Research and analysis

RPC opinion: impact of Social Housing Bill

Published 31 July 2026

Lead department: Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government

Summary of proposal: The bill contains reforms to the Right to Buy and Right to Acquire schemes, tenancy protections for victims of domestic abuse, changes to local authority housing consent requirements and private registered provider disposals, and the repeal of uncommenced statutory provisions.

Submission type: impact assessment – 12 June 2026

Legislation type: primary legislation

Implementation date: to be confirmed

RPC reference: RPC-MHCLG-26176-IA(1)

Date of issue: 24 July 2026

RPC opinion rating

Not fit for purpose:

• the impact assessment identifies statutory constraints, distributional concerns and potential administrative and information problems that provide a sufficient rationale for considering intervention
• its quantitative analysis of Right to Buy sales, replacement activity and direct business costs also provides a useful basis for further appraisal
• the impact assessment does not assess separately and consistently provisions that address different problems, affect different groups and operate through different causal pathways
• it does not identify clearly the regulatory provisions and the impacts arising from them or demonstrate a systematic process for generating, filtering and shortlisting options
• the small and micro business assessment does not adequately consider exemption, disproportionate impacts and mitigation
• the department uses its assessment against the £10 million equivalent annual net direct cost to business threshold to justify limited analysis, although the de minimis exemption does not apply to public bills containing regulatory provisions
• the impact assessment does not provide sufficient comparative evidence to justify the regulatory provisions, either individually or as part of the wider package, or bring together the principal effects on businesses, households, the public sector and wider social welfare

RPC summary

Rationale: Green

The impact assessment (IA) identifies statutory constraints, intergenerational distributional concerns and potential administrative and information problems that provide a sufficient basis for considering intervention. However, it should distinguish more clearly between retaining homes in social tenure, delivering replacement homes and increasing total housing supply.

Identification of options: Red

The IA does not demonstrate a systematic process for generating, filtering and shortlisting options. The small and micro business assessment does not justify sufficiently the business-size proxy or assess, for each relevant provision, impacts on small and micro businesses, potential exemptions, and mitigation.

Justification for preferred way forward: Red

The IA provides useful quantitative analysis of the preferred Right to Buy package but does not provide sufficient comparative appraisal to justify the regulatory provisions, either individually or as part of the wider package. It does not distinguish sufficiently between impacts attributable to those provisions and impacts arising from measures affecting local authorities, tenants or the wider housing programme. It also does not sufficiently assess the principal business, household, public sector and wider welfare effects needed to justify the preferred regulatory approach.

Regulatory scorecard: Very weak

The IA does not include a completed regulatory scorecard. Although the wider IA contains some relevant analysis, particularly its Right to Buy modelling and direct business-cost switching analysis, it does not identify clearly which impacts arise from regulatory provisions or bring the evidence together across the Part A and Part B categories. The omission prevents the scorecard from supporting transparent decision-making on the principal impacts and trade-offs.

Monitoring and evaluation: Weak

The IA identifies relevant monitoring indicators and data sources, but provides little evaluation planning. It does not set out proportionate process, impact or value-for-money evaluation, or explain how each provision’s contribution to the policy objectives will be assessed.

Summary of proposal

The IA describes the proposal as a package of measures intended to protect social housing stock, strengthen tenancy protections for victims of domestic abuse and improve social housing asset management.

The package reforms the Right to Buy by extending the minimum qualifying tenancy period from three to ten years, reducing the percentage discount range from between 35% and 70% to between 5% and 15%, exempting newly built social homes from sale for 35 years, restricting sales in designated rural areas and extending the right of first refusal to perpetuity. It also aligns aspects of the Right to Acquire with the reformed framework.

The bill introduces a statutory ground through which private registered providers can apply to remove a perpetrator’s interest in a joint tenancy. It also changes local authority housing consent requirements, requires notification before qualifying disposals by private registered providers and repeals specified uncommenced provisions.

