Research and analysis

Lived experiences of money muling

Published 16 July 2026

Authors

Anita Jeffreson, Maddy Pickles, Dorothee Stellmacher and Hannah Shrimpton, Ipsos UK

Acknowledgements

The research team would like to thank Victim Support, Elevate Her, Beacon Victim Care, Solution Focused World and the Financial Fraud Awareness Campaign for their invaluable contributions to this project, as well as Roots Research for supporting with the social media recruitment. We would also like to thank Angeliki Biliri, Samantha Dowling, Hannah Drage, Jessica Kelly, Rod Lowson, Martin Robinson, Amy Scoffham, Eleanor Smith, Andrew Kent and Iona Woodbridge at the Home Office for their support during this project.

Executive summary

Introduction

Money muling is a type of money laundering, defined as the movement of proceeds of crime on behalf of criminals, such as through bank accounts, cash and cryptocurrency. The Economic Crime Plan 2 and Money Mule and Financial Exploitation Action Plan acknowledges that money muling facilitates many crime types, particularly fraud, yet there is limited in-depth research on the topic. In 2024, the Home Office commissioned Ipsos UK to carry out this research, seeking to understand the pathways into and out of money muling, the associated risks and potential points of intervention.

This research builds on scoping work carried out between 2022 and 2024, which explored practical and ethical considerations for engaging directly with money mules. The scoping work also included 2 rounds of public perceptions polling, with some of the findings from the polling referred to within this report and full results published separately.

As a result of the scoping work, the study employed a mixed-methods approach. It included a survey of 208 respondents, employing a focused sampling approach to effectively identify money mules for qualitative exploration. While not aimed at achieving a statistically representative sample, this approach provided valuable insights into the diverse experiences of money mules and a broader population. Evidence was also gathered through qualitative interviews with money mules (9 in total, all unwitting^{[footnote 1]}), and qualitative interviews with professionals who work with money mules (11 in total). The data analysis was guided by the COM-B behavioural framework^{[footnote 2]} to identify influences on money muling behaviour. The findings presented throughout this summary and the report integrate evidence from all data sources – polling, survey responses, money mule interviews, and professional perspectives – to provide a comprehensive understanding of money muling experiences.

This exploratory research represents one of the first direct engagements with money mules in the UK, offering new insights to improve understanding of money muling experiences. Money mules who took part in the qualitative interviews were recruited into money muling activities through job ads, social media, or people they knew such as colleagues and partners. Their experiences were often intense but brief, with variation in frequency and size of transfers. They either exited by disengaging with the recruiters, for example, when trust in the recruiter became eroded, or their involvement was ended by their bank or law enforcement. Some were also only involved in a one-off transfer and were not asked by the recruiter to do it again.

It should be noted that the research has limitations, particularly regarding sample composition. The qualitative sample consisted exclusively of unwitting money mules, limiting insights into the experiences of witting and complicit individuals. The research anticipated and addressed recruitment challenges, including: the small and hard-to-reach nature of the population; potential for confusion between money muling and other crimes (such as fraud); and individuals’ fear of prosecution. To mitigate these challenges, the team employed extensive strategies across multiple recruitment channels: reaching out to online panel members, running social media campaigns, engaging gatekeepers and recontacting this project’s survey participants as well as individuals who had previously taken part in related polling activities. The team offered charity donation incentives, clearly specified the types of experiences being researched, reassured about the anonymous nature of participation, and extended fieldwork timings across multiple waves. This intensive effort ultimately yielded just 9 eligible participants from 159 initial contacts, with 73 engaging and 41 being screened – demonstrating the substantial resources required to access this hard-to-reach population. Despite these comprehensive efforts, the absence of industry-standard personal financial incentives remained a significant barrier, alongside other recruitment challenges, which are further outlined in the detailed methodology described in Annex Section 7.2.4. The exceptional difficulty and time investment required to achieve even this modest sample size has clear implications for any future attempts to research this population.

Key findings

Entry into money muling

Recruitment methods into money muling varied, utilising both online and face-to-face approaches. Recruiters were found to strategically target specific vulnerabilities, like financial need or naivety, and misrepresent the illegal activity as a safe, legitimate opportunity. Based on the COM-B analysis of evidence from across all data sources, several factors emerged as influencing individuals’ entry into money muling:

Limited awareness of money muling: Limited awareness was a primary enabling factor, operating across multiple dimensions. Around half of all survey respondents (53%) either had never heard of the term ‘money muling’ or had heard of it but did not know what it meant . Individuals could lack awareness of money muling’s criminality and its severe consequences for their financial and personal futures. Money mule participants remained unaware of the criminal origins of funds they handled. This lack of awareness prevented any moral or legal framing of their decisions; participants evaluated risks purely through personal safety and trusted relationships rather than legality.

Lack of due diligence or reflective judgement: Lack of critical evaluation compounded the above lack of awareness issues, particularly among those recruited via fraudulent job offers who concentrated on role details rather than employer legitimacy, or those recruited through personal connections who bypassed scrutiny due to trust in the recruiter.

Wider vulnerabilities: There was a strong link between experiencing life difficulties and being recruited into money muling. Financial instability was a key vulnerability that created opportunities for recruiters. Circumstances like unemployment, financial distress, and the rising cost of living made individuals more susceptible and diminished their due diligence. Other contributing factors included loneliness and isolation, and previous experiences as a victim of crime.

Trust in the recruiter: While the desire for financial gain was a motivating factor, the most compelling driver was trust in the recruiter or the opportunity, as it influenced individuals’ perceptions of the opportunity, reducing their capability to critically assess the ask. This trust, often stemming from a personal relationship with the recruiter (survey data revealed that 80% of money muling activities occurred at the request of someone known to the individual – online or offline), caused individuals to bypass critical thinking and view the request as simply “doing a favour”. Trust was also manufactured by criminals through professional-looking job advertisements and recruitment processes, which lent an air of legitimacy to the scheme and encouraged participation.

Research participants identified that prevention of money muling through awareness was the most critical intervention. For awareness raising to be successful, participants suggested several key principles: targeting specific vulnerable groups; concentrating on the tangible, personal consequences of involvement rather than criminality; and using lived experience stories to bring the training to life.

Taking part in money muling

Evidence from across all data sources showed that the experience of money muling was often intense but brief, typically lasting less than a month. Survey findings indicated that around a third (36%) of reported money muling activities were one-time occurrences. Recruiters often used frequent contact to prevent individuals from having time to reflect on their actions or disengage. Participants frequently overlooked their own suspicions, especially when the recruiter was a trusted person or when the activity was disguised as a legitimate job. If an individual hesitated, recruiters would escalate their tactics from persuasion to coercion and threats to ensure compliance. Participants described substantial barriers which prevented them from stopping their involvement:

For those in wider exploitative relationships, such as domestic abuse, exiting was almost impossible without first exiting the wider exploitation.

Both money mule participants and professionals from across sectors found the professional support system to be difficult to navigate, fragmented, and inconsistent. This is largely due to money mule participants struggling to identify appropriate support agencies. This could in part be accounted to the core ambiguity of whether a money mule is a victim or a perpetrator, which led to contradictory responses from banks, law enforcement, and support services, leaving individuals without a clear path to getting help.

Exit from money muling

Analysis of survey responses, money mule experiences, and professional insights revealed 3 primary exit pathways.

Firstly, disengagement was often linked to an increase in an individual’s capability to recognise that something was wrong. Seeking advice from trusted friends or family was a crucial step to help critically evaluate the situation, validating an individual’s arising suspicions on the activity. This validation helped individuals to recognise the problematic nature of the activity and giving them the confidence to seek formal help.

Secondly, the opportunity to continue was often removed by external factors, such as a bank freezing or closing an account or police intervention. In some cases, the recruiter simply stopped contact, which was in contrast to perceptions from law enforcement that agency intervention was needed to end money muling activity. As recruiters were not within the scope of this research, it was not clear why they disengaged. However, money mules did not question it at the time as the opportunity was presented by a trusted individual who asked for a specific number of transfers, so when this number of transactions was reached they did not expect further requests or contact.

Thirdly, a key motivation to disengage was the erosion of trust, which occurred when a recruiter’s behaviour became suspicious or contradicted their initial promises.

However, a powerful motivation not to disengage was the fear of repercussions. Professionals recognised that individuals may be reluctant to come forward because they worry about their bank accounts being closed, and are uncertain if they would be treated as a victim or a perpetrator.

To enable individuals to exit from money muling, research participants recommended creating “safe pathways” such as anonymous helplines, allowing people to seek help without fear of repercussions. Educational interventions, even post-involvement, were deemed valuable for preventing re-engagement, while law enforcement perceived the “cease and desist” notices as an effective tool for those with limited involvement. Social isolation and limited support networks could be difficult to address for those who are already involved in money muling, therefore professionals suggested that the focus for this particular vulnerability should be on prevention.

Impacts of involvement in money muling

Some individuals felt no impacts of money muling - notably, 30% of survey respondents who engaged in money muling reported experiencing no consequences. Those who did, spoke of emotional and financial impacts, perceiving them as severe. Qualitative participants faced profound financial impacts, including bank account closures and fraud markers that hindered their access to employment and housing. Emotionally, individuals suffered from lasting shame, anxiety, and isolation. Professionals stressed the risks of pushing money mules towards further crime or exposing them to violence – something they have witnessed through their work.

Individuals found the support system to be fragmented and difficult to navigate both to exit and finding support after exit. Generic support organisations could be ill-equipped to help, while smaller, specialist services were in high demand but scarce. Support organisations noted critical knowledge and skills gaps in supporting money mules, including how best to navigate the grey areas of criminality. To address these gaps, participants highlighted a critical need for accessible information, specialised emotional support and financial advocacy, all delivered through a confidential, multi-agency approach. This was seen as key to help manage consequences such as debanking and debt management, as well as practical assistance with wider needs, including how to mitigate risks of joblessness, homelessness or wider criminality.

Conclusions

Money muling constitutes a complex journey. Trust emerged as pivotal, with the majority of money muling activities reported through the survey occurring at the request of someone known to the individual (online and/or offline). This both enabled recruitment and, when the trust eroded, acted as a catalyst for disengagement. Significant gaps in knowledge and awareness of money muling as a crime further exacerbated individuals’ susceptibility to recruitment. Coupled with a lack of reflective judgement, it created conditions where recruitment opportunities could flourish.

A central finding is the ambiguity of the money mule, who can be both a victim of exploitation and a perpetrator of a financial crime. This ambiguity creates inconsistent responses from banks and law enforcement and a fragmented support system, which can lead individuals to face severe financial and emotional impacts, often without a clear path to getting help. Additionally, money muling was found to intersect with other forms of exploitation (such as domestic abuse or coercive control) and criminality (such as county lines or gang involvement). It both impacted individuals’ money muling journey, for example by making it difficult to disengage, and resulted from it, where vulnerabilities created by being a money mule led to involvement in other criminal activities.

To address these issues, the findings suggest a unified, cross-sector approach. Key considerations include targeted educational campaigns that concentrate on tangible consequences, such as the inability to get a bank account or a mortgage, rather than criminality, which can feel abstract. It also proposes systemic changes, including better verification processes on job and social media sites. Finally, it suggests a need for structured and accessible support pathways. These could feature anonymous helplines, specialised financial advocacy to navigate the consequences of debanking, and holistic emotional support that acknowledges the complex victim-perpetrator dynamic.

Further research could concentrate on understanding different money mule populations, and exit pathways and interventions. This could include targeting witting and complicit money mules, diving deeper into how recruitment methods vary by characteristic, exploring the link between money muling and other exploitation, and examining how the ambiguity of money muling affects individual journeys and outcomes. Additionally, evaluations or assessments of the effectiveness of formal exit pathways (through banks or law enforcement) could support the development of evidence-based policies and processes.

A further evidence gap that warrants further exploration is the role and experiences of money mule recruiters. This research has identified uncertainties surrounding the rationale for certain behaviours, such as disengaging from the money mule once their initial ask is completed. Developing a deeper understanding of the motivations driving recruiters’ actions could provide valuable insights for disruption strategies.

Importantly, future research should further test strategies to reach this hard-to-access population, potentially including provision of personal financial incentives, extended recruitment periods across multiple channels, culturally adapted approaches for specific communities, and closer or paid partnerships with trusted community organisations or charities.

1. Introduction

1.1 Background
1.2 Definition of money mules and money muling
1.3 Research objectives
1.4 Summary of methodology
1.5 Analysis
1.6 How to interpret the findings
1.7 Overview of report

1.1 Background

‘Money mules’ are individuals, recruited by criminals, who move proceeds of crime through bank accounts, cash, and cryptocurrency. Money muling represents a significant challenge in the UK’s fight against economic crime, identified as a key enabler of fraud, and many other crimes, in the UK’s Economic Crime Plan 2 and regarded as a system priority for tackling by the NCA (2025) and wider public and private sector partners. The Fraud Strategy 2026 to 2029 further outlines government priorities for combatting financial exploitation linked to ‘exploitative money laundering’.

Despite intelligence indicating that money mules operate at scale, there remains a significant gap in evidence about the lived experiences of those involved. As part of the Money Mule and Financial Exploitation Action Plan 2024, which recognised this knowledge gap, the Home Office committed to explore options for new research to develop a deeper understanding of how and why people get involved in money mule networks.

Scoping work was conducted to explore and assess the feasibility of primary research with money mules during 2022 to 2024. This methodical approach was necessary given the potential sensitivities, the challenges of accessing the money mule population, and the associated ethical considerations.

The Home Office commissioned Ipsos UK to carry out this research to build further understanding of the journeys into and out of money muling, as well as risk factors and harms associated with it. This study provides critical insights to inform future campaigns and interventions to prevent people from getting involved in money muling and assist those currently or previously involved.

1.2 Definition of money mules and money muling

For this project, the following definition of money muling was adopted: ‘money muling is moving the proceeds of crime through one’s financial accounts on behalf of criminals, sometimes in exchange for payment or other benefit. Some of the individuals move funds knowingly, whereas others can be unaware that what they are doing is illegal, and some may feel they have no choice’. The overall purpose of money muling is to place distance between a crime and its pay out by creating complex transaction chains.

Literature indicates that individuals can be involved in money muling in different ways and with differing levels of knowledge of the underlying criminality. There are 3 notable points on this spectrum of complicity (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2019):

• ‘complicit’ money mules, who knowingly use their bank accounts (new or existing) to receive illegal funds, participating in criminal activity
• ‘witting’ money mules, who ignore obvious red flags or suspect that they may be taking part in illegal activity, but continue to move money
• ‘unwitting’ money mules who are unaware that they are doing something illegal

There are also ‘unknowing’ money mules, where access to the financial account is acquired without the victim’s knowledge (such as identity theft) (Home Office 2024).

It is important to note that while these existing approaches to classifying money mules provide a useful framework, they are not necessarily standalone or fixed. Some money mules may become more or less aware of the transactions, or the type of crime they involve over time. This is explored further in section 2.1 which touches on awareness and understanding of money muling.

1.3 Research objectives

The overall objective of this research was to expand the limited evidence base on the lived experience of money muling, a financial crime which is not well understood. Key research questions included:

• Who are the recruiters targeting? What are the methods of recruitment?
• What are some of the vulnerabilities to becoming a money mule?
• What are the factors that influence initial entry into money muling?
• What are the factors that influence continuation of money muling activity? What prevents exit?
• What are the factors that influence exit from money muling?
• What are the potential intervention points for individuals involved in money muling activity? What type of support do people need?
• What are the harms and impacts of money muling?
• To what extent is there an interaction of money muling with other crime types, or patterns in cases of multiple exploitation?

1.4 Summary of methodology

This exploratory research represents one of the first direct engagements with money mules in the UK, offering new insights to improve understanding of money muling experiences and potential intervention points. It employed a mixed-methods approach, which was informed by the scoping work undertaken before this study. The detailed methodology can be found in the Section 7.2 in the Annex. The design combined the following methods.

1.4.1 Online survey

An online survey of individuals who indicated willingness to engage in money muling. This was conducted to gather broad insights into people willing to engage/previously engaged in money muling and to identify potential interview participants. All potential respondents answered a series of hypothetical screening questions designed to gauge their willingness to engage in money muling scenarios (see Section 7.4 in the Annex). Only those who indicated willingness to engage in money muling were invited to take part in the survey. The survey was then conducted in 2 waves: wave 1 fieldwork between 17 December 2024 and 7 January 2025; and wave 2 fieldwork between 6 and 28 May 2025. In total, 208 individuals completed the survey, of whom, 99 reported having engaged in money muling activities.

