Policy paper

UK Biological Security Strategy: Implementation Report, July 2025 - July 2026

Published 14 July 2026

This was published under the 2024 to 2026 Starmer Labour government

Ministerial foreword

The Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster

National security is the first duty of government. Biological risks regularly top the National Risk Register; as such, they are risks we take incredibly seriously. As the COVID-19 pandemic showed, these risks pose an existential threat to our way of life and we must take preventative action and invest today for what may happen tomorrow.

Preparedness requires all of us to come together — in government, industry, academia and with our international partners — with a shared goal and understanding of where the gaps in our knowledge and capabilities are, and together take bold and decisive action to strengthen our defences. The 2023 Biological Security Strategy was published to do just that, and helped us chart the path to ensuring the UK is resilient to a spectrum of biological risks and a world leader in responsible innovation by 2030. This is also a key objective of our National Security Strategy.

We have sustained strong progress this year to turn the ambition of the Strategy into a reality. Over the past 12 months, we have opened Moderna’s cutting edge mRNA vaccine manufacturing centre at Harwell, and we have pledged significant investment through the spending review to build the Network of National Biosecurity Centres. We have accelerated our data capabilities, including by operationalising a Biothreats Radar to provide real-time data on biological incidents, whilst pioneering new clinical and wastewater metagenomic surveillance approaches in health and security settings to enhance early warning. We have also published a new Pandemic Preparedness

Strategy, backed by around £1 billion to strengthen domestic resilience to infectious disease outbreaks, and delivered Exercise Pegasus, the largest non-military national exercise in UK history.

This report outlines these milestones and sets ambitious targets for the year ahead. It also includes the launch of the UK’s strategic approach to biosurveillance, with a particular focus on strengthening national coordination, accelerating the development of our defences against AI-assisted biological threats, and backing British companies critical to our resilience. We will keep doing all we can to keep the British people safe.

The Rt Hon. Darren Jones MP

Introduction

Overview

The 2023 Biological Security Strategy (BSS) provides the overarching strategic framework that underpins the UK’s One Health and national security approach to biological security^{[footnote 1]}. It outlines the vision that, by 2030, the UK is resilient to a spectrum of biological threats and a world leader in responsible innovation.

This report sets out delivery — from across the UK Government and devolved governments — against the BSS outcomes and commitments in the June 2025 Biological Security Strategy Implementation Report, and establishes new commitments for the year ahead.

Risk landscape^{[footnote 2]}

Since the initial publication of the BSS and the 2025 Implementation Report, the biological security risk landscape has continued to evolve and the threats posed to the UK have become more significant and complex.

Natural threats: Natural biological threats, including antimicrobial resistance (AMR), continue to pose a significant threat to humans, animals, plants, and the environment. Zoonotic spillover events are increasing and outbreaks of high-consequence infectious diseases (HCIDs) continue to impact the health of humans and animals across the world, with knock-on consequences for food security and livelihoods. These threats are exacerbated by climate-change, conflict, and the changing boundaries of the human-animal interface. The notable incidence of HCIDs, including Marburg virus disease, Ebola virus disease, and Andes virus infection (hantavirus) across the world over the past 12 months are demonstrative of this.

Accidental threats: The risk of accidental release of biological material persists regardless of the actor and whether biological research is conducted for peaceful or nefarious purposes. As the biological research landscape expands, and high-containment laboratories and high-consequence pathogen research proliferates, so too does this risk of accidental release; particularly if appropriate laboratory biosafety and biosecurity protocols are not followed.

Deliberate threats: Hostile state and non-state actors remain interested in the development, acquisition, and use of biological material for malicious purposes. The norm against the development and use of chemical or biological weapons has been challenged repeatedly. The presence of epibatidine in samples taken from Alexei Navalny highlights the danger of biotoxins, whether they are derived naturally or synthesised in a laboratory.

Technological advancements

The convergence of emerging technologies and life sciences have advanced at a rapid pace in the past 12 months, with signs of acceleration on the horizon.

Rapid advances across multiple technology domains are transforming the pace and scale of biological research and innovation. AI is enabling the analysis of vast biological datasets and accelerating discovery, while advances in sequencing provide unprecedented insight into genomes, pathogens, and biological systems. This year, a team at the University of Cambridge developed the first entirely AI-designed vaccine. Designed to provide broad-spectrum protection against entire viral families — provisionally coronaviruses, but also universal vaccines for influenza (whether pandemic, zoonotic, or seasonal) and viral haemorrhagic fevers (including Ebola) — even those that have mutated. This is a significant development in the pursuit of achieving the global 100 Days Mission.

Improvements in nucleic acid synthesis are expanding the ability to engineer biological components and develop novel diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines. At the same time, robotic laboratory platforms are automating experimentation and enabling high-throughput research at previously unattainable speeds. These interconnected technological advances are reshaping biotechnology and global health, creating significant opportunities for scientific progress, disease prevention and biosurveillance.

These same advances also introduce significant biological security risks, giving greater access to the necessary skills and knowledge to perform high-risk research at a low cost. This increases the risk of accidental misuse and provides new opportunities for hostile actors to pursue the development of biological weapons.

As the biotechnology sector shifts toward AI-driven vaccine design and automated cloud laboratories, the threat landscape moves from traditional physical security to digital and hardware security. Biological datasets may be vulnerable to “poisoning attacks” that corrupt training data, while laboratory automation systems and connected research infrastructure may be exposed to hardware manipulation. In parallel, scientific and technological advances are accelerating gain-of-function experimentation and increasing risk of accidental misuse. In the longer-term, these technologies could also lead to the unlocking of new risks — such as significant advancements in the development of mirror biology — with dangerous consequences.

These technological capabilities are evolving more rapidly than traditional policy frameworks can adapt, creating gaps in oversight, biological security regulation, and preparedness. Policy must be reflective of the speed, scale and dual-use nature of engineering biology and AI. To capture the opportunities and effectively mitigate emerging risks, we must keep pace with technological advancements through adaptive interventions, strengthened international coordination and proactive horizon scanning, working at pace on upstream preventative measures and strengthening our preparedness and ability to respond at pace and scale.

Infectious disease incidents in 2025/2026

The global infectious disease landscape has continued to be dominated by high-consequence viral outbreaks over the past year, emphasising the need for sustained and cohesive action. For example:

• The World Health Organization (WHO) designated the active Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on 17 May 2026, prompting a global response and urgent calls for vaccine proposals.
• An exceptional outbreak of Andes hantavirus aboard a South Atlantic cruise ship triggered an international health response, including international containment protocols.
• Genomic surveillance enables the tracking of the prevalence of highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) which is now a complex multi-mammal outbreak with persistent, sporadic spillovers into humans.
• The landscape of invasive meningococcal disease (IMD) saw a major shift following a severe meningococcal serogroup B (MenB) outbreak in Canterbury.
• Across the broader epidemiological landscape, climate volatility and warming seasonal windows have expanded the geographic range and active periods of Culex mosquitoes, causing predictable baseline surges in neuroinvasive West Nile virus cases across North America and Southern Europe moving into the summer months.

Achievements 2025-2026

The Government has made progress across all 15 outcomes and three strategic enablers of the BSS and is on track to delivering all medium-term commitments by 2028. Over the last year, we have:

Understand:

• Delivered a mature operational Biothreats Radar (BTR) tool utilised by 14 government departments and agencies, providing real-time situational awareness and digitised outbreak reports.
• Delivered Exercise Pegasus, the largest Tier 1 exercise of a pandemic scenario in UK history.
• Delivered coordinated communications for measles, MenB, hantavirus and Ebola virus incidents and a second wave of the Keep Antibiotics Working communications campaign.

Prevent:

• Published a new Pandemic Preparedness Strategy, backed by around £1 billion in health protection measures to strengthen domestic resilience.
• Published guidance for major UK genomic data holders to strengthen safeguards around UK genomic data.
• Announced a £45 million Value Chain Growth Fund to build UK sovereignty in engineering biology.
• Presented findings of the Russian Federation’s repeated violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) to both treaty bodies.

Detect:

• Published the new UK strategic approach to biosurveillance, to catalyse engagement with industry and academia, and create a pipeline of innovation which can be integrated into Government capabilities.
• Took significant steps to advance UK microbial forensics and attribution capability, including delivering the first in silico exercise for the detection of genetic engineering.
• Operationalised and scaled metagenomics surveillance, including successfully piloting public health analysis over winter.