The IA considers the following options across the package:

• retaining the existing Right to Buy and Right to Acquire framework
• changing individual scheme parameters, including the qualifying tenancy period, discount range, exemptions and duration of the right of first refusal
• adopting the preferred combined package of Right to Buy and Right to Acquire reforms
• maintaining the existing legal framework for domestic abuse cases
• introducing a new statutory ground within housing law
• maintaining the existing asset-management framework
• encouraging voluntary coordination between social housing providers
• introducing targeted legislative changes to consent and disposal-notification arrangements
• limiting the disposal-notification requirement to a narrower group of sector bodies

The IA discusses these approaches across its measure-specific analysis but does not assemble them into a clearly defined longlist and shortlist for the provisions. It provides neither a net present social value estimate nor a central equivalent annual net direct cost to business (EANDCB) estimate.

The IA estimates one-off familiarisation costs of approximately £450,000 and costs of approximately £223,000 for updating tenant-facing materials. It presents switching analysis for ongoing administrative activity rather than expected volumes or central cost estimates. The department uses this analysis to support its conclusion that the package is unlikely to exceed the £10 million EANDCB threshold, although the de minimis exemption does not apply to public bills containing regulatory provisions.

Rationale

Problem under consideration

The IA identifies 3 main problems: depletion of social housing stock; limitations affecting joint tenancies in domestic abuse cases; and inefficiencies or information gaps affecting social housing asset management.

The IA states that local authorities sold around 133,000 homes through Right to Buy between 2012–13 and 2024–25, while delivering around 51,000 replacements. This supports concern about the future availability of local-authority housing. However, the IA should distinguish between retaining homes in social tenure, delivering replacements and increasing total housing supply.

A Right to Buy sale reduces the stock available for social letting by changing the dwelling’s ownership and tenure, but does not directly reduce the total number of dwellings in the overall housing stock. The IA should distinguish this tenure effect from replacement activity and additions to total housing supply. A replacement may involve new construction, acquisition of an existing home or a change in funding.

The IA also suggests that when a home is sold under the Right to Buy but not replaced there is a permanent loss of the capital subsidy embodied in the dwelling which creates an intergenerational equity problem. However, the IA should explain how sale receipts are used, what additional expenditure or investment they support, and how these effects should be reflected in the assessment of public value and intergenerational distribution.

The IA also refers to more than 1.3 million households on local-authority housing registers. This shows substantial registered demand under current eligibility and allocation arrangements, but does not capture all households experiencing immediate housing need or establish the number or type of additional homes required. The department should explain how retaining homes in social tenure is expected to affect suitable lettings and household outcomes, taking account of eligibility and allocation arrangements.

For the other measures, the IA identifies relevant legal and administrative problems but provides limited evidence on their scale. In domestic abuse cases, landlords cannot remove one party from a joint tenancy without ending it. The IA identifies a clear limitation in the current treatment of joint tenancies in domestic abuse cases.

However, the available evidence does not establish how often this specific issue arises, the outcomes under current arrangements or the number of cases in which the proposed provision is likely to change those outcomes.

For asset management, the IA identifies burdensome consent requirements and an information gap affecting disposals by private registered providers but provides limited evidence on the scale of these problems or their effects under current arrangements.

The department should provide proportionate evidence on the likely number and type of affected cases and the resulting costs or missed opportunities, sufficient to establish whether the identified consent and information problems significantly constrain current outcomes.

Argument for intervention

The IA identifies an intergenerational distributional concern about how the benefits of social housing and discounted purchase are distributed between current and future eligible households. It also identifies a mismatch between the period over which local authorities recover investment costs and the point at which tenants become eligible to buy a home.

The eligibility rules, discounts and exemptions are set in legislation. The domestic abuse and asset-management problems also arise from the current statutory framework. The IA therefore provides a sufficient basis for considering government intervention.

The IA should nevertheless distinguish distributional transfers from changes in total welfare and outcomes attributable to the bill from those dependent on wider housing policy and market conditions. The transfer of an asset at a discount may benefit the purchaser while reducing the public asset value available for other uses.

These are principally distributional and financial effects rather than, by themselves, changes in total social value. Their significance for the appraisal depends on the associated resource, behavioural and distributional consequences, which the IA should assess explicitly.