A £5 charity donation incentive was offered. The non-representative sampling method (social media, panel recruitment) means that the results from the screener cannot be generalised to the general population or all those willing to engage in money muling. Additionally, since the demographic profile of UK money mules is unknown, we cannot assess how well the achieved sample represents the wider money muling population. Therefore, all findings should be considered indicative rather than generalisable to all money mules.

1.4.2 In-depth qualitative interviews with former money mules

Nine in-depth qualitative interviews with former money mules. Due to ethical considerations, the research protocol excluded individuals aged 17 and under, those currently engaged in money muling activities, and those undergoing prosecution for money muling offences. Most interviewees were recruited from the survey strand of the project. The participant-led interviews with money mules were conducted remotely via telephone or video call, lasting up to one hour. The research offered a £30 charity donation as an incentive. The final sample comprised 9 individuals: 7 women and 2 men, aged 24 to 40, from various locations across England and Scotland.

As an exploratory study with a hard-to-reach population, these qualitative data represent a reasonable range of experiences across age, gender and experiences of money muling. Therefore, it considerably adds to the existing evidence on this topic. However, it is important to note that none of the qualitative participants knew their actions constituted money muling. Therefore, this report primarily documents the experiences of individuals at the unwitting end of the complicity spectrum, with limited insights into those who were wittingly involved. Pen portraits of each participant are available in the Annex, outlining their individual journeys.

1.4.3 In-depth qualitative interviews with professionals

Eleven in-depth qualitative interviews with professionals who directly interact with or support individuals engaged in money muling activity. These interviews were conducted remotely via telephone or video call, lasting up to one hour. They were semi-structured, with no incentives offered. The achieved sample comprised 11 professionals (4 from law enforcement, 5 from support organisations, 2 from banks).

1.4.4 Polling with members of the public

This report also incorporates data from 2 national polls, or surveys, previously conducted for the Home Office by Ipsos UK. This includes (with further information on their respective methodologies in Section 7.2 of the Annex):

• i:omnibus polling (between 22 and 28 March 2024): explored respondents’ perceptions of the legality of various scenarios and their own experiences of money muling; sample: 2,233 respondents aged 16 to 75 in the UK
• KnowledgePanel polling (between 15 and 21 February 2024): explored respondents’ encounters with money mule recruitment and their willingness to engage in a hypothetical money muling scenario; sample: 2,114 respondents aged 16 to 75 in Great Britain

The full findings from these polls are also published separately.

1.5 Analysis

The survey data were analysed through descriptive statistics to identify patterns and trends. The qualitative data were analysed thematically, using the COM-B behavioural model (Michie et al., 2011) as a framework to systematically identify factors influencing money muling behaviour. This model was selected as it provided a useful framework to address the key research questions, helping to identify influences that lead individuals to engage in money muling and what causes them to continue or disengage.

The COM-B model suggests that 3 key factors are needed for a behaviour to occur or change:

• capability encompasses an individual’s psychological and physical ability to carry out a behaviour, such as their knowledge, cognitive and physical skills, and emotional capacity
• opportunity addresses external factors that enable or constrain behaviour, such as social influences, environmental contexts and physical surroundings
• motivation explores the conscious and subconscious cognitive processes that affect behaviour, including attitudes, beliefs, intentions and emotional responses

A key advantage of the COM-B approach is its integration with the Behaviour Change Wheel (BCW) framework. This connection allows identified influences to be systematically mapped to potential intervention strategies (see Section 7.1 in the Annex). In this report, at key points in the money muling journey (entry and exit), the COM-B analysis is mapped against the BCW, linking findings to potential interventions (see Table 2.1 and Table 4.1). However, when interpreting findings organised through this framework, it should be noted that the model helps identify potential intervention points but does not establish causal relationships.

1.6 How to interpret the findings

1.6.1 Terminology

Where possible, each chapter integrates findings from all data sources (survey data, polling data, qualitative interviews with money mules and qualitative interviews with professionals). When drawing on different data sources, it specifies where each finding comes from. For clarity and consistency throughout the report:

• ‘money mules’ refers to individuals who engaged in money muling activity
• ‘professionals’ refers to stakeholders who participated in interviews (with the sector specified if necessary)
• ‘qualitative participants’ refers to all participants (both money mules and professionals) who took part in the in-depth interviews
• ‘research participants’ is used when findings echo views from across both the survey participants and qualitative participants
• ‘survey respondents’ is used when talking about findings from the survey conducted as part of this project, while ‘polling’ is used when talking about findings from previously run polling studies, carried out as part of scoping work

Professionals mentioned money mule demographics when discussing their knowledge and experiences. To clarify, when the report refers to young people, professionals were generally referring to individuals between the ages of 16 to 24 years. Therefore, when referring to ‘young people’ in the report, we adapt this wider definition, rather than the Market Research Society (MRS) definition (which defines ‘young people’ as those aged 16 and 17 years old). We add the term ‘children’ where professionals spoke of those 15 years old and under.

The term ‘young professionals’ is used for those who are actively engaged in the labour market, but still at the beginning of their career (such as individuals who have recently graduated or left the education system to enter the job market).

1.6.2 Presentation of survey data

Given the exploratory nature of the research and its non-representative sample, results are presented as both percentages and numbers. This dual approach helps readers interpret findings appropriately given the small sample, particularly for heavily routed questions with smaller base sizes. We only report on questions with a base of 20 or above. Throughout the report, we reference 2 levels of survey data:

Individual level (n=208 for all respondents, or n=99 for respondents who were money mules): All of the respondents answered general questions about their demographics and circumstances. Those who indicated they engaged in money muling were also asked about their overall experiences and impacts of money muling. Graphs and analyses at this level specify whether they use the full sample (n=208) or money mule sub-sample (n=99).

Activity level (n=251): Many respondents reported having engaged in several types of money muling activity. Across all 99 money mule respondents, 251 distinct money muling activities were captured. The survey collected information about each activity separately (for example, recruitment route, type of account used, motivation, number of transactions). When presenting activity-specific data, graphs and analyses use a base reflecting the number of relevant activities rather than individuals (n=251). The question wording and response options can be found in the detailed methodology section in the Annex.

Verbatim quotes have been included to illustrate the data presented. To protect participants’ anonymity, quotes have not been attributed to specific individuals or organisations.

1.7 Overview of report

This report summarises the findings of primary research into the experiences of money muling. This introductory chapter provided background to the project, an overview of research questions, as well as the approach and methodology. The remainder of the report is structured as follows:

Chapter 2: Entry into money muling: discusses how individuals are targeted and recruited, including characteristics and vulnerabilities that make certain groups more likely to be targeted. It explores COM-B factors that led individuals to become engaged in money muling, as well as potential support and intervention points to prevent engagement.

Chapter 3: Taking part in money muling: outlines money mules’ experiences of being involved in the activity, structured around factors which prevented them from exiting, keeping them engaged in money muling.

Chapter 4: Exit from money muling: details the findings on the enablers of exiting from money muling. It also provides potential support and intervention options to further enable individuals’ exit.

Chapter 5: Impacts of involvement in money muling: discusses the impacts experienced by individuals after exiting money muling, as well as support and intervention needs at this point in their journey.

Chapter 6: Conclusions: brings together key findings and conclusions from the report.

Annex: includes the detailed methodology, pen portraits of money mule participants, and the survey screening questionnaire.

2. Entry into money muling

2.1 Awareness and understanding of ‘money muling’
2.2 Recruitment methods
2.3 Factors leading individuals to engage in money muling
2.4 Support and interventions which could disrupt or prevent entry into money muling

This chapter discusses how individuals become involved in money muling activities. It assumes the definition of money muling as “the movement of proceeds of crime through one’s financial accounts on behalf of criminals, sometimes in exchange for payment or other benefit; some of the individuals move funds knowingly, whereas others can be unaware that what they’re doing is illegal, and some may feel they have no choice”.

The chapter begins by exploring general awareness and understanding of money muling amongst research participants, then analyses recruitment methods and targeting strategies. This chapter then explores the factors that can lead individuals to engage in money muling, structured according to the COM-B behavioural model. It also highlights potential intervention points that could disrupt this journey.

2.1 Awareness and understanding of ‘money muling’

The data show that the term ‘money muling’ and its definition were not widely recognised or understood by those who had engaged in the activity. Around half of all survey respondents (53%; 111 out of 208 respondents) either had never heard of the term ‘money muling’ or had heard of it but did not know what it meant. Similarly, during qualitative interviews, money mules demonstrated varying levels of awareness. None of the qualitative participants knew the term ‘money muling’ when becoming engaged in the activity. Those who became aware of the term were informed of it by their bank or law enforcement once these agencies became involved.

Some participants were presented with the term and definition during this research. They confirmed their experiences matched that definition – particularly the aspects describing a lack of awareness about illegality or feeling coerced into participation. One participant noted that, upon the closure of their account by a bank, they tried to seek information online but did not come across this term. The bank did not inform them of the reason for their account closure, so it took a long time for them to become aware of what had happened. Ultimately, it was a financial advisor who informed the participant about money muling.

A key finding was the significant divergence in how professional sectors perceived the criminality of money mules. While all understood the nature and purpose of money muling, their definitions of victimhood and complicity differed. Support organisations adopted the broadest definition of victimhood and consistently framed money mules as victims of financial abuse. From their perspective, even those who benefited financially should be classed as ‘unwitting’ if they were unaware of the money’s source or the illegal nature of the activity.

“My sort of main takeaway would be recognising that they’ve actually been put in this situation not through choice sometimes, not through, you know, knowing it at all. And that sort of lack of awareness and education that people have on money muling… I think it’s really important that they are treated as a victim.”

Support organisation stakeholder

In contrast, law enforcement and banks made distinctions based on vulnerability and awareness. Law enforcement participants described classifying those aged 17 and under and those with other vulnerabilities (such as due to disability) as victims of financial exploitation. For other adults, the determination of being ‘witting’ depended on whether they had a clear or genuine understanding of their involvement. Similarly, banks concentrated on awareness as the key factor, using it to distinguish between witting and unwitting mules.

“Which is why it’s all the Protect officers in force that end up doing the money mule awareness, because it can be a bit of a grey area because there is the vulnerability factor that, you know, if you are… You’re being recruited because you could be completely unwitting. Are you a victim? Are you an offender? Technically you’re an offender, but you’re also a victim as well.”

Law enforcement stakeholder

The data on whether the distinction between witting and unwitting money mules led to different interventions or strategies by official agencies was limited, so it is difficult to know the full impact of this divergence in perceptions.

2.2 Recruitment methods

Money muling recruitment occurred through multiple channels, with both online and face-to-face approaches playing significant roles. While professionals often perceived social media recruitment as the predominant pathway, our research revealed a more complex picture across both qualitative interviews and survey responses. Digital channels represented a crucial recruitment pathway, with the survey identifying email and text messaging or other messaging service (such as WhatsApp or Telegram) as the top 2 recruitment methods (see Figure 2.1 below representing the different money muling activities captured by the survey). Social media platforms mentioned by survey respondents included Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, and TikTok. These findings are echoed by KnowledgePanel polling, which identified email (54%), text message (32%), messaging apps (29%), and social media (28%) as main routes through which individuals were directly asked to receive money into their personal bank and/or crypto account.

Figure 2.1: Methods through which survey respondents first received a money mule recruitment request or heard about an opportunity

Response	Proportion of money muling activities
An email	29%
A text message or other messaging service	24%
Word of mouth	18%
An advertisement online	9%
A direct message on social media	9%
A social media post	8%

Base: n=251. In total, 99 participants engaged in 251 separate money muling activities. The above proportions are based on the number of money muling activities identified, rather than the number of survey respondents.

Qualitative participants described being recruited through various digital channels, including social media posts, dating apps, messaging platforms (Telegram, WhatsApp groups) and fake job advertisements. These online approaches typically originated from strangers or individuals with whom participants had only digital connections (such as social media influencers). Professionals reported that the relative anonymity of these channels can be a strategic advantage for recruiters, allowing them to cast a wide net with minimal personal risk.

In contrast to online methods, face-to-face recruitment typically used existing relationships; 18% (45 out of 251 activities reported by 99 respondents) of money muling activities captured by the survey had been recruited through word of mouth. Qualitative participants described being approached by colleagues, romantic partners or friends. Professionals also highlighted that children and young people are at risk of being recruited face-to-face outside of schools.

Generally, recruiters tailored their methods of recruitment to exploit specific vulnerabilities, including age, financial need or naivety. This targeting manifested in distinct approaches for different demographic groups. Professionals reflected that children and young people can be targeted through social media posts promising quick and easy earnings. These posts use slang and youth-orientated language that adults do not often understand, alongside images of cash and lavish lifestyles. Notably, these recruitment methods often do not attempt to conceal the act of moving money but misrepresent them as safe and legal. Support organisations suggested that this use of relatable language helps create a sense of familiarity among children and young people, potentially making them more likely to trust the message and engage with it.

“They [the recruiters] say, ‘I’ve got opportunity for you to make some money. You don’t need to sell drugs, you don’t need to go in and do county lines. It’s safe, there’s no risk. Just do that for me.”

Support organisation stakeholder

In contrast, both professionals and money mules discussed how young professionals can be targeted through investment opportunities or fake job advertisements. These methods obscure the money muling activity behind a believable narrative.

2.3 Factors leading individuals to engage in money muling

This section outlines the COM-B analysis of qualitative interviews with money mules and professionals, and survey respondents. The analysis used the 3 dimensions (capability, opportunity, motivation) to identify what influenced the individuals to become involved in money muling and is structured thematically.

Findings suggest that entry into money muling results from interconnected barriers across capability, motivation and opportunity:

• limited capability – primarily through lack of awareness that money muling is criminal – can undermine individuals’ ability to evaluate the opportunity or apply moral/legal frameworks to their decisions
• opportunity - the awareness gap is exploited through opportunity factors; recruiters can deliberately target those experiencing financial instability, loneliness or existing crime victimisation, while leveraging trust through personal connections or sophisticated fraudulent fronts
• motivation factors around financial want, compounded by societal pressure to enhance lifestyle, further encourage engagement

2.3.1 Lack of awareness

Limited awareness of consequences

Both money mules and professional participants identified insufficient understanding of money muling’s criminality as a common factor leading to involvement. They reflected that without knowing that moving money between accounts could be illegal, it was hard to identify the opportunities presented to them as fraudulent or suspicious.

In the i:omnibus polling, only around a fifth (18%) of respondents correctly identified all 3 hypothetical money muling scenarios as illegal. Recognition rates were higher for individual scenarios (between 37% and 61%, as seen below in Figure 2.2, suggesting that some types of money muling were more widely recognised as illegal.

Figure 2.2: Proportion of i:omnibus respondents legal classification of each fictitious money muling scenario

Statement	Illegal	Legal	Don’t know	Prefer not to say	Total
Olivia sees an opportunity on social media to make money through her bank account. She provides her bank details and access to her bank account to an organisation in return receives £5000 plus on-going commission.	37%	36%	27%	1%	100%
After applying online, Aisha has been offered a role as a money transfer agent. On the instruction of her new employer, Aisha opens a new personal bank account to manage her business transactions through.	41%	30%	28%	1%	100%
Harry has been getting to know someone online over the last few weeks. They ask Harry if he can receive money into his personal bank account and transfer it to an unknown third party. Harry agrees and makes the transaction.	61%	22%	17%	1%	100%

Base: 2,233 adults aged 16 to 75 in the UK, fieldwork between 22 and 28 March 2024.

There was also limited awareness about the consequences of involvement in money muling. Professionals across sectors emphasised that money mules were often unaware of the serious legal consequences of their involvement, or the long-term impacts on their financial and personal futures. This was supported by the experience of money mule participants, who consistently reported not recognising that their actions constituted a criminal offence.

Law enforcement and support organisation professionals expressed particular concern about the knowledge gap among children and young people, who typically understood the consequences of more visible crimes like carrying weapons or selling drugs, yet remained unaware of money muling’s serious implications. The i:omnibus polling reinforced this concern: only one-in-10 (12%) of polling respondents aged 16 to 24 correctly identified the 3 hypothetical scenarios as illegal, compared with just under a third (27%) of respondents aged 55 to 75.

“During that time, I didn’t even know that kind of stuff exists or can happen, so now that we are talking about it, I actually think, ‘Wow, this kind of thing can actually be financial crime, can lead to something else.’ [And now], I can think more in another way, [like] ‘What if it goes wrong?’”

Money mule

“Ignorance is a huge risk, okay? If people are ignorant, they will do things that perhaps if they had known about what they were doing, they wouldn’t have done.”

Support organisation stakeholder

Limited awareness of criminal funds

Law enforcement participants emphasised that money mules are typically unaware of the source and wider implications of the funds they transfer. They explained that money mules typically do not know the specific origin of the funds they handle – whether from drug trafficking, human exploitation or other organised crime. Consequently, they remain oblivious to the broader criminal system they are facilitating and the real-world harm it causes to victims.