Respond:

• Published the Life Sciences Sector Plan, supported over the lifetime of the Spending Review by government funding of over £2 billion, alongside funding from UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) and the National Institute for Health and Care Research (NIHR).
• Opened the cutting edge Moderna Innovation and Technology Centre, building the UK’s capacity to produce mRNA vaccines at scale and marking a cornerstone of the Government’s 10-year strategic partnership with Moderna.
• Contributed to progressing the 100 Days Mission, with £606 million investment annually via the National Institute for Health and Care Research (NIHR) and £80 million committed to recommission NIHR’s Health Protection Research Units.

Strategic Enablers:

• Announced investment of over £1.83 billion to establish a Network of National Biosecurity Centres, including £1 billion in Weybridge, £580 million in Dstl Porton Down, and £250 million over this Parliament in Harwell.
• Allocated £15 million under the Integrated Security Fund (ISF)^{[footnote 3]} to incentivise innovation, and test solutions, to fill critical biological security capability gaps.
• Signed Memorandums of Understanding with the US and Japan, covering collaboration on advancements in frontier life sciences research and alignment in countering biological threats.
• Convened senior governance and advisory forums, connecting work across pillars.

Overarching Strategic Framework

VISION: By 2030, the UK is resilient to a spectrum of biological threats and a world leader in responsible innovation, making a positive impact on global security, economic and health outcomes.

OUR MISSION: To implement a UK-wide approach to biosecurity which strengthens deterrence and resilience, projects global leadership, and exploits opportunities for UK prosperity and S&T advantage.

UNDERSTAND the biological risks we face today and could face in the future:

• Outcome 1 (CO) A real-time integrated Biothreats Radar assured by experts
• Outcome 2 (CO) Timely access to relevant data through established data and information standards and sharing protocols, to support evidence based decision making
• Outcome 3 (UKHSA) A coordinated UK biological security awareness public information campaign
• Outcome 4 (CO) Regular domestic and international exercising of our collective preparedness and defences to biological threats

PREVENT biological risks from emerging (where possible) or from threatening the UK and UK interests:

• Outcome 5 (DSIT) The UK is a world leader in responsible innovation, shaping international norms and standards
• Outcome 6 (CPACC) Prevent state and non-state actors from developing, producing, acquiring, transferring, stockpiling and using biological weapons
• Outcome 7 (DHSC/DEFRA/FCDO) Reduce the risk from the spread of infectious diseases, pests and invasive species, including drug resistant infections, in the UK and overseas
• Outcome 8 (HO) A UK Border which maintains biological security and creates prosperity

DETECT, characterise and report biological risks when they do emerge as early and reliably as possible:

• Outcome 9 (UKHSA) A national biosurveillance network engendering a One Health approach
• Outcome 10 (UKHSA) Enhanced capability to rapidly roll out diagnostics for population use in response to new or existing biological threats
• Outcome 11 (MOD) A strengthened national microbial foresnics capability

RESPOND to biological risks that have reached the UK or UK interests to lessen their impact and to enable a rapid return to business as usual:

• Outcome 12 (FCDO) A coordinated international response to a natural outbreak, accidental release or deliberate attack
• Outcome 13 (CO) A comprehensive set of tested response plans which are ready to guide UK responses to a spectrum of biological threats
• Outcome 14 (DHSC/UKHSA) Capability to scale up discovery and development of therapeutics and vaccines within 100 days underpinned by targeted R&D programmes across the range of biological threats
• Outcome 15 (DEFRA) Capability to remediate a scene or area within the UK that has been contaminated by hazardous biological material in a small or medium scale incident

STRATEGIC ENABLERS:

• Strategic Enabler 1: Governance, Leadership and Coordination (CO) Formalised UK leadership, governance and accountability for biological security, to strengthen collective decision making, and improve preparedness and response for incidents affecting the UK
• Strategic Enabler 2: UK Sciene Base, Health and Life Science Sector (DHSC/DSIT/DBT) A world-class science base, resilient S&T capabilities against the spectrum of threats, and a thriving Health and Life Sciences sector, increasing trade and stimulating growth and investment across the UK
• Strategic Enabler 3: International Leadership (FCDO) International engagement and leadership to improve global health security and future pandemic prevention, preparedness and response, shape international biosafety and biosecurity norms, standards, practices and strengthen non proliferation instruments and mechanisms

UK Biological Security Strategy: pillar implementation updates and commitments

UNDERSTAND

Outcome 1 ~ A real-time integrated Biothreats Radar assured by experts

We committed to operationalising the Biothreats Radar (BTR). Since then we have:

• Delivered a mature operational BTR tool utilised by 14 government departments and agencies, providing real-time situational awareness and digitised outbreak reports. The BTR synthesises cross-government data with open-source intelligence, dynamically prioritising central Government’s response to human, animal, and plant pathogens, using a One Health approach.
• Formally validated the BTR during Exercise Pegasus and used the capability operationally during the 2026 hantavirus outbreak.

In the next 12 months the Government’s ambitions include:

• Further develop and deploy automated detection tools and classified data sharing within the BTR (using funding from the ISF Biosecurity Portfolio) and enhance cooperation with key international partners.
• Collect new data from biosurveillance projects and connect into the BTR, covering One Health, AMR, air, clinical and wastewater surveillance.
• Strengthen the use of advanced analytics, modelling and simulation in decision making, including exploring the use of combined epidemiological-economic modelling in pandemic preparedness and response, aligning with the 2026 Pandemic Preparedness Strategy, and building on research by the Institute for Government.

Outcome 2 ~ Timely access to relevant data through established data and information standards and sharing protocols, to support evidence-based decision making

We committed to removing barriers to data sharing. Since then we have:

• Streamlined cross-government data sharing through the establishment of a Data Brokerage Service for government within the National Biosurveillance Network, providing a single, secure pathway to make and track data access and sharing requests. This ensures critical biological security information flows reliably during both “peacetime” and crises.
• Established a cross-government Metadata Catalogue — a searchable online index that makes 49 key pathogen data sets visible to government analysts. This tool helps analysts detect biological risks earlier, by making critical biological security data easily accessible, with new data teams embedded across departments to continually expand the tracking network.

In the next 12 months the Government’s ambitions include:

• Transition the Situation Centre’s foundational data capabilities into long-term operations to ensure the UK’s biological security data infrastructure remains resilient, sustainable, and embedded within permanent government response systems. This will include increasing the speed of data sharing at department and agency level during both “peacetime” and crisis for horizon scanning and monitoring.
• Improve the flow of AMR data from private veterinary laboratories into the Government. The Private Laboratories Initiative, funded by the ISF, will deliver data sharing agreements with private veterinary laboratories and assure data received for quality and accuracy to improve UK biosurveillance in animals and fill current data gaps.
• Integrate over 70 additional datasets into the Metadata catalogue, broadening the catalogue’s biosurveillance data and helping bridge the gap between human clinical data and environmental, animal and plant health, and marine biosurveillance. Data teams from the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) and UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) will work throughout 2026 and 2027 to collate and share biosurveillance metadata to be listed in the NBN data catalogue.

Outcome 3 ~ A coordinated UK biological security awareness public information campaign

We committed to improve public understanding and awareness of natural, accidental and deliberate biological risks, including through international engagement. Since then we have:

• Delivered coordinated communications for measles, MenB, hantavirus and Ebola virus incidents, providing timely public health advice, targeted local messaging, content, and reassurance to the public and stakeholders. Activity included geographically specific outreach, support and interventions (including vaccination) for potentially exposed individuals, and alignment with partners, using behavioural and digital insight to respond proportionately.
• Launched the second wave of the Keep Antibiotics Working communications campaign, designed to raise awareness of Antimicrobial Resistance and educate the public on correct antibiotic usage.
• Scaled up avian influenza incident communications, delivered geographically-targeted mass messages informing the public of cases and the resulting restriction zones for highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1.
• Worked in partnership with the devolved governments and the travel industry to raise public awareness and understanding of the animal health restrictions on personal imports of animal products from the EU, introduced in April 2025.
• Held the annual National Plant Health Week with over 30 organisations in the plant sector, raising awareness on plant health. APHA also exhibited at the Royal Horticultural Society (RHS) Chelsea Flower Show, winning an RHS Gold Medal and best in show GreenSTEM award. The exhibit showcased government-funded research using detector dogs and electronic noses to detect plant pests and diseases. Over 30,000 visitors engaged with the exhibit.