Objectives and theory of change

The IA sets out objectives to protect social housing stock and improve incentives to build, protect social tenants who are victims of domestic abuse, and clarify the statute book and reduce unnecessary bureaucracy.

The objectives are relevant but are not fully specific, measurable or time-bound. The IA also does not explain how competing outcomes, including stock retention, home ownership, housing supply and public expenditure, will be balanced. The IA does not include a theory of change, although the monitoring and evaluation section states that the evaluation will be informed by one.

Although the provisions are contained in one bill, they address different problems, operate through different causal pathways and affect different groups.

The IA should therefore explain how each distinct provision or group of measures contributes to the relevant SMART objectives and provide proportionate, problem-specific theories of change. These should identify the intended measurable outcomes, causal pathways, assumptions and risks for each distinct problem and associated provision, and explain how the provisions interact within the wider package.

Identification of options

The bill contains measures affecting private registered providers alongside measures principally affecting local authorities, tenants and the public sector. The IA does not identify clearly which measures it treats as regulatory provisions or distinguish their impacts from those of associated measures.

Identification of the ‘longlist’ of options

The IA discusses alternatives across the Right to Buy and Right to Acquire reforms, domestic abuse tenancy reform and asset-management measures. However, it does not present a defined longlist and shortlist for each distinct problem that the regulatory provisions are intended to address. Nor does it apply transparent filtering criteria or explain why the shortlisted options cover a credible range. The IA therefore does not show that it selected the preferred regulatory designs systematically.

The qualifying tenancy period, discount range, exemptions and duration of the right of first refusal are material choices. The department should identify which choices alter requirements on private registered providers and explain why it selected the preferred parameters. It should test credible alternative parameters where these could materially affect the expected impacts or ranking of options.

The department should also consider narrower, less burdensome or non-regulatory alternatives for the domestic abuse tenancy and notification measures. It should also compare repeal with continued non-commencement or amendment, so that the assessment demonstrates why repeal is the preferred approach.

Consideration of alternatives to regulation

The IA explains that non-legislative approaches cannot amend statutory rights or obligations. However, it does not show why complementary action or less burdensome regulatory designs could not address part of the identified problems. The evidence on current coordination and expected provider behaviour is insufficient to establish that voluntary action would not address a material part of the problem.

For the asset-management measures, the department should consider credible alternatives to the preferred changes, including narrower or less burdensome approaches where these could address the identified problems.

The IA does not need to assess every possible alternative. It should, however, demonstrate why each material regulatory provision is required and why credible, less restrictive approaches would not achieve the objectives sufficiently.

Justification for the shortlisted options

For the Right to Buy and Right to Acquire reforms, the IA should explain why the selected parameters are preferred and test credible alternative values where these could materially affect the appraisal or ranking.

The IA should also explain whether the regulatory provisions and associated measures are complementary or separable. Without this assessment, it is difficult to determine which outcomes are attributable to regulation, whether the expected benefits depend on other bill measures or whether a narrower regulatory package could deliver most of the intended benefits at lower cost.

Small and micro business assessment and medium-sized business assessment

The IA identifies private registered providers as the principal businesses affected and uses stockholding as a proxy for business size. It does not explain sufficiently how this relates to the relevant business-size definitions or how the limitations of the proxy affect the analysis. Although transaction-driven costs may scale with stockholding, fixed familiarisation costs and differences in internal capacity may create higher relative burdens for smaller providers.

The small and micro business assessment considers the package largely in aggregate, although the affected businesses, costs and potential mitigation may differ across the provisions. It should assess separately, where relevant, the impacts of the Right to Buy and Right to Acquire reforms, the domestic abuse tenancy ground and the disposal-notification requirements. For each provision, it should assess the principal absolute and relative costs, the potential for exemption and proportionate mitigation.

The IA states that the required activities are not expected to be materially more burdensome for smaller providers but provides limited evidence to support this conclusion. The department should explain the evidence and assumptions underpinning the assessment, including how fixed costs, transaction volumes and differences in provider capacity affect relative burdens. It should also explain whether any exemption or mitigation would materially reduce the intended benefits.