“But the criminality in the middle, the human trafficking, the organised immigration crime, the prostitution, the drugs, there’s all sorts of murkiness that people aren’t aware of. So, they just think, ‘I’m moving money from a fraud’, but they don’t know what it is, they don’t know it’s hurting anybody. So, that needs to be out there all the time by everybody.”

Law enforcement stakeholder

Money mule participants unanimously reported no awareness of a connection between the funds they managed and broader criminal activities when engaging in money muling. However, one participant discovered after completing a transaction that the money was transferred to a gang. This realisation came because they cohabitated with the recruiter, granting them access to the recruiter’s devices and communications – an access most money mules do not have.

Limited moral and legal framing

There was a notable absence of legal or moral considerations when deciding to engage in money muling activities among money mule participants. This stemmed directly from their limited awareness of criminality or organised crime connections. Without recognising their actions as illegal, participants were unable to make informed ethical or legal judgements.

The moral framing differed significantly based on the recruitment context. Those recruited through trusted individuals viewed their actions through the lens of interpersonal loyalty rather than legality. These participants thought of their actions as “doing a favour for a friend”, effectively recasting criminal activity into a framework of social support and obligation.

When participants did engage in risk assessment, they concentrated narrowly on personal consequences rather than broader legal or ethical implications. One participant described evaluating the risks of sharing their bank details with strangers and considering potential personal harm, but admitted they had never recognised the criminal nature of the activity:

“Well, I wouldn’t say I was comfortable with it. You know, sharing out your details to a stranger, someone you didn’t know much about, but I would say because I wasn’t harmed… But like you said, this is a financial crime, so something like this shouldn’t have been going on.”

Money mule

This illustrates how participants’ evaluations of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ concentrated on personal safety, trust relationships and immediate consequences, with no incorporation of criminality into their decision-making process. This finding highlights how the absence of legal awareness fundamentally alters the motivational landscape, removing what would typically be a substantial barrier to engaging in criminal behaviour. For instance, a participant recruited by a colleague to carry out a single transaction reflected that they would not have agreed to do it had they known it was illegal.

2.3.2 Lack of due diligence or reflective judgement

Interviews with money mules identified patterns of insufficient due diligence and reflective judgement. This was often attributed by both professionals and money mules themselves to a fundamental lack of awareness regarding the nature of money muling. This ignorance meant individuals were often unable to recognise the associated warning signs of a fraudulent scheme. It is important to note, personal circumstances can diminish the ability to critically evaluate situations, a factor explored separately in Section 2.3.3.

The pattern of poor due diligence was particularly evident among participants recruited through false job adverts. While these individuals often made some effort to verify information, their enquiries were not always sufficient in scope or depth. They tended to concentrate on the details of the role rather than investigating the legitimacy of the employer or the opportunity itself. For instance, one money mule participant was recruited through a job advert which described the role as a contractor. They researched what being a contractor meant and how contractors are typically paid, but did not verify the legitimacy of the company itself. Participants in this situation often explained that their lack of prior experience in similar roles meant they did not know what to expect and were therefore unable to identify red flags.

“I guess I was naive and thinking, ‘Oh wow this is a really good job. I’ve found the jackpot.’ If it sounds too good to be true, it usually is.”

Money mule

A similar lack of scrutiny was observed among those recruited through personal connections. In these cases, individuals were inclined to trust the recruiter and therefore did not question the nature of the activity they were asked to engage in. This exploitation of pre-existing trust represents a distinct vulnerability to being recruited and is explored in greater detail in Section 2.3.4.

2.3.3 Vulnerabilities

A consistent finding across data sources – survey responses, money mule interviews, and professional perspectives – was the strong link between experiencing life difficulties and being recruited into money muling. Both survey (see Figure 2.3 below) and qualitative data highlighted specific challenging circumstances that create opportunities for recruiters to exploit. These circumstances in turn could diminish money mules’ capability to evaluate risk or think critically about the opportunities presented to them.

Figure 2.3: Proportion of respondents reporting various life difficulties at the time of completing the survey or within the past 5 years

Response	Money mules	Individuals willing to engage in money muling, who have not engaged
Being a victim of fraud	60%	38%
Isolation or loneliness	58%	47%
Severe financial stress	51%	34%
Job instability	47%	39%
Loss of employment	41%	32%
Being a victim of a different crime	37%	14%

Base: All participants (n=208) were screened in based on their willingness to engage in hypothetical money muling scenarios (see the Annex for screening questions). The above chart is based on those who then indicated that they had engaged in it (‘Money mules’, n=99), and those who were willing to but had not engaged (n=109).

Financial instability

Financial instability emerged as a primary vulnerability factor across all data sources. Among survey respondents who had engaged in money muling, 47% (47 out of 99 respondents) had faced job instability, 51% (50 out of 99 respondents) had experienced severe financial stress and 41% (41 out of 99 respondents) had lost their job within the last 5 years. This was reinforced in money mule interviews, where participants described experiences of unemployment, unexpected financial setbacks and societal pressures to increase their income.

Professionals across sectors emphasised that money muling tends to flourish in communities already experiencing broader social challenges, particularly economic deprivation or gang presence. They attributed this to the compounding effect of limited legitimate opportunities and financial need, which makes illicit money movement proposals more appealing:

“If you have low attainment opportunities, you come from, a place where there’s a lot of poverty, a lot of gangs. A lot of these things hold a lot of young people back and this opportunity comes and it seems like a really good opportunity.”

Support organisation stakeholder

Financial instability impaired money mule participants’ ability to critically examine opportunities. Both money mule and professional participants felt that being in financial need played upon a money mule’s naivety when they decided to engage. One money mule participant, desperate for income due to long-term unemployment, reflected on their lack of diligence in accepting a job offer that they insufficiently scrutinised. They felt that they would not do this now that they were more financially stable.

“Usually, I’d be a bit more cautious and look more into things. But because I was so, sort of, needing a job as soon as possible, I just took anything that came my way.”

Money mule

Additionally, professionals stressed that recruiters deliberately exploit naivety and financial need when targeting specific youth demographics. Groups identified as particularly vulnerable included children and young people outside of mainstream education, school leavers, and those within the care system. These demographics were thought to be targeted due to a combination of urgent financial need and limited financial literacy, alongside a weak support system, which can impair their ability to recognise and question a fraudulent offer.

“With the young people that we’ve worked with… [the] majority of them lack financial education or financial awareness. They are naive…They didn’t know the consequences or they were deceived… The people who present [the opportunity] to them are not honest with them. They do not tell them exactly where the money’s coming from or how they’re going to acquire it, but because these young people need money to survive and they just go ahead with it without doing their proper research or without being cautious, and then they end up getting in trouble.”

Support organisation stakeholder

Similarly, money mule participants indicated that financial instability could increase an individual’s appetite for risk. Around two-thirds (64%; 134 out of 208) of survey respondents who presented a willingness to engage in money muling stated that ‘they were willing to take some risks to grow their money, but they also wanted to protect what they had’. For example, one money mule participant described how their need for money made them more willing to take risks, as they were working multiple part-time jobs while caring for children in the household.

Loneliness and social isolation

Loneliness emerged as another significant vulnerability factor, with 58% (57 out of 99) of survey respondents who engaged in money muling reporting experiences of isolation or loneliness in the last 5 years. Professionals noted that recruiters deliberately target emotionally vulnerable individuals, particularly in the context of romance fraud and domestic abuse. In these cases, recruiters intentionally isolate victims, limiting their access to support systems and eroding their ability to resist demands. Professionals described how, by becoming the sole source of emotional support, recruiters systematically undermined the victim’s judgement.

Case study example – loneliness affecting the participant’s capability to agree to requests.

A money mule participant, recruited by their abusive partner, reflected how the partner had purposefully restricted contact with their loved ones, leaving them isolated. They added that, because of their isolation, they believed everything their partner said and were less likely to question the requests of the transactions they made.

“He blocked people, but I thought they’d blocked me. So, I only had him, and anything he said to me I, kind of, believed. So, when he said to me about moving money and I’d get paid for it, I didn’t think anything bad at the time.”

Money mule

Money muling within a wider context of criminality

Qualitative data suggest that money muling can both precede and follow on from other forms of victimisation. Professionals across sectors and money mule participants described coercive recruitment tactics; for example, cases where individuals were forced into money muling through criminal intimidation, including threats of violence or blackmail with personal images. Significantly, coercive recruitment typically involved pre-existing relationships – peers, family members or romantic partners (including domestic abusers) – highlighting the complex interplay between social connections and criminal exploitation and victimisation.

This is supported by the survey and polling data sources, which identified a relationship between money muling opportunities and other victimisation. Among KnowledgePanel polling respondents who had experienced cybercrime or fraud in the last 12 months, 22 % had also seen online money muling adverts or postings, and 10% had been directly asked to receive money into their personal account. These figures were significantly lower for respondents who had not experienced cybercrime or fraud in the last 12 months, with only 11% seeing online adverts and postings, and 4% receiving direct requests. While KnowledgePanel respondents were not asked if they ultimately engaged with these opportunities, it identifies a potential link between encountering the opportunities and other victimisation within a sample which is nationally representative of the general population. Moreover, the survey with money mules found that 60% (57 out of 99) of money mule respondents had been fraud victims, and 37% (37 out of 99) had experienced other crimes within the last 5 years.

A law enforcement participant highlighted how money laundering serves as a core operational component for criminal networks, often functioning as an entry point to wider gang or organised crime group (OCG) involvement. A support organisation participant reported that criminals recruit individuals with promises of legitimate earnings (taking advantage of participants’ lack of awareness that money muling is illegal), then use coercion tactics to engage them in other criminal activities, such as drug dealing through county lines, once they are no longer useful to money muling (for example, after bank account closure).

“Sometimes they’re befriended. A person who brings them in on the opportunity might have all the hallmarks of a money maker. […] And they say I’ve got opportunity for you to make some money. You don’t need to sell drugs, you don’t need to go in and do county lines. It’s safe, there’s no risk. Just do that for me.”

Support organisation stakeholder

2.3.4 Trust in the recruiter or opportunity

Trust in the recruiter

A key factor that led participants to engage in money muling was their trust in the recruiter. This trust commonly resulted from a personal connection. Out of all the money muling activities reported in the survey, 80% (201 out of 251 activities) occurred at the request of either an online or in-person friend, romantic partner or family member (Figure 2.4 below). Only 10% (24 out of 251) of reported activities were through someone they did not know beforehand. Qualitative participants reinforced this, with accounts of being recruited by colleagues, partners, friends, and friends of friends. Importantly, this trust could also develop solely through online interactions – one support organisation outlined an example of an individual being recruited online through romance fraud, where the request to move money came after the recruiter built a relationship with the individual, gaining their trust and loyalty. Similarly, another participant trusted an influencer they had followed for a long time, feeling as though they knew them personally.

“When there’s an emotional connection to it, if someone’s trying to refer you in that way, a friend or a family member, it’s very convincing. And it’s almost this big sticker of approval and a big stamp that says approved, […] because if you trust anyone in this life, it’s your friend and your family.”

Support organisation stakeholder

Figure 2.4: How well respondents knew the person who requested them to move money through their personal accounts/provide them access to their bank or financial accounts

Response	Proportion of money muling activities
I had a good connection with them, in person or online only (a friend)	51%
I am related to them (a family member)	15%
I had a romantic connection to them, in person or online only (a romantic partner)	14%
I knew them but I did not count them as a friend (an acquaintance)	10%
I didn’t know them	6%
I didn’t know them, but they were introduced to me by someone I know	4%

Base: n=251. In total, 99 participants engaged in 251 separate money muling activities. The above proportions are based on the number of money muling activities identified, rather than the number of survey respondents.

For those recruited through job offers, trust was established through seemingly legitimate recruitment processes rather than personal connections. For example, one participant described going through what appeared to be a standard recruitment process – including a job interview and formal offer letter – which convinced them that the opportunity was legitimate. Money mule participants described various narratives used by recruiters, but these typically centred on the recruiter having difficulties with their own bank account and requesting help with transactions. The established trust in the recruiter effectively functioned as a barrier to critical evaluation of the activity. Even among participants who recognised some level of risk, trust in personal connections diminished these perceptions.

Survey responses highlighted the complex role of personal connections in shaping assessments of risk. Although 48% (99 out of 208) of participants claimed they would be unlikely to do something financially risky at the request of a close friend or family member, almost a third of respondents (32%; 66 out of 208) said they moved money as a favour to a friend without receiving any financial benefit (Figure 2.5). One money mule participant, recruited through a colleague, was offered payment but declined, feeling they were helping a friend and therefore did not need compensation.

“I think it’s risky to just give your details to someone you don’t know, but because the person was a friend of my friend, I was rest assured.”

Money mule

Figure 2.5: Proportion of respondents who have engaged in the following activities within the past 5 years

Statement	Proportion of survey respondents
Moved money as a favour to a friend/acquaintance with no financial benefit	32%
Moved money in exchange for a payment	29%
Gave access to online bank/financial account for a payment	21%
Gave access to credit/debit card for a payment	21%
Moved money because someone made you	18%

Base: All participants (n=208)

This contradiction suggests that individuals recruited via trusted sources simply may not perceive money muling requests as risky. Qualitative interviews indicated that individuals recruited through trusted connections bypassed risk evaluation entirely, framing their participation as “doing their friend/colleague a favour” rather than engaging in a potentially illegal activity. This clearly shows how some of the factors described above influence and strengthen each other, such as trust in the recruiter (motivation) reducing individuals’ reflective judgement (capability).

Trust in the opportunity

Trust in the opportunity was particularly compelling as a factor enabling entry into money muling among those who were recruited as part of a job or investment opportunity. A bank professional explained that scams have become increasingly sophisticated, making them difficult to identify, even for individuals who attempted critical assessment and exercised caution. For example, one money mule participant described how recruiters cloned a legitimate business website to use as a recruitment front. Despite researching the company, they found no signs of fraud. The bank professional noted that this growing sophistication may explain why they are identifying increasing numbers of ‘unwitting’ money mules. This can include individuals who have made reasonable verification attempts but were deceived by convincing fraudulent fronts.

2.3.5 Societal pressure

Financial want

While financial instability represented an external circumstance that could create vulnerability to money muling recruitment (as discussed in Section 2.3.3), financial want represented an internal psychological drive that could motivate engagement. These factors could overlap – some of the money mules spoken to in this research experienced both financial hardship and a desire for additional income – but they could also operate independently. The motivation to earn more money, even when basic needs were met, was particularly highlighted by law enforcement and bank professionals as a distinct driver of money muling behaviour. Of the money muling activities captured in the survey, almost a quarter (23%; 58 out of 251 activities) included the desire to earn extra money to enhance one’s lifestyle as one of the reasons the participant decided to engage in that activity.

Professionals across sectors emphasised that both the desire for quick money and pursuing social status were key motivating factors. When coupled with naivety or lack of critical evaluation, they said certain groups were put at particular risk of engaging in money muling: young professionals looking for investment opportunities; and individuals with limited English language skills (such as international students or foreign workers). This perspective was supported by accounts from money mule participants. One participant, who described their life as stable at the time, was motivated by a desire to increase their income and capital. This led them to agree to move funds for a friend in exchange for payment.

Peer and social influences

Both qualitative and quantitative sources suggested that peer and societal pressure to earn more money was a factor contributing to money mule involvement. Of survey respondents who engaged in money muling, 83% (82 out of 99 respondents) stated they felt either a little or a lot of pressure from family, friends or wider society to earn more money to enhance their lifestyle. Law enforcement participants highlighted that social media posts featuring designer goods and money attracted people by appealing to their desire for social status and a lavish lifestyle. One money mule participant shared that, at the time of engaging in money muling, they felt pressure to earn more money because their partner was wealthier than them. Law enforcement and support organisation professionals argued that children and young people could be especially vulnerable to peer pressure.

2.4 Support and interventions which could disrupt or prevent entry into money muling

Having examined the factors that lead individuals into money muling, this section outlines participants’ suggestions for mitigation and disruption strategies. They are also summarised in Table 2.1 at the end of the chapter.

Overall, a consensus emerged across all data sources on the importance of prioritising prevention, particularly through raising awareness of money muling and its consequences. As COM-B analysis revealed, limited awareness could reduce an individual’s capability to recognise money muling as a criminal activity, making them more vulnerable to recruitment.