In the next 12 months the Government’s ambitions include:

• Increase biological security awareness, promote responsible behaviour, and deter illegal imports through a more coherent and efficient border communication framework. We will proceed with the first phase of an ISF-funded UK Border Biosecurity Communication Campaign by building the messaging framework, gathering behavioural insights through focus groups, and finalising campaign materials and testing, deploying low-cost communication channels ahead of the formal launch in 2027.
• Continue to deliver and expand national public health campaigns on:
  • Winter and routine vaccination programmes, to increase vaccination uptake among eligible populations and reduce the impact of infectious diseases.
  • Travel health, to increase awareness of vaccinations and preventative medication.
  • Antimicrobial resistance, awareness raising and promoting responsible antibiotic use through the Keep Antibiotics Working campaign.
  • Farm visits and food safety, to increase hand hygiene and advice on disease preventative measures.
  • Vector borne diseases, awareness raising and preventative actions.
• Deliver outreach and training materials for professionals working in plant health-related sectors to increase capability and the stock of knowledge about plant health issues and good biosecurity practices.

Outcome 4 ~ Regular domestic and international exercising of our collective defences to biological threats

We committed to delivering a Tier 1 pandemic exercise and a regular schedule of exercises. Since then we have:

• Delivered the Tier 1 Exercise Pegasus, the largest exercise focused on a pandemic scenario in UK history — involving all regions and nations of the UK, and thousands of participants across all levels of the system, from first responders to Ministers.
• Delivered and participated in a range of exercises, including a major national security exercise jointly delivered by Eastern Region Counter Terrorism Policing and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). This tested regional police, emergency, and specialist responders’ preparedness for Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) events.
• Delivered exercises through APHA to test UK Government contingency plans and Outbreak Response Teams. This included exercises for a UK-wide foot and mouth disease outbreak, and separate exercises for the plant disease Xylella, strengthening national readiness, survey and sampling processes, and ensuring a coordinated response.
• In the next 12 months the Government’s ambitions include:
• Publish Exercise Pegasus findings through the post-exercise report in winter 2026, highlighting recommendations to be resolved in the short to medium term, supported by a robust lessons management process aligning with wider pandemic preparedness work.
• Continue to develop, participate in and observe domestic and international exercising on scenarios across a spectrum of biological risks. Including, for example, through NATO and other defensive partnerships.
• Deliver an exercise with counterterrorism policing and MOD to test and improve interoperability and coordination across government in response to a Chemical Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) incident, ensuring the UK can respond rapidly, effectively and with confidence.
• Deliver a Tier 2 CBRN Command Post Exercise to test the health system’s ability to manage an incident and mitigate the hazard.
• Create an exercise forward look tracker to allow the wider system to better plan, coordinate and deconflict exercises on priority biological security scenarios.
• Under the ISF, deliver new modelling based on biological hazards, incorporating new data inputs, updated scenarios and the current risk picture to the homeland to enhance response.

Exercise Pegasus

Exercise Pegasus was the largest Tier 1 exercise of a pandemic scenario in UK history. It involved multiple government departments, the devolved governments, arm’s-length bodies and local resilience fora, and also engaged with businesses, academics and external stakeholders. Across three ‘core’ exercise days, participants were challenged to respond across the key phases of a pandemic — emergence, containment and mitigation.

Exercise Pegasus was based on a novel enterovirus originating from a fictional island. Enteroviruses are a group of viruses that usually cause mild illnesses, but can lead to serious conditions such as meningitis or acute flaccid paralysis. The scenario was designed by a multi-disciplinary team including epidemiologists, behavioural scientists, public health experts and social researchers to ensure that it was as realistic as possible and incorporated lessons from the COVID-19 inquiry. Details of the disease and most other aspects of the scenario were kept strictly confidential by the design team prior to the exercise, to ensure that participants’ responses were comparable to what might have happened in a real-life pandemic crisis.

Whilst the exercise used a single disease to drive the scenario, it was designed so that findings and recommendations will be applicable across multiple diseases and modes of transmission.

PREVENT

Outcome 5 ~ The UK is a world leader in responsible innovation, shaping international norms and standards

We committed to the development of proportionate policy solutions to the risks associated with misuse of sensitive biodata and the implementation of the UK screening guidance on synthetic nucleic acids. Since then we have:

• Published guidance for major UK genomic data holders to strengthen safeguards around UK genomic data.
• Welcomed a second cohort of external experts to the Responsible Innovation Advisory Panel (RIAP), chaired by Lord Vallance. The RIAP will continue to be used to develop responsible innovation policy, inform horizon scanning, and promote a culture of safe innovation in the UK life sciences and biotech sector.
• Surveyed stakeholders to form an assessment on the uptake of the UK’s Screening Guidance on Synthetic Nucleic Acids for Users and Providers. The findings of this research, alongside feedback from engagement with stakeholders will inform updates to the UK approach and enable continued implementation.
• Supported the development of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Recommendation on Responsible Innovation in Synthetic Biology, including co-hosting a workshop to shape provisions on biosafety, biosecurity, societal participation, and agile governance.
• Announced a £45 million Value Chain Growth Fund to build UK sovereignty in engineering biology.
• Updated the UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) statement on research with potential misuse risk, setting out definitions, examples, and expectations for the people and organisations that UKRI fund.
• Published reports covering AI and biology, including the AI Security Institute (AISI) annual Frontier Trends Report in December 2025, which provided accessible, data-driven insights into the frontier of AI capabilities, and promoted a shared understanding among governments, industry, and the public.
• Held a UK-EU technical exchange on responsible innovation in engineering biology, to strengthen and align approaches to biological security, including on nucleic acid synthesis screening.

 In the next 12 months the Government’s ambitions include:

• Implement genomic data guidance and review its effectiveness to determine if it should be placed on a statutory footing.
• Determine if guidance for nucleic acid synthesis screening should be moved to a statutory footing and continue to work with international partners to share best practices on screening and align approaches where appropriate.
• Publish the second AISI Frontier Trends Report to further assess the capabilities of frontier AI models in biology. The report will help inform policy development regarding the risks associated with the convergence of AI and biology.
• Scope options to legislate to implement recommendations in the Biological Security Strategy, as soon as parliamentary time allows, including to proportionately mitigate dual-use risks from AI-enabled biological capabilities.
• Work with our domestic and international partners to promote best practice in responsible innovation to safely unlock the benefits of engineering biology.
• Work closely with experts and industry partners to understand advances in emerging technology, ensuring that we can harness the benefits and opportunities, while identifying and mitigating the risks. This includes near-term advances such as the convergence of AI and biology, as well as medium- and longer-term concepts such as mirror biology.
• Deliver a NATO Biotechnology Literacy project, providing scenario based training for non-specialist military and policy personnel, to build a shared baseline of biotechnology understanding across the alliance.
• Conduct outreach with secondary school students in collaboration with the British Science Association, giving students a chance to conduct hands-on research projects, to build early public awareness and trust in engineering biology.

Outcome 6 ~ Prevent state and non-state actors from developing, producing, acquiring, transferring, stockpiling and using biological weapons

We committed to continued leadership of international efforts to counter the proliferation of biological weapons and material; and work to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Since then we have:

• Invested over £5 million into threat-reduction projects in 52 countries across 5 continents through the UK International Biological Security Programme (IBSP) and Counter Proliferation Fund. This included:
  • One Health threat reduction projects to minimise the risk of a biological threat emerging from malicious actors.
  • Workshops on universalisation and implementation of the BTWC across Asia, Europe and Africa.
• Made progress on negotiations with States Parties to the BTWC on proposals to strengthen the Convention to improve its ability to address modern scientific advances. The UK presented a non-paper on Scientific and Technological Advances in the Life Sciences since 1975: How the Last 50 Years Will Shape the BTWC S&T Advisory Mechanism to underscore the case for reform. Whilst areas of contention remain, there is provisional agreement on the majority of the proposals.
• Played a leading role in driving international efforts to counter the proliferation of biological weapons and materials. This includes:
  • Funding the UN Secretary General’s Mechanism for the Investigation of the Alleged Use of Biological and Chemical Weapons (UNSGM).
  • Proposing and establishing a G7 working group to focus on bioweapons related risks to address modern threats, advances in technology and practical steps to reinforce the international ban.
  • Presenting papers to the Australia Group Export Control Regime on AI risks and biosurveillance, to shape collective understanding of how emerging technologies impact the group’s control framework and ensure it adapts to evolving biological threats, while maintaining the effectiveness of its core export control regime.
• In collaboration with Sweden, France, Germany, and The Netherlands, used cutting-edge detection capabilities to identify and confidently state that Alexei Navalny was poisoned by the Russian Federation with a lethal toxin, epibatidine. This conclusion was based on analyses of biological samples from Alexei Navalny. We have presented the findings of Russia’s repeated violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention and, in this instance, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to both those treaty bodies.

