Statutory guidance

Search and Examination of UK Patent Applications under the Patents Act 1977 (as amended)

Published 14 July 2026

Summary

1. On 11 February 2026, the UK Supreme Court gave its judgment in Emotional Perception AI Limited v Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks [2026] UKSC 3. 

2. The judgment brought about an immediate change to the way in which section 1 of the Act should be interpreted and applied. This, in turn, changed the way in which UK patent applications, notably those for computer-implemented inventions, should be searched and examined under sections 17 and 18 of the Act. 

3. This practice notice has two parts. Part 1 gives a summary of the Emotional Perception judgment, setting out how examiners should interpret and apply section 1 of the Act. Part 2 gives some general guidance on how examiners should apply the judgment as a matter of practice. 

Part 1: the Judgment 

Section 1 and its relationship with Article 52 EPC 

4. The judgment is concerned with the interpretation and application of section 1 of the Act (see paragraph 13 of the judgment). The source provision for section 1 is Article 52 of the European Patent Convention (the ‘EPC’) (see paragraph 14 of the judgment). 

5. The Supreme Court held that the approach set out by the Court of Appeal in Aerotel Ltd v Telco Holdings Ltd & Ors [2006] EWCA Civ 1371 should no longer be followed, in light of the decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal in G 1/19 (Bentley Systems (UK) Ltd/Pedestrian Simulation). 

6. The Supreme Court held that the UK should adopt the same interpretation of Article 52 EPC as the Enlarged Board of Appeal in G 1/19 (see paragraphs 20 and 66 of the Emotional Perception judgment).

7. In G 1/19, the Enlarged Board endorsed the approach set out in the decision of the Board of Appeal in T 0641/00 (Two identities/Comvik) and approved the reasoning of the Board of Appeal in T 0154/04 (Estimating sales activity / Duns Licensing Associates) (see paragraphs 37 to 39 of the Emotional Perception judgment). The Enlarged Board adopted seven principles, A to G, set out in Duns (see paragraph 39 of the Emotional Perception judgment). The Duns principles summarise the “constant jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal concerning the application of Articles 52, 54, and 56 EPC” (see paragraph 5 of the Duns decision). 

8. In paragraph 66 of the Emotional Perception judgment, the Supreme Court held that the approach which should be adopted in the UK is that contained in the Duns principles other than principle G. The Supreme Court therefore adopted Duns principles A to F which are as follows:

“(A) Article 52(1) EPC sets out four requirements to be fulfilled by a patentable invention: there must be an invention, and if there is an invention, it must satisfy the requirements of novelty, inventive step, and industrial applicability.

(B) Having technical character is an implicit requisite of an ‘invention’ within the meaning of Article 52(1) EPC (requirement of ‘technicality’).

(C) Article 52(2) EPC does not exclude from patentability any subject matter or activity having technical character, even if it is related to the items listed in this provision since these items are only excluded ‘as such’ (Article 52(3) EPC).

(D) The four requirements - invention, novelty, inventive step, and susceptibility of industrial application - are essentially separate and independent criteria of patentability, which give rise to concurrent objections. Novelty, in particular, is not a requisite of an invention within the meaning of Article 52(1) EPC, but a separate requirement of patentability.

(E) For examining patentability of an invention in respect of a claim, the claim must be construed to determine the technical features of the invention, i.e. the features which contribute to the technical character of the invention.

(F) It is legitimate to have a mix of technical and ‘non-technical’ features appearing in a claim, in which the non-technical features may even form a dominating part of the claimed subject matter. Novelty and inventive step, however, can be based only on technical features, which thus have to be clearly defined in the claim. Non-technical features, to the extent that they do not interact with the technical subject matter of the claim for solving a technical problem, i.e. non-technical features ‘as such’, do not provide a technical contribution to the prior art and are thus ignored in assessing novelty and inventive step.”

Interpreting section 1(1) 

9. Section 1(1) sets out the requirements that must be fulfilled by a patentable invention. Section 1(1) requires that there must be an “invention”, and if there is an “invention” then it must satisfy each of the other conditions for patentability (see Duns principle A). 