Therefore, awareness-raising was seen by both professional participants and money mules as the first step to prevention. Professionals outlined existing efforts across sectors to raise awareness of money muling, but described them as fragmented, localised, and disjointed. Individual banks carry out their own awareness campaigns, while police resources dedicated to money muling prevention vary by force and region. Some police forces have officers who specifically concentrate on money muling, but broader understanding within forces is often limited. While important, these efforts are unlikely to lead to the level of awareness needed to disrupt money muling more widely.

“I’ve provided the forces with a presentation that can be delivered to anybody at high school, college or university age. And I accompany it with presenter notes because it may well be that it could be a PCSO [Police Community Support Officer] that’s asked to go into a school and do a presentation and they wouldn’t have, like I didn’t […], they might not have a clue about money muling.”

Law enforcement stakeholder

Professionals across sectors emphasised that, while these isolated efforts are valuable, they are insufficient to generate the level of awareness needed to significantly disrupt money muling on a larger scale. They advocated for a unified, cross-sector approach that acknowledges the diverse pathways into money muling, recognising that no single sector can effectively target all vulnerable populations.

Research participants outlined several key principles that they thought should be taken into consideration when preparing awareness-raising or educational campaigns.

Personalisation of communications, reflecting the varied and individualised nature of recruitment routes: Some suggested very specific personalisation, not only by a primary characteristic (such as age), but also by regional factors (for example, whether an individual lives in an urban or rural area, or in regions like London or Northern England) and cultural or ethnic background. This personalisation could require adaptation of content, as well as language and delivery locations (formal settings, such as schools or workplaces, and informal venues, such as community centres or libraries).

Focus on tangible consequences of money muling: Both professionals and money mules emphasised that individuals are more likely to respond to concrete impacts they can personally relate to, rather than abstract threats of criminal prosecution. These tangible consequences include the inability to obtain a phone contract, student loan or mortgage .

“The thing that tends to horrify the younger generation is it would stop them from being able to get financed for the latest mobile phones. Honestly, you tell them they’re going to get a criminal record, you tell them it might stop them from being able to get a mortgage… […] but you tell them it’s going to stop them from being able to get the latest tech and mobile phones and they’re horrified. That’s a real, ‘oh my God, life’s not worth living’ kind of moment for them.”

Law enforcement stakeholder

Include lived experience examples in education or awareness campaigns: Support organisations emphasised that true stories bring the impacts of money muling to life and demonstrate that anyone can be vulnerable. These narratives could particularly address the trust factor that enables recruitment by showing how even trusted connections can involve someone in money muling.

Connect money muling to other serious crimes: Law enforcement suggested highlighting the source of funds to show how money muling can enable and be enabled by other serious crimes. They mentioned that this could particularly resonate with young people. During awareness-raising sessions at universities, law enforcement professionals found that students were less likely to engage after being told they might be moving funds acquired through (for example) human trafficking.

Build identification skills: Help individuals develop confidence and skills to identify warning signs, through fraud awareness courses that include money muling examples.

Beyond individual-focused awareness and education initiatives, money mule participants identified several structural approaches that distribute prevention responsibility more broadly across platforms and systems:

• enhanced verification processes: job listing websites should implement fact-checking processes before publishing advertisements to prevent fraudulent recruitment attempts
• platform accountability for fraudulent content: money mule participants emphasised that social media and job recruitment websites have a responsibility to remove fraudulent advertisements and warn users about scams; the Online Safety Act 2023 mandates such responsibilities for job websites – in response, the Jobs Aware scheme^{[footnote 3]} was launched in 2024, providing auditing and certification to help job boards identify, stop and report fraudulent activity related to job advertising; while jobseekers who use recruitment companies certified by Jobs Aware could face reduced exposure to fake jobs, there are currently only a few recruitment websites that have joined the scheme according to their website
• improved reporting systems: money mule participants also highlighted the importance of platforms, apps, and websites responding more quickly to reports of suspicious content or accounts

Table 2.1: Potential intervention strategies based upon the COM-B influences identified to prevent engagement

To achieve research objectives in identifying potential intervention points, the COM-B influences were mapped onto potential intervention strategies to prevent money mule engagement. All intervention strategies proposed below were mapped onto the influences through a combination of participant suggestions and wider analysis using the BCW. For more information on which intervention types (displayed in bold below) the BCW recommends for which COM-B influence, please refer to the Annex.

COM-B	Influences	Implications for behaviour change (intervention type/s)
Capability	1. Lack of awareness of the consequences 2. Lack of awareness of the criminal nature of the funds 3. Lack of reflective judgement	1, 2. Increase awareness of money muling consequences through broad communication strategies (education and persuasion) and targeted banking app notifications sent to individuals when completing a transaction (environmental structuring). 3. Adaptable guidance and training on identifying and responding to money muling requests to target critical evaluation skills. General financial literacy training, especially for younger demographics, could focus on identifying risky or illegitimate financial offers. 1, 2, 3. Lived experience examples within training, guidance, and advice, to make resources more relatable and demonstrate the consequences of money muling (enablement).
Opportunity	1. The vulnerabilities money mules are experiencing: financial instability, peer and social influences, loneliness, and the wider context of criminality 2. Scams being more complex and shared on social media and job websites	1. Bolster support for those vulnerable to money muling, especially those coerced into it (enablement). Survey respondents suggested banks offer transaction refusal options (such as warning passwords) to enable discrete requests for help. Similarly, a participant recruited by an abusive partner reflected they might have silently contacted the police if they had known this was an option at the time. 2. Social media and job websites to actively prevent and remove fraudulent postings, through encouragement to join JobsAware (environmental restructuring). Awareness raising of this scheme would also be of benefit (education). 2. Clearer verification processes for organisations to demonstrate legitimacy (environmental restructuring).
Motivation	1. Financial want 2. Their trust in the recruiter, both with recruiter as an individual and as an organisation 3. Limited doubt on the requests 4. Limited moral/legal framing	1, 4. General financial literacy training could also target how to perform financially sound rather than financially risky behaviours. 2, 3, 4. Banking apps to incorporate notifications highlighting potential risks from trusted sources and advising caution when individuals are uncertain of the true fund origins (environmental restructuring). 2, 3. Develop case studies and presentations featuring lived experiences of individuals who were recruited via trusted sources or scams, and how they disengaged (enablement). 4. Increased awareness of the money muling consequences and origins of the funds would enable individuals to assess opportunities within a moral or legal framing (education).

Figure 2.6: Visual map of Leanne’s journey, who is coerced into engaging by her abusive partner

See Pen portrait 7 for details.

3. Taking part in money muling

3.1 Money mule experiences
3.2 Factors preventing money mules from disengaging

This chapter examines the money muling experience from the perspective of all qualitative participants – both money mules and professionals. It explores factors which prevented money mules from exiting sooner and is structured in accordance with the COM-B thematic approach. Since individuals could receive support to exit at any point of their journey, intervention strategies to target these factors are discussed in Chapter 4.

3.1 Money mule experiences

Money mule experiences were typically brief – often involving single transactions or activities lasting less than a month. Around a third (36%; 91 out of the 251 activities) of reported money muling activities were one-time occurrences. Qualitative participants described experiences ranging from single same-day transactions to multiple transactions over several weeks – all lasting less than a month.

Activities ranged widely in size of transactions and how the transactions were arranged. They varied from a single £300,000 transaction (for which payment was offered but declined), to transactions starting at £20 and building up to £1,000 to £2,000. Additionally, one individual received transactions in increments of £50 to £60 and was asked to move the money forward once £160 to £170 had been received.

Both existing and newly opened bank accounts and cryptocurrency accounts were used. Of the money muling activities captured by the survey, around three-quarters (74%; 186 out of 251 activities) used an existing personal bank account and 16% (39 out of 251 activities) used an existing personal cryptocurrency account. Qualitative participants described setup periods involving either sharing existing account details or creating new accounts, both at banks and for cryptocurrency.

3.2 Factors preventing money mules from disengaging

This section outlines the COM-B analysis of qualitative interviews with money mules and professionals. It identifies the factors that prevented individuals from stopping the activities. External opportunity factors primarily prevented individuals from exiting: recruiters maintained intense, rapid contact that left no time for reflection (opportunity); sophisticated schemes mimicking legitimate jobs suppressed natural suspicions (motivation); and when doubts emerged, recruiters escalated from reassurance to coercion and threats (opportunity). For those experiencing broader exploitation (such as domestic abuse), exit became possible only when the wider abuse ended. Even when recognising problems, money mules faced fragmented support, inconsistent professional responses, and confusion over their victim-or-criminal status.

The trust in recruiters and/or the opportunity (discussed in Chapter 2) continued to impact individuals’ involvement in money muling. Where participants’ involvement went ahead as expected, they remained involved without suspicion. Some reported having ‘gut feelings’ that something was wrong, yet these instincts were overridden during participation through tactics explored below. Trust in recruiters (motivation factor discussed in Chapter 2) further suppressed suspicion – participants recruited through personal contacts handled amounts from £450 to £300,000 without concern.

3.2.1 Intense, rapid engagements and recruitment

Money mule participants reported that the compressed timeframe between agreement and first transaction – often just hours to days – substantially limited their ability to reflect and disengage. Recruiters maintained constant contact with participants, often daily through calls or messages on social media or messaging services such as Snapchat and WhatsApp, until the first transaction was completed. One money mule participant reflected how this tactic of regular contact meant that they did not have the time or space to reflect on the activity and subsequently disengage.

“They responded very quickly, there was no chance for me to sit back and think about things.”

Money mule

3.2.2 Complexity of scams

For participants who engaged through false job adverts, the complexity of the scams prevented them from recognising them as fraudulent. One participant, recruited for translation work, received an hourly salary plus commission on £50 to £60 transactions, which they forwarded to their ‘manager’ for processing. They received documents for translation and felt that the modest amounts were appropriate for their work, which avoided triggering their suspicion.

“[The small payments] made me feel relaxed. I felt that the documents I am translating, maybe this is what they are paying for.”

Money mule

Case study example – a complex job onboarding process prevented a participant from questioning the scheme.

One participant described a tiered induction process into a job role, characterised by incrementally increasing transaction amounts (using a cryptocurrency account). The participant’s initial involvement began with transactions of £20. Subsequent ‘promotions’ within the hierarchical structure of the scheme saw transaction values rise to between £100 and £200, eventually exceeding £1,000. This graduated system, presented as a training programme, created a sense of progression for the participant, and prevented them from developing doubts about the scheme’s legitimacy.

For this participant’s full journey, refer to Pen portrait 6 in the Annex.

3.2.3 Escalating persuasion and coercion

When suspicions arose, qualitative participants across all groups described how recruiters employed increasingly persistent tactics to ensure money mules completed transactions and continued their involvement. When money mules began expressing doubts, recruiters shifted to persuasive techniques. In some instances, the aim of these techniques was to maintain the participant’s trust. For example, one participant reported receiving images of the recruiter’s passport to prove they were a legitimate organisation. Similarly, another participant recruited through a job advert described how their recruiter, sensing their growing hesitation, connected them with other supposed ‘employees’ through a WhatsApp group. Individuals in the group collectively reassured them that the activity was legitimate and that they would recover their money.

“The original person put me in touch with the people from the group and they said, ‘Oh, don’t worry, we’ve been doing this for years, don’t worry.’ The tone of the messages were quite reassuring and clear that I should have picked it up more.”

Money mule

When reassurance failed, qualitative participants described how recruiters escalated to more coercive methods. In some instances, the aim of the messages was to make the participant feel guilt. For example, messages sent to one participant stated they were jeopardising the recruiter’s livelihood by reporting concerns. Some recruiters resorted to intimidation and threats of violence. One money mule participant described being sent a picture of their own passport and address when trying to disengage, with recruiters reminding them that they knew where they lived. Moreover, professionals gave accounts of such threats escalating to actual violence, including stabbing (discussed further in Chapter 5 on the impacts of involvement in money muling).

3.2.4 Exploitation creates barriers to refusal

When money muling occurred within broader exploitation contexts, escape could be substantially more difficult. Professionals consistently reported that domestic abuse victims could only exit money muling when they were able to leave the relationship or report the domestic abuse. This was echoed by a money mule participant who was only able to disengage from the money muling when they fled an abusive relationship with the recruiter. They further reflected that their involvement ended completely once the perpetrator received a conviction for domestic violence. This highlights how addressing the wider exploitation or victimisation in which money muling occurs (discussed in Section 2.3.3) could be necessary for successful exit.

3.2.5 Fragmented professional support pathways

Findings suggest that money mules struggled to identify appropriate support. Both professional and money mule participants described how the lack of clear support pathways inhibited money mules seeking assistance – which lengthened their involvement and delayed exit. For example, a participant reported difficulty identifying appropriate support channels after recognising the problematic nature of their behaviour. They struggled to contact their bank outside of working hours and were subsequently referred between multiple organisations, such as Citizen’s Advice, before finding help with Action Fraud (now known as Report Fraud).

“Professionals are fully aware of sexual exploitation, modern slavery, knife crime, gun crime, drugs etc county lines but in terms of being a debanked money mule, there’s a gap of knowledge they don’t know what to do.” – Support organisation stakeholder

The fragmented nature of available support was an additional barrier. Support provision varied by region and organisation. Professionals highlighted that awareness of money muling varied between professionals in potential organisations that money mules might reach out to. This could mean that individuals who reach out to a support organisation may be faced with a professional who is unfamiliar with money muling. This in turn could lead to the individual being referred on to a different organisation without being offered support, delaying their exit from money muling.

Individuals often faced punitive responses from official authorities such as banks and law enforcement which were inconsistent with the approach of support organisations (discussed further in Section 4.1.1). These responses proved confusing within the context of victim-based support that individuals might already be receiving. One support organisation professional outlined an example of an individual who engaged in money muling unwittingly and so was treated by the organisation as a victim; at the same time, they were being punished by their bank, which closed their account.

This inconsistent support stems from ambiguity about whether money mules are criminals or victims. As explained in Section 2.2, money mules can occupy a grey area as both victim and offender, complicating responses from banks and law enforcement. Banks and law enforcement participants reported how, even if a money mule is unaware of their involvement, they have still broken the law, which complicates matters. Support organisations reported attempting to help money mules as victims, only to see them face criminal charges or account closures from agencies concentrating on the criminal aspects. This ambiguity lies at the core of fragmented professional support networks.

4. Exit from money muling

4.1 Factors leading individual to disengage from money muling
4.2 Support and interventions needed to enable exit from money muling

This chapter examines the factors that led individuals to disengage from money muling activities. The analysis is structured thematically and based on the COM-B framework, drawing primarily on qualitative interviews with money mules and professionals.

4.1 Factors leading individuals to disengage from money muling

Analysis of survey responses, money mule experiences, and professional insights revealed that money mule participants exited through 3 primary pathways: firstly, when the opportunity to continue was removed by external factors (namely, intervention by banks or law enforcement or recruiters ceasing contact); secondly, erosion of trust in recruiters prompting self-initiated exit; and thirdly, via support from family and friends who helped them critically evaluate the situation. When analysed alongside the COM-B model, exit was often triggered by external opportunity factors explored in Chapter 3 – for example, a loss of trust in the recruiter or job opportunity due to the recruiter behaving in ways that contradicted expectations (motivation). This shift in trust changed participants’ perceptions of the activity and was enabled by wider support networks such as friends and family (opportunity). Some participants faced threats of violence when attempting to exit. Formal support remained limited, primarily available to those who engaged with banks or law enforcement, highlighting significant gaps for those seeking to exit independently or anonymously .

4.1.1. Intervention by banks or law enforcement

Professionals across all sectors consistently identified intervention by banks or the police as a primary pathway for exiting money muling. Law enforcement participants perceived the recruiters’ main aim as using an individual to move as many funds as possible until authorities detect the activity. However, several money mule participants were only asked to move funds once or a few times and were not contacted again (as discussed in Section 4.1.2), suggesting differing approaches among recruiters.

Bank representatives noted a clear behavioural distinction in how different types of money mules responded to their investigations. Those who were unwitting typically demonstrated a greater willingness to engage with the investigation process, answering communications and providing evidence such as screenshots of conversations with recruiters. In contrast, those presumed to be witting did not respond or engage.

“If they are a real criminal money mule and they are willingly involved in this type of activity, then often, you know, they won’t tell us the truth or they’ll keep changing their story or they’re not able to provide any evidence.”

Bank stakeholder

Law enforcement professionals described tailoring their response depending on individual circumstances. Their interventions ranged from formal arrest to ‘cease and desist’ notices^{[footnote 4]}. These notices – orders directing individuals to stop engaging in an activity – are typically reserved for first-time fraud or economic crime offenders. They act as a formal warning of potential legal action should the recipient continue with their behaviour. Compliance with the notice is voluntary, but ignoring it can lead to escalation of legal action, potentially resulting in an arrest and imprisonment. The process involves the police notifying the subject of the alleged unlawful conduct and demanding them to stop, often with an offer to sign the notice as a record of the warning issued. While unlikely to appear on basic or standard Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) checks, it may appear on enhanced checks.