In the next 12 months the Government’s ambitions include:

• Work with partners to strengthen international accountability and counter proliferation mechanisms, funding projects in support of these aims through the International Biological Security Programme and Counter-Proliferation Fund, to strengthen the implementation of the BTWC and UNSCR 1540.
• Support efforts that align international counterproliferation activity with the evolving threat landscape, including engagement through the Australia Group to strengthen controls on biological materials, such as additional export controls on potential toxins, equipment and technologies.
• Bolster the UNSGM by funding technical training for experts and increasing the number of countries contributing to the UNSGM roster, via outreach to under-represented regions.
• Strengthen the BTWC through funding of projects widening BTWC participation. Projects will focus on increasing the number and quality of Confidence Building Measures submitted by States Parties, Convention universalisation efforts, implementation of counter-proliferation activities and upskilling of National Contact Points. Ahead of the 2027 Review Conference, we will continue our international engagement with States Parties through Working Groups and wider multilateral environments to be proactive partners on measures to strengthen the BTWC.
• Reduce the risk of non-state acquisition and use of hazardous materials by reviewing the availability of plant precursors of lethal toxins. We will consider the feasibility, impact and proportionality of regulation in line with the recommendations of the Southport Inquiry’s Phase 1 Report, and the Government’s wider commitment to reducing access to hazardous materials and strengthening protective security.
• Utilise ISF funding to deliver a red-teaming project which will inform ongoing Home Office work to enhance the safety and security of pathogens and toxins.

Outcome 7 ~ Reduce the spread of infectious diseases, pests and invasive species, including drug-resistant infections, in the UK and overseas

We committed to enhance our ability to prevent, detect and rapidly respond to invasive non-native species, and strengthen our One Health approach to biological security. Since then we have:

• Published the Pandemic Preparedness Strategy on 25 March 2026 which outlines our ambition for pandemic preparedness to 2030 — backed by around £1 billion of investment in health protection measures including enhancing our access to essential vaccines and therapeutics, improving our pandemic surveillance systems and expanding our ability to roll out testing to the whole population.
• Built on the delivery of commitments made in response to Module 1 of the COVID-19 inquiry and published the response to Module 2. This includes commitments to enhance data capabilities for response, a greater role for the Cabinet Office in whole-of-system emergencies, and regular exercises for pandemic preparedness.
• Formally confirmed the eradication of the Colorado beetle, a major potato pest, in December 2025, and continued to take action to prevent the yellow-legged hornet widely establishing in the UK. This success followed extensive operational investigative work, surveillance, and cooperation with the wider public.
• Delivered the Defra Barcoding for Biosecurity project, including method development for DNA barcoding; knowledge exchange with international partners; and piloting environmental monitoring for border biosecurity, such as the deployment of environmental sampling (including air sampling) within Border Control Posts to identify previously unknown or unsuspected plant health risks.
• Developed and published a Statement of Intent to address concerns around the availability of veterinary vaccines in the UK and support the Life Sciences sector to stimulate innovation to develop new veterinary vaccines.
• Established a Public Health Water Taskforce in February 2026, through a Defra commission to the Chief Medical Officer for England, following the Independent Water Commission recommendations. The Taskforce brings together senior technical experts to provide independent advice to the Government on the public health risks associated with drinking and recreational water, including from pathogen-related infections, antimicrobial resistance (AMR), and chemical exposure. Minutes and Terms of Reference are published on gov.uk.

We committed to further our understanding of AMR trends and population differences through implementation of commitments in the second AMR National Action Plan. Since then we have:

• Strengthened understanding of AMR trends in humans through the development of modelling methods to gain deeper insight from national data, identifying populations generating the greatest health and economic burden, projecting drug resistant infection numbers to 2029 under different scenarios and understanding factors driving the trends.
• Published a series of key documents, including the English surveillance programme for antimicrobial utilisation and resistance report.

In the next 12 months the Government’s ambitions include:

• Implement commitments in the AMR National Action Plan to strengthen AMR surveillance across animal, environmental and human health to support identification of AMR transmission risk.
• Work to reduce the risk of Avian Influenza to UK poultry farms, through launching a new ISF-funded proactive vet-led farm review scheme, aimed at strengthening disease prevention through providing site-specific recommendations for farmers to reduce the risk.
• Strengthen the UK and partner countries’ ability to prevent the spread of AMR threats, through the ISF-funded Bio-resistance Intelligence and Data Generation (BRIDGe) project. The project will build One Health biosurveillance systems and partnerships internationally, including strengthening regulatory guidance and standards, improving data quality, early warning and coordinated responses to emerging AMR risks that could impact UK health and biological security.
• Progress the 2030 commitments in the 2026 Pandemic Preparedness Strategy, including:
  • Investment to help ensure access to clinical countermeasures, including vaccines and therapeutics, through maintaining stockpiles of existing products at target volumes.
  • Investment in the underpinning scientific research and innovation to rapidly evaluate existing countermeasures and to develop novel products when needed; capitalising on the potential opportunities presented by AI to rapidly identify therapeutics for novel pathogens.
  • Refining plans for mobilising and distributing PPE from national stockpiles and emergency procurements in a pandemic.
  • Replenishing stockpiles and secure contractual arrangements for the supply of PPE and hygiene consumables in a pandemic.

Outcome 8 ~ A UK border which maintains biological security and creates prosperity

We committed to introduce new Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures at the border to protect animal and plant health, using a risk-based approach to control biological threats. Since then we have:

• Advanced UK-EU negotiations on the SPS agreement, including a Call for Information to identify business support requirements, launching an 18-month business readiness campaign, and a programme of secondary legislation to support the EU Partnership Bill.
• Worked in partnership across the UK Government and devolved governments to swiftly implement trade restrictions in response to disease outbreaks in countries that we trade with, ensuring consistent enforcement against emerging border threats.
• Established a multi-departmental governance mechanism for border health security, bringing together key departments to facilitate a national security and One Health approach to biological security at the border.

In the next 12 months the Government’s ambitions include:

• Progress UK-EU negotiations on and implementation of the SPS agreement, ensuring that biological security considerations at the border are protected, including via access to EU systems, databases and decision shaping frameworks.
• Scope a public information campaign to protect humans, animals, plants, and the environment from biological threats entering the UK at the border. This will generate a consistent and joined up message to help everyone adhere to the rules, protect public health and prevent the illegal import of animals and meat.
• Through ISF funding, pilot the metagenomic surveillance of imported meat ingredients destined for raw pet food at the UK border to understand its risk to the UK. The project outputs will assess the feasibility and value of this approach and provide evidence to inform future policy development and potential improvements to biosurveillance in this area.
• Utilise the Border Health Working Group to coordinate cross government action on priority border biosecurity issues, including data sharing, biosurveillance, zoonotic disease control, preparedness and SPS-related biosecurity measures.

UK International Biological Security Programme

The International Biological Security Programme (IBSP) aims to minimise the risk of states or terrorists acquiring or developing biological weapons. As a key delivery mechanism of the PREVENT pillar, it works flexibly to deliver against broader UK priorities for both biological and chemical non-proliferation.

The IBSP has funded over 40 projects in the past five years to deliver meaningful interventions across multiple areas of biological security. Key examples of recent work delivered by the IBSP include:

• Strengthening Global Architecture: In 2026, the multi-year project Supporting Universalisation and Effective Implementation of the BTWC in Africa, delivered with Canada, the US, and Italy, was completed. It successfully led to three new States Parties joining the Convention and provided legislative assistance to 18 States, closing gaps where biological weapons could be developed and enhancing international trust.
• Equipping Frontline Responders: To enhance global deterrence, the IBSP co‑funded a multi-year INTERPOL project alongside Canada titled Global Biosecurity Enhancement for Law Enforcement. This programme delivers specialist workshops to enhance the capabilities of national law enforcement and partner agencies to prevent, prepare for, and respond to biological incidents and bioterrorism.
• Countering Biotoxin Threats: The Biotoxins Analysis project, now in its final phase, seeks to improve the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons’ (OPCW) capability to respond to biotoxin threats and strengthen its collaboration with the UN Secretary General’s Mechanism (UNSGM). The project has yielded excellent results, including an OPCW recommendation to establish a designated laboratory network for biotoxins.

The UK will maintain its high-value partnerships with allies to drive efficient, burden‑shared threat reduction and sustain the IBSP’s global impact.