“invention”

10. An implicit requirement of an “invention” under section 1(1) is that it should have technical character (see Duns principle B). The requirements for “invention”, novelty, inventive step, and industrial applicability are separate and independent requirements (see Duns principle D).  

11. The requirement that a claim discloses an “invention” must be considered first, ahead of the requirements for novelty, inventive step, and industrial application (see paragraph 61 of the Emotional Perception judgment). Only when the requirement for an “invention” is satisfied do the other requirements for patentability become relevant (see paragraphs 34 and 110 of the Emotional Perception judgment).

Interpreting section 1(2)

12. Section 1(2) declares a non-exhaustive list of things to be “not inventions”, i.e. subject matter which is not to be regarded as an “invention” within the meaning of section 1(1). 

13. The things listed as “not inventions” in section 1(2) should be interpreted as being abstract and/or non-technical in character (see paragraph 60 of the Emotional Perception judgment and paragraph 25 of the decision in G 1/19). By contrast, an “invention” within the meaning of section 1(1) must have technical character (see Duns principle B).

14. Accordingly, claimed features may be described as “non-technical features” if, on their own, they would be considered “not inventions” under section 1(2) (see Duns principle F and paragraphs 42 and 101 of the Emotional Perception judgment). Conversely, if claimed features would, on their own, be considered to be an “invention” under section 1(1), then they may be described as “technical features”. 

15. Section 1(2) does not exclude any subject matter having technical character, even if it is related to any of the non-technical things specified in section 1(2), since section 1(2) defines that these things are only excluded “as such” (see Duns principle C). The words “as such” appearing in section 1(2) are understood as being a bar to a broad interpretation of the “not inventions” listed in section 1(2) (see paragraph 25 of the decision in G 1/19). 

A three-step approach involving an “intermediate step”

16. The combined effect of sections 1(1) and 1(2) is that the exclusions from patentability listed in section 1(2) play a role in assessing both patent eligibility (i.e. whether there is an “invention”) and in assessing patentability (i.e. novelty and inventive step). This twofold assessment is often referred to as the “two-hurdle approach” (see paragraph 43 of the Emotional Perception judgment, quoting from paragraph 37 of the decision in G 1/19). 

17. In holding that Duns principles A to F should be followed (at paragraph 66 of the Emotional Perception  judgment) the Supreme Court also approved the reasoning the Enlarged Board gave in paragraph 39 of the decision in G 1/19 about the need for an “intermediate step” in the two-hurdle approach: 

“[39] The two-hurdle approach for computer-implemented inventions actually entails three steps. Establishing whether a feature contributes to the technical character of the invention constitutes an intermediate step between assessing (i) the invention’s eligibility under Art 52 EPC, and (ii) whether the invention is based on an inventive step vis-à-vis the closest prior art. This additional intermediate step serves as a filter for features contributing to a technical solution of a technical problem in view of the closest prior art. Only those distinguishing features can contribute to inventive step.” 

18. The Supreme Court approved this three-step approach for applying sections 1(1) and 1(2) of the Act (see paragraphs 66, 100, 107, and 109 of the Emotional Perception judgment). The three steps of the approach may be expressed as:

(i) the “first hurdle” – decide whether the subject matter of the claim qualifies as an invention, by applying the “any hardware” approach;

(ii) the “intermediate step” – identify the features of the claim which contribute to the technical character of the invention, viewed as a whole; and 

(iii) the “second hurdle” – assess whether the invention is new, then whether it involves an inventive step in relation to the prior art by considering only those features which do so contribute to technical character. 

The first hurdle (the ‘any hardware’ test)

19. The first hurdle, also known as the “patent eligibility hurdle”, requires that the claimed subject-matter as a whole is an “invention” under section 1(1), i.e. that it does not fall under the “not inventions” listed in section 1(2). This follows from Duns principles A to D. 

20. The requirement for an eligible “invention” is assessed using an “any hardware” approach (see paragraphs 31 and 38 of the Emotional Perception judgment). The “any hardware” assessment is made without reference to prior art (see Duns principle D and paragraph 28 of the decision in G 1/19).  

21. The words “as such” in section 1(2) are taken to imply that just one technical feature is sufficient to confer eligibility. If the claimed subject matter is directed to, or uses, technical means, then it is an “invention” within the meaning of section 1(1) (see paragraphs 38 and 97 of the Emotional Perception judgment). 