Law enforcement professionals considered cease and desists particularly appropriate for unwitting or vulnerable individuals, who may not have fully understood money muling’s criminality. These serve as early interventions, offering education and a chance to stop without more severe consequences.

“We may arrest them and go through the legal process and seek a conviction. Or on the other hand, we may use cease and desist notices to say, we know this has happened. We are not sure where your involvement and responsibility lies, but we do know that you’ve, you’ve moved criminal monies. Therefore, please don’t do it again because next time, if you do do it again, we’ll seek prosecution.”

Law enforcement stakeholder

While no qualitative participants received a cease and desist notice, one described police contact after account freezing as “traumatic” and “scary”. In contrast, those who proactively contacted the police found the experience helpful and informative. This includes participants who had additional mitigating circumstances, such as having been subjected to domestic abuse or disengaging prior to completing a money transfer.

It is important to note that the interventions by the bank and police varied. Law enforcement approaches varied by region, with cease and desist notices implemented inconsistently across different police forces depending on whether there was an active operation promoting their use. Similarly, while one bank professional stated that their organisation contacted suspected individuals before taking any action, money mule participants reported different experiences, such as having their accounts closed without explanation. Bank professionals acknowledged these inconsistencies, noting that the bank’s response to money muling is based on internal intelligence and guidance, and can therefore vary between different institutions.

Case study example – confusing information from organisations.

After engaging in one transaction, a participant described having their bank account closed, receiving no explanation from their bank. They sought support online but were unable to find resources relevant to their situation. They had to request sight of their credit file to understand what had happened. However, the credit report listed ‘misuse of facilities’ as the reason, which was still not clear to the participant.

For this participant’s full journey, refer to Pen portrait 9 in the Annex.

4.1.2 Recruiter disengagement

In contrast to perceptions of law enforcement that agency intervention is typically required to end money muling activity, some qualitative participants described their involvement coming to a natural end. These individuals, who typically completed between one and a few transactions, reported that their recruiters simply stopped contacting them. As recruiters were not contacted as part of this research, it was not clear why they disengaged. However, money mules did not question it at the time as the opportunity was presented by a trusted individual who asked for a specific number of transfers, so when this number of transactions was reached, they did not expect further requests or contact.

This pattern contradicts the assumption that recruiters always attempt to maximise exploitation until authorities intervene. For example, one participant described completing a single £2,000 transaction, receiving £500 as payment along with a transaction receipt. Following this single instance, they received no further communication about moving money, effectively ending their involvement without any authority intervention.

4.1.3 Recruiter behaviour erodes trust

For some participants who engaged due to trust in the recruiter, this initial trust gradually diminished as the money muling activity progressed. Trust erosion occurred when recruiters’ behaviour differed from what the individual expected, triggering increased suspicion about the nature of the activity. This pattern appeared across different recruitment contexts, whether participants were recruited by people they knew personally or through supposed employment opportunities. For example, a participant who believed they had been hired to distribute stock became suspicious when only money – never any physical inventory – arrived for processing.

Case study example – suspicions arising when the activity did not reflect the participant’s expectations.

Recruited via a former colleague who asked for financial assistance in exchange for a payment, one money mule participant was in the bank to discuss another financial matter of a family member’s healthcare. During this interaction, the bank noted the account details of a recent transaction did not reflect the identity of the participant’s former colleague. This confused the money mule participant, raising concerns that their former colleague had shared their bank account details with others. The participant confronted the former colleague but remained suspicious. The bank advised the participant to check if any other transactions were made, which none were.

“I was seriously surprised… I actually confronted my colleague and he was giving me a different answer totally…I got so confused about the whole situation….I am actually so confused about who moved the money because it wasn’t his details on it. So, even though he did not ever use another person’s account to remove the money from my account… I am seriously confused here now. I didn’t know what to do.”

Money mule

For this participant’s full journey, refer to Pen portrait 5 in the Annex.

Trust erosion could accelerate following financial disappointments. For individuals who were promised a payment, trust diminished if this payment was not received, or it was smaller than originally stated. It led them to question the honesty of the recruiter.

“I looked at my bank and there was no money left for me, that made me think instantly, you know, this was a scam and there’s going to be consequences from it.”

Money mule

For another participant, their trust in the recruiter eroded when the money muling led to being a victim of fraud, with the recruiter stealing from them. Recruited for what they believed was a digital marketing job, this money mule participant lost trust after realising how much personal financial investment they had made in the scheme. The job involved purchasing items from the company website using a cryptocurrency account in the participants’ name but with money paid in by the company. The participant believed they were carrying out actions to promote the items but none of the purchased goods were sent to their house. Later encouraged to invest personal funds with the promise of redemption, this participant’s trust eroded after investing approximately £40,000 without return.

4.1.4 Support from trustworthy friends and family

Access to trusted relationships helped participants critically evaluate their activities. Once suspicions arose, some participants sought validation and advice from alternative sources. These supportive connections (typically friends or family members not involved in the money muling) played a crucial role in helping participants recognise the problematic nature of their activities and seek formal assistance. For example, one participant discussed their growing concerns with their partner, who encouraged them to contact their bank about the suspicious transactions.

However, seeking support from trusted individuals was not always feasible. With more than half of surveyed money mules (58%; 57 out of 99) experiencing loneliness or isolation in the past 5 years, many likely lacked trusted confidants. For instance, a support organisation supporting an individual who became involved in money muling via a romantic connection cited loneliness as the individual’s main motivation for wanting to develop the connection.

Additionally, a support organisation highlighted that the stigma of being involved in a scam or money muling activity can prevent people from talking to their friends and family.

“There’s still unfortunately quite a big stigma around fraud and scams. And it is that whole mentality of how could you fall for that? And that means a lot of the times they are really, they’re really hesitant to tell their family or friends because that is exactly what they don’t want to hear.”

Support organisation stakeholder

4.2 Support and interventions needed to enable exit from money muling

Having examined exit factors, this section outlines participant-suggested support and interventions (summarised in Table 4.1 below). It concentrates on how an exit from money muling could be enabled or supported.

To address the lack of consensus regarding the criminality of money muling and the inconsistent distinction between ‘unwitting’ and ‘witting’ money mules, participants stressed the need for interventions to recognise that individuals may lack understanding of their actions and suggested a range of strategies.

Professionals suggested that educational interventions could still be valuable even after initial involvement in money muling. A support worker involved in community awareness sessions highlighted how these sessions frequently prompted audience members to recognise and reflect on their own, or their loved ones’ experiences. This suggests that awareness-raising can increase an individual’s recognition of money muling activities even retrospectively, potentially preventing re-engagement. The support worker also noted that community-based educational work helped reduce stigma and encouraged people to speak about their experiences, making them more likely to seek help.

Law enforcement participants consistently emphasised the perceived benefit of cease and desists, particularly for money mules who had only engaged in one or a few transactions; however, a comprehensive evaluation of cease and desists would be needed to confirm this. One law enforcement participant also added that they were working on an educational video that could be used during this point of contact.

The importance of creating safe pathways to exit emerged as a key theme across data sources. When asked what support or resources would be most beneficial for an individual wanting to stop their involvement in money muling, survey respondents stressed the importance of ‘safe ways out’. In particular, they mentioned the need for exit strategies for individuals who realise that they have engaged in an illegal activity after the act. A law enforcement participant also noted that non-judgemental approaches were important for enabling disengagement. Anonymous and confidential helplines were suggested as avenues to provide this support. While services like Action Fraud (now known as Report Fraud) and Crimestoppers may already fulfil this role, increased awareness of these resources is important to ensure individuals know they can turn to them.

“I think being able to anonymously report would greatly help people who want to stop, but are worried about blackmail threats or getting into trouble. I think more support options, such as charities and support groups, would also be helpful to get people to speak up and feel more comfortable doing so.”

Open text survey response

Practical support for managing recruiter pressure also emerged as a key intervention area. Money mules and support organisations gave examples of receiving or offering guidance on how to end involvement after receiving threats. This support gave individuals confidence in their next steps and the ability to seek further assistance if needed. One money mule described how police had advised them on returning money to a recruiter to de-escalate threatening behaviour, providing practical safety strategies.

Professionals across sectors emphasised the need for greater recognition of the connections between money muling and wider victimisation, such as child sexual exploitation, organised crime and domestic violence. They argued that understanding money muling’s full complicity spectrum would help first responders and support organisations identify it and assist unwitting or coerced individuals accordingly. They argued that this targeted professional education should extend to include practitioners working with vulnerable populations across various contexts, including law enforcement, schools, support organisations, and financial institutions.

Table 4.1: Potential intervention strategies based upon the COM-B influences identified to enable disengagement

To achieve research objectives in identifying potential intervention points, the COM-B influences were mapped onto potential intervention strategies to enable disengagement. All intervention strategies below were mapped onto the influences through a combination of participant suggestions and wider analysis using the BCW. Please see the Annex for further information on the BCW intervention types.

COM-B	Enablers	Barriers	Implications on behaviour change (intervention type/s)
Capability	1. Increasing awareness of activity following conversations with trusted sources		1. Inclusion of lived experience examples in training, guidance, and advice, to increase opportunities for individuals to have their concerns validated and prevent re-engagement or continuation of money muling (enablement).
Opportunity	1. Involvement ending by bank or police	2. Intense engagement from the recruiter 3. Recruiters persuading to continue engagement 4. Money muling is connected to wider exploitation 5. Fragmented and unclear support systems 6. Lack of trusted support or stigma preventing individuals speaking up 7. Lack of clarity whether a money mule is a victim or offender	1, 5. Ensure a consistent approach across forces and organisations where: police consider whether a cease and desist or arrest is appropriate; banks use a structured communication approach to engage individual and identify what has happened (environmental restructuring). 2, 3. Lived experience examples to demonstrate how individuals should respond to recruiters when they begin to make threats, or how they ceased communication (modelling, enablement). 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. Anonymous and confidential support, including legal advice, in how to exit (enablement) and awareness raising on the existing anonymous reporting avenues (education). 4. Addressing the exploitation when an individual has been coerced or exploited in money muling (enablement). 6. Communications or work within communities to make people feel more comfortable to speak up (enablement). 7. A more consistent approach in how to distinguish and react to witting vs. unwitting money mules (environmental restructuring).
Motivation	1. Suspicions following eroding trust		1. Anonymous and confidential support individuals can access when they start to distrust the recruiter and need advice on how to end involvement (enablement). Lived experience examples could demonstrate how an individual’s trust began to diminish and how they exited (enablement, modelling).

Figure 4.1: Visual map of Josh’s journey, who realises what he is doing is wrong just before he completes the transaction

See Pen portrait 8 for details.

5. Impacts of involvement in money muling

5.1 Impacts of money muling experienced by participants after exit
5.2 Support needed after exiting from money muling

This chapter discusses the impacts of money muling on individuals after they exit. It then outlines the support needs that arise from those impacts, alongside suggestions from qualitative participants and survey respondents on how they could be addressed. Only participants who had contact with official agencies (law enforcement, banks) were able to access formal support to help with the impacts outlined in this chapter. Other participants either tried to find support but failed or did not seek support at all.

5.1 Impacts of money muling experienced by participants after exit

The impacts of money muling could be wide-ranging. Survey data suggest that respondents across different types of money muling activities most commonly reported experiencing anxiety or guilt, having to pay back money that was lost, damage to relationships with family or friends, and people thinking that they are bad with money.

While respondents across data sources generally indicated these impacts affected them markedly, it is notable that 30% (30 out of 99; see Figure 5.1) of survey respondents who engaged in money muling felt no consequences.

Figure 5.1: Proportion of respondents who reported experiencing various impacts of money muling involvement

Response	Proportion of survey respondents
I experienced anxiety or guilt	31%
Nothing happened as a result	30%
I’ve had to pay back money that was lost	19%
It damaged the relationship with my family or friends	15%
People thinking I am bad with money	14%
My bank account was closed	13%
My personal information was stolen and used for other crimes	11%
I had/am having trouble opening a new bank account	9%
Was spoken to by police as a result of the activity but not arrested or charged	8%
I’ve had markers attached to my credit file	7%
I had/ am having trouble getting a phone contract or internet service	5%
I had/am having trouble finding a new job or university place	5%
I have been arrested or charged with a crime	3%

Base: n=99, respondents who engaged in money muling activity.

This pattern was echoed in qualitative interviews, where participants whose involvement ended without bank or law enforcement contact – typically after a single transaction, or because of recruiter disengagement – perceived minimal impact on their lives. For example, one qualitative participant who moved money as a one-time favour for a friend and received payment, did not perceive any negative consequences of their actions.

5.1.2 Financial impacts

The financial impacts of money muling ranged from minor inconveniences to life-altering penalties. At the least severe end, individuals experienced additional safeguards on existing accounts – limits on device access and IP restrictions that made transactions more time-consuming but secure. This was experienced by a participant who was coerced into money muling, resulting in a preventative rather than punitive measure.

More serious consequences ranged from temporary account freezing during investigations, to complete debanking (the practice where banks or financial institutions close customer accounts, or refuse to open new ones, often due to perceived risk factors) with a Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance System (CIFAS) marker. A CIFAS marker is a warning placed on a person’s credit file by CIFAS, the UK’s fraud prevention service, to alert financial institutions about potentially fraudulent activity. It signifies that an organisation suspects fraudulent activity by the individual and acts as a flag to other members of CIFAS. This can make it difficult to obtain credit, insurance, or even employment in the financial sector, effectively excluding individuals from the financial system.

Case study example – influence of a CIFAS marker.

One participant who received a CIFAS marker reflected that they would have been homeless if they had not purchased a property before becoming involved in money muling. They had to stay with their current mortgage provider to avoid credit checks, resulting in an increased mortgage cost which affected their quality of life.

“I was informed that my credit score would be impacted for 6 years, this would stay on my files. I was fortunate that I had already purchased a property and I was living in my property, so I wouldn’t be homeless. […] I’m not allowed to have credit cards. […] I’m not allowed to have full flexible plans or instalments plans. I can’t get new windows because, like, literally a couple of thousand pounds, I can’t borrow for new windows. You know, all my future plans, I’ve had to put on-hold.”

Money mule

For this participant’s full journey, refer to Pen portrait 6 in the Annex.

Support organisations detailed the far-reaching implications of these financial penalties. Debanked individuals with CIFAS markers often faced multiple challenges, including being unable to access credit or borrowing facilities, difficulties securing employment and even losing housing. They emphasised the difficulty of functioning without a bank account in modern society, and the barriers it creates to daily life. Additionally, one support organisation reflected that some of these financial consequences may be delayed. For example, if a young person is debanked, they might not realise the severity of the situation until they apply for university and require a bank account for student finance.

“Often I think that when somebody becomes involved, they really don’t understand the repercussions of that. I don’t think they understand at all that it’s a criminal offence. I don’t think they understand that it means that there’ll be a barrier to having a bank account or go into university.”

Bank stakeholder

This financial exclusion could potentially push individuals toward alternative, sometimes criminal, income sources.

“I know of a few cases that I’ve engaged where a young person was debanked. I don’t know the full context, but what is believed is that this person started to also do things around, you know, county lines. He’d go missing for a week or two. And it makes sense if you’ve got no way to make money then, and this is put in front of you, then that’s the case.”

Support organisation stakeholder

Support organisations also stressed that being debanked could lead to violent repercussions if the individual owed money to criminals, or if they refused to continue their engagement with the OCG/ gang in a different capacity.

“This young man in particular, he was stabbed and… Well, his mom had to make the decision and move out the area because they wanted to do a lot more. So, there wasn’t… It wasn’t as simple as, ‘ah, my bank doesn’t work anymore’. ‘Fine’. No, they wanted to use him for more things. So, money muling was just one step. They stabbed him because, you know, he didn’t want to comply with their demands.”

Support organisation stakeholder

Some participants also experienced direct financial losses if recruiters withdrew more funds than initially deposited, compounding their financial hardship.

5.1.3 Emotional and psychological impact

Emotional impacts of money muling typically evolved over time. When participants first suspected problems or faced confrontation by banks or law enforcement, their initial reactions included immediate panic, worry and/or confusion. As their understanding of the situation grew, participants described these emotions changing into more complex feelings of embarrassment and shame, alongside anger and a sense of vulnerability.

“It’s just, kind of, overwhelming disappointment in myself, it wasn’t going away, wasn’t sure what I needed to do.”

