Research and analysis

Best practice in POCA agencies: Environment mapping

Published 15 September 2026

Executive summary

Background and context

The Criminal Finances and Asset Recovery team in the Home Office commissioned Ipsos UK in 2023 to conduct research to explore the use of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) by law enforcement agencies and other government bodies (‘POCA agencies’). The findings of the research will contribute to the overall evidence base, which was a key government ambition under the Economic Crime Plan 2 (HM Government, 2023a). The research was exploratory, to better understand key stakeholders’ and agencies’ perspectives on the use of asset denial and recovery powers.

The overarching objectives are:

• to understand and map the current landscape of POCA asset denial and recovery processes among POCA agencies, including understanding the perceived rationale of both POCA and non-POCA powers; as well as the processes of applying these, including, enforcement and prioritisation activities
• to understand how POCA agencies define and measure asset denial and recovery performance and how measurement could be improved
• to get an initial understanding of what POCA agencies perceive to be good practice

Findings are primarily based on 34 qualitative interviews with individuals from a cross-section of organisations from the asset denial and recovery system, including large law enforcement agencies (n=6), local authorities (n=3), small-medium law enforcement agencies (n=6), local police forces (n=10), regional forces and regional organised crime units (n=6), and prosecution and enforcement agencies (n=3).

While organisations from across the asset recovery system were represented in these interviews, respondents were primarily from the asset denial part of the process, and are therefore not all directly involved in recovery or enforcement procedures. It should also be noted that examples or processes identified as ‘good practice’ represent examples perceived to be best practice by interviewees. It was not possible within the scope of this research to independently validate whether these have led to better performance.

Key findings

Understanding the asset denial and asset recovery landscape

Aims of POCA powers:

The POCA agencies interviewed felt that the purpose of POCA powers was primarily to disrupt criminal activity, deprive criminals of the profits of crime and to deter future crimes. Compensating victims was also seen as a core element of POCA.

POCA powers were viewed as predominantly for use against economic crimes (for example, fraud, bribery, money laundering), drug-related offences and human trafficking offences.

How, when and why conviction- and non-conviction-based POCA powers are used:

The range of powers available under POCA was perceived as important and highly valuable amongst those interviewed, as it offered flexibility to address different situations.

Conviction-based (criminal) confiscation remained the first point of call for most POCA agencies interviewed, particularly law enforcement and regional organised crime units (ROCUs), as it was seen as more effective. The possibility for Section 22 uplifts^{[footnote 1]} and victim compensation played a key role in this preference.

Non-conviction-based (civil) confiscation was used when there was not enough evidence for confiscation.

Findings suggest the use of non-conviction-based (civil) POCA powers has increased in recent years, and there was an appetite to further increase the use of civil powers, largely because of the advantages of the lower burden of proof. For civil forfeiture powers (which are heard in Magistrates’ Courts), this was mainly because these powers were seen as less time and resource intensive to use, compared with criminal confiscation. Civil Recovery powers (heard in the High Court), on the other hand, were seen as more resource and time intensive than criminal confiscation, due to the underlying complexity of the cases.

Larger law enforcement agencies often reported leaning more towards using civil forfeiture and recovery processes, particularly for complex cases involving serious fraud, bribery, corruption, or tax-related crimes. The ability to recover assets without a criminal conviction was seen as advantageous by some respondents in these complex cases.

Enforcement of criminal and civil orders

Enforcement of confiscation orders was seen as a lengthy and time-consuming process, with some examples of cases requiring continuous effort over several years to ensure the payment of an Order. While not all interviewees spoken to were directly involved in recovery and enforcement stages, perceptions regarding timeliness had led to some concerns amongst POCA agencies, particularly when large sums were involved and victims were waiting for compensation.

Similarly, enforcement of civil recovery orders in the High Court was seen as complicated and time consuming. Enforcement of forfeitures, on the other hand, was generally viewed as straightforward, especially in relation to cash and listed assets due to the type of assets.

How, when and why non-POCA powers are used:

When comparing the use of POCA versus non-POCA powers in asset recovery and denial, there was a clear overall preference expressed by respondents for using POCA powers. This preference was due to a mix of factors, including efficiency, suitability for the type of case and value of the asset, and availability of staff. POCA powers were often seen as more effective for asset denial and recovery, particularly for higher value cases. Non-POCA powers would typically be employed when POCA powers were impractical due to the amount of work involved relative to the volume of cash.

While court delays were consistently flagged in interviews as a concern, the impact they had on whether agencies went down the asset recovery route seemed to be minimal.

How, when and why POCA agencies prioritise cases for asset recovery:

Not all agencies taking part in the research felt able to actively prioritise asset recovery cases. Local police forces and local authorities were more likely to report working through cases on a ‘first come, first served’ basis.

For those that did, the key decision-making factors reported were the value of available assets (and likelihood of success), the level of disruption the asset denial/recovery would have on criminal activity, the public message it would send to victims/ the wider community, whether there were identifiable victims that could be compensated, as well as what capacity the agencies had to take on a case.

Measuring performance in asset denial and recovery

How performance in asset recovery is defined and measured by POCA agencies:

Most agencies noted that they primarily measured performance by the value and volume of proceeds of crime restrained, seized, frozen and subsequently recovered through criminal confiscations, civil forfeitures and civil recovery powers. Stakeholders across all agencies did acknowledge that measuring only by value and volume was limited in its use and ability to indicate where asset recovery performance could be improved.

Some agencies used additional forms of measurement, such as the level of disruption caused.

How the measurement of performance in asset denial and recovery could be improved:

Suggestions from respondents for improving POCA performance measures included improving the accessibility and usability of currently existing performance measures; for example, more could be done centrally to ensure that POCA agencies are making the most of the currently available data, and Joint Asset Recovery Database (JARD) could be more user friendly, especially as it relies on manual data entry. They also suggested adding additional metrics, such as to assess the number of victims helped or record the amount of money returned to victims, particularly in cases of fraud and money laundering, as although JARD does allow agencies to record compensation through confiscation, it does not report on the total number of victims compensated.

Good practice and drivers of asset recovery performance

Agencies regarded the following as key performance drivers:

• clear ownership and continuity of case management, including the early and continued involvement of financial investigators (FIs), proactively looking for POCA opportunities and having a clear strategy in place in each case
• collaboration and communication between and within POCA agencies
• awareness of POCA powers and asset recovery across different teams within an agency – including among frontline staff
• focusing, where possible, on compensation for victims and investing recovered assets in the community
• the ability to use POCA powers in innovative ways to locate and seize assets
• resource, capacity and specialist knowledge, particularly FIs having the right levels of training, knowledge and capacity; there was high demand for FIs, and challenges with recruitment and retaining FIs
• sensitivity to the vulnerabilities of the people from whom assets might be recovered

Perceived best practice was predominantly shared informally and within their own teams/agency. Examples included team meetings, masterclasses/workshops and debrief sessions post investigation.

Sharing best practice with other agencies was seen as more limited and tended to be done informally (for example, through existing personal relationships). There were, however, also examples of cross-agency sharing of best practice such as through external workshops or multi-agency practitioner groups.

1. Introduction

1.1 Background

The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) sets out the legislative framework for law enforcement agencies to recover the proceeds of crime, with the aim to deny criminals the use of their assets and disrupt and deter criminality.

There are 2 main routes that agencies can use for asset recovery: conviction-based (criminal) and non-conviction-based (civil). Criminal asset recovery (confiscation) involves the imposition of a confiscation order by the court after a criminal conviction, which has to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The level of a confiscation order is set as the defendant’s ‘benefit’ from crime, which they are required to satisfy with any assets they have available.

Civil forfeiture in the Magistrates’ Court or civil recovery in the High Court does not require a criminal conviction. Instead, these civil powers target specific assets rather than the individual. Civil forfeiture can only be used to forfeit cash, monies held in bank accounts, crypto assets and certain listed assets, whereas civil recovery can be used against any assets. Where it can be shown on the balance of probabilities (a lower burden of proof than the criminal standard) that assets have been obtained through unlawful conduct, and in civil forfeiture also where they are intended for use in unlawful conduct, those assets can be recovered. Unlawful conduct means conduct that constitutes a criminal offence under UK law or would do so if it occurred in the UK, even where the conduct took place overseas. This includes property that represents such proceeds (for example, assets that have been converted, transferred or substituted) and therefore allows for a fairly broad application of the powers.