DETECT

Outcome 9 ~ A National Biosurveillance Network engendering a One Health approach

We committed to operationalise the foundational capabilities of the National Biosurveillance Network and enhance our existing biosurveillance systems and transition capabilities like wastewater monitoring into operational functions. Since then we have:

• Launched the National Biosurveillance Network (NBN) Knowledge Hub, successfully delivering technical webinars to over 570 experts across 43 UK Government departments and devolved governments. Serving as a central resource to share insights and best practices, this new platform fosters a cross-government One Health community to enhance our collective capacity to manage biological threats.
• Built the NBN Meta Data catalogue and brokerage service which will facilitate sharing of biosurveillance information across government, removing barriers and supporting the development of expertise.
• Delivered a new scalable end-to-end system for sample collection and analysis of wastewater across 31 sites. This UKHSA-led and ISF-funded work supported targeted testing against 12 priority pathogens.
• Embedded AI-enabled Biological Tools into biosurveillance pipelines. For example, UKHSA set up a range of tooling to examine tuberculosis drug resistance and to predict the risk of avian influenza strains jumping from bird to human hosts. This capability will be expanded as work on environmental surveillance develops.

We committed to roll out the Respiratory Metagenomics Project from 10 to up to 30 NHS Trusts. Since then we have:

• Scaled up the active network of 18 NHS sites establishing respiratory metagenomics services and provided a platform for rapid iteration and improvement, including increased sensitivity in viral detection, shorter turnaround times and standardising clinical reporting approaches across adult and paediatric services. We achieved an average time to diagnosis of seven hours through this project (significantly faster than the two to three days taken for standard tests), enabling faster pathogen detection and effective care for patients with severe respiratory illnesses.
• Operationalised and scaled the Metagenomics Surveillance Collaboration and Analysis Programme (mSCAPE) and developed the digital solutions for real-time data sharing from the NHS to UKHSA and metagenomic data processing at scale. Data is being received from eight large NHS hospital sites (and growing), feeding into a central data platform to monitor trends at the national level. To date, the platform has processed over 6000 samples, including almost 3000 directly from the NHS. This was successfully piloted over winter, detecting microbes suspected of causing disease in over 90% of the approximately 900 samples received between October 2025 and March 2026.

We committed to deliver year one of the National Food Surveillance Programme and increase the scope and utility of biosurveillance data via enhancement of the Pathogen Surveillance in Agriculture, Food and the Environment (PATH-SAFE) genomic data platform. Since then we have:

• Delivered year one of the Food Surveillance Programme, strengthening national biosurveillance capability and partnerships. Achievements include:
  • Progressing the Genomic Data Sharing Platform towards operational readiness, improving cross-government data sharing and coordination; advancing machine learning models that identify E. coli sources, with potential applications in future outbreak investigations.
  • Demonstrated a “One Sample, Many Analyses” approach to identifying E. coli in river water which illustrated the feasibility and benefits of integrated, cross-government environmental monitoring.
  • Mapped the key regulatory and cultural barriers to deploying novel and existing onsite diagnostics in food safety, building a strong evidence base to inform improvements in Salmonella detection.

In the next 12 months the Government’s ambitions include:

• Finalise the expansion of the metagenomics programme to 30 active NHS sites and ensure continuous scientific improvements to support efficiencies such that up to 20 mature sites are operating year round respiratory metagenomics services.
• Maximise the utility and benefits of the NHS and UKHSA establishing a metagenomics infrastructure, including further developing the national surveillance analysis platform mSCAPE to monitor trends and detect pathogens early.
• Deliver new priority Food Surveillance Programme (FSP) projects across the areas of sampling, methods, tools, and infrastructure and progress next phases of existing initiatives and innovations towards deployment in the biosurveillance system.
• Pilot an integrated environmental biosurveillance capability, expanding wastewater surveillance across municipal, transport, and hospital settings and supporting defence programmes, alongside the implementation of airborne sampling in high-footfall environments to generate and interpret population level signals.

Outcome 10 ~ Enhanced capability to rapidly roll out diagnostics for population use in response to new or existing biological threats

We committed to improve resilience through a dedicated project to assess onshoring UK manufacture of point-of-care tests. Since then we have:

• Identified key onshore manufacturers for point-of-care tests (POCT) that could supply the UK demand in the event of an outbreak. We have removed a significant pinchpoint in large scale PCR testing pathways for UKHSA, NHS and devolved governments through assessment of an existing self-use sample collection kit that inactivates samples at point of collection.
• Established the Amplify facility, a rapidly scalable PCR testing laboratory which, once fully commissioned and aligned to inactivating sample collection kits, will have the capacity to process 13,000 samples in eight hours.

In the next 12 months the Government’s ambitions include:

• Engage UK industry to scale up testing solutions and to produce multiplex lateral flow diagnostics for routine use, along with pilot studies to develop new tests for priority pathogens.
• Build capacity for diagnostics, utilising evidence from the recent vaccine, therapeutics and diagnostics framework analysis. This analysis explored capability of manufacturing in emergency response, including the role of oligonucleotide manufacturing for PCR reagents.
• Support the development of point-of-care tests, driving the next generation of lateral flow test devices and utilise alternative sample collection methods, reducing variability of results from human interpretation and improving outbreak response. The ISF-funded project will cohere key stakeholders to develop use cases and a series of target product profiles, for domestic manufacturers to produce pilot products against. The project team will then assess efficacy of products against target profiles, which will inform long-term procurement decisions.

Outcome 11 ~ A strengthened national microbial forensics capability

We committed to increase international collaboration on microbial forensics and to develop a standard operating procedure. Since then we have:

• Launched a microbial forensics innovation competition and commissioned £1.5 million of cutting-edge research. Alongside other work, this has generated new approaches for rapidly identifying anomalies in genome sequencing data and has improved our ability to identify whether an organism has been laboratory grown.
• Held the second annual event of the UK Microbial Forensics Consortium (UKMFC), with over 150 delegates from six different countries, including government, academic and industry partners. The event included sharing lessons learnt from two major international investigations: the Russian use of chemical weapons in Salisbury in 2018 and the Amerithrax biological attacks in the USA in 2001.
• Deployed the first microbial forensics tool across all organisations in the UKMFC laboratory network, representing the backbone of the analysis pipeline and the first set of shared working practices in microbial forensics.
• Created a draft guidance document to outline standard operating procedures across the UKMFC laboratory network, including advice on the alert process, maintaining forensic integrity of exhibits, and chain of custody.
• Completed the first “baselining” in silico^{[footnote 4]} exercise for the detection of genetic engineering, working closely with international partners from the Public Health Agency of Canada.

In the next 12 months the Government’s ambitions include:

• Conduct a UKMFC tabletop exercise considering the response required during an event involving the deliberate release of a biological hazard, to contribute to government policy.
• Undertake testing and evaluation to assess the performance of UKMFC’s new analytical tools (i.e. utilising AI); help shape the planning of a doctoral training programme (DTP) in biosecurity; and undertake a detailed requirements capture for UKMFC to enable initial operating capability (IOC) to be declared in 2027.

The UK’s strategic approach to biosurveillance

The strategic need

Biosurveillance is the systematic collection, analysis, and interpretation of data to detect and monitor biological threats and hazards. It is direct detection of a disease through the application of a specific test. It is also detection or monitoring of a pathogen through environmental sampling; not directly from a person, animal or plant, but rather from what they have emitted. And it is also detection of an outbreak through non-traditional epidemiological data, such as open source intelligence.

Biosurveillance is thus crucial and broad. It spans the One Health system and it spans the response cycle. It provides an early warning that an outbreak is beginning, to support a departmental response, and then must be able to scale up if that outbreak expands as described in the Pandemic Preparedness Strategy.

We must therefore have a biosurveillance system which enables us to respond most effectively. The data that biosurveillance produces informs decision making: if we detect an outbreak earlier we can respond earlier; if we have better information about a pathogen we can respond more effectively. And that matters for our public health, for our national security, and for our economic security.

As set out in the 2023 Biological Security Strategy, the UK has a comprehensive and well-tested system in place for biosurveillance. From front-line clinicians notifying of disease, to citizen scientists providing reports of invasive species, there are a range of capabilities which can be used to inform decision making. Our approach must be to build on this system, creating a layered approach to the detection of threats and hazards.

The UK has unique strengths in this area and we must build on these. A centralised healthcare system provides opportunities for deep collaboration between clinicians and public health officials, for example with respiratory metagenomics. Our world-leading science and research base demonstrates particular prowess in areas such as genomics, bioinformatics and modelling. Government has invested to build on these strengths, including announcing over £1 billion investment for a new National Biosecurity Centre in APHA Weybridge, alongside UKHSA Harlow and Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) Porton Down in a Network of National Biosecurity Centres. These strengths act as a powerful deterrent to malicious threats.