Money mule

Participants described struggling to reconcile their self-perception as law-abiding individuals with the reality of having engaged in illegal activity. They described feeling scammed or groomed, leading to feelings of isolation. Some participants reported that interactions with financial institutions exacerbated their distress, particularly when they received threatening messages about potential account closures. The emotional toll often intertwined with financial impacts and sometimes escalated to clinical mental health issues.

“Again, just, like, devastation that I couldn’t open a bank account with a high street bank. […] It was quite embarrassing, in front of my friends, like, not being able to transfer, and it’s just so inconvenient, and nowadays, people, they don’t really care. You know, if you’ve fallen behind, then you’ve fallen behind, and I just felt a bit isolated.”

Money mule

5.1.4 Behavioural changes

For some participants, these impacts resulted in behavioural changes. They described becoming more cautious and vigilant when applying for jobs, apprehensive about any requests to transfer money, and/or increasingly suspicious of online content and communications from unknown sources (such as on WhatsApp). This suggests that exposure to the impacts of money muling is likely to reduce the possibility of an individual being involved in money muling again.

“Having to go through it again, I would not, sort of, do it again. It was really unpleasant. Isolating. Like, traumatising […] I’m terrified since I did that. I feel panic if, like, sometimes someone will hack into your phone and you’ll get a message to, you know, say that you’ve received a-, just like, small spam messages and stuff like that. I’m just really wary of those.”

Money mule

5.2 Support needed after exit from money muling

Having explored the consequences of money muling, this section outlines the existing support, followed by a discussion of its gaps and how they could be addressed. It draws on suggestions made by research participants.

5.2.1 Existing support

Participants who had ceased their involvement in money muling reported significant challenges in accessing appropriate support. Those who tried to find support independently faced difficulty trying to locate relevant information online, and when they reached out to large, generic support organisations they were passed on or turned away. For participants who successfully accessed support, the referral typically originated from their bank or a law enforcement agency through their established fraud-related victim referral routes. These individuals found value in receiving information about money muling, guidance on next steps, and access to online courses on identifying fraudulent schemes.

Support organisations indicated that they mostly provide emotional support, with some practical advocacy-based support alongside it, such as helping individuals in discussions with their bank. However, due to organisations’ lack of knowledge of money muling, providing this practical support presented a steep learning curve. One support organisation participant recounted that, upon receiving their first money muling case, they had to undertake ample research to develop the institutional knowledge and resources required to effectively support the individual with their financial impacts.

Support organisations also confirmed that the majority of their money muling cases originated from professional referrals, particularly from banks and law enforcement, rather than self-referrals.

The data pointed to clear differences in the experiences between large, national or regional organisations and smaller, local organisations. Large organisations with a broad victim support focus reported very few money muling cases – one regional organisation mentioned handling only a few cases over the past couple of years. They described how they could struggle with the grey areas of criminality surrounding money muling, as they could only provide support to victims, and those engaged in money muling could be perceived as perpetrators.

As one support organisation professional articulated, there is a critical skills gap, with many frontline professionals lacking awareness of money muling and how to support individuals affected by it.

“There’s not enough people doing the work. There’s not enough youth workers trained, which I’m trying to change that. There’s not enough individuals who are competent, who understand, because we’re bridging safeguarding with, you know, the financial space and they are two deep worlds that never really connect.”

Support organisation stakeholder

Case study example – support organisation having to cease support due to shift in an individual’s complicity.

One support organisation participant described a case referred to them by a bank, involving an individual experiencing romance fraud. Through the support, the individual acknowledged their vulnerability to fraud due to past trauma. They felt lonely and isolated and the relationship with the recruiter meant a lot to them. Despite warnings from their bank that they were becoming accessory to crime, they continued their involvement. The support worker discussed this case with their manager, but ultimately, they were unable to continue providing support. They had to signpost them to another organisation as the individual’s knowing complicity shifted their classification from victim to perpetrator.

“They continued to participate in it, which made it a lot more difficult obviously for us to support as well, because that’s actively contributing in a crime.”

Support organisation stakeholder

5.2.2. Support needed to address gaps

Findings suggest a disconnect; despite both the need for support and its theoretical availability, money mules cannot always access appropriate support. There were several reasons for this, including individuals not perceiving themselves as victims, and not knowing where and what to look for, especially when specialist financial support was their main need. Research participants across all groups identified several critical components of effective post-exit support to address this gap:

Accessible information from trusted sources was mentioned by both money mules and professionals. Government agencies or established third sector organisations could provide easily accessible online guidance detailing available support options and practical next steps for those exiting money muling activities.

Emotional support could include formal mental health services and support groups specifically for money mules. Support organisations noted they try to group people by experience, so that they can feel understood by other participants, but currently they only offer fraud-focused support groups (for example, romance fraud). They noted that similar groups for money mules could be helpful in overcoming the specific impacts they experience.

Specialised financial advocacy was a clear gap identified by participants, with current support providers lacking this technical expertise. Participants described how professionals trained in understanding debanking processes, account markers and strategies for addressing broader financial impacts, including debt management, could be important for those struggling with the consequences of money muling and mitigate against risks of individuals falling into debt, joblessness, homelessness or further criminality.

Practical assistance with finding safe, legitimate income sources was seen as essential, particularly given the employment challenges created by financial markers and account closures. Importantly, participants emphasised that effective support needs to be confidential, integrated, and follow a multi-agency approach, due to the multi-faceted nature of the impacts experienced by individuals.

Figure 5.2: Visual map of Harry’s journey, who was debanked as a result of his money muling activity

See Pen portrait 9 for details.

6. Conclusions

6.1 Key cross-cutting themes
6.2 Potential interventions to prevent or respond to money muling
6.3 Further research considerations

While acknowledging the limitations of our sample – particularly the focus on unwitting money mules – this chapter synthesises the key insights from this research, including potential intervention strategies mentioned by research participants. We move beyond the discrete findings presented in previous chapters to identify cross-cutting themes and systemic patterns.

6.1 Key cross-cutting themes

The money mule journey is complex. The findings suggest that money muling does not always simply constitute a discrete criminal act, but rather a complex journey shaped by multiple influences across the capability, opportunity, and motivation spectrum. The pathway begins with targeted recruitment that exploits specific vulnerabilities, proceeds through a (sometimes very short) period of engagement where various factors either enable continuation or prompt exit, and concludes with impacts that can persist long after the activity ends.

Trust emerged as a key enabler of recruitment, as well as a potential catalyst for exit. Four-in-five (80%; 201 out of 251 activities) money muling activities reported through the survey occurred at the request of someone known to the individual (both online and offline). Money mule participants described feeling emotionally connected to their recruiter, which hindered participant’s critical evaluation of the situation. Conversely, when this trust eroded – due to suspicious behaviour, unfulfilled promises or increasing demands – it could trigger the critical reflection that led to disengagement. This highlights the complex role of interpersonal relationships in both facilitating and disrupting money muling activities.

Findings suggest a cyclical relationship can occur between limited capability (knowledge and skills) and the opportunities for exploitation. The lack of awareness of what money muling involves, or its criminality and consequences, was clear from all data sources. Coupled with a lack of reflective judgement, this can create conditions where recruitment opportunities flourish. Professionals described how this cycle can be particularly evident among children and young people and those experiencing financial instability, where the combination of knowledge gaps and external pressures creates vulnerability for recruitment.

External agency intervention was important to stopping involvement in money muling. Due to money mule participants’ limited knowledge and understanding of money muling, those who were involved on a continuous basis (rather than just being asked to carry out a one-off transfer) often required external agency intervention for them to disengage from the activity.

Money muling can intersect with other forms of exploitation and criminality. For some, money muling occurs within contexts of domestic abuse or coercive control, where disengagement from money muling is only possible when individuals can exit the broader exploitative relationship. Some money mules faced coercion and threats of violence from recruiters when trying to disengage, and support organisations noted examples of physical violence following disengagement, including stabbing. This shows the key role money muling plays within a wider organised crime/ gang ecosystem, putting individuals who unwittingly engage at risk of harm. Additionally, the consequences of money muling (particularly debanking) can create vulnerabilities that lead to involvement in other criminal activities, such as county lines.

Money mules can sometimes exist in an ambiguous space between victim and offender, with some individuals simultaneously experiencing exploitation while technically committing financial crimes. This ambiguity creates significant challenges for intervention, with inconsistent approaches across agencies potentially deterring individuals from seeking help. The research revealed that support organisations, law enforcement, and financial institutions often have different thresholds for determining complicity, leading to contradictory responses to the same individual.

A disconnect exists between the support needs of money mules and the availability of appropriate services. Even when individuals recognise problematic activity and seek help, they can encounter fragmented systems, inconsistent responses, and a lack of specialised knowledge among frontline professionals. This gap could be particularly pronounced for those in the grey area of complicity, where uncertainty about their status as victim or offender can leave them without clear support pathways. This research found that the right support (especially with financial impacts) is not widely available, as well as difficult to find.

6.2 Potential interventions to prevent or respond to money muling

In this section, we draw together findings from the COM-B analysis, and suggestions for interventions from research participants, to outline possible interventions to prevent money muling or to offer a way out from money muling. These interventions address the key factors influencing money muling behaviour while recognising the complex interplay between capability, opportunity, and motivation.

6.2.1 Education and awareness

Educational interventions to enhance understanding of money muling and its consequences could play a critical role in both prevention and exit support.

Targeted awareness campaigns concentrating on impacts: Public awareness campaigns could be developed to address the significant lack of knowledge about money muling and its long-term consequences. Research participants reported that communications emphasising concrete personal impacts (for example: inability to obtain student loans or mortgages) rather than criminality could be more impactful. Including lived experience stories from former money mules could make educational materials more relatable and powerful, particularly in demonstrating how an individual can be recruited by people close to them. Additionally, recruiters were described as exploiting specific vulnerabilities such as financial instability, loneliness, peer pressure, and naivety. Efforts to prevent money muling could be targeted at people experiencing these vulnerabilities, providing specific groups with tailored information and interventions that resonate with their unique circumstances.

Critical evaluation skills: Educational content could concentrate on building the skills needed to identify fraudulent opportunities and assess risk, particularly for young people and those entering the job market or higher education.

Contextual financial warnings: Financial institutions could consider implementing banking app notifications that warn customers about potential money muling risks at the point of transaction, particularly for unusual transaction patterns or when sending money to new recipients.

Post-involvement education: Educational interventions (for example, alongside external agency intervention) might remain valuable even after initial involvement in money muling, potentially preventing re-engagement by increasing awareness retrospectively.

6.2.2 Environmental restructuring

Our research found that responses to money muling can be hampered by fragmented and inconsistent approaches across different sectors. Changes to systems, processes, and environments could help reduce opportunities for money muling recruitment and create more consistent responses.

Cross-sector coordination: Establishing a unified approach to money muling across banks, law enforcement, support services, and wider sectors could make more efficient interventions and enhance their effectiveness. This might include clarity on the approach to the criminality of money muling and consistent guidelines for assessing money mule complicity across sectors. In addition, developing protocols to improve information sharing between organisations could enable more coordinated and timely interventions while respecting privacy considerations.

Consistent intervention approaches: Law enforcement participants suggested that local forces could benefit from standardised guidelines for determining when to use cease and desist notices versus formal prosecution, with particular attention to assessing complicity and vulnerability.

Platform verification systems: Social media companies and job websites might consider implementing enhanced verification processes for job advertisements and investment opportunities to reduce fraudulent listings.

Safety mechanisms: Financial institutions could explore implementing transaction refusal options (similar to silent 999 calls) that allow individuals being coerced to discreetly request intervention without alerting the recruiter.

6.2.3 Support

Our research identified a disconnect between the support needs of money mules and the availability of appropriate services. Several ideas for structured, accessible support pathways were suggested for individuals exiting, or wanting to exit money muling.

Comprehensive support systems: A centralised, nationally recognised resource could be developed to clearly outline available support options, alongside anonymous and confidential helplines, allowing people to seek help without fear of repercussions. Clearer referral pathways between financial institutions, law enforcement, and support organisations could ensure individuals do not fall through the cracks when seeking help from multiple services.

Financial rehabilitation services: Support organisations might develop specialised expertise in helping former money mules navigate the consequences of debanking, including challenging inappropriate markers, accessing basic banking services, and finding legitimate income sources despite financial exclusion. This practical assistance could help prevent individuals from turning to further criminality due to financial barriers.

Holistic wellbeing approaches: Targeted support services could address both the practical and emotional impacts of money muling, including guidance for managing recruiter pressure and threats, alongside mental health support for the shame, anxiety, and isolation reported by participants. These services might consider complicity-neutral approaches that provide assistance regardless of perceived complicity level, recognising the often-blurred victim-offender boundary in money muling cases.

6.3 Further research considerations

This exploratory research has identified numerous areas warranting further investigation to build a more comprehensive understanding of money muling in the UK. Future research should consider the following priorities.

6.3.1 Understanding different money mule populations

Given that this research captured only unwitting money mules, future studies could specifically target witting and complicit individuals to understand their motivations, experiences, and exit pathways. This would require careful exploration around the most feasible and practical routes to identifying and accessing witting money mules.

Further investigation into how recruitment methods vary by demographic and individual characteristics, including age, gender, ethnicity and socioeconomic status could be valuable. Particular focus could be made on vulnerable groups identified in this research, such as international students, care leavers, and individuals experiencing financial instability. This could enable the development of tailored prevention strategies and targeted awareness campaigns for groups most at risk.

Research tracking individuals over time could illuminate how people move along the complicity spectrum – from unwitting to witting involvement – and what factors influence this progression. Understanding these transitions could identify critical intervention points to prevent escalation of involvement.

Given the evident links between money muling and other forms of exploitation (domestic abuse, county lines, romance fraud), research should explore these interconnections more systematically to inform integrated prevention and response strategies.

Further research exploring the ambiguous status of money mules as both victims and offenders, including how this affects help-seeking behaviour, professional responses, and outcomes could be informative. This could help develop clearer frameworks for assessment and more appropriate, consistent support.

6.3.2 Exit pathways and interventions

Further research should examine what determines whether a money mule exits through bank intervention, law enforcement action, recruiter disengagement, or self-initiated departure. Understanding these pathways could inform more targeted intervention strategies.

Evaluations or an assessment of the effectiveness of cease and desist notices and other law enforcement and banking interventions, including their impact on re-offending rates and long-term outcomes for individuals, could support the development of evidence-based policies and processes.

The role and experiences of money mule recruiters is an additional area that warrants further exploration. Investigation into why recruiters sometimes cease contact after minimal transactions, for example, rather than maximising exploitation, could provide valuable insights for disruption strategies.

Research could map the variation in how different banks and financial institutions respond to suspected money muling, including when and why debanking occurs, and how these decisions affect individuals’ subsequent trajectories. This could inform more consistent and proportionate responses across sectors.

As cryptocurrency use in money muling grows, research is needed to understand patterns in the use of different financial platforms. Are certain account types associated with specific money muling activities or recruitment methods? Understanding these patterns could help financial institutions develop more targeted monitoring systems and risk indicators.

6.3.3 Future methodological considerations

Future research should test strategies to reach this hard-to-access population more effectively, potentially including: provision of financial incentives while managing ethical considerations; extended recruitment periods across multiple channels; translated materials and culturally adapted approaches for specific communities; and closer or paid partnerships with trusted community organisations or charities.

The COM-B model used in this research could be extended through the full BCW to systematically identify and test specific intervention types and behaviour change techniques targeting identified influences.

7. Annex

7.1 The COM-B model
7.2 Detailed methodology
7.3 Pen portraits of money mule participants
7.4 Survey screener

7.1 The COM-B Model

The COM-B model describes 3 primary elements – capability, opportunity and motivation – which are further subdivided into 6 dimensions. This table outlines each subdivision that contributes to a holistic understanding of behaviour change.