In addition to conviction-based (criminal) and non-conviction-based (civil) asset recovery, the National Crime Agency (NCA) has special tax powers under POCA that allows it to access revenue powers to tax income which it has reasonable grounds to suspect are the proceeds of crime.

There was £284.5 million of assets recovered from confiscation, forfeiture and civil recovery orders in the financial year ending 31 March 2025. This represents a 15% increase compared to the previous year, and a 31% increase compared to the financial year ending March 2020 (Home Office, 2025). Although significant volumes of proceeds of crime have been recovered and denied, the Economic Crime Plan 2 (ECP 2) commits HM Government to further increasing the recovery of criminal assets.

To support this, the Home Office commissioned Ipsos to carry out exploratory research into the use of POCA and how performance in POCA is (and should be) measured, and to identify examples of best practice. This research specifically supports Action 12 under the Economic Crime Plan 2.

1.2 Research questions

This research sought to answer the following questions:

1. What are the perceived purposes of asset confiscation and POCA powers?

2. How, when and why are conviction- and non-conviction-based POCA powers used?

3. How long does asset confiscation under POCA take?

4. What is the process for enforcing criminal and civil orders?

5. How, when and why are non-POCA powers used?

6. How, when and why do POCA agencies prioritise asset recovery in their organisation strategy, and how do they prioritise between cases which have the potential for asset recovery?

7. How is performance in asset recovery defined and measured by POCA agencies?

8. How could the measurement of performance be improved?

9. What is considered good practice and what facilitates good performance in POCA?

1.3 Methodology and limitations

In 2023, Ipsos UK conducted 34 depth interviews with stakeholders from POCA agencies.

Researchers used semi-structured discussion guides, co-developed with the HO’s Asset Recovery Policy and Research teams. Interviews were conducted online via Microsoft Teams, lasted approximately one hour each, were recorded with the consent of participants, and professionally transcribed before being analysed using thematic analysis.

The agencies were selected in order to include some whose asset recovery value was above average, and some below, based on Home Office data for 2018 to 2023. Although it was understood performance would be more nuanced than values, this was agreed as the best way to initially ensure a good spread of agencies in the sample. The sample of interviewees is detailed in the table below. The Home Office supported the recruitment of interviewees, making initial contact with the included agencies. Ipsos provided recruitment materials for the HO to share with prospective participants, which included a privacy policy and information sheet. Snowball sampling method was used, where individuals identified by the HO suggested further contacts to be interviewed.

Table 1: Final sample

Type of agencies	Make-up of agencies	Number of interviews achieved	Stakeholder type
Large law enforcement agencies	HMRC (HM Revenue & Customs)	6	Law enforcement stakeholders
	NCA (National Crime Agency)
	SFO (Serious Fraud Office)
Local authorities	Local councils	3	Local authority stakeholders
	Trading standards services
Small-medium law enforcement agencies	DWP (Department for Work and Pensions)	6	Law enforcement stakeholders
	Environment agency
	FCA (Financial Conduct Authority)
Local police forces	Mix of small, medium and large forces across England and Wales	10	Local authority stakeholders
Regional forces	Regional Organised Crime Units	6	Police stakeholders
Prosecution and Enforcement agencies	CPS (Crown Prosecution Service)	3	Police stakeholders
	HMCTS (HM Courts & Tribunal Service)

Participants’ responses reflect their individual perceptions and experiences within asset recovery and do not necessarily reflect the viewpoints of others within asset recovery agencies. While interviews were conducted with a range of asset recovery agencies, sample size for each agency type was relatively small – particularly for small-medium law enforcement agencies (n=3) and local authorities (n=3). This restricts the generalisability of the findings and necessitates a cautious approach when interpreting results.

The recruitment process was facilitated by the HO. This led to successful recruitment but also introduced the risk of sampling bias. This was somewhat mitigated by including individuals directly recruited by Ipsos through ‘snowballing’.

2. Asset denial and recovery landscape

This chapter presents findings from the interviews in relation to the first 6 research questions:

2.1 Perceptions of the purpose of POCA powers

Key findings

The POCA agencies interviewed felt that the purpose of POCA powers was primarily to disrupt criminal activity, deprive criminals of the profits of crime and to deter future crimes.

Compensating victims was also seen as a core element of POCA.

There was a relatively consistent sense that the legislation was designed to disrupt criminal activity by removing financial incentive, and depriving criminals of the profits of crime, as well as providing a deterrent to future crimes. Agencies interviewed stated they most commonly used POCA powers to combat economic crimes (for example, fraud, bribery, money laundering), as well as drug-related offences and human trafficking offences. Some agencies, such as Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCUs), regularly used POCA to tackle serious organised crime (HM Government, 2023b). Stakeholders within large law enforcement agencies felt that through POCA, law enforcement is encouraged to take a more holistic approach, moving beyond merely prioritising criminal justice outcomes.

“[In short] it’s taking the profit out of crime.”

Police stakeholder

Several stakeholders, especially the police, referenced the importance of victim compensation to the purposes of POCA.

“… what we’re always looking towards is this reduction of crime first and foremost, and then right beside that would be public interest. So, we will utilise an absolute range of asset denial powers and it’s very much assessed on a case-by-case basis as to what would have the greatest impact”…We take away the…benefit from criminal conduct from individuals, and we put in place confiscation orders with a view to also having compensation, so that victims can get their funds back. That, of course, is if there’s victims in place.”

Police stakeholder

2.2 How, when and why conviction- and non-conviction-based POCA powers are used

Key findings

Stakeholders appreciated the range of asset recovery powers – both conviction-based (criminal) and non-conviction-based (civil).

Conviction-based (criminal) confiscation powers were more frequently used than civil recovery. Criminal confiscation was seen as the most effective option.

Victim compensation was an important factor in the decision to use criminal confiscation. Section 22 uplifts were also perceived as one of the key benefits of criminal confiscation orders – allowing newly identified assets to be restrained and used to satisfy the original confiscation order.

Non-conviction-based (civil) confiscation was used when there was not enough evidence for confiscation. Some stakeholders felt civil powers should be considered at an earlier stage.

The benefits of using civil recovery powers included the lower burden of proof. Criminal confiscation investigations were seen as more in-depth and time consuming compared with forfeiture investigations. Civil recovery investigations, on the other hand, were seen as time consuming as confiscation investigations, if not more, due to the underlying complexity of the cases. Partly for this reason, civil forfeiture in the Magistrates’ Court was used more frequency than civil recovery in the High Court.

When civil measures were used, they were reported to be more commonly used by larger law enforcement agencies.

Although less commonly used compared to criminal measures, stakeholders from all agencies reported an increase in using civil powers in recent years.

A number of stakeholders, particularly from the police and other law enforcement agencies, valued the range of POCA powers available, which they noted enabled them to select the most disruptive method against criminals on a case-by-case basis. Stakeholders across agencies highlighted that conviction (criminal) and non-conviction-based (civil) powers were often purposefully used at the same time to maximise the chance of a successful outcome.

The use of conviction-based measures: criminal confiscation

Criminal confiscation remained the preferred route, compared to civil measures, particularly among police stakeholders. There was a view that criminal confiscation was often the first point of call as stakeholders saw it as a natural consequence of prosecution. It was emphasised that decisions about the use of criminal confiscation were taken on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the level of criminality and nature of the case. FIs taking part in the interviews reported taking the following aspects into consideration when deciding whether to confiscate assets: the type of crime being investigated; characteristics of the individual such as whether they are a ‘career criminal’, whether they are likely to have a high number of assets, or any assets; whether there are appropriate tools available to recover the assets in question; whether FIs have the accreditation needed to carry out the confiscation.