22. For example, a claim directed to a computer-implemented invention avoids exclusion under section 1(2) merely by referring to the use of a computer, a computer-readable storage medium, or other technical means (see paragraph 38 of the Emotional Perception judgment). 

The intermediate step

23 The intermediate step is based on Duns principle F. The Supreme Court acknowledged (see paragraphs 31 and 41 of the Emotional Perception judgment) that Duns principle F is derived from paragraph 1 of the headnote in the decision of the Board in T 0641/00 (Two identities/Comvik): 

“[1] An invention consisting of a mixture of technical and non-technical features and having technical character as a whole is to be assessed with respect to the requirement of inventive step by taking account of all those features which contribute to said technical character whereas features making no such contribution cannot support the presence of inventive step.” 

24. The purpose of the intermediate step is to exclude claimed features which do not contribute to the technical character of the invention, when assessing whether the invention involves an inventive step in relation to the prior art (see paragraph 66 of the Emotional Perception judgment). A feature contributes to the technical character of an invention if the feature contributes in some way to the technical solution of a technical problem (see Duns principle F and paragraph 104 of the Emotional Perception judgment). Whether a feature contributes to the technical character of the invention must be assessed in the context of the invention as a whole (see paragraph 42 of the Emotional Perception judgment). 

25. The Supreme Court provided additional guidance on the intermediate step in paragraphs 100 to 111 of the Emotional Perception judgment. 

26. The analysis of the intermediate step must be carried out by reference to “the technical character of the invention, viewed as a whole” (see paragraph 106 of the Emotional Perception judgment). 

27. It follows that a necessary first part of carrying out the intermediate step is to identify “the technical character of the invention, viewed as a whole” (see paragraph 106 of the Emotional Perception judgment). The Supreme Court observed that it is open to the UKIPO and to the UK courts to adopt any appropriate method of identifying the technical character of the invention, viewed as a whole. An example of an appropriate method might in a particular case be to identify the alleged inventive concept of the claim, as explained in Pozzoli (see paragraph 106 of the Emotional Perception judgment). 

28. The intermediate step must involve a feature-by-feature analysis (see paragraphs 107 and 108 of the Emotional Perception judgment).  

29. The subject matter of the invention must be dissected into its component features (see paragraph 107 of the Emotional Perception judgment). The contributory role of each component feature must then be reviewed, by reference to the contribution made by that feature to, or its interaction with, the technical character of the invention viewed as a whole (see paragraph 107 of the Emotional Perception judgment). 

30. When considering the contributory role of a feature, the sole criterion is whether the feature contributes to the technical character of the invention as a whole (see paragraph 109 of the Emotional Perception judgment). It is irrelevant whether the feature would, if viewed separately, be considered “technical” or “non-technical” (see paragraph 109 of the Emotional Perception judgment). 

The second hurdle (novelty and inventive step)

31. The second hurdle is where novelty and inventive step are assessed, following Duns principles E and F. Only features which contribute to the technical character of the invention are eligible to be taken into account in the assessment of inventive step (see paragraph 105 of the Emotional Perception judgment).   

32. The Supreme Court did not see any need to adjust the methodologies used in the UK for assessing novelty and inventive step (see paragraph 67 of the judgment). It follows that unless and until UK courts say otherwise, all existing UK case law concerning novelty and inventive step should continue to be followed. 

33. For example, the Supreme Court confirmed that the approach for the assessment of inventive step set out in Pozzoli SPA v BDMO SA [2007] EWCA Civ 588, and later approved in Actavis Group PTC EHF v ICOS Corporation [2019] UKSC 15, remains a valid approach. 

Application to the facts of Emotional Perception

34. In Emotional Perception, the Supreme Court applied the “any hardware” test to the claims at issue. They held that it is beyond dispute that the claims are to an “invention” and are not to a program for a computer “as such” under section 1(2) (see paragraphs 24 and 98 of the Emotional Perception judgment). For example, the claims refer to a database for storing data files, a communications network and a user device – all of which require or constitute hardware. That is sufficient to show that the subject matter of the claims has technical character and is not to a computer program “as such” (see paragraph 98 of the Emotional Perception judgment). 