But the risk landscape is changing. Climate change means that the boundaries between human and animal infections are increasingly blurry and new risks are now migrating to our shores. The world is increasingly connected and geopolitically volatile, enabling disease to spread more easily. And malicious actors remain interested in acquiring harmful biological materials, which may be aided with advancements in technology. We must do more to enhance our ability to detect the materialisation of these risks.

This section will focus on acute detection. That is, the ability to detect a pathogen and to feed that information into decision making as quickly as possible. But it is important to note that our biosurveillance must also support monitoring of trends of chronic risks, such as antimicrobial resistance, or changes in the trajectories of endemic disease.

Innovation

Just as the risk landscape is changing, so too is the opportunity space.

Next Generation Sequencing technologies have dramatically increased the speed and sophistication of pathogen genomics, letting us know the precise genetic material of the microorganisms that cause diseases. It also enables us to better inform countermeasure decisions; if you know more about what you are up against then you can take more effective action to mitigate the threat. Metagenomic surveillance – looking at all of the genetic information in a sample, not just the pathogen you know you care about – has the benefit of being pathogen agnostic. This may allow the detection of novel (or engineered) pathogens.

The development of AI science tools will also have an extraordinary impact. Mission One of the AI for Science Strategy is about the utilisation of AI to support drug discovery. Similar utilisation is already underway in the bioinformatics underpinning areas of biosurveillance. For example, Dstl commissioned a microbial forensic themed innovation challenge to advance the tools available to detect engineered organisms. Suppliers in academia and industry from across the UK have been funded to develop novel AI solutions to support the mission of the UK Microbial Forensics Consortium.

But historically the Government has been too often risk-averse when considering deployment of new technologies. And we must take advantage of these opportunities in order to counter the changing risk. For example, the PATH-SAFE programme developed a concept called ‘deployment readiness levels’ to complement ‘technology readiness levels’. They assess not only how mature a technology is, but how prepared it is to be deployed as part of an operational system. Similarly, MOD have developed ‘system readiness levels’ to assess and communicate system maturity. These can both be used by industry and academia to prove the utility of their technology, and by the Government to onboard them.

In order to strengthen early detection of a spectrum of threats, we must:

• Review current capabilities and scenarios of concerns to understand where new technologies may add to our biosurveillance system. We will then embrace new operational technologies which can do so and make their deployment easier. We will create a pipeline of innovation with a genuine path to deployment.
• Focus new effort on pathogen-agnostic capabilities and build the most comprehensive and secure pathogen data sets in the world. We will play to UK strengths in continuing to roll out pathogen genomics programmes, leveraging the NHS and UK research base through clinical sampling and a secure environment for sharing of data. But, recognising that diseases do not respect borders, biosurveillance is an international endeavour and we will also work with our international partners. And we will build on the work of the Genomics for Animal and Plant Disease Consortium.
• Make more use of AI Science Tools and frontier AI models to bolster our biosurveillance system.

Case study: Biosecurity Frontiers competition

The Cabinet Office launched an innovation competition with UK Defence Innovation. The competition solicited bids from academia and industry clustered around three challenges:

• Next generation biodetection and biosurveillance
• AI and diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines
• Non-pharmeceutical protective systems

Within the first challenge, we sought ideas including: new environmental surveillance technologies which could be deployed in-field; computational tools which can aid the detection of pathogens, both natural and unnatural; cutting-edge sequencing technologies; and air surveillance systems at high-footfall locations to detect biological agents.

The aim of the competition is to catalyse innovation between UK Government departments, agencies, academia and industry. It will support successful bidders to develop their technologies and move them towards deployment. Alongside other programmes and initiatives, we hope to build a pipeline of innovation which can be exploited as functional capabilities.

The roles of departments across the One Health system

Different departments across government have a particular responsibility within our biosurveillance system.

But each of these departments and agencies need to work together if our biosurveillance system is to be as robust as is needed. The UK seeks One Health outcomes — acknowledging that it is only through collaborative and sustained effort across domains that optimal outcomes will be achieved. The Dstl-led UK Microbial Forensics Consortium is an excellent example of breaking down governmental silos.

One Health Approach to biosurveillance

Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, Including:

• Animal and Plant Health Agency
• Environment Agency
• Veterinary Medicines Directorate
• Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science

Ministry of Defence, Including:

• Defence Science and Technology Laboratory

Home Office

Department of Health & Social Care, Including:

• United Kingdom Health Security Agency
• Food Standards Agency

It is not just the Government who has a role to play. As discussed above, industry and academia are key to the functioning of the system. For example, the UKHSA-led mSCAPE programme is a collaborative initiative involving a consortium including the University of Birmingham, University of Edinburgh, and the NHS.

We must:

• Operate UK capabilities, not merely departmental. We will utilise expertise and capacity from one department or agency to support another, for example through the integration of sampling technologies, logistics, or sequencing. We will work with industry and academia to build and operate these capabilities.

Case study: wastewater surveillance

Wastewater surveillance is a population-level method for detecting infectious disease signals from sewage. It can provide earlier, cheaper and less biased information than clinical sampling alone. It is one of several new capabilities which may be considered. Another example may be genomics used to monitor risks from people and goods entering the UK.

UKHSA successfully used wastewater surveillance during the COVID-19 pandemic. The technique has also been in routine use since 2014 for poliovirus monitoring. More recently, UKHSA was funded by the Integrated Security Fund to evaluate how wastewater monitoring and broader environmental surveillance can be used to detect a wider range of pathogens.

But environmental surveillance is also useful for other departments and agencies. Just as it can provide population-level data for the public health system, a sample could show the presence of illicit or malicious chemicals, or provide force-level disease information for the defence system.

If subjected to metagenomic analysis, the same sequencing equipment and bioinformatics may be used regardless of whether the sample came from human wastewater or agricultural wash-off in rivers. And it may be able to identify maliciously released pathogens as well as those which come from nature.

The Environment Agency collects and analyses many environmental samples and the wide set of reforms underway may mean that the next generation of evidence gathering capabilities can be of direct or indirect benefit to biosurveillance.

The importance of data sharing

Data sharing is a key aspect of collaboration, as is data quality. Government must ensure that each department has access to the data that they need to perform their function. If one department has information which can support the biosurveillance or response of another, it must be shared quickly and securely. That is what will lead to the most effective action being taken and that is what the public expect.

The metadata catalogue of the National Biosurveillance Network enables departments and agencies to understand what is collected, and its data brokerage enables the streamlined sharing of the underlying data. The strategic information from biosurveillance capabilities will be displayed on the Biothreats Radar, making their outputs visible across the system and allowing signals detected in one domain to enhance the monitoring of another.

We must:

• Share data by default. We will build on the National Biosurveillance Network to ensure that the right level of data is shared with teams which need to see it, and that inability to share is limited only to good reason (such as obligations under UK GDPR).

RESPOND

Outcome 12 ~ A coordinated international response to a natural outbreak, accidental release or deliberate attack affecting humans, animals, plants and the environment

We committed to play a leading role in the WHO’s Pandemic Agreement and to constructive engagement in the Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing System (PABS) discussions. Since then, we have:

• Co-chaired the Intergovernmental Working Group (IGWG) on the Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing (PABS) Annex to the WHO Member State Pandemic Agreement, advocating for an effective, implementable, and equitable system that protects global and domestic health.
• Co-hosted the Global Fund’s Eighth Replenishment with South Africa — the UK’s £850 million commitment (2026-2028) is expected to save up to 1.3 million lives and avert up to 22 million new cases or infections of HIV, TB and malaria. The UK committed £1.25 billion (2026-2030) to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, which will save up to 8 million lives.
• Supported the establishment of a Joint Task Force on reform of the global health architecture at the World Health Assembly (WHA) in May 2026.
• Shaped the development of the G7 Financing for Development Framework for Promoting Health Sovereignty Financing and Self-Reliance, which includes UK-championed actions on surge financing for medical countermeasures.
• Advocated for the 100 Days Mission — which published its Fifth Implementation Report in January 2026 — and continued to invest in global diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines development and infrastructure, working closely with the UK’s life sciences industry and academia.
• Provided funding from the £5 million IBSP portfolio to the following critical initiatives:
  • Numerous international projects to enhance disease surveillance and diagnostics, specifically focusing on pathogen resilience in African countries where risk or need was identified.
  • The Africa Phytosanitary Programme (APP), the first continent-wide initiative to combat the threat of natural and deliberate introduction of diseases and pests. The APP aims to improve all African countries’ response and resilience to such threats.
  • Phase II of the Health Security Partnership for Africa (HSPA), alongside Canada’s Weapons Threat Reduction Program. This will significantly expand African biosurveillance capabilities to improve the continent’s ability to prevent, detect, and respond to natural and deliberate outbreaks.
• In collaboration with international partners, the UK responded to outbreaks of hantavirus and Ebola virus (Bundibugyo strain):
  • Following an outbreak of Andes hantavirus linked to the cruise ship MV Hondius in April 2026, UKHSA led a coordinated response with FCDO, DHSC, the NHS, MOD, and devolved governments. This included deploying a mobile laboratory to Saint Helena, implementing contact tracing and isolation in line with WHO guidance, and a first of its kind military medical parachute drop into Tristan da Cunha to deliver critical medical support and supplies.
  • FCDO is supporting an Africa-led response to the Ebola outbreak in Democratic Republic of the Congo — designated a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) by WHO — with subsequent cases detected in Uganda. FCDO is providing additional funding, technical assistance and partnerships with WHO, Africa CDC and others to strengthen disease surveillance, isolation and case management, infection prevention and control, and community engagement. In June 2026, the UK also committed up to £5 million to fund research and development for new treatments and rapid diagnostics targeting the Bundibugyo strain of the Ebola virus.
  • Led a coordinated international response to expose Russia’s use of the lethal toxin, epibatidine, to poison Alexei Navalny in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Along with Sweden, France, Germany, and The Netherlands, we have taken steps at the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and other relevant bodies, to call out this violation, and other Russian breaches of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

In the next 12 months the Government’s ambitions include:

• Engage in follow-up work related to the WHO Pandemic Agreement, including on-going negotiations on PABS.
• Champion ambitious action on global health security and pandemic prevention, preparedness and response (PPPR) through international fora, including the UN High-Level Meeting on PPPR in September 2026.
• Collaborate with and support partners internationally via the IBSP to improve coordinated responses to biological threats, however they occur.
• Participate in coordinated international responses to infectious disease outbreaks when necessary, through sharing UK technical expertise and providing relevant support.

Outcome 13 ~ A comprehensive set of tested response plans which are ready to guide UK responses to a spectrum of biological threats

We committed to the delivery of the UK’s largest Tier 1 national pandemic exercise; publication of a new pandemic preparedness strategy; completion of a UK-wide Respiratory Pandemic Response Plan for health and adult social care. Since then, we have:

• Tested a Respiratory Response Plan for health and social care through Exercise Pegasus.
• Exercised UK Government contingency plans for a UK-wide foot and mouth disease outbreak, strengthening national readiness and ensuring a coordinated response.
• Strengthened response to non‑native invasive species threats through rapid detection and coordinated action, as demonstrated by the eradication of the Colorado beetle in 2025 and the continued prevention of yellow-legged hornet establishment through public reporting and operational response.

In the next 12 months the Government’s ambitions include:

• Embed and start implementing lessons identified by Exercise Pegasus to improve pandemic preparedness and response.
• Deliver short-term commitments in the Pandemic Preparedness Strategy, including adapting the respiratory pandemic response plan for health and adult social care to articulate the different response mechanisms for non-respiratory pathogens, and preparing a draft ‘All Pandemic Hazards Bill’ that can be used in response to all pandemic pathogens.
• Systematically update and align response plans across sectors as necessary to have ready made response plans for the five main routes of transmission, and to review departmental plans to maintain government services and critical national infrastructure.
• Deliver an evidence-based assessment of Local Resilience Forum capability requirements for pandemic response, funded by the ISF.

Outcome 14 ~ Capability to scale up discovery and development of therapeutics and vaccines underpinned by targeted R&D programmes across the range of biological threats

We committed to consider further developments and updates to the Priority Pathogen Family R&D tool; and continuing to invest in UK life sciences manufacturing and epidemic and pandemic prevention, preparedness and response R&D. Since then we have:

• Furthered the UK’s contribution to progressing the 100 Days Mission goal to speed up access to safe and effective diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines in a future public health emergency, including:
  • £606 million investment annually via the National Institute for Health and Care Research (NIHR) to sustain the UK’s robust research infrastructure, including in specialist facilities, expert knowledge and skilled delivery teams.
  • Committed £80 million to recommission NIHR’s Health Protection Research Units (HPRUs), which cover infectious diseases, emergency preparedness and cross-cutting areas.
  • Advanced the Moderna-UK Strategic Partnership to enhance pandemic preparedness and health resilience, including the opening of the Moderna Innovation and Technology Centre (MITC), an mRNA manufacturing and clinical laboratory facility, in September 2025 at Harwell, Oxfordshire.
  • Published the Life Sciences Sector Plan, to support the repair and transformation of both the nation’s economy as part of the Industrial Strategy, and the nation’s health in alignment with the commitments set out in the 10 Year Health Plan.
• Made continued progress on transforming the National Biosecurity Centre at Weybridge, including new laboratories and resilient site-wide infrastructure, strengthening the UK’s ability to respond to the full spectrum of biological threats, particularly those posed by animal and zoonotic diseases.
• Published the cross-government health and care research and development (R&D) framework and governance structure for pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response in July 2025.

In the next 12 months the Government’s ambitions include:

• Utilise and update understanding of UK capabilities, and embed this into policy development and decision making for the incentivisation of domestic manufacturing capacity and capability for diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines. Outline a plan for how the Government can address priority capability gaps, and improve wider UK biological security and resilience.
• Deliver on the Moderna-UK Strategic Partnership, to bolster our preparedness and health resilience for future biological threats.
• Drive forward continued UK implementation of the 100 Days Mission and seek to sustain global commitments.
• Embed the health and care R&D framework by aligning commissioning and funding decisions to pandemic preparedness priorities, improving cross-government coordination for research during incidents, and strengthening the system’s ability to rapidly activate and deliver studies in response to emerging threats.
• Lead the delivery of two Collaborative Open Research Consortia on behalf of the World Health Organization, facilitating research and development pipelines for five priority pathogen families.
• Build on the commitments in the Pandemic Preparedness Strategy which signal HMG’s intention to work closely with the life sciences sector, specifically on the development and manufacture of clinical countermeasures, recognising that the sector is vital for a successful exit strategy from an emergency.

Outcome 15 ~ The ability to efficiently remediate a scene or area within the UK as soon as possible that has been contaminated by hazardous biological material in a small or medium-scale incident.

We committed to develop and maintain the capabilities required to safely and efficiently remediate affected sites and environments following a biological incident. Since then we have:

• Demonstrated an initial operating capability for remediating small-/medium-sized biological incidents.
• Tested the ability of the National Technical Advisory Group for Recovery (NTAG-R) to work collaboratively alongside framework providers effectively demonstrating operational delivery.
• Tested robotic systems to detect, sample and remediate contaminated environments; enhancing the UK’s capability to safely and efficiently remediate affected sites following biological incidents.

In the next 12 months the Government’s ambitions include:

• Via the NTAG-R, continue to exercise and test innovations to remove operators from hazardous areas and assure effectiveness of existing remediation technologies.
• Continue to ensure interoperability with framework providers via a comprehensive programme of joint exercising. This will ensure that up-to-date knowledge and skills transfer directly from science and technology spaces into operational practice.
• Under a Cabinet Office and UK Defence Innovation initiative, scope the potential to collaborate with UK innovators to develop novel non-pharmaceutical protective systems which may be applicable to remediation processes.

Case study: Moderna UK strategic partnership: the Moderna Innovation and Technology Centre (MITC)

Opened in September 2025, the Moderna Innovation and Technology Centre (MITC) in Oxfordshire is a national strategic mRNA research asset bolstering the UK’s biological security response capabilities and leadership.

A success story grounded in partnership

Based at the Harwell Science and Innovation Campus, the MITC is one of the integral facets of the wider 10-Year Strategic Partnership between Moderna and HMG which encompasses pre-clinical and clinical research and partnerships with UK academics and researchers on science and technology. Recognising the need for closer collaboration between government and industry, the commitments to delivery of the MITC and wider partnership features in both the UK Biological Security Strategy and Pandemic Preparedness Strategy, and contributes towards our preparedness for biological threats.

The MITC brings together mRNA research, clinical development and manufacturing in a single UK-based hub. It enables streamlined transition from pathogen identification to vaccine manufacture, strengthens onshore access to mRNA technology and reduces reliance on global supply chains. In a pandemic scenario, the MITC is set up to rapidly develop mRNA vaccines for new pathogens or variants, and scale manufacturing to support national and global response efforts.