Victim compensation was an important factor in the decision about the use of criminal confiscation. The presence of an identifiable victim of the crime who could be compensated was a reason for pursuing criminal compensation.

“We always put victims at the heart of everything that we do. They’re always our number one priority, is recovering assets for victims.”

Police stakeholder

Section 22 was described as one of the key benefits of confiscation orders compared to civil powers. This provision ensures that, where new assets are been found, even many years after the original order, these can be restrained and used to satisfy the original confiscation order. Although one disadvantage of Section 22 was that assets recovered through these uplifts cannot be directed to an existing compensation order or a new compensation order created.

“Confiscation can be done in conjunction with a compensation order. But once the confiscation order has been made, you can’t make a compensation order after the conclusion of the trial. And the trial concludes when the confiscation order is made. So, if we then go for an uplift, because we’ve found new assets, the trial is over. So, we can’t actually ask for a compensation order. So, we can’t give that uplift money back to the victim. Which, as a victim of fraud, is a big deal.”

Local authority stakeholder

The passage of the Crime and Policing Bill in 2026 resolves the issue by allowing for additional funds to be directed to victims with outstanding losses following the uplift of a confiscation order.

The use of non-conviction-based measures: civil recovery

Overall, civil measures were said to be used when there was not enough evidence of criminality to use confiscation powers. Stakeholders expressed concern that civil proceedings are often only considered once all criminal options have been exhausted or are regarded as a ‘bolt-on’ to criminal investigations, and were often not considered at an early enough stage.

“Then on civil recovery, what we do here is probably slightly different in that it’s not always the case or apparent early doors whether the property has been obtained by criminal means. What we may well do is open up a case…with a view to be able to use our Part 8 powers. You open the case, you use your tools, you gather that evidence and if at the end of it you go, ‘Actually, I can’t show that this has come from criminal means.’ Then your [criminal] case dies. If we proceed, we may be looking at PFOs, interim freezing orders with a view to then getting some re-judgement or recovery order or negotiated settlement further down the line.”

Law enforcement stakeholder

The advantages of pursuing civil orders were said to be the lower burden of proof and that they were less time and resource intense to obtain. Stakeholders noted the lower burden of proof and that, in contrast to criminal, in civil cases the investigation focused on the asset in question (the cash or the money held in a bank account, crypto assets or the listed assets) not on the individual.

“It’s [civil forfeiture is] now starting to look like a lot more of an attractive prospect because it doesn’t require a prosecution, it’s on the civil standard and it will be for the defendant or the interested person to prove the legitimacy of whatever it is rather than us to prove the criminal standard that it’s derived from crime.”

Law enforcement stakeholder

Although civil powers were less commonly used compared to criminal powers, stakeholders from all agencies reported an increase in using civil powers in recent years. There was an assumption that, despite the challenges, the lower burden of proof means that this will continue to increase in the future, and stakeholders across agencies expressed an interest in using civil interventions more. Small-medium law enforcement and police stakeholders explained they were increasingly exploring the use of civil powers where it would not be deemed cost effective to pursue prosecution, or when prosecution fails.

“I think going forward it probably will be that we do a lot more civil recovery as opposed to criminal where it’s appropriate. I mean, ultimately, I think criminal investigation and confiscation is preferable because that person ends up getting the criminal conviction as well. As well as the asset denial. But in certain circumstances where it is appropriate, I think civil recovery is massively useful. I think I can see us doing more of it going forward.”

Police stakeholder

When civil measures were used, they were reported to be more commonly used by larger law enforcement agencies. Stakeholders within large law enforcement agencies explained how civil recovery might be used if assets are hidden through complex structures such as trusts, offshore companies or corporate structures where a criminal conviction was seen as unlikely.

Overall, civil forfeiture was used much more frequently and by a larger number of agencies compared with civil recovery. This is because not all agencies have civil recovery powers, and because civil recovery is often used where the property involved is of significant value or where the unlawful conduct is particularly serious or complex. These types of cases tend to be less common and, as a result, civil recovery as a tool tends to be used less frequently.

There was consensus among all types of agencies that unexplained wealth orders (UWOs) were used in limited circumstances. This was partly said to be because UWOs can only be applied for by relevant enforcement agencies (such as NCA, HMRC, FCA or SFO) and are only used in very specific types of cases such as those involving a politically exposed person (PEP) from outside the European Economic Area (EEA) or where there is a reasonable suspicion that a person’s lawfully obtained income would not be sufficient to obtain the property in question (worth at least £50,000), and the person is either involved in or connected to someone involved in serious crime. Other considerations mentioned related to timings (both the time needed for investigation and the overall length of time it took to obtain a UWO though the High Court), difficulties in accessing relevant materials (for example, because the assets are abroad), difficulties in establishing that the wealth was ‘unexplained’, and the risk of financial liability to the applicant agency if the UWO is unsuccessful. Changes made in the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 now protect agencies from adverse costs rulings, apart from where they are found to have acted dishonestly, unreasonably or improperly during the proceedings. These changes have mitigated the risk and supported an increased use of UWOs.

Decisions about the use and timing of account freezing orders (AFOs) take into account that they alert the individual to an investigation. As a result, investigators mentioned that it can be beneficial to gain more intelligence before freezing bank accounts – even if not needed for the Court Order – to secure other assets as well. Stakeholders said that AFOs were powers that would be used to aid investigation, rather than an action taken separately from the investigation.

Property freezing orders (PFOs) were reported to be time and resource intensive. Insights from large law enforcement agencies involved in civil recovery suggest that getting a PFO can be time and resource intensive. This was partly because these are heard in the High Court, rather than the Magistrates’ Court. Some stakeholders mentioned that they would only consider PFOs for high-value assets (one agency put this at £500,000 and above) to offset the risks of financial liability in case the PFO does not result in a civil recovery order. To avoid this lengthy and complex PFO process, stakeholders from an agency involved in civil recovery highlighted that it was common for investigating agencies to negotiate a settlement with the defendant outside of court or get a summary judgement to avoid going to trial to obtain a recovery order.

While freezing assets was temporary, stakeholders acknowledged that it can be very intrusive for the individual. There was a sense from law enforcement agencies that judges were sometimes reluctant to, for example, grant AFOs based on a single strand of intelligence from Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs). Therefore, although the burden of proof is much lower, in practice it was not always seen as easy to receive the freezing order from the courts.

2.3 The length of time taken for asset confiscation under POCA

Key findings

For criminal confiscation, timelines varied considerably between cases. Factors that affected the timeline included court waiting times, case complexity and level of co-operation from the defendant.

The time between initiation and asset recovery was generally perceived to be quicker for forfeitures compared with both criminal confiscation orders and civil recovery.

Conviction-based asset recovery

The time it takes for assets to be denied was reported to vary considerably between cases. Factors that affected the timeline included:

Court waiting times: Some stakeholders reported waiting several months, or even years, for cases to reach court. They acknowledged courts were still recovering from a backlog of cases from the COVID-19 pandemic. Court delays were generally seen by stakeholders as worse in Crown Courts, compared to Magistrates’ Courts, meaning that the effects were felt more for confiscation orders compared with civil forfeitures.

Case complexity: In relatively straightforward cases (for example, no hidden or overseas assets), stakeholders suggested that asset recovery would take roughly 6 months from the point of sentencing. For more complex cases (for example, those with international elements, involving hidden assets or serious organised crime), asset recovery could take years.

Unco-operative defendants: Cases involving individuals who are ‘unwilling to co-operate’ were seen as those who did not engage with the POCA agency, or who deliberately delayed proceedings or sought ways to exhaust the judicial system through multiple appeals.

Appeals: While not routinely mentioned, a few stakeholders pointed out that in their view there had been an increase in appeals (including to the Court of Appeal). This was attributed to individuals (and their solicitors) growing more knowledgeable about POCA. It seems, however, that appeals have little impact on the decision-making of POCA agencies, as it did not stop them from enforcing, and they were not always aware that an appeal had been made until they received the Court of Appeal’s order.

“There are lots of quirks to the regime. And lots of legal challenges that get thrown up by the courts in terms of the judgements and the interpretation and the application of the law by the courts. It’s the area of law that I think generates the most appeal cases on the criminal side.”