35. However, the Supreme Court decided that it would be inappropriate for it to further define the intermediate step or to carry it out in relation to the claims at issue (see paragraphs 112 to 117 of the Emotional Perception judgment). The Supreme Court remitted the questions of how the intermediate step applies to the claims at issue, and whether the features of the invention which contribute to its technical character can be considered to involve an inventive step, to the Hearing officer (see paragraph 118 of the Emotional Perception judgment). 

Interpreting ‘program for a computer’ in section 1(2)

Definition of a computer

36. In Emotional Perception, the Supreme Court considered that the description of a computer as “a machine which processes information” is too broad, in that it encompasses many devices which are not generally considered to be computers, such as a basic oven, a smoke detector, an analogue radio or record player with a volume control, and an old-fashioned jukebox that plays a song selected by a user. What differentiates these devices from a “computer” is that they are not used to perform computations (see paragraph 76 of the Emotional Perception judgment). 

37. The Supreme Court also saw no reason to confine the term “computer” to conventional digital computers. It is unreasonable to interpret the EPC in a way that ties its application to a particular technology which happens currently to be prevalent. The concepts used in the Convention are intended to accommodate technological change. Before the development of digital computers, electronic analogue computers were used for various applications. Looking to the future, quantum computers are now being developed which use the principles of quantum physics to process information in a fundamentally different way from conventional computers. All of these devices (and potentially others in future) are within the scope of the definition of a computer for the purposes of section 1(2)(c) (see paragraph 77 of the Emotional Perception judgment). What characterises a computer as a physical machine is its functionality, not the specific technology used to achieve that functionality (see paragraph 86 of the Emotional Perception judgment). 

Definition of a program for a computer

38. Likewise, the Supreme Court held that the concept of a “program for a computer” is not limited to a set of instructions addressed to a conventional digital computer with a CPU. To allow for the fact that there are computers which are not conventional digital computers, the description of a “program” must be correspondingly broadened to include a set of instructions capable of being followed by a computer of any kind to produce desired manipulations of data. These manipulations of data are predictable in the sense that they are determined by the instructions which the computer is “programmed” to follow. However, they may not be predictable in the sense that the results of the manipulations can be foreseen in advance (see paragraph 79 of the Emotional Perception judgment).  

Application to Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs)

39. The Supreme Court held that the expression “program for a computer” is applicable to an artificial neural network (ANN) and rejected the characterisation of an ANN as a physical machine (see paragraph 80 of the Emotional Perception judgment).  

40. The Supreme Court approved the description of an ANN as “an abstract model which takes a numerical input, applies a series of mathematical operations (applying weights and biases and an activation function) and outputs a numerical result at successive layers”. It concluded that an ANN is an abstract entity, and not a physical object, which can be implemented in hardware (i.e. a physical machine) of a variety of forms, but an ANN itself is not and cannot be identified with a type of hardware (see paragraphs 80 and 81 of the Emotional Perception judgment).  

41. The machine on which an ANN is implemented is a computer and it makes no difference whether the hardware used is a conventional digital computer or a dedicated item which embodies a particular network architecture or a set of field programmable gate arrays configured to embody that architecture (see paragraph 82 of the Emotional Perception judgment). Whatever the specific form of the machine on which an ANN is implemented, the ANN constitutes a set of instructions to manipulate data in a particular way so as to produce a desired result. That is, an ANN is a program for a computer (see paragraph 87 of the Emotional Perception judgment). 

42. The instructions of an ANN include the weights and biases and the topology of the network. The topology may include the number of layers of neurons, the number of neurons in each layer and how the neurons are interconnected. The instructions also include the mathematical function applied by each neuron to generate an output value. All these features of the ANN operate in combination to instruct the machine to process data in a particular way which will generate a final output. They are a set of instructions to a computer to carry out computations on data presented to it (see paragraph 88 of the Emotional Perception judgment).  

43. An ANN represents a set of instructions to the machine to perform operations irrespective of whether any of its features can be changed. It is irrelevant whether the ANN is implemented on a machine in which the weights and biases are baked into the hardware and cannot be changed, on a machine in which the architecture is “hard-wired” but the weights and biases can be altered, on hardware that can be reconfigured, or on a conventional computer (see paragraph 91 of the Emotional Perception judgment).  