Moderna has collaborated with the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) to implement a new trial using an investigational mRNA vaccine against potential influenza A (H5N1) (also known as ‘bird flu’) as part of pandemic preparedness research. This large-scale, phase 3 trial was initiated in April 2026 and will involve around 4,000 adult volunteers aged 18 and over in the UK and USA, with 75% of participants recruited in the UK across 26 sites. This will help the UK prepare for future pandemics and apply system-wide learnings from COVID-19, strengthening wider system capacity in line with the 100 Days Mission.

Material number: UK-MRNA-2600047

Date of preparation: June 2026

CROSS-CUTTING STRATEGIC ENABLERS

Strategic Enabler 1 ~ Formalised UK leadership, governance and accountability for biological security, to strengthen collective decision making and improve preparedness and response for incidents affecting the UK

We committed to our UK-wide approach to biological security with a regular pattern of engagement with the devolved governments and annually updating the BSS Impact Monitoring Framework. Since then we have:

• Convened senior governance and advisory forums, connecting work across Pillars, including:
  • Quarterly Director General chaired meetings to drive forward priorities set out in the BSS across departments.
  • Quarterly Chief Scientific CBR Security Subgroups, to provide expert advice and challenge on policy development.
  • Quarterly meetings with the devolved governments to continue our four nations approach to biological security.
  • Frequent Ministerial briefings and meetings across departments on biological threats and the Government’s efforts to counter them.
• Maintained biannual reporting across government, feeding into a centralised monitoring database. This ensured that a mitigation plan for cross-cutting risks was discussed at quarterly Director General chaired meetings.

In the next 12 months the Government’s ambitions include:

• Sustain a campaign of implementation meetings with Ministers, devolved governments, Chief Scientific Advisors and senior officials.
• Use the quarterly Director General meetings to ensure departmental priorities capture mitigating the risks, and capitalising on the benefits from rapid advancements in technology.

Strategic Enabler 2 ~ A world-class science base, resilient S&T capabilities against a spectrum of threats, and a thriving Health and Life Sciences sector, increasing trade and stimulating growth and investment across the UK

We committed to the establishment of a Network of National Biosecurity Centres, including the transformation of the Animal and Plant Agency Health Facility at Weybridge; and maintaining progress on designs of the new UKHSA National Biosecurity Centre in Harlow and at Dstl Porton Down. Since then we have:

• Remobilised UKHSA’s programme at pace, undertaking robust benchmarking of costs and delivery plans whilst working closely with partners to ensure that the Harlow facility delivers a viable design that is fit for the future and delivers value for public money. The Programme Business Case has been submitted for final approval, laying the necessary groundwork for the successful delivery of the Harlow facility.
• Progressed the National Biosecurity Centre Weybridge Science Hub to final design stages, appointed a main construction contractor, and began construction on interim facilities, including new laboratories and resilient site-wide infrastructure improvements.
• Announced investment of £580 million to build a new laboratory at Dstl Porton Down — to be named after Ernest Bevin, one of the major figures behind the founding of NATO — to enable new research into protection against biological threats to the UK and our NATO allies.
• Announced investment of £115 million to raise the UK’s defences against the threats from AI, including using AI to improve our biological security and mitigate risks posed by autonomous AI agents.
• Launched £2 million of funding via the Biosecurity Frontiers Innovation Competition in partnership with UK Defence Innovation, to catalyse innovation between UK Government departments and agencies and the UK’s world-leading academic and industry base.
• Published the Life Sciences Sector Plan, supported by over £2 billion in funding over this Spending Review period. The Plan sets out how the Government is building the engine needed to supercharge both Life Sciences and economic growth.

In the next 12 months the Government’s ambitions include:

• Develop a coordinated and strategic approach to industry and external engagement for biological security, facilitating greater collaboration between the Government and the UK’s world-leading health and life-sciences industry base, to confront the evolving risk landscape. This includes aligning HMG investments, developing new partnerships, and promoting and supporting UK innovators to solve some of the most pressing biological security issues across: biodetection and biosurveillance; the development of diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines; and non-pharmaceutical protective systems.
• Progress towards the main construction stage of the new National Biosecurity Centre at Weybridge, securing the site’s longer-term resilience to manage a range of threats. Agree main collaboration and shared capability areas across the Network of National Biosecurity Centres, fostering a coordinated approach to build peacetime capabilities and enhance national surge capacity.
• Advance the developments and refinements of site designs for the UK Health Security Campus in collaboration with delivery partners and UKHSA scientists to ensure the final site meets current and future requirements.
• Launch procurement of long-term delivery partners — including the main construction contractor — to initiate enabling construction works on the UKHSA Campus site.
• Progress efforts to secure, develop and retain the necessary skills and people across the Government to deliver the long-term objectives within the BSS.

Strategic Enabler 3 ~ International engagement and leadership to improve global health security and future pandemic prevention, preparedness and response, shape international biosafety and biosecurity norms, standards, practices and strengthen non-proliferation instruments and mechanisms

We committed to take forward the tangible steps identified for cooperation on biological security under the UK-Norway Strategic Partnership; and continue to provide thought leadership on the global stage. Since then we have:

• Engaged allies and like-minded partners, including discussions under the UK-Norway Strategic Partnership, and briefed counterparts across Europe, the Middle East, North America, Asia, NATO, the Five Eyes alliance and the G7. This includes topics such as the UK’s strategic approach to biological security and responsible innovation, pandemic preparedness and response, and our understanding of the threat landscape. Throughout, we are promoting a holistic One Health and national security approach with the international community.
• Signed the US-UK Technology Prosperity Partnership on 18 September 2025, including joint Flagship Research programs for AI-enabled science in joint priority areas, including collaborating on the development of models and datasets in mutual priorities such as AI for biotechnology and precision medicine including for cancer and rare and chronic diseases.
• Agreed the UK-Japan Frontier Technology Partnership, signed by the Prime Minister, including a commitment to counter and deter novel and emerging biological threats and to strengthen our shared commitment to non-proliferation. This builds on the strong existing UK-Japan public health partnership.
• Advanced UK-EU collaboration on health security and chemical and biological security through the 2025 UK-EU Summit Common Understanding commitments. This includes working with the EU to strengthen our preparedness and response capabilities to serious cross-border health threats, and exploring ways to enable improved information exchange and cooperation between the UK and EU on health security.
• Pushed forward market access opportunities potentially worth around £2.3 billion over five years to UK businesses through the Prime Minister’s visit to China in January 2026. This included the UK welcoming approval of innovative vaccines and medical device products from the UK for export to China and regional access for healthcare services opportunities in three Chinese provinces.

In the next 12 months the Government’s ambitions include:

• Promote the benefits of adopting a strategic, One Health and national security approach to biological security, by demonstrating the benefits gained from the UK Biological Security Strategy. This will include: sharing lessons learned and successes from the UK’s strategic approach; sharing the UK understanding of the risk and threat landscape; and participating in technical exchanges with allies and like-minded partners.
• Promote the UK’s strategic approach to biosurveillance, identify and develop opportunities for partnerships to deliver the approach, and encourage other nations to develop and implement aligned approaches to biodetection and biosurveillance.
• Uphold the international arms control architecture, promote the norm against the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of biological and toxin weapons as set out in the BTWC, and hold those who violate it to account. This will include sustained leadership through bilateral engagement and multilateral fora.
• Support the international and multilateral health security architecture to improve pandemic prevention, preparedness and response, and drive progress towards achieving the 100 Days Mission. This will include demonstrating UK leadership in health security, for example through international fora, including the UN High-Level Meeting on Pandemic PPR; continued support to international organisations and the UN system (including WHO and WOAH); and continued efforts to improve pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response.
• Pursue greater international alignment on responsible innovation efforts across the convergence of AI and biology, nucleic acid synthesis screening, and dual-use research of concern (including medium- to long-term considerations around mirror biology). This will include leading and participating in international discussions to identify, develop and shape novel approaches to responsible innovation, biosafety and biosecurity. Ensuring that the benefits of emerging technologies across the life sciences and health sectors can be harnessed safely and that risks are identified and mitigated.

1. The UK’s One Health approach integrates animal, plant, and environmental health with human health to strengthen preparedness and response. ↩

2. Some work undertaken under the BSS cannot be disclosed publicly for national security reasons; however, this report seeks — where possible — to describe actions taken to implement the strategy across the Government. ↩

3. 3 The Integrated Security Fund (ISF) is a government-wide funding mechanism that addresses the highest-priority threats to UK national security at home and abroad, through the delivery of targeted projects and programmes. ↩

4. Computer modelled or computer simulated. ↩