Prosecution and enforcement stakeholder

Custodial sentences: Stakeholders highlighted that recovery could be delayed where offenders were in prison, as this acted as a barrier to communicating with them.

Selling property: Where properties needed to be sold as part of asset recovery, this could cause delays. Stakeholders acknowledged that judges would give extensions where circumstances out of their control affected the time it took to recover assets.

Non-conviction based asset recovery

The time between initiation and asset recovery was generally perceived to be quicker for forfeitures compared with both criminal confiscation and civil recovery. Two factors primarily played into this:

1. Without the need for prior conviction, civil powers can be actioned without the need for a criminal trial.
2. Court delays were generally seen as less pronounced in Magistrates’ Courts.

Civil recovery, on the other hand, could take a long time. Insights on civil recovery were limited, but stakeholders noted that the investigation alone can take up to 5 years due to the complexity of the cases. It was also mentioned that the numerous legal avenues for suspects to appeal and challenge the process could lead to considerable delays.

“[Civil recovery cases are] extremely large and complex litigious cases, it’s very rare that these are done in any time shorter than 4 or 5 years. They can take longer. The great deal for that is there are so many avenues within the judicial process for the respondent to basically escalate appeals and the courts themselves are very busy, so just court availability. All of these things, limited court availability, extremely litigious, extremely complicated, they tend to involve, or they can involve multiple jurisdictions, they can involve complicated areas of the law. But it means that this is an extremely, it can be extremely protracted.”

Law enforcement stakeholder

2.4 Enforcement of criminal and civil orders

Key findings

For criminal POCA powers, most POCA agencies reported little involvement in enforcement, which was said to be led by HM Courts & Tribunals Service (HMCTS).

Some local forces and ROCUs relied on Regional Asset Recovery Teams and Asset Confiscation Enforcement Teams to oversee enforcement and recovery.

Enforcement of confiscation orders was seen as a lengthy and time-consuming process, leading to some concerns raised amongst POCA agencies, particularly when large sums were involved and victims were waiting for compensation.

Stakeholders reported that enforcing forfeiture orders was generally straightforward. Civil recovery orders, on the other hand, were seen as more complicated and time consuming.

Conviction-based asset recovery

Most POCA agencies reported minimal involvement in the enforcement process beyond asking HMCTS/CPS to enforce the order. Agencies’ involvement at this stage was generally limited to reviewing the cases and possibly looking into getting a production order and asking HMCTS for a full review if they notice any suspicious activity on the defendant’s accounts. Agencies such as the SFO, that do play a role in enforcement, explained they would request a confiscation hearing where the judge orders the defendant to pay back the profit gained from criminal activity within a set amount of time.

Strictly, speaking it’s HMCTS that collects the order, but we are still the lead enforcement agency. So as our cases are so complex we are, very much, the ones running round, trying to identify assets, trying to recover those assets. And it’s only when we can add no further value to the order that we remit the case back to HMCTS. So, if we have done everything we can, we can’t find any further assets to enforce against rather than it just sitting on our books and us occasionally going to the Magistrates’ Court to ask for a Means form [Means Enquiry Form/Statement of Means (MC100)(HMCTS, 2013)] it goes back to the courts at that stage.”

Law enforcement stakeholder

The enforcement of confiscation orders was seen as a lengthy and often time-consuming process. This challenge was highlighted by stakeholders from a large law enforcement agency, who mentioned an example where it took 5 years to recover a payment from a confiscation order. The case required continuous effort over several years to ensure the order was paid. Similar challenges were mentioned by some prosecution stakeholders, primarily regarding the limited control POCA agencies have over assets. For instance, a defendant can refuse to sell their house, making it difficult to realise the asset.

Some local forces/ ROCUs relied on regional asset recovery teams (RARTs) and asset confiscation enforcement (ACE) teams to oversee enforcement and recovery. Reliance on ACE teams differed between ROCUs; while some indicated that all enforcement sits with the ACE teams, others suggested they tended to use them in a more ad hoc manner – for instance, to value and establish authenticity of high-value assets, rather than for all enforcement.

A ROCU also highlighted that the investigation continued in the enforcement stage. This was especially in regard to identifying (more) assets to meet the confiscation order:

“The investigation doesn’t stop until that benefit figure we talked about on that confiscation order is paid, the ACE team will be investigating, looking for assets.”

Police stakeholder

Stakeholders reported appointing enforcement receivers in some instances or making compliance orders^{[footnote 2]}. Views on the use of receivers in practice were mixed. Some stakeholders reported that they had experienced enforcement receivers downplaying the value of assets. This then necessitated the appointment of an independent valuer, which further added to costs.

A default sentence was seen as a last resort. There was a clear sense that agencies prioritised realising assets over additional time in custody. A defendant would only be sent to prison if all efforts to realise their assets had been made. POCA agencies strongly felt that the chances of enforcement post default sentence were much diminished, as their ‘sharpest tool’ (POCA) had already been used.

“They’ll always be afforded an opportunity for either the system to do its work and get the assets exchanged and sold and what have you, or for the defendant to comply with it himself. However, for the defendants who won’t comply with the system, it is there as a stick to finally beat them with and say, ‘Well, okay, you know, you’re getting sent to prison now.’ But as I said, the biggest frustration is if they’ve come out of prison and they know you’ve used the sharpest tool in the box, that you’re struggling then to get them.”

Prosecution and enforcement stakeholder

The range of enforcement powers that HMCTS have includes powers used by HMCTS post default sentence were mainly attachment of earnings orders, deduction from benefit orders or a Warrant of Control. Both attachment of earnings orders and deduction from benefit orders are court issued orders that dictate a specific sum of money is taken from the defendant’s salary or benefits to pay off the confiscation order (see ‘Magistrates’ court fines: how they work and how to deal with them’). A Warrant of Control authorises a County Court Bailiff to try and take control of the defendant’s possessions to encourage them to pay off the confiscation order (see ‘Court action: County Court bailiffs’).

Non-conviction-based asset recovery

Stakeholders reported few barriers to enforcing forfeiture orders. Although insight from the stakeholder interviews was limited, there was a sense that compared with criminal confiscation proceedings, enforcement in forfeiture cases was generally straightforward. This was especially in relation to cash, as the bank or building society will have already transferred the money away from the account as a result of the forfeiture order. Listed assets would also already have been seized as part of the asset freezing/recovery stage and therefore would be easy to enforce.

Civil recovery orders, on the other hand, were seen as more complicated and time consuming. The asset can be an active business, such as a company or a hotel that needs to be managed and maintained until the asset is sold. Maintaining the business to keep the value of the asset for recovery, as well as getting a business valued, were seen as challenging and time and resource intensive.

“Civil recovery is more complicated in that basically, you’re forfeiting what is effectively an asset by that time, meaning it could be a business. So, it could be a hotel and then it would be for the NCA to appoint trustees to basically maintain that asset until such time as the business is sold off and it ultimately results in a recovery. So, there is a huge, complication as you can imagine, area of dealing with the recovery of assets for part 5 investigations and part 6 yes. It’s very simple for confiscation but for civil recovery it can be bricks and mortar and okay, it might be easy to value a house, but we’ve done a hotel before, which was an [on]going concern. So, trying to attribute a value to that and then realising it is hugely challenging and it’s far from simple.”

Law enforcement stakeholder

2.5 How, when and why non-POCA powers are used

Key findings

Some examples of using non-POCA powers were reported. Overall, there was a clear preference for using POCA powers in asset recovery and denial.

The use of non-POCA powers differed by agency.

Some examples of using non-POCA powers were reported. Findings from interviews suggest that most of the non-POCA powers were used by local and regional police. However, the usage of non-POCA powers for asset recovery and denial was seen as rare by those taking part in the research.

Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE): Police stakeholders mentioned using PACE; however, this was used more to seize assets to provide evidence for a criminal investigation (NCA and NECC, 2021).

The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (MDA) could be used for the recovery of assets related to drug offences.