Justification for preferred way forward

Appraisal of the shortlisted options

The IA provides useful analysis of Right to Buy sales, replacement activity and stock effects. It also provides switching analysis of direct business costs. However, it focuses on the preferred package and does not compare consistently the costs, benefits, risks and uncertainties of shortlisted options. The IA provides neither net present social value estimates nor an equivalent structured assessment of non-monetised impacts.

Where proportionate monetisation is not feasible, the department should use indicative estimates, ranges, switching analysis or reasoned qualitative comparison. It should also distinguish financial transfers from real resource effects. Without this analysis, the IA does not demonstrate that the preferred Regulatory Provisions are expected to provide a better overall balance of costs, benefits, risks and distributional effects than feasible alternatives.

The IA does not distinguish sufficiently between homes retained in social tenure, Right to Buy-funded replacements and additions to total housing supply. The department should explain whether replacements represent new construction, acquisition of existing homes or changes in funding. It should also explain how changes in sales and receipts are expected to affect replacement activity and future housing availability.

The appraisal should assess reduced access to discounted home ownership alongside the effects of retaining homes in social tenure. It should identify the principal effects on prospective purchasers, existing and future social tenants and, where material, other households. It should also consider material effects on mobility, turnover and linked housing markets. A qualitative assessment would be sufficient where robust quantification is not feasible.

The IA describes its Right to Buy modelling as indicative and identifies uncertainty about qualifying tenancy length, delayed purchases and behavioural responses. The department should test the assumptions that have the greatest effect on projected sales, replacements, retained stock and option ranking.

The analysis should consider whether prospective purchasers and relevant properties differ from the wider tenant and housing populations. It should also provide evidence for the 35-year new-build exemption and test alternative periods where these could materially affect the results.

For the other measures, proportionate qualitative analysis should explain how uncertainty over the baseline, take-up and behaviour affects the appraisal.

For the asset-management measures, the IA should compare the preferred approach with credible alternatives, taking account of the expected administrative and information benefits and principal costs and risks.

For the notification requirement, it should explain why providing earlier information is expected to change acquisition outcomes and whether the expected benefits justify the additional burdens created. The appraisal should compare the expected benefits with the principal administrative, valuation, transaction, delay and assurance effects, including possible displacement of other provider investment.

The IA treats subsequent valuation and commercial decision-making as business as usual but should explain the counterfactual basis for this treatment and distinguish activity that would have occurred anyway from additional activity generated by the measure.

Selection of the preferred option

The IA does not explain why the preferred regulatory provisions, individually or as part of the wider package, are superior to feasible alternatives. The department should explain why regulation is necessary, why credible lower-burden or non regulatory options are insufficient and how the expected benefits justify the costs and risks. For the Right to Buy and Right to Acquire reforms, the department should explain why it selected the principal parameters.

It should assess how alternatives would affect stock retention, replacement receipts, home ownership and investment incentives. For the other measures, it should justify the selected scope and implementation arrangements. The IA should also explain whether a narrower package could achieve most of the benefits and remain proportionate under plausible assumptions.

Regulatory scorecard

The IA does not include a regulatory scorecard. Although it contains relevant Right to Buy modelling and direct business-cost switching analysis, it does not identify clearly which impacts arise from regulatory provisions or summarise the evidence across the Part A and Part B categories. It also does not identify clearly the main additional administrative costs or when they are expected to arise. These omissions prevent the IA from providing a transparent summary of the principal impacts and trade-offs.

Part A

Total impacts including non-monetised and distributional impacts

The scorecard should bring together the principal costs and benefits. It should distinguish real resource effects from transfers, direct from indirect effects and impacts of the bill from those dependent on wider policy or market conditions.

The assessment should compare the benefits from retaining social housing, improving housing stability and reducing administrative burdens with reduced access to discounted home ownership for certain tenants, changes in sale receipts and any consequent effects on Right to Buy-funded replacement activity.

