputs achieved within the Centre as identified by strategic documentation, the most recent CBRN self assessment, improvement plan and portfolio of evidence and other organisational documentation
- The quality and relevance to the CBRN mandate, of the training functions, including the application of the national ' Models for Learning'
- The extent to which, and how forces apply the services, including training, supplied by the Centre
- The extent to which the Centre involves its client base in identifying and developing its products

1.3 The inspection did not focus on the operational aspects of CBRN. However early inspection activity identified the need to test the relevance and accuracy of the learning requirement and training needs analysis, both of which are inextricably linked to the operational role.

1.4 In order to ensure that the inspection focused on the critical issues, a two-stage, upward service provision, inspection methodology was adopted, providing triangulated qualitative and quantitative sources of data.

1.5 A reference group was formed at the start of the inspection process to support the inspection in the role of 'critical friend'. It comprised personnel with expertise and experience of CBRN training within the police environment, the public, military and private sector.

1.6 Stage one of the inspection involved a literature review, a questionnaire and five national focus group meetings. The focus groups involved training managers and members of the CBRN community across England and Wales. This was followed by a series of strategic interviews with stakeholders to clarify their expectations and experiences of the Centre and was complemented by opportune inspection activity scenario based exercises.

1.7 Stage two involved analysis of the data collected and subsequent fieldwork involving nine force CBRN Units. This together with the data collected from stage one, informed a four-day inspection of the Centre and resultant follow up formative activity. Following the collection, collation and analysis of the above data this report has been produced.

1.8 The Adult Learning Inspectorate (ALI) was commissioned to inspect and focus on the training as experienced by the learner at the Centre and within forces. The ALI report is at appendix (A).

2 CONTEXT

2.1 The Police National Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Centre (PN-CBRN-C)³ situated at Winterbourne Gunner (WG) was opened in October 2001 as a result of a project developed by Her Majesty's Government (HMG) referred to as

This resulted in a significant and justifiable demand being placed on the Centre by HMG and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in establishing and developing a Centre capable of responding within limited time scales to a national requirement.

2.2 It is important to recognise the commitment and hard work of all of the staff involved at the Centre and in forces, in what has been achieved to date. The effort and dedication necessary in responding to the requirement to the degree achieved should not be underestimated.

HM Inspector is pleased formally to place on record, through this report, his recognition of the work of the staff at the Centre and in forces.

2.3 The training provided by the Centre is critical to supporting social cohesion and public reassurance through the effective training of police officers and staff to respond to, and manage a CBRN incident. Staff from other emergency services and agencies are also trained at the Centre.

2.4 The Centre is a relatively new training establishment. As a result of recent global events including terrorist attacks and the threat assessment process, it has been subject to significant pressures to ensure that the police service is trained and prepared to manage the threat of terrorist activity. Whilst the Centre has been engaged in various training programmes since its inception in 2001, the focus to date has been to train a proportion of the police service total in the wearing of, and working in, personal protective equipment (PPE) for the role of 'first responders' to a CBRN incident. First responders are those staff whose primary role is the containment and protection of a CBRN scene.

2.5

³ Referred to in the report as 'the Centre'

The Centre achieved the prescribed quantitative total of approximately seven thousand (7,000) officers nation-wide in 2005.

2.6 The events of the 11 September 2001, and recent events, has meant that the Centre has had to become increasingly responsive to the dynamic demands being placed upon it by the service⁵. Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary with responsibility for Personnel Training and Diversity, in consultation with the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) lead on CBRN, decided that it would be timely for Her Majesty's Inspector (HMI) to inspect the facilities and provision of the training at the Centre and follow on training in forces in order to consider whether what has been required has been, and continues to be, delivered to the necessary standards.

2.7 The understandable need for the Centre to respond quickly as a result of global events meant that considerable pressure was placed upon it to respond to nationally identified requirements. In the quest for quick results training was delivered without the benefit of an appropriate training framework or management structure, including the lack of doctrine and an identified and agreed learning requirement. Additionally resources and staffing at the Centre were considerably stretched to meet the target.

2.8 A CBRN incident is described in the context of CBRN terrorism which "includes the release of chemical hazards where this has been done deliberately or where it is not likely that the release is accidental (ie incidents eventually classified as HAZMAT) and incidents involving biological infections which are confirmed as not having occurred spontaneously. It involves an immediate, co-ordinated, multi-agency response, requiring concurrent investigations, including specialist advice, a clear and consistent media and public reassurance strategy and customised procedures, plans, training and equipment (eg personal protective equipment (PPE), detection equipment, decontamination, evacuation and managing fatalities)"⁶.

2.9 A distinction is thus created between a criminal action and an accidental release of CBRN material, which would fall under the definition of HAZMAT (Hazardous Materials). Currently all activity and training at the Centre falls within the counter terrorism arena, therefore investigational primacy lies with the Police Service whereas HAZMAT investigation is the remit of the Fire Service.

CAPACITY AND CAPABILITY

3.1 The distinction between capacity, which is based on the whole service and is managed at ACPO's discretion on a regional basis, and the capability in terms of resources reflected on the ground including equipment and training being fit for purpose, has a fundamental impact upon the current position of national CBRN resource resilience.

3.2 Capacity and capability are two terms used extensively throughout this report regarding the number of first responder staff available to carry out their duties during a CBRN incident. The Counter Terrorism and Intelligence Directorate of the Home Office (CTID) collects data on an ACPO regional basis to identify the capacity of the service. In doing so it applies the following terminology in monitoring the numbers trained and the national CBRN resource resilience:

"Capacity is nationally trained and available to deploy."
"Capability includes officers trained plus all equipment, co-ordination mechanisms, command and control, and concept of operations etc."

Capacity

3.3 HMIC understands that this means capacity is the current number of staff who have been properly trained and/or refreshed. Therefore where a member of staff has not been properly trained, or their training properly refreshed, they should not be included in the capacity number.

Capability

3.6 HMIC understands this term to mean the ability to provide fully trained and equipped staff with the resources required relevant to the incident. Where a member of staff has been trained but is not properly equipped or the equipment is out of licence they cannot be included within the capability figures.

3.7 The 'Portacount' procedure is time consuming and expensive in terms of the equipment required.

3.12 It is not sufficient to accept that someone is trained because the positivist data states so, without establishing with certainty, through robust quality assurance processes, that what is being trained is what is required and actually drives the organisational performance. HM Inspector is pleased to see that a new audit tool is now in place, and should be signed off in person by a chief officer, to address the issues identified.

3.13 Ensuring initial capacity and capability is not sufficient; there should be clear standards and targets set for refresher training, including a robust nationally monitored quality assurance process. Forces should be encouraged to consider more frequent contextualised refresher training, which meets national minimum dressing and undressing standards, to reduce skill decay and increase the confidence of staff. Such an approach,

would accelerate the current capability to respond to a CBRN event.

3.14 The Police National Operational Response Programme (PN-CBRN-ORP) has been developed to improve a police response to a CBRN incident. This programme is police specific rather than multi-agency. It has a work stream to develop doctrine and tactics for seven projects that will form part of the programme. HM Inspector notes the intention to use the programme to identify what must be trained, who must

be trained, delivery options, and most importantly, how this training will be supported in the workplace.