“Essentially if someone gets convicted of a drugs offence where the size of the offence is quite small or they clearly don’t have any assets that would warrant any, formal POCA confiscation investigation, which is quite a long, drawn-out investigation. But they do have a few hundred quid on them, for example. We might ask the court to forfeit the money under the Misuse of Drugs Act. So, effectively, we would still get the money back but we’re not using POCA powers.”

Police stakeholder

Local authority powers: Stakeholders within local authorities mentioned the occasional use of other civil powers, such as forfeiture under the Trades Marks Act 1994 in instances of intercepting counterfeit foods, or cash seizures under PACE. However, the view was that, when carrying out asset recovery, POCA powers were the most used tool.

Historic asset recovery tools, such as the Drug Trafficking Act 1994 (DTA 1994) and Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA 2003), Section 143 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, were mentioned by stakeholders as non-POCA powers that were also available to them. Historic confiscation orders that were made under the DTA may still be enforced by agencies, but stakeholders highlighted that POCA powers have now largely replaced the use of orders under the DTA; for example, CPS stakeholders reported using the Criminal Justice Act (CJA 2003) for cases pre-dating POCA, although the frequency of using this was minimal.

“Other than if it’s a really old case then we’d use the Criminal Justice Act or the Drug Trafficking Act. We still do have some pre-POCA cases, they go on that long […] you can have some really long scale frauds like the offence has just been going on for so long. So, I had an identity theft case that was a recent one but because they’d been doing it for so long, it was pre-POCA. But I mean, it’s very few and far between.”

Prosecution and enforcement stakeholder

CJA 2003 Section 2 was mentioned by law enforcement stakeholders to support an ongoing confiscation investigation. Section 2 is equivalent to Part 8 POCA powers, but it does not require them to go through court to get an order. They can then use the acquired material to support an ongoing confiscation investigation. This was seen as a significant advantage over POCA, as court delays were mentioned as one of the key barriers to usage and performance.

“Under The Criminal Justice Act Section 2, my director will do that. I don’t have to go to court. So, he will sign that off, but it does exactly the same thing [requiring individuals and businesses to produce documents and information related to suspected financial wrongdoing]. What will happen then is, if the criminal case team, who use that Section 2 power, if they get banking material that, actually, I can also use for my confiscation investigation, because we’re not going to ask for it twice.”

Law enforcement stakeholder

Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPA): A large law enforcement agency also reported that DPAs were used by criminal case teams in the instance of self-referrals, such as a company that admits wrongdoing but does not want to face prosecution. These cases were handled by separate teams, and if DPA were used, then it would not be considered as proceeds of crime.

Specialist powers of some POCA agencies: Some agencies have specialist powers that can be used for asset recovery purposes. For example, the FCA can use non-POCA powers under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2002 (FMSA), and HMRC can use other civil recovery powers, like insolvency powers under the Insolvency Act 1886, tax powers, and Code of Practice 9 (COP9) powers (HMRC, 2023c).

Small-medium sized law enforcement agencies mostly reported that they did not use any non-POCA powers for asset recovery. In some instances, stakeholders highlighted working with debt recovery teams; however, these teams do not have any specific recovery powers.

Overall, there was a clear preference for using POCA powers in asset recovery and denial. FIs tended to prefer POCA over non-POCA powers as they are seen as more efficient, especially with a lack of FI resource, and due to them being ‘embedded’ within the asset recovery process.

For most stakeholders, the decision-making process behind using POCA or non-POCA powers was based on effectiveness and lawfulness. If the intention was to seize and remove assets, POCA powers were seen as more effective for asset denial and recovery. Non-POCA powers would typically be employed when POCA powers were impractical due to the amount of work involved relative to the volume of cash. Police stakeholders noted it was often decided on a case-by-case basis as to which powers were most appropriate; for example, POCA powers would be used where there was a risk of the dissipation of cash, and non-POCA powers were preferred for one-off uses of powers to forfeit the asset. Interviewees explained that smaller amounts (such as £1,500) were generally viewed as suitable to be seized under PACE or MDA, whereas substantial amounts, such as thousands of pounds, would be viewed as suitable for a POCA seizure. This was also linked to the court costs associated with POCA. Similarly, stakeholders mentioned using POCA in high-interest cases, such as when dealing with serious organised crime or profile individuals well known to the agency for their criminality.

2.6 How, when and why POCA agencies prioritise cases for asset recovery

Key findings

Not all agencies actively prioritised asset denial and recovery cases. Less specialist agencies, such as local forces, reported working through cases on a ‘first come, first served’ basis.

The following factors were said to be taken into account across agencies, when prioritising cases: the value of the assets, the practicality of recovering the assets, the potential for disruption and/or deterrent effects – which could lead to a decision to confiscate assets even in cases with relatively low-value assets, the profile of the person benefitting from crime (for example, confiscation powers were more likely to be used against high-profile ‘career criminals’ with a senior role in organised crime groups), the impact of confiscation on public perceptions, trust and confidence (for example the benefits of seeing assets confiscated from criminals), defendant vulnerability (which could make it less likely that a case was prioritised for asset recovery), and the potential to secure victim compensation.

Not all agencies could prioritise asset denial and recovery cases over other work and priorities. More ‘generalist’ agencies, such as local police forces or local authorities, tended to have less of an opportunity to prioritise cases, instead proceeding with cases as and when they came in. By contrast, ROCUs and large law enforcement agencies reported prioritisation processes by type of crime.

Despite this, across most agencies there was a consensus that several key factors came into play when prioritising cases, including the following.

Value of assets

The higher the value of the assets, the more likely POCA powers will be used. One of the most common factors when it came to prioritising cases was the value of available assets. This was a factor for multiple agencies. Police forces in particular explained that they assess the value of available assets to see whether the use of POCA powers is justified.

Recoverability of assets was taken into consideration. While respondents explained they focus on high-value cases over other cases, stakeholders also emphasised the importance of there being a strong likelihood of being able to recover the assets successfully.

Within high-value cases, prioritisation was informed by an assessment of risk of dissipation. ROCU stakeholders also reported that the risk of dissipation also played a role in prioritisation. Describing how they are usually faced with organised crime groups with high-value assets, forces will work quickly to prioritise cases if they suspect that offenders will hide, move or spend assets soon.

Disruption of criminal activity

Some stakeholders explained they prioritised cases where the potential for disruption of criminal activity was the highest. This was the case for multiple agencies.

In line with the remit of their work, ROCUs and large law enforcement agencies tended to focus their time on disrupting more serious, organised criminal activity, often prioritising cases where there was evidence of serious offending.

To achieve disruption and harm reduction, cases might be prioritised even if the overall value of assets was not very high. ROCUs and large law enforcement agencies explained that they sometimes pursue cases that are not necessarily ‘asset rich’, but the use of POCA could lead to the disruption of serious criminal activity. Other POCA agencies, due to the nature of their work, considered factors such as harm to the environment, risk to human health or impact on the economy. This involved, for example, prioritising cases involving hazardous waste or illegal practices that pose significant risks.

Deterring future criminal activity

The potential for asset recovery to have a deterrent effect was considered. A few stakeholders prioritised individuals of significant public interest. They argued that the media interest linked with these cases meant that this would act as a deterrent for others considering committing similar crime types.

Deterrence could be a consideration even in relatively low-value cases. For example, if the police encounter high-profile offenders who perhaps may not currently be profiting from their criminal activity, they will take opportunities to show that they will pursue them and chase down any future assets.

“There is also the offender management consideration in terms of understanding, even if they do not have any assets… to send the right signals out, the fact that we are taking POCA seriously and we will pursue you for POCA. Even if you don’t have any assets at the moment, we will leave the door open. If you come into assets in the future, then we will take them from you.”

Police stakeholder

Offender profile and seniority

Stakeholders also discussed the importance of prioritising cases that involve high-profile criminals who are associated with large crime groups, are long-time offenders, and those perceived to have chosen to become ‘lifestyle’ criminals (compared to lower-level offenders who, for example, deal drugs to support their own addiction). This sentiment was particularly shared by ROCUs who discussed that, if presented with a case involving a large amount of people, they will prioritise people with high-level involvement in organised crime groups, compared to people who have low-lying involvement.