Table 7.1: Table providing the definitions of the COM-B model (Michie et al., 2014, pp. 63)

Com-B	Com-B (specified)	Definitions
Capability	Psychological capability	“Knowledge or psychological skills, strength or stamina to engage in the necessary mental processes”
Capability	Physical capability	“Physical skill, strength or stamina”
Opportunity	Social opportunity	“Opportunity afforded by interpersonal influences, social cues and cultural norms that influence the way that we think about things, for example, the words and concepts that make up our language”
Opportunity	Physical opportunity	“Opportunity afforded by the environment involving time, resources, locations, cues, physical ‘affordance’”
Motivation	Automatic motivation	“Automatic processes involving emotional reactions, desires (wants and needs), impulses, inhibitions, drive states and reflex responses”
Motivation	Reflective motivation	“Reflective processes involving plans (self-conscious intentions) and evaluations (beliefs about what is good and bad)”

Table 7.2: Table providing definitions of the intervention strategies (Michie et al., 2014, pp. 111-112)

Intervention strategies	Definition
Education	“Increasing knowledge or understanding”
Persuasion	“Using communication to induce positive or negative feeling to stimulate action”
Incentivisation	“Creating an expected reward”
Coercion	“Creating an expectation of coercion or cost”
Training	“Imparting skills”
Restriction	“Using rules to reduce or increase the opportunity to engage in a target behaviour”
Environmental restructuring	“Changing the physical or social context”
Modelling	“Providing an example for people to aspire to or imitate”
Enablement	“Increasing means or reducing barriers to increase ability to perform desired behaviour”

Table 7.3: Table demonstrating the recommended intervention strategy for each COM-B influence (Michie et al., 2014, pp. 116)

	Education	Persuasion	Incentivisation	Coercion	Training	Restriction	Environmental restructuring	Modelling	Enablement
Physical Capability					X				X
Psychological Capability	X				X				X
Physical Opportunity					X	X	X		X
Social Opportunity						X	X	X	X
Automatic motivation		X	X	X	X		X	X	X
Reflective motivation	X	X	X	X

7.2 Detailed methodology

This research aimed to expand the limited evidence base on the lived experience of money muling in the UK, offering new insights to improve understanding of unwitting money muling experiences and potential intervention points. It employed a mixed-methods approach to develop a comprehensive understanding of money muling experiences. The design combined:

• a non-representative online survey to gather broad insights and identify potential interview participants
• in-depth qualitative interviews with money mules
• in-depth qualitative interviews with professionals who directly interact with or support individuals engaged in money muling activity

The qualitative thematic analysis was guided by the COM-B behavioural framework, which analyses behaviour through 3 interconnected factors: capability, opportunity and motivation (Michie et al., 2011). This model was selected as it provided a useful framework to address the key research questions, helping to identify influences that lead individuals to engage in money muling and what causes them to continue or disengage. Additionally, it allows the data to be mapped directly onto potential intervention routes.

7.2.1 Recruitment strategy and challenges

The recruitment strategy for this project was informed by the scoping work carried out between 2022 and 2024, which evaluated the feasibility of primary research and various potential channels to reach money mules for research. While using gatekeepers (such as support organisations) to access money mules was considered preferable, this approach proved impractical due to the lack of specialised support organisations for money mules, and the small number of money mules being supported by broader support organisations. Similarly, the option of recruiting money mules through banks was explored and deemed unlikely to be successful. During consultations, bank officials noted they could only introduce the research when closing accounts, a point at which positive engagement would be unlikely.

The scoping work concluded that social media outreach and research panel recruitment targeting the general public would be the most effective recruitment routes. These were the primary recruitment routes chosen for this research. While a nationally representative survey was initially considered, the research team opted for a more exploratory approach, given the significant unknowns surrounding the demographic profile and prevalence of money muling activities in the population. Due to recruitment challenges, gatekeeper recruitment was explored again during this project; however, it was unsuccessful due to the barriers identified by the scoping work.

7.2.2 Quantitative research strand

The quantitative strand centred on an online self-completion survey about money muling, designed by Ipsos UK and hosted by Roots Research. While primarily serving to identify participants for the qualitative phase, the survey also provided valuable broader insights into money muling experiences.

To maximise participation, the survey was distributed through multiple channels: Roots’ quantitative panel (invitation emails were sent to 150,000 panel members), social media advertisements and Roots’ website (though most survey respondents were reached through the panel).

As the survey’s main purpose was to support recruitment for the qualitative strand, it was decided that it would not be feasible to achieve representativeness. Due to the unknown incidence of money muling among the general population, a representative survey could require a very large sample size to capture a few individuals with relevant experiences. Therefore, the survey incorporated scenario-based screening to identify individuals with potentially relevant experiences (see Section 7.4 the Annex). Only those who indicated willingness to engage in money muling activity were invited to complete the full survey. Follow-up text message reminders were sent to non-completers to boost response rates, and participants were offered a £5 charity donation as an incentive.

Out of the 208 individuals who completed the survey, 99 reported having engaged in money muling. This was captured by the following single-code, progressive grid question:

Q. In the past five years, have you ever actively engaged in any of the following activities?

Please do not consider any cases where you were tricked into losing money or money was stolen from your account/s.

ROWS

• Moved money someone else sent you through your personal account in exchange for a payment (e.g. a cut of the transfer, a one-off sum, or return on investment).
• Moved money someone else sent you through your personal account as a favour to a friend/acquaintance with no financial benefit. We do not mean instances when you might have sent money to a friend or acquaintance because you owed it to them.
• Moved money someone else sent you through your personal account because someone made you.
• Provided others with access to your online bank/ financial account(s) on a temporary or permanent basis in exchange for payment (e.g. a cut of the transfer, a one-off sum, or return on investment).
• Provided others with access to your debit or credit card(s) on a temporary or permanent basis in exchange for payment (e.g. a cut of the transfer, a one-off sum, or return on investment).

COLUMNS

1. Yes

2. No

3. Not sure

4. Don’t know

5. Prefer not to say

The survey was conducted in 2 waves: wave 1 fieldwork between 17 December 2024 and 7 January 2025, and wave 2 fieldwork between 6 and 28 May 2025. In total, 208 individuals completed the survey. No demographic quotas were applied. For the makeup of the achieved sample, see Table 7.4 below.

As part of the scoping work in 2022 to 2024, 2 public polls, or surveys, were undertaken by Ipsos UK to help generate further understanding of respondents’ perceptions of the legality of money muling, respondent encounters with money mule recruitment and willingness to engage in hypothetical money mule scenarios. The full results from these polls are published separately with brief details of the methodology for these outlined below.

The i:omnibus polling was launched between 22 and 28 March 2024 and reached 2,233 respondents. The online Omnibus is hosted on Ipsos’ online platform, and respondents are selected from Ipsos panels, which anyone can join themselves, rather than being randomly recruited. Quotas were set on age, gender, working status and standard geographical regions. The data were then post weighted to the profile of the UK population aged 16 to 75 (including non-telephone owning households) to account for any shortfalls in quotas using key demographic variables: gender by age, region, social grade, education and working status. Quotas and post weighting were used to produce a nationally representative sample. As the survey uses non-probability sampling, it may be subject to different forms of bias that can limit generalisation to the wider population. Furthermore, as it is an online panel survey, it does not include digitally excluded individuals and may attract younger, higher educated, urban individuals compared to the general population.

KnowledgePanel polling was conducted between 15 and 21 February 2024. In total, 2,114 respondents across Great Britain aged 16 to 75 completed the survey. The KnowledgePanel is a random probability online panel comprising over 15,000 panellists. Therefore, the KnowledgePanel does not use a quota approach when conducting surveys. Instead, invited samples are stratified when conducting waves to account for any profile skews within the panel.

For KnowledgePanel, panellists are recruited via a random probability un-clustered address-based sampling method. This means that every household in the UK has a known chance of being selected to join the panel. Members of the public who are digitally excluded can register for the KnowledgePanel either by post or by telephone, and are given a tablet, an email address, and basic internet access which allows them to complete surveys online.

The KnowledgePanel poll was also subsequently used to identify and invite potential individuals who may be eligible for interview as part of the main stage fieldwork in this study, although in the end no eligible candidates were able to be recruited using this route. When considering recruitment for this project for qualitative participants, we did not have consent to recontact participants from the i:omnibus polling, but we did have consent to recontact the KnowledgePanel polling participants.

7.2.3 Survey data limitations

The data from the survey ran as part of this project provide useful contextual information, but has several limitations and must be interpreted as such. The non-representative sampling method (social media, research panel) means the data cannot be generalised to the wider general population. The 208 respondents self-selected through online panels and social media. In addition, the survey relied on self-reported behaviours and intentions. Consequently, responses may be affected by social desirability bias, where individuals report in ways perceived favourable by others rather than representing their true behaviours – especially crucial, as questions asked about their willingness to engage in money muling explicitly. Also, it is possible that some respondents were actually fraud victims rather than money mules, as qualitative recruitment revealed some confusion between the 2 experiences.

Additionally, since the demographic profile of UK money mules is unknown, we cannot assess how well the achieved sample (see Table 7.4) represents the demographic makeup of the wider population of UK money mules. Therefore, the evidence should be interpreted as speaking to views and experiences of the sample, rather than all UK money mules.

Table 7.4 Characteristics of the achieved sample

Characteristic	Characteristic (specific)	Split of the total sample (n=208)
Gender	Male	39%
Gender	Female	60%
Gender	Non-binary	1%
Age	18 to 24	16%
Age	25 to 34	44%
Age	35 to 44	26%
Age	45 to 54	8%
Age	55+	5%
Region	Greater London	33%
Region	Rest of England	52%
Region	Wales	3%
Region	Scotland	8%
Region	Northern Ireland	2%

7.2.4 Qualitative research strand

The qualitative strand formed the core of this research project, comprising in-depth interviews with both former money mules and professionals who encounter them through their work. The following sections set out the qualitative strand methodology.

7.2.5 Ethics and safeguarding considerations

Any research involving primary data collection with money mules could involve engaging with vulnerable participants about a challenging and/or potentially distressing time in their lives. Primary research of this nature needs a particularly careful and multi-faceted ethical and safeguarding process, to avoid harm to participants as a result of the research. These approaches were considered throughout the research, to ensure ethical and safeguarding risks were mitigated.

There are complex ethical risks around research involving those currently involved in crime, or subject to ongoing police investigation. This includes balancing maintaining participant anonymity for ethical purposes under the Market Research Society code of conduct, and the potential for participants to disclose ongoing criminal activity and incriminating themselves. To minimise the risk of the research affecting any ongoing criminal justice system activity, or participants incriminating themselves, the research protocol excluded those currently involved in money muling activities, or those undergoing prosecution for money muling offences. Participants were also informed when taking part in the research that if they disclose immediate or serious risk of life concerns about themselves or someone else, that information might need to be passed on to someone else.

There are also multiple ethical risks for speaking to anyone aged 17 and under as part of research, and particularly in relation to a crime they were involved in. To minimise the heightened risk of harm and re-traumatisation involving those aged 17 and under, this age group was not included in the research.

7.2.6 Interviews with money mules

Despite implementing a diversified recruitment strategy (social media adverts, gatekeepers, reaching out to online panel members and recontacting this project’s survey participants, as well as previous KnowledgePanel polling participants), only 2 approaches yielded successful participant engagement:

• recontacting consenting respondents from the survey who had indicated past involvement in money muling
• targeted social media advertisements run by Roots Research specifically for the qualitative component, using consistent screening criteria to maintain methodological coherence across recruitment channels

Due to the exploratory nature of this research, no hard quotas were imposed. The overall aim was to speak to a diverse pool of people with experiences across the spectrum of money muling complicity, who met the eligibility criteria outlined above.

Initial contact with the 159 potential participants occurred via email or telephone, with up to 2 follow-up attempts for non-responders. All participants completed a preliminary screening call with a researcher before the main interview to build rapport and confirm eligibility – an important step given the sensitive nature of the research topic. Out of the sample of 159, 73 individuals engaged; out of those who engaged, 41 were screened, identifying 12 eligible participants.

The interviews with money mules were conducted voluntarily. They were participant-led, carried out remotely via telephone or video call, and lasted up to an hour. Participants were provided with a ‘thank you’ support leaflet which included information on support they could access, alongside a designated helpline they could access if needed for further support.

While the scoping work had recommended using conventional personal voucher incentives (to minimise ethical risks of providing cash to potentially vulnerable individuals), participants were offered a £30 charity donation as an incentive instead. This is due to the individuals being recruited having committed a financially related crime and being likely to be under financial pressure. Therefore, a personal voucher incentive was not deemed appropriate as an approach in this context.

The research encountered significant recruitment challenges. Firstly, a considerable number of screened individuals were ineligible, primarily due to confusion between fraud victimisation and money muling experiences (6 out of 41 screened were victims of fraud). Some potential participants also expressed concerns about the sensitivity of the topic and the government funding the research (3 out of 73 who engaged with the research).

Secondly, with potential participants being reached through established research recruitment routes which conventionally offer personal incentives, almost one-in-five of those who engaged with the research declined due to the absence of cash or personal voucher incentives (13 out of 73). The remaining participants who engaged with the research but were not interviewed disengaged without giving a reason.

The research did not successfully recruit any qualitative participants from the KnowledgePanel polling. The KnowledgePanel team attributed this to 2 factors: the 10-month gap between the initial polling and the qualitative fieldwork, and the lack of personal cash incentives. This marked the first time KnowledgePanel had launched a qualitative research opportunity without offering personal financial compensation – a departure from what their panel members typically expect. Roots Research cited similar concerns about the lack of personal incentives before the survey launched.

These challenges resulted in an achieved sample of 9 money mules. While their experiences of being involved in money muling were diverse, none of the qualitative participants knew their actions constituted money muling before taking part. The final sample comprised 7 women and 2 men, aged 24 to 40, from various locations across England and Scotland.

7.2.7 Interviews with professionals

To supplement interviews with money mules, the research also sought to speak to professionals who work directly with or support money mules. The aim was to contextualise wider findings, provide insight into willing money mules and enrich direct experiences gathered from money mule interviews. The sample comprised support organisations identified through the scoping work, as well as law enforcement and financial sector contacts held by the Home Office. Snowball sampling was also used.

The research team at Ipsos UK and the Home Office contacted potential participants via email, with up to 2 follow-up attempts for non-respondents. The interviews with professionals were conducted remotely via telephone or video call, lasting up to an hour. They were semi-structured, with no incentives offered. The achieved sample comprised 11 professionals (4 from law enforcement, 5 from support organisations, 2 from banks).

7.2.8 Qualitative data limitations

By its nature, qualitative research is not designed to be statistically representative. The findings presented are illustrative of a range of experiences and viewpoints. A primary consideration when interpreting these findings is that the achieved sample consists solely of individuals who were unaware that their actions constituting money muling when deciding to engage. Therefore, this report documents the journeys and experiences of individuals towards the unwitting end of the spectrum of complicity, with limited insights into the experiences of witting and unknowing money mules. While it is not possible to determine the exact reasons for this skew in the sample, the research team identified several potential barriers which could be explored through further research:

The exclusion criteria (individuals who are still involved or being prosecuted for money muling-related offences) could potentially apply to those towards the witting end of the spectrum to a higher degree, resulting in them being screened out.

Lack of a cash or personal voucher incentive, rather than the charity donation incentive provided, could discourage participants and prevent the research from identifying a diverse, larger sample. The charity incentive worked well for those who engaged unwittingly, as they felt they wanted to speak of their experience to warn others. This is less likely to apply to those who engage wittingly. However, it should be noted that there are wider ethical considerations that would need to be made around providing personal incentives to individuals currently wittingly involved in crime.

Those who engage in money muling wittingly/complicitly are knowingly committing a crime. While precautions were taken to limit this, it might discourage those individuals from speaking about their activities with researchers due to a fear of prosecution.

Those who were unknowingly involved may not recognise what happened to them as money muling. In fact, a number of participants who were screened out of the qualitative strand were victims of fraud rather than money mules.

While professional perspectives (from law enforcement, support organisations and banks) provide some insight into the broader spectrum of money muling activity, the direct lived experience data remain limited to unwitting participants. This creates challenges in fully validating findings across the spectrum of money muling behaviours.

As an exploratory piece of research, these findings should be considered indicative rather than definitive and within the context of existing literature and understanding of money muling activities. However, despite the small sample size (9 money mules), these qualitative lived experience data represent a reasonable range of experiences across age, gender and pathways into money muling.

7.2.9 Application of the COM-B Model

The analysis employs the COM-B model to identify influences on money muling behaviour. When interpreting findings organised through this framework, it should be noted that the model helps identify potential intervention points but does not establish causal relationships. Additionally, capability, opportunity and motivation factors can interact in complex ways. While the research team explores these interactions in the report, with a limited sample to triangulate against, these interactions may not be fully captured.

7.3 Pen portraits of money mule participants

This annex provides detailed pen portraits of all 9 money mule participants interviewed during the qualitative research phase. Each portrait captures the participant’s journey through money muling, including: their age and gender; life circumstances at the time of recruitment; how they were recruited; the nature of their money muling activities; how their involvement ended; and any consequences they experienced. These narratives offer rich insights into the diverse pathways into and out of money muling, illustrating the varied experiences captured in this research. All participants have been given fictional names to protect their anonymity. Where participants are also featured in visual journey maps within the main report, this is noted in their individual portrait.

Pen portrait 1: Linda – recruited through a fake translator role

Linda, aged 25 to 34, woman.