44. In considering whether an ANN is a program for a computer, the Supreme Court confirmed that a program need not take the form of a sequence of logical operations of the type “if X then Y”. Computers can (and often do) process information in parallel and not just in series and can be programmed to do so.  

45. The Supreme Court also confirmed that there is no distinction in law between instructions created by a computer (such as those of a trained ANN) and those created by a human programmer. It makes no difference what particular method is used to program a computer to generate instructions which themselves constitute a computer program. Computer programs generated by machine learning are therefore computer programs, nonetheless. Nor is it relevant whether the variable parameters of a computer program such as a trained ANN can be predicted in advance by a human being. 

Part 2: Applying the three-step approach in practice

Interpreting section 1 of the Act 

46. Examiners should follow and apply the interpretation of section 1 of the Act adopted by the Supreme Court in the Emotional Perception judgment. 

47. Examiners should not apply the approach set out by the Court of Appeal in Aerotel Ltd v Telco Holdings Ltd & Ors [2006] EWCA Civ 1371. In addition, examiners should not follow the guidance contained in present sections 1.07 to 1.51.7 of the Manual of Patent Practice.  

48. Examiners should take care in situations where an objection to excluded matter under the Aerotel approach has been made previously. If an applicant responds to such an objection, then examiners should reconsider the requirements for patentability afresh by following the Emotional Perception judgment and the guidance in this practice notice. 

The first hurdle

49. Examiners should apply the “any hardware” test to determine whether a claimed invention relates to an eligible “invention” for the purposes of the Act. 

50. Any claim which involves technical means (e.g. some form of computer hardware) is an “invention” for the purposes of section 1(1) and avoids exclusion under section 1(2). 

51. Examiners should raise an objection under section 1(2) if, and only if, a claimed invention does not involve any technical means. 

The intermediate step

52. Examiners should identify the features of a claimed invention that contribute to the technical character of an invention in an intermediate step performed between the “any hardware” test and the assessment of inventive step. 

53. Examiners should perform a feature-by-feature analysis of the whole claim when applying the intermediate step.  

54. Examiners should identify that a feature contributes to the technical character of the claim, viewed as a whole, if it contributes to, or interacts with, the technical subject matter of a claim for the technical solution of a technical problem. 

55. Although examiners are not bound to follow the EPO Guidelines for Examination, examiners may find it helpful to refer to Part G – Chapter 2, Section 3 of the guidelines when considering whether a claimed feature contributes to technical character.  

The second hurdle

56. Examiners should continue to follow and apply the guidance concerning novelty and inventive step set out in present section 2 and section 3 of the Manual of Patent Practice respectively. 

57. Examiners should continue to make a novelty objection when a single prior disclosure discloses, either explicitly or implicitly, all the features of a claim (see for example the Manual of Patent Practice, section 2.09). 

58. Examiners should continue to assess inventive step using the approach set out in Pozzoli.   

59. Where the only differences between an inventive concept and the prior art make no contribution to the technical character of the invention, examiners should raise an objection to lack of inventive step. 

60. Where differences between an inventive concept and the prior art contribute to the technical character of the invention, examiners should consider whether those differences are obvious at step 4 of Pozzoli. 

Searching

61. Examiners are reminded that section 17(4) of the Act requires that the examiner shall make such investigation as in their opinion is reasonably practicable and necessary for them to identify the documents which they think will be needed to decide, on a substantive examination under section 18, whether the invention is new and involves an inventive step. 

62. At the search stage, the search examiner should identify which features contribute to the technical character of the claimed subject-matter and ensure that their search under section 17 covers those features. 

63. The Manual of Patent practice sets out further guidance about preparing for a search and performing the search (see in particular sections 17.32 to 17.67 of the Manual). Examiners should continue to follow this guidance. 

Updates to the Manual of Patent Practice

64. The Manual of Patent Practice will be updated in due course to reflect the contents of this practice notice. 

65. For any enquiries about this PPN, please contact the PPN queries team PPNQueries@ipo.gov.uk.