“So, the priority will be those who tick the boxes for being serious and organised, will come higher on that priority… You know, street dealers are generally dealing because they’re just supporting their own habits… Whereas, actually, I would focus on the ones who have made a conscious decision to become lifestyle criminals.”

Police stakeholder

Impacts on defendants, and their vulnerability, were also taken into consideration. This related to whether confiscation was proportionate and justified. Small-medium law enforcement agencies mentioned using a ‘merit test’ before applying for a confiscation order to ensure that removing the asset or assets in question would not make a person (more) vulnerable. An example of a case mentioned where the decision was made not to go for a confiscation order despite meeting the legal requirements was where the individual in question had a terminal illness and removing their only asset – their house – would have left them homeless^{[footnote 3]}.

“We’re mindful of […] the impact on the suspect if they’re restrained. It really has a massive impact on their life, so we’re very conscious of that and the potential case outcome. So, lots of enquiries then are made to determine the position and before we make a decision on restraint, whether there’s a risk of dissipation, the proportionality of obtaining a restraint order, what’s the benefit level that we’re looking at, what sort of assets, is it proportionate to do an all assets restraint order.”

Law enforcement stakeholder

Impacts on public trust

Prioritising cases with high-profile offenders, for most agencies, was often tied closely to public perception. Stakeholders from police forces and a large law enforcement agency, for example, discussed the importance of recovering assets from well-known individuals, not only to act as a deterrent to other criminals, but also to build public trust and show that public sector funds are being used to pursue those criminals benefitting from crime.

Compensating victims and recognising the level of harm

The potential for victim compensation makes cases a higher priority for asset confiscation. For instance, some agencies prioritised cases where there was more opportunity for victims to be compensated, compared to cases where there were no direct victims involved.

“Victim compensation is probably the next one [used to prioritise cases]. If there is compensation available there, then we will [go down the confiscation route]. Victim compensation matters.”

Police stakeholder

Cases in which there had been high levels of harm from criminal activity may be prioritised for asset recovery. Some ROCUs and a law enforcement agency used the Management of Risk in Law Enforcement (MoRiLE) scoring system. Other agencies, while not always using a formal scoring system, considered whether any harm had occurred to victims. This is not always just in relation to victim compensation but wider considerations. For example, a police stakeholder explained that cases will be prioritised if there are vulnerable or multiple victims involved.

“The harm to the victim is always there, if there are victims… we will prioritise those because obviously, putting victims first is first and foremost what we’re here to do.”

Police stakeholder

Capacity

Resources and capacity were taken into account in prioritisation decisions. For most agencies, resourcing alone was not an explicit reason for prioritisation but was taken into consideration when thinking about the other factors covered above.

Delays and timing

Removing/recovering assets from criminals and compensating victims were key objectives, regardless of how long the process may take. While the lengthy timings and ongoing court delays had some impact on agencies’ decision-making about which POCA powers to choose, the impact on whether they go down the asset recovery route and prioritisation seemed to be minimal. Many agencies reported using POCA powers as a default whenever the legal thresholds were met and there was sufficient FI availability to pursue the case.

3. Measuring performance in the asset denial and recovery system

This chapter addresses research questions 7 and 8:

7. How is performance in asset recovery defined and measured by POCA agencies?

8. How could the measurement of performance in asset denial and recovery could be improved?

3.1 How performance in asset recovery is defined and measured by POCA agencies

Key findings

Most agencies measured performance by the value and volume of proceeds of crime restrained, seized, frozen and subsequently recovered through criminal confiscations, civil forfeitures and civil recovery powers. This is in line with reporting requirements for the Joint Asset Recovery Database (JARD). Stakeholders across all agencies, however, acknowledged that measuring only by value and volume was a limited measure of performance.

Some agencies used the level of disruption caused as an indicator of performance; others looked at the numbers of orders rejected by the CPS or the courts.

Some police stakeholders suggested that Asset Recovery Incentivisation Scheme (ARIS) payments are a performance measurement tool, with higher value receipts indicating good performance.

The following were mentioned by stakeholders as indicators of asset recovery performance.

Numbers of orders and value of assets recovered

Stakeholders, particularly local police forces, said that performance should primarily be measured by the number of confiscation orders, forfeitures and so on, that are obtained and the value of assets that agencies recovered. This seemed to be linked to the fact that most POCA agencies made use of data from the ARIS and the JARD as the main way to measure POCA performance.

Data from the JARD remained the main way for agencies to measure POCA performance. This was not only the case for police, but across all agencies involved in the asset recovery process.

Level of disruption of criminal activity

The extent to which asset recovery resulted in the disruption of criminal activity, and taking profit away from criminals, was used as a measure of performance. This reflects the consensus amongst stakeholders that the overall purpose of POCA powers was aligned with the objectives in the Home Office (2019) Asset Recovery Action Plan (ARAP), namely that the aim of POCA is to use the powers to remove the financial incentive of crime to disrupt and prevent further criminal activity.

“It’s basically just impact on crime, that impact on crime can be done in a number of ways. That can be actually disrupting the criminal network, or it could be taking a load of money and therefore taking the profit off of a criminal. Because if we get really good at taking profits off criminals, or taking the money they make away from them, it makes the crime less attractive.”

Police stakeholder

Disruptions due to asset confiscation were recorded on the Agency and Partner Management Information System (APMIS) by a few agencies. AMPIS is a national database that stores records of serious and organised crime threat assessments and disruption activity (HMICFRS, 2023). Some police forces and a large law enforcement agency reported recording confiscations and civil recoveries as ‘disruptions’ on APMIS, in addition to JARD. Levels of disruption were reportedly moderated by a team within the agency who analysed assessments across the whole of law enforcement to ensure that there was a consistent standard throughout.

“Within the performance management of the agency as a whole, [we measure] within the disruptions which are major, moderate and minor. And that’s around the level of disruption caused. So, for a major disruption you’d expect an organised crime group to be put out of business effectively. Moderate would be substantially damaged. And minor would be inconvenienced. So, as well as looking at the actual values and number of orders, we’re also looking at the disruption effect of it.”

Law enforcement stakeholder

Numbers of orders rejected by the CPS or the courts

Having orders thrown out or dismissed by the CPS or the courts, because they did not meet the legal thresholds, was a measure of (poor) performance. Using POCA powers to obtain orders that are ‘unrealistic’ was seen as bad practice.

“There’s no point in getting a confiscation order unless you’re actually going to get the confiscation order and it gets paid, so it’s being realistic… there was an ethos many years ago which was, get the biggest benefit against an individual because that’s kudos, I’ve got the biggest benefit and everything else and I’ve got the biggest order. If it doesn’t get paid, what’s the point?”

Law enforcement stakeholder

ARIS payments

Some police stakeholders suggested ARIS payments are also used as a performance measurement tool, with higher value receipts indicating good performance. However, some stakeholders felt this measure was reductive, not capturing the full benefits of the use of POCA.

Other forms of measurement

Although the value and volume of assets were by far the most common way of measuring performance, a few agencies mentioned using additional forms of measurements.

Quill was used by at least one medium-small law enforcement agency to measure POCA performance. Quill is legal case management software used by financial investigators. It keeps and stores data (separate to the software used by the criminal investigations team) which is used for debt management. It includes information about when and what orders have been made, and what money has been recovered.

Some prosecution stakeholders used internal measures that were not based on asset value, such as quality assessments. This involved the assessment of cases (selected at random) by several lawyers to ensure that the case was progressing as expected, and that the expected outcomes were being achieved. This was seen as an effective way of ensuring good performance across the organisation. Similarly, for ROCUs and larger police forces in particular, good performance was linked to assessing past performance through honest reflections on previous cases, taking opportunities to hold thorough debriefs where teams can identify areas where more innovative approaches could have been taken, or where cases could have been dealt with more efficiently.