It should identify the main groups bearing costs and receiving benefits. Where proportionate monetisation is not feasible, it should explain each impact’s direction, likely scale and uncertainty. The department should distinguish the distributional value placed on retaining homes in social tenure from changes in total social value, and explain the evidence and assumptions used to assess both.

Impacts on business, including non-monetised and distributional impacts

The IA estimates familiarisation costs of around £450,000 and document-update costs of around £223,000. It also provides switching values for several event-driven activities. The scorecard should identify which measures affect business and distinguish requirements on private registered providers from changes applying only to local authorities.

The department should treat business impacts consistently in the EANDCB and small and micro business assessment. It should present the main one-off, recurring and wider impacts by provider type and size, including transaction or delay costs.

For the domestic abuse tenancy ground, the upper-bound unit cost covers staff time and routine legal input, but the IA provides no expected caseload or central aggregate cost.

The IA should also identify the material additional administrative costs created by each provision and, where relevant, explain when they are expected to arise, to support assessment against the government’s administrative burden reduction target.

Impacts on households, individuals or consumers, including non-monetised and distributional impacts

The scorecard should assess reduced access to discounted home ownership alongside the expected benefits from retaining homes in social tenure. It should explain how changes in sale receipts, replacement activity, turnover and future lettings affect prospective purchasers, existing and future social tenants and, where material, households outside social housing.

The scorecard should explain how the measures affect the outcomes of households likely to benefit from an additional social letting, and the wider welfare impact. For the domestic abuse reform, it should provide a proportionate assessment of the expected benefits and explain the available evidence and its limitations where the number of affected cases cannot be estimated robustly.

Part B

Business environment

The scorecard should assess any material effects on provider incentives, investment, asset management and operational flexibility, distinguishing effects of the bill from those of funding, rent policy and the wider housing programme. It should explain briefly whether effects differ materially by provider size or business model.

The department should also consider whether the measures could have material effects on competition or linked housing markets, including through changes in social housing sales, acquisitions, lettings and development. Where a credible causal pathway is identified, the scorecard should assess the likely direction, scale and affected groups. Where the department considers such effects unlikely to be significant, a brief evidence-based explanation would be sufficient.

Trade and investment

The scorecard should state whether material trade or investment effects are expected and explain briefly where the department considers these to be limited or immaterial.

Natural capital and decarbonisation

The scorecard should state whether material natural-capital or decarbonisation effects are expected. Where the department considers these effects immaterial a brief explanation would be sufficient.

Monitoring and evaluation

The IA commits to a post-implementation review three to five years after Royal Assent. It identifies indicators covering Right to Buy sales and replacements, housing delivery, tenant outcomes and provider activity. This provides a basis for monitoring implementation and outcomes. However, the IA provides limited detail on how the department will evaluate whether the provisions caused the observed outcomes, why they did so or whether they provided value for money.

The evaluation plan should cover proportionate process, impact and value-for-money evaluation. It should set out evaluation questions linked to the SMART objectives and explain how the effects of the different provisions will be assessed separately. This includes how the department will distinguish each provision’s effects from those of other bill measures, wider housing policies and market conditions.

The absence of fully specific, measurable and time-bound objectives and proportionate theories of change limits the basis for assessing whether the intended outcomes were achieved and whether the expected causal pathways operated.

The department should develop measure-specific theories of change before implementation and use them to guide the evaluation design, data requirements and assessment of unintended effects.

The unintended effects assessed should include those on incentives for different types of households and impacts on households that are, and are not, currently in social housing.

Data collection

The department should specify the main indicators, baselines, collection frequency, ownership and data-quality risks. It should consider the need to collect evidence on domestic abuse tenancy cases, disposal notifications and resulting acquisitions, consent-processing costs and impacts on small and micro providers. It should also ensure that the evidence collected can support evaluation, rather than monitoring trends alone.

Post-implementation review

The PIR should assess whether the SMART objectives were achieved and, where feasible, identify the contribution of each provision to the observed outcomes. It should test whether the main causal pathways and assumptions were supported and whether the expected costs, benefits and unintended effects arose. The PIR should also test whether each provision remains necessary and proportionate or could be replaced by a less burdensome approach.