Pre-entry: Linda was working on a zero-hour contract while searching for a permanent job where she could work from home. She regularly applied for positions on Indeed, LinkedIn and similar job platforms.

Entry: After a phone interview for a translator position, Linda received a job contract within 2 to 3 days offering £10 per hour as an independent contractor. The role required her to provide bank account details to receive client payments, which she would then transfer to her manager after deducting a 3% commission. Her manager would supposedly then handle tax and salary processing. Having never worked as a contractor before, Linda researched online and thought the arrangement seemed legitimate.

During: Linda accessed a portal where the materials to translate would be shared and uploaded. She translated articles about finance research and IT websites. While working, she received payments of £50 to £60. Once these accumulated to £160 to £170, she was instructed to transfer the funds onwards.

Exit: After 6 days, Linda completed this research survey and recognised that the questions related to her situation. She became nervous and worried about being involved in illegal activity, so together with her husband, they decided to seek support. Unable to reach her bank that evening, Linda anxiously contacted Citizen’s Advice the next morning, who said they were unable to help. They suggested she should contact ACAS (Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service – an advisory service for employees), who also said they could not support her, so ACAS directed Linda to Action Fraud (now known as Report Fraud). Following Action Fraud’s advice, Linda called her bank and the police. Despite on-going threats and demands to transfer the remaining funds, her bank advised her to cease all contact with the recruiters, which she did by blocking them.

Impact: While Linda found Action Fraud’s support helpful, she felt distressed and threatened by her bank’s emails about potential account closure and requested phone contact only. Her account was temporarily frozen, leaving her unable to pay bills, which she found really difficult.

Pen portrait 2: Claire – recruited by a friend for money transfers with no subsequent impact

Claire, aged 25 to 34, woman.

Pre-entry: 2 to 3 years ago, Claire was juggling multiple part-time jobs while supporting 2 children. She felt constant pressure to ensure her family had everything they needed.

Entry: A friend approached Claire with an opportunity described as a “big offer” – quick payment for minimal effort. Although they lived in different cities and were not particularly close, Claire trusted the friend enough to consider the proposal. The friend did not clarify if they were also participating. Facing financial pressures, Claire accepted without thinking extensively about it.

During: Claire’s friend introduced her to another friend, who called to arrange the payment. Claire did not know how her friend knew this person – Claire never asked about the connection between her friend and the third party, and no explanation was offered. Within hours of providing her bank details, Claire received the first transfer. This person stayed on the phone, guiding her through the process of forwarding the money. Claire completed 2 to 3 transactions, each around £15,000, keeping £2,000 as payment for each transfer. She never learned where the money was ultimately going.

Exit: Claire’s involvement ended after completing the requested transactions. No further contact was made.

Impact: Claire experienced no direct consequences but was worried whether it ‘exposed’ her account. In retrospect, she recognises the activity was risky but ultimately did not harm her. She reflected that financial desperation had impaired her judgement at the time. Now in a more stable financial position, she said she would not engage in similar risky activities.

Pen portrait 3: Andrea – assisted a colleague and underwent police investigation

Andrea, aged 35 to 44, woman.

Pre- entry: 1 to 2 years ago, Andrea worked as a legal advisor and led a stable, routine life.

Entry: A colleague approached Andrea claiming he was experiencing problems with his bank account and needed urgent help transferring money. He asked to use her account to receive funds that she would then forward to his account.

During: Andrea gave the colleague her bank account details and completed a single transaction of £300,000. She did not have any concerns or suspicions about the request, viewing it simply as helping a colleague in need. When he offered payment for her assistance, she declined, considering it a favour between friends.

Exit: Andrea’s involvement ended abruptly when her bank froze her account, and the police contacted her about fraudulent activity. Only at this point did she realise something was wrong. She provided a police statement and found her experiences with the police frightening and traumatic. Although she had legal representation throughout the process, she received no other support. The police accompanied her to the bank to address her frozen account, but Andrea was unprepared and did not know what documents were needed to resolve the situation.

Impact: Andrea’s account remained frozen for around one month, preventing access to her salary and causing significant financial hardship. Her colleague denied her involvement to the police, which Andrea believed helped clear her name, though she was never informed of the investigation’s outcome or what happened to her colleague. This first encounter with law enforcement left Andrea deeply shaken and unwilling to engage with the police again. She now maintains extreme caution whenever anyone requests money transfers.

Pen portrait 4: Suzanne – one-time assistance to a friend with no consequences

Suzanne, aged 35 to 44, woman.

Pre-entry: In 2023, Suzanne led a stable life, while having a desire to increase her income and capital.

Entry: A friend approached Suzanne for help with a financial transaction. He explained he was experiencing unresolved issues with his bank account but needed to receive money from a client. Due to time constraints, he asked to use her account. Suzanne requested he call to verify his identity before agreeing. She did not know anything about the client involved but viewed this simply as helping a friend in need.

During: The transaction occurred on the same day. £2,000 moved through Suzanne’s account, and she retained £500 as a thank you. Her friend provided a transaction receipt. It was a single, one-time transaction with no further involvement.

Impact: Suzanne experienced no negative consequences from this transaction. During the interview, she appeared reluctant to discuss details and redirected the conversation.

Pen portrait 5: Rachel – helped unemployed former colleague, discovered discrepancies during bank visit

Rachel, aged 35 to 44, woman.

Pre-entry: Rachel worked as an accountant but faced significant financial pressure. Her father was hospitalised, requiring expensive care, and she was also financially supporting a friend going through a divorce.

Entry: A former colleague who had recently lost their job approached Rachel requesting the use of her bank details in exchange for a payment. Rachel said she did not know what this would involve at the time and recognised the risk in giving out her information. However, she trusted him and felt her financial situation left her with no alternative.

During: Rachel completed 3 transactions through her account. While at the bank discussing financing for her father’s medical care, bank staff examined recent transactions and discovered the account she had received money from did not match her colleague’s details. This revelation confused and alarmed Rachel. When she confronted her colleague, his evasive responses only deepened her confusion. She feared he might have shared her banking details with others. Following the bank’s advice, she monitored her account for additional transactions, but none occurred. Despite being promised £200 for her assistance, she received only partial payment.

Exit: The transactions ended after the bank visit raised Rachel’s suspicions, though the situation remained unresolved.

Impact: Rachel faced complications when paying for her father’s healthcare, receiving queries from the healthcare provider about the source of the funds she was using. The confusion and stress from the experience contributed to depression. The incident left her determined never to engage in similar arrangements.

Pen portrait 6: Kathryn – recruited through fake digital marketing role, left with £40,000 debt

Kathryn, aged 35 to 44, woman

Pre-entry: A couple of years ago, following government warnings about worsening economic conditions, Kathryn became anxious about her financial future. She began searching for additional work to supplement her existing job.

Entry: Kathryn received a WhatsApp message about a job opportunity. The company’s website appeared professional, displaying certificates and credentials that seemed legitimate. They asked her to complete a trial task, which required opening a cryptocurrency account.

During: The role involved selecting products from the company’s website to buy with funds they deposited into her crypto account. Kathryn believed this was digital marketing work and that online reviews were created like this. The company promoted her through different membership levels, each involving larger sums and more expensive items to purchase – escalating from £10 to over £1,000 per transaction.

The company encouraged Kathryn to put her own money into the account with promises of full redemption. After successfully withdrawing her money once, she grew confident. When her bank warned her about the investment, she was confused – this was a job, not an investment. Her recruiter connected her with other ‘employees’ via a WhatsApp group, who reassured her. Following the company’s recommendation, Kathryn secured a short-term loan of £40,000 from a bank. This time, when she tried to withdraw the money, she could not. The company claimed she needed to deposit more money first.

Exit: Kathryn found the situation very worrying and called Action Fraud, who advised it was a scam. She called the police, who declined to investigate after determining it involved foreign nationals. Subsequently, Kathryn discovered a disclaimer on the company’s website warning that their name was being used fraudulently.

Impact: Kathryn went on a debt management plan and feels like she had to put all her future plans on hold. She felt taken advantage of and exploited at a point when she desperately needed income. She sought mental health support, although the overwhelming disappointment persists. Kathryn’s credit score will be impacted for 6 years, and she cannot obtain or use credit cards. She feels the shame prevents her from having serious romantic relationships because she does not want to disclose what happened.

Pen portrait 7: Leanne – coerced by an abusive partner, escaped by leaving the relationship

Note: This participant’s journey is also illustrated in a visual journey map in the main report (Figure 2.6).

Leanne, aged 18 to 24, woman.

Pre-entry: Leanne was trapped in an abusive relationship. Her partner had systematically isolated her from family and friends. She relied on disability benefits to afford essential medicine.

Entry: Leanne’s partner instructed her to move some money through her account in exchange for a payment of £50, claiming the funds were being sent to a friend. Although the request seemed strange, Leanne did not question it. Fear of her partner and a need for money encouraged her to agree to what she understood to be a one-off transfer.

During: Leanne’s partner deposited money into Leanne’s account and set up a re-occurring transaction without her knowledge. When Leanne cancelled the direct debit after the first transaction, he raped her in retaliation. He then continued to use her account without her knowledge, stealing money with each transaction.

Exit: While her partner was out, Leanne accessed his laptop and discovered money was still being transferred and sent to a gang. One day, her partner uncharacteristically left the door unlocked when he went to work. Leanne seized the opportunity to escape to her mother’s house. After explaining the situation, her stepfather helped her call the bank.

Impact: The bank implemented additional safeguards on Leanne’s account to prevent future exploitation, reimbursed some stolen funds, and froze her ex-partner’s account. Police supported the domestic abuse investigation and referred her to a fraud awareness course. While she declined mental health support initially due to not feeling ready, she completed the fraud course and found it valuable, learning things she had not previously known.

Pen portrait 8: Josh – recruited through a fake job advertisement, withdrew after becoming suspicious

Note: This participant’s journey is also illustrated in a visual journey map in the main report (Figure 4.1).

Josh, aged 25 to 34, man.

Pre-entry: Josh had been unemployed for an extensive period and was growing increasingly desperate for a job. This led him to use lesser-known job search websites. In retrospect, he recognises he did not critically evaluate job advertisements – his urgent need for employment meant he was prepared to accept any opportunity.

Entry: Josh found a position as a product distributor. He was to receive stock from a business and distribute it to clients. The role description mentioned receiving client payments and transferring them to the company. Josh applied for the job and sent a copy of his passport, address and bank details. No interview was conducted.

During: Within 24 hours, Josh received money with instructions to transfer it abroad via Western Union. His trust eroded when no physical inventory arrived for distribution. When he questioned his company contact, they evaded his queries or provided illogical answers. Phone calls went unanswered. Despite growing doubts, Josh went to the post office to complete the transfer. While completing the form and still in contact with recruiters, he sought his parents’ advice. They urged him to abandon the transaction immediately.

Exit: Josh left the post office without completing the transfer. When he informed the recruiters that he would not proceed without receiving the products, they began to threaten him, reminding him that they knew where he lived. Josh called the police, who advised him to return the money. He blocked the recruiters on all communication channels.

Impact: Josh got a new passport and continued to feel anxious and worried for a few months.

Pen portrait 9: Harry – recruited by a rapper on Snapchat, closed by bank

Note: This participant’s journey is also illustrated in a visual journey map in the main report (Figure 5.2).

Harry, aged 18 to 24, man.

Pre-entry: Harry had left school without qualifications, limiting his employment opportunities. Facing intense pressure to earn money, he saw a Snapchat story from a rapper he had followed for years advertising a money-making opportunity. Having built trust in this influencer over time, Harry assumed the offer was legitimate.

Entry: Hoping to make money, Harry replied to the rapper’s story and was connected with the recruiter (presented as the rapper’s friend). Following the recruiter’s instructions, Harry opened a new bank account and provided the recruiter with access to it. He was promised £1,000 to £2,000.

During: Harry saw money being repeatedly transferred in and out of his account but received no payment for himself. When he realised the recruiter had blocked him on social media, he began to feel something was wrong.

Exit: Harry received an email from his bank stating his account would be closed, without any explanation. He panicked but felt too ashamed to tell anyone what had happened. He searched online for information about bank account closures and scams but found no relevant support. He was unfamiliar with the term ‘money muling’ at this time.

Impact: Harry was left without a bank account. When he tried to open another bank account, he was refused without explanation. Seeking help from a family member, he accessed his credit report, which showed ‘misuse of facilities’ – a term he did not understand. Harry experienced significant mental health issues, feeling isolated and unable to take part in social activities. He felt particularly embarrassed having to ask his parents to transfer money for him. He described feeling scammed and groomed, emphasising he had not known his actions were illegal.

7.4 Survey screener

ASK ALL
S1. Gender

Which of the following best describes your gender?

• Man
• Woman
• Non-binary
• My gender is not listed
• Prefer not to say

ASK ALL
NUMERIC [SCREENOUT IF LESS THAN 18]
S2. Age
What is your age range?
[INSERT DROP DOWN LIST]

• 17 or under [SCREEN OUT]
• 18 – 24 years
• 25 – 34
• 35 – 44
• 45 – 54
• 55 – 64
• 65 – 74
• 75+
• Prefer not to say

ASK ALL
S3. Region
Where do you live?

• Channel Islands
• East of England
• East Midlands
• London
• North East
• North West
• Northern Ireland
• Scotland
• South East
• South West
• Wales
• West Midlands
• Yorkshire and Humberside
• None of the above [SCREEN OUT]

ASK ALL

Which country or countries do you hold citizenship in?
By citizenship, this means you have the right to live in that country permanently without restriction or need for a visa.
Please select all that apply.
[INSERT LIST OF COUNTRIES]

ASK ALL
S5a. Employment
Which of the following describes your main activity…
Please select one option only

• Working full-time (30+ hours per week)
• Working part-time (less than 30 hours per week)
• Studying full-time
• Studying part-time
• Not working
• Prefer not to say [SINGLE CODE]
• Don’t know [SINGLE CODE]

ASK IF S5a_3 OR 4=1
S5b. Overseas student
Are you an overseas / international student?

• Yes, I travelled to study in the UK from __ [INSERT LIST OF COUNTRIES]
• No, I’m a UK resident

ASK ALL
S6. Financial security
How easy is it for you to pay for everything you need?

• Very easy - I have plenty of money to cover everything I need.
• Fairly easy - I can pay for everything I need but don’t have much left over.
• It’s a bit of a struggle - I have to budget carefully to make ends meet.
• Quite difficult - I sometimes have to go without things I need.
• Very difficult - I often can’t afford the basic things I need.
• Don’t know
• Prefer not to say

ASK ALL
S7. Willingness to money mule
In today’s social and economic climate, people are increasingly earning money in new ways.
Would you consider, or have you previously considered, doing any of the following?
ANSWER OPTIONS

• Yes
• No
• Don’t know
• Prefer not to say [SCREEN OUT]

ATTRIBUTES - RANDOMISE [1-3 are examples of willing money muling]

• Someone you know asks if you would be willing to move some money through your bank account in return for a fee or a share of money.
• Applying for a role advertised on a job site or social media, promising quick and easy money while working from home. The only requirement for the role is having a UK bank account.
• An organisation offers a lump sum payment of £500 plus on-going commission for providing them with your bank card details / access to your account.
• Someone on social media contacts you, inviting you to a limited time investment opportunity for a crypto currency scheme that guarantees a high rate of return.
• Investing some of your money into a stocks and shares ISA.
• A high street bank offers £175 cashback if you move an existing current account to them.
• Placing bets on sporting, cultural or political events.

SCREEN IN IF AT LEAST 1 OF ATTRIBUTES 1-3 = 1, OTHERWISE SCREEN OUT

[SCREEN OUT]

Thank you for completing the screening questions. While your experiences are important, it appears you don’t meet the specific criteria for this study. We really appreciate you taking the time to take part. If you have any questions about the research, please contact Ipsos at UK-PA-Financial-Research@ipsos.com. If you would like support on any of the issues relevant to this research, please find some support links below.
[INSERT SUPPORT LEAFLET]

1. An ‘unwitting money mule’ is an individual who is unaware that their actions are illegal. These individuals are distinct from ‘witting’ mules, who may suspect or ignore red flags about the illicit nature of the transactions, and ‘complicit’ mules, who knowingly participate in the criminal activity ↩

2. The COM-B model (Michie et al., 2011) is a behavioural framework that identifies three factors necessary for behaviour to occur: Capability (knowledge and skills), Opportunity (external factors that enable behaviour), and Motivation (conscious and unconscious processes that drive behaviour) ↩

3. For more information on this scheme please see: Join the JobsAware Online Recruitment Scheme - JobsAware ↩

4. The cease and desist approach is outlined further in the money mule and financial exploitation action plan: Money mule and financial exploitation action plan (accessible) ↩