3.2 How the measurement of performance in asset denial and recovery could be improved

Key findings

Suggestions for improving POCA performance measures included improving the accessibility and usability of JARD, as well as adding additional metrics – for example, to assess the number of victims helped or record the amount of money returned to victims.

Stakeholders routinely mentioned the difficulties of measuring POCA performance only through the volume of assets recovered. These difficulties included: one-off large cases skew overall annual performance; asset value might not reflect case complexity; and the length of time (sometimes years) between imposing an order and asset recovery meant that efforts are not reflected in annual performance results.

“… in the monthly returns… I can see how many new investigations we’ve started, how many orders we’ve requested, how many confiscations have been successful at court… this … we’ve recovered £100,000. That could have been from a case from 3, 4 years ago.”

Police stakeholder

Stakeholders made a few suggestions for improving POCA performance measures.

Improving accessibility and usability of JARD

Stakeholders routinely felt that JARD could be improved. Areas for improvement included making JARD more user friendly, increasing compatibility between JARD and other case management systems, and widening access to JARD databases in specialist units. One of the main issues highlighted was the high level of manual data entry when using JARD, which was an administrative burden and was associated with a risk of human error and data inaccuracies. Stakeholders involved in prosecution and enforcement of assets said that their performance was negatively impacted by a lack of consistency of databases, meaning that they often had to search multiple places or access different independent systems to gather all relevant information. It was thought that improvements could help boost the use of JARD within POCA agencies and reduce the quality issues that undermine the use of JARD to measure performance. A new system to replace JARD, Asset Recovery IT (ARIT), started development after the interviews for this research were conducted.

“Best practice would be receiving orders with as much information upfront from the prosecution, as many assets identified as possible. Good intelligence using Government databases, HMRC, DWP, access to those databases that we haven’t got that we find frustrating.”

Prosecution / Enforcement stakeholder

Adding metrics linked to victim compensation and victim outcomes

While JARD does allow agencies to record compensation through confiscation, it does not report on the total number of victims compensated. Interview data suggest that not all stakeholders were aware of metrics linked to victim compensation or victim ‘outcomes’. They discussed that for agencies who deal with large amounts of fraud and money laundering, victim-focused would be a particular benefit. This would capture the value of money recovered for victims and the number of victims assisted. This again highlighted the perception that helping victims and securing compensation was evocative of good asset recovery performance.

“One of the things that would help would be to have a greater assessment of the monies that we don’t necessarily recover but we might return to victims… Because that falls out of scope sometimes. How many victims have we helped? How much money have we recovered for victims? That’s particularly for fraud and money laundering. […] The challenge is sometimes identifying those victims. That would be the only metric that I think perhaps there could be more on that. There might be for all I know, but I’ve certainly not come across it.”

Law enforcement stakeholder

4. Good practice and drivers of asset recovery performance

This chapter presents findings in relation to research question 9. What is considered good practice and what facilitates good performance in POCA? It looks at what stakeholders consider to be facilitators and drivers of good practices in POCA, as well as how this is being shared. Some examples of approaches taken by POCA agencies to work effectively are included.

4.1 Good practices - drivers of performance

Key findings

Stakeholders considered the following to be facilitators and drivers of good practices in POCA:

• clear ownership and continuity of case management, including the early and continued involvement of FIs, proactively looking for POCA opportunities and having a clear strategy in place at the start of each investigation
• collaboration and communication between and within POCA agencies
• awareness of POCA powers and asset recovery across different teams within an agency – including among frontline staff
• focusing, where possible, on compensation for victims and investing recovered assets in the community
• the ability to use POCA powers in innovative ways to locate and seize assets
• resource, capacity and specialist knowledge – particularly FIs having the right levels of training, knowledge and capacity; there was high demand for FIs, and challenges with recruitment and retaining FIs
• sensitivity to the vulnerabilities of the people from whom assets might be recovered

It was not easy for stakeholders to define what best practice in asset recovery looked like for their agency. For many, best practice was simply ‘doing their job well’. Stakeholders frequently talked about the importance of having the right systems in place, following the standard operating procedures and guidance, complying with the legislation, obtaining and maintaining accreditations (as per the NCA requirements) and exercising the powers in a legal, fair and successful manner.

The following features were mentioned by stakeholders as being best practice or facilitating good performance.

Clear ownership and continuity of case management

It was considered good practice for there to be clear ownership of POCA cases. Ownership and continuity were defined by stakeholders as individual officers and FIs having clear roles and responsibilities for assigned cases and being invested in the case’s outcome. Having a clear asset recovery strategy, setting out those roles and responsibilities, was also important.

“Number one is ownership. Have you got an officer and a manager who really own that case and are invested in it and are pursuing all the avenues of investigation and driving the case forward. For me, that is absolutely the key thing. So, that means you’ve got to have well-trained, enthusiastic, engaged, investigators who are driving the cases forward.”

Law enforcement stakeholder

Early and continued involvement of FIs was considered good practice. Stakeholders working across the asset recovery process called for FIs to be brought in as soon as possible in the asset denial and recovery process. Early involvement was seen as key to ensure that POCA was being considered from the start, to ensure continuity and to give FIs the opportunity to feed into the (criminal) investigation at an early stage.

“I think that, from a very early stage of any investigation, … to have a Financial Investigator put into that investigation at the very beginning and to identify assets at the beginning and to consider use of all the powers that are available to them throughout that investigation, from the start, right through to conviction and … to asset enforcement.”

Police stakeholder

Proactively looking for POCA opportunities was considered good practice. For most agencies, good practice required taking a proactive rather than a reactive approach. This often relied on the involvement of an experienced FI as early as possible to disrupt activity. Some ROCUs felt that when FIs had capacity, experience and training, they were more likely to proactively seek out and get involved in relevant cases, rather than waiting for cases to be handed to them. An example of this was proactively looking for SARs.

“I think we’re quite proactive around looking for opportunities to use POCA. And especially with the civil powers and looking at SARs proactively to try to identify opportunities. Looking at people around the periphery of some of the criminal investigations to look who’s ripe for it. That’s purely because our remit is to be a proactive unit, where we can, to a great degree, decide what we do with our time. So, we have that luxury, and it pays off.”

Local authority stakeholder

Stakeholders, especially from prosecution agencies, instead mentioned the importance of having a strategy in place from the start of each investigation. This enables ownership, as it can ensure that individuals and agencies involved in the asset recovery process have a shared end goal.

“In terms of what underlines all of our approach to this is we have a strategy throughout, an asset recovery strategy. We have a strategy document and we’re always thinking about, ‘Well what’s the end result? What are we going to get out of this?’”

Prosecution and enforcement stakeholder

Collaboration and communication between and within agencies

Good intra-agency collaboration and communication was seen as key to achieving the best possible asset recovery outcome. For example, between frontline staff, different teams (for example, civil and criminal teams, enforcement teams) and in-house lawyers. This was raised specifically in relation to integrating specialist economic crime units within frontline teams, embedding FIs into divisions, and encouraging the development of good inter-team relationships that can lead to opportunities to upskill frontline officers on POCA. Some interviewees mentioned the Roskill Model (SFO, 2016) as good practice. This is used by the SFO, where investigators and prosecutors work together in multidisciplinary case teams.

For prosecution and enforcement agencies in particular, good performance depended on having good inter-agency working with other POCA agencies. Good communication with the CPS Proceeds of Crime team was seen as particularly important. Interview data suggest that a good level of collaboration could also be found between CPS and ROCUs, making the asset denial and recovery process overall more efficient and less time consuming for these agencies.

“I think what works really well is that this is a very small community. So, although we’re all dispersed across different agencies we really work closely together. And the co-operation levels are generally very high.”

Prosecution and enforcement stakeholder

“We’re lucky, we have allocated lawyers from the CPS Proceeds of Crime Division. So, we, at a very early stage, can engage with them and if we do that, things tend to go really well. If you’re on district, you probably don’t have the same access to specialist POCA lawyers. And then we find that they don’t really understand POCA, and they [other forces] don’t use it as effectively. So good practice looks like that [engaging with CPS].”

Police stakeholder

Stakeholders mentioned regular communication and coordination meetings. These provided the opportunity for agencies to come together to review cases and ensure they were being handled in the best way possible, to increase and uphold good communication. A specific example of best practice was said to be regular tasking and coordination meetings where investigators and lawyers on a case would come together every month or so to discuss their caseloads and prioritise resources.

“The way in which we prioritise them is, we have monthly tasking and coordination meetings where the case controllers, such as myself and the rest of the senior investigators and senior lawyers, all come together once a month, I chair the meeting, and we discuss our cases. We look at what tasks are coming up, what resource priorities are, new cases that are in the pipeline where we’ll need to resource those, etc. We will set our priorities during that period as it were, and that’s done once a month.”

Law enforcement stakeholder

Agency-wide knowledge of POCA powers

For some agencies, good performance involved awareness of POCA powers and asset recovery across different teams within their organisation, as well as some prioritisation of asset recovery across departments. For frontline officers, knowing who to refer to was seen as key to ensuring that all cases can be assessed for their asset recovery potential, and fewer opportunities are missed.

“[For] me as long as they [frontline police] know where to refer it to. As long as they know the pathway and there is something that can be done about that guy on the street who’s stuck an extension on his house but doesn’t work and that sort of thing, then yes, that’s what [drives performance].”

Police stakeholder

Compensation for victims and investing recovered assets in the community

Stakeholders mentioned giving back to individual victims and the wider community was best practice. This was particularly in cases of fraud where there was a direct and identifiable victim of crime.

A few forces, as well as other law enforcement agencies and some local authorities, mentioned the use of ARIS as good practice. This allowed the investment of assets recovered to benefit the wider community. Views about ARIS tended to focus on the ability to give back to the wider community, although one local authority mentioned using the scheme to sustain their self-funded asset recovery team.

Example of good practice:

A local authority used ARIS to fund CCTV, to support local food banks, and to set-up neighbourhood watch schemes. Using the assets taken from criminal activity and reinvesting them back into the local community was seen both as a key driver to performance, and an example of best practice.

“We’ve done a lot of reinvestment of POCA into the community … It’s just putting those ill-gotten gains back into the community and trying to get benefit for the community as well.”

Law enforcement stakeholder

Innovation in approaches to locating and seizing assets

An agency’s ability to use POCA powers in innovative ways to locate and seize assets was seen as key for good asset recovery performance. Stakeholders from multiple agencies discussed the threat from new, more nuanced economic crime types, which require equally new and creative ways of combatting them. This led some agencies to define good performance as being adaptable and being able to establish new ways of using POCA powers to combat more crimes.

“It’s very easy to see and to use POCA powers as a tick box, formulaic and linear process because it’s defendable. Whereas, to do it well requires a lot of lateral thinking and a lot of innovative thinking. So, to do it poorly is very easy and it’s defendable, whereas to do it well is actually really hard.”

Police stakeholder

Example of good practice:

A large law enforcement agency gave the example of perceived innovative use of POCA. They were working to recover over £2 million by using Part 5 powers to prevent dissipation of funds and return them to defrauded charitable organisations.

“So, a really good success for us would be, I can think of one case right now where we’re looking to recover £2.3 million but we’re not looking to recover that through forfeiture. We’ve managed to utilise, innovatively, Part 5 powers to basically prevent the dissipation of those funds while we investigate it, and we have been able to, through settlement, recover the money back to two charitable organisations that were defrauded.”

Law enforcement stakeholder

Resource, capacity and specialist knowledge

FIs having the right levels of training, knowledge and capacity was seen as crucial to asset recovery performance and best practice. Stakeholders noted that the number of FIs available to work on cases directly influenced performance. Furthermore, newly trained FIs may not yet have the accreditation to use the full spectrum of POCA powers. This was frequently seen as further limiting an agency’s ability to optimise their asset recovery performance. POCA agencies within law enforcement reported that while their officers could technically use POCA powers, often an internal policy decision was made to restrict the use of POCA powers to FIs only to ensure the correct and proportionate use of POCA.

“We need to train people properly, ready to give police forces the resources, and the time, to investigate it.”

Police stakeholder

There was a sense the demand for FIs and confiscators continued to outstrip supply, and challenges with recruitment and retaining of FIs remained. A lack of confiscators was flagged as a challenge in both confiscation and civil recovery cases. Stakeholders from large law enforcement agencies and ROCUs mentioned that criminals were increasingly using cryptocurrency assets to attempt to avoid asset recovery under POCA. This resulted in more complex cases that required additional resources and specialist knowledge. A pressure on the supply of FIs was due to pay discrepancies between public and private sector pay.

“I think financial investigators are quite sought after and that’s not just by public agencies, by private agencies as well. So, I think there’s often a recruitment and retention issue and I think if we could recruit more and then retain them longer, I think that would help a lot with increasing that knowledge base across the organisation.”

Law enforcement stakeholder

Example of good practice:

A police stakeholder mentioned they had introduced an FI-specific career pathway where officers join the force as investigators and are then provided with the relevant training and experience in-house to allow them to progress to financial intelligence officer (FIO), then to financial investigator (FI) and ultimately to confiscator. Besides having a clear development pathway, FIs renumeration goes up with increased seniority. This has allowed them to retain FIs.

“The other good practice, what we’ve introduced, is a progressive scale […] And that career pathway, we think, is good practice. And you don’t get that everywhere. But it seems to work pretty well for us.”

Police stakeholder

Taking offender vulnerability into account

For multiple stakeholders, good performance in POCA included sensitivity to the vulnerabilities of the people they encounter and pursue. Across some agencies, it was mentioned that using POCA powers to pursue ‘vulnerable’ individuals would be considered bad performance. The definition of vulnerability varied across agencies, given their differing lines of work. For example, for local police forces, vulnerability considerations tended to be centred around individuals involved in county lines or modern-day slavery. As such, good performance for them would involve trying to take into consideration the fairness, and perhaps the moral implications, of pursuing certain individuals for POCA.

“We have really been thinking about the necessity to do confiscation on people. And I suppose putting a little bit of a moral compass on it as well. I know they say that maybe you shouldn’t but, you know, if we’ve got an 18/19-year-old person who has clearly got involved in county lines and doesn’t have any assets whatsoever, or, you know, they’re not the runner of the line… Is it right and proper to put a debt on them for the rest of their life to the value of the drugs when you think they’re not really the main player here?”

Police stakeholder

Mechanisms for sharing best practice

Informal internal sharing was the most common mechanism. Most agencies mentioned that best practice was primarily shared within their own teams/agency. Examples mentioned included team meetings, internal masterclasses/workshops or debrief sessions.

While less frequent, there were also several examples of sharing best practice with other agencies. This tended to be done informally through existing personal relationships. Some took part in regular multi-agency meetings and/or practitioner groups to discuss and share best practice with a wider set of stakeholders. For instance, the National Economic Crime Centre (NECC) hosts quarterly forums for staff who use POCA powers to discuss best practice. This working group setting was seen as a good way to encourage cross-agency working and share learnings. ROCUs mentioned using their ROCU network, where the heads of the ROCUs meet monthly to discuss, share and promote best practice across the regions.

Resource constraints meant that POCA agencies did not always feel they had the additional time needed to share best practice or promote their successes. Suggestions on how to improve the sharing of best practice moving forward included having more interactive meetings, promoting a culture of sharing case studies, and developing a template for presenting them consistently and efficiently.

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Research was conducted by Ipsos. For more information on their standards and accreditation, please visit their website.

1. Section 22 of the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) of 2002 allows the prosecution to ask a court to reconsider the amount of a Confiscation Order and if necessary add to the order if new assets were identified. ↩

2. Since 1 June 2015, a court imposing a confiscation order has additional means by which it can seek to enforce that order. A compliance order is an order that the court believes is appropriate for the purpose of ensuring that the confiscation order is effective. ↩

3. Note that this is in line with the intended use of POCA powers. See Section 41 POCA in relation to Restraint orders: “A restraint order may be made subject to exceptions, and an exception may in particular— (a)make provision for reasonable living expenses and reasonable legal expenses;” ↩